* [RFC v4 10/11] snet: introduce snet_stats
From: y @ 2011-05-05 13:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, jamal, Patrick McHardy,
Grzegorz Nosek, Samir Bellabes
In-Reply-To: <1304603961-2517-1-git-send-email-y>
From: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
this patch adds a /proc/snet/snet_stats entry to show statistics about
snet. this patch adds also the functions to manage the statistics.
Signed-off-by: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
---
security/snet/snet_stats.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/snet/snet_stats.h | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_stats.c
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_stats.h
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_stats.c b/security/snet/snet_stats.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b946dda
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_stats.c
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
+#include "snet_stats.h"
+#include "snet_utils.h"
+
+extern struct net init_net;
+
+#define SNET_STATS_PROC_DIR "snet"
+#define SNET_STATS_PROC_INFO "snet_stats"
+
+static struct proc_dir_entry *snet_stats_dir;
+static struct proc_dir_entry *snet_stats_pde;
+struct snet_statistics snet_stats;
+
+static int snet_stats_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
+{
+ unsigned int sys = 0;
+ seq_printf(m, "snet statistics\n");
+
+ for (sys = SNET_SOCKET_CREATE; sys < SNET_NR_SOCKET_TYPES; sys++) {
+ unsigned int v = 0;
+ seq_printf(m, "%s {", snet_syscall_name(sys));
+
+ seq_printf(m, " Exec: %u ", SNET_STATS_GET(SNET_STATS_EXEC, sys));
+ seq_printf(m, " Unreg: %u ", SNET_STATS_GET(SNET_STATS_UNREG, sys));
+ for (v = SNET_VERDICT_GRANT; v < SNET_NR_VERDICT_TYPES; v++) {
+ seq_printf(m, " %s: %u ", snet_verdict_name(v),
+ SNET_STATS_GET(v, sys));
+ }
+ seq_printf(m, " Reg Error: %u ", SNET_STATS_GET(SNET_STATS_REG_ERROR, sys));
+ seq_printf(m, "}\n");
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int snet_stats_proc_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return single_open(file, snet_stats_show, NULL);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations snet_stats_proc_fops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .open = snet_stats_proc_open,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .release = single_release,
+};
+
+void snet_stats_init(void)
+{
+ snet_stats_dir = proc_mkdir(SNET_STATS_PROC_DIR, init_net.proc_net);
+ if (snet_stats_dir == NULL) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "snet: can't create /proc/%s\n",
+ SNET_STATS_PROC_DIR);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ snet_stats_pde = proc_create(SNET_STATS_PROC_INFO, 0644, snet_stats_dir,
+ &snet_stats_proc_fops);
+out:
+ return;
+}
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_stats.h b/security/snet/snet_stats.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..05ab06d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_stats.h
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+#ifndef _SNET_STATS_H
+#define _SNET_STATS_H
+
+#include <linux/snet.h>
+
+enum {
+ SNET_STATS_REG_GRANT = 0,
+ SNET_STATS_REG_DENY,
+ SNET_STATS_REG_PENDING,
+ SNET_STATS_REG_NONE,
+ SNET_STATS_REG_INVALID,
+ SNET_STATS_REG_ERROR,
+ SNET_STATS_UNREG,
+ SNET_STATS_EXEC,
+ __SNET_STATS_MAX
+};
+
+#define SNET_STATS_MAX __SNET_STATS_MAX
+
+struct snet_statistics {
+ atomic_t mibs[SNET_NR_SOCKET_TYPES+1][SNET_STATS_MAX];
+};
+
+extern struct snet_statistics snet_stats;
+#define SNET_STATS_INC(field, syscall) (atomic_inc(&snet_stats.mibs[syscall][field]))
+#define SNET_STATS_DEC(field, syscall) (atomic_dec(&snet_stats.mibs[syscall][field]))
+#define SNET_STATS_GET(field, syscall) (atomic_read(&snet_stats.mibs[syscall][field]))
+
+void snet_stats_init(void);
+
+static inline void snet_stats_inc_reg(const enum snet_verdict verdict,
+ const enum snet_syscall syscall)
+{
+ switch (verdict) {
+ case SNET_VERDICT_GRANT:
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_REG_GRANT, syscall);
+ break;
+ case SNET_VERDICT_DENY:
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_REG_DENY, syscall);
+ break;
+ case SNET_VERDICT_PENDING:
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_REG_PENDING, syscall);
+ break;
+ case SNET_VERDICT_NONE:
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_REG_NONE, syscall);
+ break;
+ case SNET_VERDICT_INVALID:
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_REG_INVALID, syscall);
+ break;
+ default:
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_REG_ERROR, syscall);
+ break;
+ }
+ return;
+};
+
+#endif
--
1.7.4.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [RFC v4 10/11] snet: introduce snet_stats
From: y @ 2011-05-05 13:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, jamal, Patrick McHardy,
Grzegorz Nosek, Samir Bellabes
In-Reply-To: <1304603961-2517-1-git-send-email-y>
From: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
this patch adds a /proc/snet/snet_stats entry to show statistics about
snet. this patch adds also the functions to manage the statistics.
Signed-off-by: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
---
security/snet/snet_stats.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/snet/snet_stats.h | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_stats.c
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_stats.h
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_stats.c b/security/snet/snet_stats.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b946dda
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_stats.c
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
+#include "snet_stats.h"
+#include "snet_utils.h"
+
+extern struct net init_net;
+
+#define SNET_STATS_PROC_DIR "snet"
+#define SNET_STATS_PROC_INFO "snet_stats"
+
+static struct proc_dir_entry *snet_stats_dir;
+static struct proc_dir_entry *snet_stats_pde;
+struct snet_statistics snet_stats;
+
+static int snet_stats_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
+{
+ unsigned int sys = 0;
+ seq_printf(m, "snet statistics\n");
+
+ for (sys = SNET_SOCKET_CREATE; sys < SNET_NR_SOCKET_TYPES; sys++) {
+ unsigned int v = 0;
+ seq_printf(m, "%s {", snet_syscall_name(sys));
+
+ seq_printf(m, " Exec: %u ", SNET_STATS_GET(SNET_STATS_EXEC, sys));
+ seq_printf(m, " Unreg: %u ", SNET_STATS_GET(SNET_STATS_UNREG, sys));
+ for (v = SNET_VERDICT_GRANT; v < SNET_NR_VERDICT_TYPES; v++) {
+ seq_printf(m, " %s: %u ", snet_verdict_name(v),
+ SNET_STATS_GET(v, sys));
+ }
+ seq_printf(m, " Reg Error: %u ", SNET_STATS_GET(SNET_STATS_REG_ERROR, sys));
+ seq_printf(m, "}\n");
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int snet_stats_proc_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return single_open(file, snet_stats_show, NULL);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations snet_stats_proc_fops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .open = snet_stats_proc_open,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .release = single_release,
+};
+
+void snet_stats_init(void)
+{
+ snet_stats_dir = proc_mkdir(SNET_STATS_PROC_DIR, init_net.proc_net);
+ if (snet_stats_dir == NULL) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "snet: can't create /proc/%s\n",
+ SNET_STATS_PROC_DIR);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ snet_stats_pde = proc_create(SNET_STATS_PROC_INFO, 0644, snet_stats_dir,
+ &snet_stats_proc_fops);
+out:
+ return;
+}
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_stats.h b/security/snet/snet_stats.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..05ab06d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_stats.h
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+#ifndef _SNET_STATS_H
+#define _SNET_STATS_H
+
+#include <linux/snet.h>
+
+enum {
+ SNET_STATS_REG_GRANT = 0,
+ SNET_STATS_REG_DENY,
+ SNET_STATS_REG_PENDING,
+ SNET_STATS_REG_NONE,
+ SNET_STATS_REG_INVALID,
+ SNET_STATS_REG_ERROR,
+ SNET_STATS_UNREG,
+ SNET_STATS_EXEC,
+ __SNET_STATS_MAX
+};
+
+#define SNET_STATS_MAX __SNET_STATS_MAX
+
+struct snet_statistics {
+ atomic_t mibs[SNET_NR_SOCKET_TYPES+1][SNET_STATS_MAX];
+};
+
+extern struct snet_statistics snet_stats;
+#define SNET_STATS_INC(field, syscall) (atomic_inc(&snet_stats.mibs[syscall][field]))
+#define SNET_STATS_DEC(field, syscall) (atomic_dec(&snet_stats.mibs[syscall][field]))
+#define SNET_STATS_GET(field, syscall) (atomic_read(&snet_stats.mibs[syscall][field]))
+
+void snet_stats_init(void);
+
+static inline void snet_stats_inc_reg(const enum snet_verdict verdict,
+ const enum snet_syscall syscall)
+{
+ switch (verdict) {
+ case SNET_VERDICT_GRANT:
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_REG_GRANT, syscall);
+ break;
+ case SNET_VERDICT_DENY:
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_REG_DENY, syscall);
+ break;
+ case SNET_VERDICT_PENDING:
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_REG_PENDING, syscall);
+ break;
+ case SNET_VERDICT_NONE:
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_REG_NONE, syscall);
+ break;
+ case SNET_VERDICT_INVALID:
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_REG_INVALID, syscall);
+ break;
+ default:
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_REG_ERROR, syscall);
+ break;
+ }
+ return;
+};
+
+#endif
--
1.7.4.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [RFC v4 10/11] snet: introduce snet_stats
From: y @ 2011-05-05 13:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, jamal, Patrick McHardy,
Grzegorz Nosek, Samir Bellabes
In-Reply-To: <1304603961-2517-1-git-send-email-y>
From: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
this patch adds a /proc/snet/snet_stats entry to show statistics about
snet. this patch adds also the functions to manage the statistics.
Signed-off-by: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
---
security/snet/snet_stats.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/snet/snet_stats.h | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_stats.c
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_stats.h
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_stats.c b/security/snet/snet_stats.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b946dda
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_stats.c
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
+#include "snet_stats.h"
+#include "snet_utils.h"
+
+extern struct net init_net;
+
+#define SNET_STATS_PROC_DIR "snet"
+#define SNET_STATS_PROC_INFO "snet_stats"
+
+static struct proc_dir_entry *snet_stats_dir;
+static struct proc_dir_entry *snet_stats_pde;
+struct snet_statistics snet_stats;
+
+static int snet_stats_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
+{
+ unsigned int sys = 0;
+ seq_printf(m, "snet statistics\n");
+
+ for (sys = SNET_SOCKET_CREATE; sys < SNET_NR_SOCKET_TYPES; sys++) {
+ unsigned int v = 0;
+ seq_printf(m, "%s {", snet_syscall_name(sys));
+
+ seq_printf(m, " Exec: %u ", SNET_STATS_GET(SNET_STATS_EXEC, sys));
+ seq_printf(m, " Unreg: %u ", SNET_STATS_GET(SNET_STATS_UNREG, sys));
+ for (v = SNET_VERDICT_GRANT; v < SNET_NR_VERDICT_TYPES; v++) {
+ seq_printf(m, " %s: %u ", snet_verdict_name(v),
+ SNET_STATS_GET(v, sys));
+ }
+ seq_printf(m, " Reg Error: %u ", SNET_STATS_GET(SNET_STATS_REG_ERROR, sys));
+ seq_printf(m, "}\n");
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int snet_stats_proc_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return single_open(file, snet_stats_show, NULL);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations snet_stats_proc_fops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .open = snet_stats_proc_open,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .release = single_release,
+};
+
+void snet_stats_init(void)
+{
+ snet_stats_dir = proc_mkdir(SNET_STATS_PROC_DIR, init_net.proc_net);
+ if (snet_stats_dir == NULL) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "snet: can't create /proc/%s\n",
+ SNET_STATS_PROC_DIR);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ snet_stats_pde = proc_create(SNET_STATS_PROC_INFO, 0644, snet_stats_dir,
+ &snet_stats_proc_fops);
+out:
+ return;
+}
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_stats.h b/security/snet/snet_stats.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..05ab06d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_stats.h
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+#ifndef _SNET_STATS_H
+#define _SNET_STATS_H
+
+#include <linux/snet.h>
+
+enum {
+ SNET_STATS_REG_GRANT = 0,
+ SNET_STATS_REG_DENY,
+ SNET_STATS_REG_PENDING,
+ SNET_STATS_REG_NONE,
+ SNET_STATS_REG_INVALID,
+ SNET_STATS_REG_ERROR,
+ SNET_STATS_UNREG,
+ SNET_STATS_EXEC,
+ __SNET_STATS_MAX
+};
+
+#define SNET_STATS_MAX __SNET_STATS_MAX
+
+struct snet_statistics {
+ atomic_t mibs[SNET_NR_SOCKET_TYPES+1][SNET_STATS_MAX];
+};
+
+extern struct snet_statistics snet_stats;
+#define SNET_STATS_INC(field, syscall) (atomic_inc(&snet_stats.mibs[syscall][field]))
+#define SNET_STATS_DEC(field, syscall) (atomic_dec(&snet_stats.mibs[syscall][field]))
+#define SNET_STATS_GET(field, syscall) (atomic_read(&snet_stats.mibs[syscall][field]))
+
+void snet_stats_init(void);
+
+static inline void snet_stats_inc_reg(const enum snet_verdict verdict,
+ const enum snet_syscall syscall)
+{
+ switch (verdict) {
+ case SNET_VERDICT_GRANT:
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_REG_GRANT, syscall);
+ break;
+ case SNET_VERDICT_DENY:
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_REG_DENY, syscall);
+ break;
+ case SNET_VERDICT_PENDING:
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_REG_PENDING, syscall);
+ break;
+ case SNET_VERDICT_NONE:
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_REG_NONE, syscall);
+ break;
+ case SNET_VERDICT_INVALID:
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_REG_INVALID, syscall);
+ break;
+ default:
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_REG_ERROR, syscall);
+ break;
+ }
+ return;
+};
+
+#endif
--
1.7.4.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [RFC v4 11/11] snet: introduce security/snet, Makefile and Kconfig changes
From: y @ 2011-05-05 13:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, jamal, Patrick McHardy,
Grzegorz Nosek, Samir Bellabes
In-Reply-To: <1304603961-2517-1-git-send-email-y>
From: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
this patch creates folder security/snet and adds changes for Kconfig and Makefile
Signed-off-by: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
---
security/Kconfig | 6 ++++++
security/Makefile | 2 ++
security/snet/Kconfig | 11 +++++++++++
security/snet/Makefile | 15 +++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/snet/Kconfig
create mode 100644 security/snet/Makefile
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 95accd4..7e393c4 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ source security/selinux/Kconfig
source security/smack/Kconfig
source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
source security/apparmor/Kconfig
+source security/snet/Kconfig
source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -193,6 +194,7 @@ choice
default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
+ default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SNET if SECURITY_SNET
default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
help
@@ -211,6 +213,9 @@ choice
config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
+ config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SNET
+ bool "snet" if SECURITY_SNET=y
+
config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
@@ -222,6 +227,7 @@ config DEFAULT_SECURITY
default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
+ default "snet" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SNET
default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
endmenu
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index 8bb0fe9..9e769b2 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux
subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack
subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo
subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor
+subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SNET) += snet
# always enable default capabilities
obj-y += commoncap.o
@@ -21,6 +22,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack/built-in.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += lsm_audit.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo/built-in.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor/built-in.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SNET) += snet/built-in.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o
# Object integrity file lists
diff --git a/security/snet/Kconfig b/security/snet/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6dabd7d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+#
+# snet
+#
+
+config SECURITY_SNET
+ bool "snet - Security for NETwork syscalls"
+ depends on SECURITY_NETWORK
+ default n
+ ---help---
+ If this option is enabled, the kernel will include support for reporting
+ networking's syscalls to userspace and wait for a verdict
diff --git a/security/snet/Makefile b/security/snet/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..002c102
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+#
+# Makefile for building the Security Network Events module.
+#
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SNET) := snet.o
+
+snet-y := snet_event.o \
+ snet_netlink_helper.o \
+ snet_netlink.o \
+ snet_verdict.o \
+ snet_ticket_helper.o \
+ snet_ticket.o \
+ snet_hooks.o \
+ snet_core.o \
+ snet_stats.o \
+ snet_utils.o
--
1.7.4.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [RFC v4 11/11] snet: introduce security/snet, Makefile and Kconfig changes
From: y @ 2011-05-05 13:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, jamal, Patrick McHardy,
Grzegorz Nosek, Samir Bellabes
In-Reply-To: <1304603961-2517-1-git-send-email-y>
From: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
this patch creates folder security/snet and adds changes for Kconfig and Makefile
Signed-off-by: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
---
security/Kconfig | 6 ++++++
security/Makefile | 2 ++
security/snet/Kconfig | 11 +++++++++++
security/snet/Makefile | 15 +++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/snet/Kconfig
create mode 100644 security/snet/Makefile
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 95accd4..7e393c4 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ source security/selinux/Kconfig
source security/smack/Kconfig
source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
source security/apparmor/Kconfig
+source security/snet/Kconfig
source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -193,6 +194,7 @@ choice
default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
+ default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SNET if SECURITY_SNET
default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
help
@@ -211,6 +213,9 @@ choice
config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
+ config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SNET
+ bool "snet" if SECURITY_SNET=y
+
config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
@@ -222,6 +227,7 @@ config DEFAULT_SECURITY
default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
+ default "snet" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SNET
default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
endmenu
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index 8bb0fe9..9e769b2 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux
subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack
subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo
subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor
+subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SNET) += snet
# always enable default capabilities
obj-y += commoncap.o
@@ -21,6 +22,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack/built-in.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += lsm_audit.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo/built-in.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor/built-in.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SNET) += snet/built-in.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o
# Object integrity file lists
diff --git a/security/snet/Kconfig b/security/snet/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6dabd7d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+#
+# snet
+#
+
+config SECURITY_SNET
+ bool "snet - Security for NETwork syscalls"
+ depends on SECURITY_NETWORK
+ default n
+ ---help---
+ If this option is enabled, the kernel will include support for reporting
+ networking's syscalls to userspace and wait for a verdict
diff --git a/security/snet/Makefile b/security/snet/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..002c102
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+#
+# Makefile for building the Security Network Events module.
+#
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SNET) := snet.o
+
+snet-y := snet_event.o \
+ snet_netlink_helper.o \
+ snet_netlink.o \
+ snet_verdict.o \
+ snet_ticket_helper.o \
+ snet_ticket.o \
+ snet_hooks.o \
+ snet_core.o \
+ snet_stats.o \
+ snet_utils.o
--
1.7.4.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [RFC v4 11/11] snet: introduce security/snet, Makefile and Kconfig changes
From: y @ 2011-05-05 13:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, jamal, Patrick McHardy,
Grzegorz Nosek, Samir Bellabes
In-Reply-To: <1304603961-2517-1-git-send-email-y>
From: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
this patch creates folder security/snet and adds changes for Kconfig and Makefile
Signed-off-by: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
---
security/Kconfig | 6 ++++++
security/Makefile | 2 ++
security/snet/Kconfig | 11 +++++++++++
security/snet/Makefile | 15 +++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/snet/Kconfig
create mode 100644 security/snet/Makefile
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 95accd4..7e393c4 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ source security/selinux/Kconfig
source security/smack/Kconfig
source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
source security/apparmor/Kconfig
+source security/snet/Kconfig
source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -193,6 +194,7 @@ choice
default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
+ default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SNET if SECURITY_SNET
default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
help
@@ -211,6 +213,9 @@ choice
config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
+ config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SNET
+ bool "snet" if SECURITY_SNET=y
+
config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
@@ -222,6 +227,7 @@ config DEFAULT_SECURITY
default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
+ default "snet" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SNET
default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
endmenu
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index 8bb0fe9..9e769b2 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux
subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack
subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo
subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor
+subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SNET) += snet
# always enable default capabilities
obj-y += commoncap.o
@@ -21,6 +22,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack/built-in.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += lsm_audit.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo/built-in.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor/built-in.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SNET) += snet/built-in.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o
# Object integrity file lists
diff --git a/security/snet/Kconfig b/security/snet/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6dabd7d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+#
+# snet
+#
+
+config SECURITY_SNET
+ bool "snet - Security for NETwork syscalls"
+ depends on SECURITY_NETWORK
+ default n
+ ---help---
+ If this option is enabled, the kernel will include support for reporting
+ networking's syscalls to userspace and wait for a verdict
diff --git a/security/snet/Makefile b/security/snet/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..002c102
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+#
+# Makefile for building the Security Network Events module.
+#
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SNET) := snet.o
+
+snet-y := snet_event.o \
+ snet_netlink_helper.o \
+ snet_netlink.o \
+ snet_verdict.o \
+ snet_ticket_helper.o \
+ snet_ticket.o \
+ snet_hooks.o \
+ snet_core.o \
+ snet_stats.o \
+ snet_utils.o
--
1.7.4.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [RFC v4 01/11] lsm: add security_socket_closed()
From: y @ 2011-05-05 13:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, jamal, Patrick McHardy,
Grzegorz Nosek, Samir Bellabes
In-Reply-To: <1304603961-2517-1-git-send-email-y>
From: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
Allow a module to update security informations when a socket is closed.
Signed-off-by: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
---
include/linux/security.h | 10 ++++++++++
net/socket.c | 1 +
security/capability.c | 5 +++++
security/security.c | 5 +++++
4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index ca02f17..da0d59e 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -918,6 +918,9 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
* @sock contains the socket structure.
* @how contains the flag indicating how future sends and receives are handled.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_close:
+ * Allow a module to update security informations when a socket is closed
+ * @sock is closed.
* @socket_sock_rcv_skb:
* Check permissions on incoming network packets. This hook is distinct
* from Netfilter's IP input hooks since it is the first time that the
@@ -1593,6 +1596,7 @@ struct security_operations {
int (*socket_getsockopt) (struct socket *sock, int level, int optname);
int (*socket_setsockopt) (struct socket *sock, int level, int optname);
int (*socket_shutdown) (struct socket *sock, int how);
+ void (*socket_close) (struct socket *sock);
int (*socket_sock_rcv_skb) (struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int (*socket_getpeersec_stream) (struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, int __user *optlen, unsigned len);
int (*socket_getpeersec_dgram) (struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid);
@@ -2559,6 +2563,7 @@ int security_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock);
int security_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname);
int security_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname);
int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how);
+void security_socket_close(struct socket *sock);
int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen, unsigned len);
@@ -2674,6 +2679,11 @@ static inline int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
{
return 0;
}
+
+static inline void security_socket_close(struct socket *sock)
+{
+}
+
static inline int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
diff --git a/net/socket.c b/net/socket.c
index 310d16b..d588e9e 100644
--- a/net/socket.c
+++ b/net/socket.c
@@ -1093,6 +1093,7 @@ static int sock_close(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
printk(KERN_DEBUG "sock_close: NULL inode\n");
return 0;
}
+ security_socket_close(SOCKET_I(inode));
sock_release(SOCKET_I(inode));
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 2984ea4..1f8bbe2 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -629,6 +629,10 @@ static int cap_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
return 0;
}
+static void cap_socket_close(struct socket *sock)
+{
+}
+
static int cap_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
return 0;
@@ -1025,6 +1029,7 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_setsockopt);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_getsockopt);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_shutdown);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_close);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_sock_rcv_skb);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_getpeersec_stream);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_getpeersec_dgram);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 1011423..84187d8 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1074,6 +1074,11 @@ int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
return security_ops->socket_shutdown(sock, how);
}
+void security_socket_close(struct socket *sock)
+{
+ return security_ops->socket_close(sock);
+}
+
int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
return security_ops->socket_sock_rcv_skb(sk, skb);
--
1.7.4.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [RFC v4 04/11] snet: introduce snet_event
From: y @ 2011-05-05 13:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, jamal, Patrick McHardy,
Grzegorz Nosek, Samir Bellabes
In-Reply-To: <1304603961-2517-1-git-send-email-y>
From: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
This patch adds the snet's subsystem responsive of managing events
snet is using the word 'event' for a couple of values [syscall, protocol].
For example, [listen, tcp] or [sendmsg, dccp] are events.
This patch introduces a hastable 'event_hash' and operations (add/remove/search..)
in order to manage which events have to be protected.
With the help of the communication's subsystem, managing orders are coming from
userspace.
Signed-off-by: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
---
security/snet/snet_event.c | 201 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/snet/snet_event.h | 21 +++++
2 files changed, 222 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_event.c
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_event.h
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_event.c b/security/snet/snet_event.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7146d5a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_event.c
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/jhash.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/snet.h>
+#include "snet_event.h"
+#include "snet_netlink.h"
+#include "snet_utils.h"
+
+static struct list_head *snet_evh;
+static DEFINE_RWLOCK(snet_evh_lock);
+
+struct snet_event_entry {
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct snet_event se;
+};
+
+static struct kmem_cache *snet_event_entry_cachep;
+
+/* lookup for a snet_evh - before using this function, lock snet_evh_lock */
+static struct snet_event_entry *__snet_event_lookup(const enum snet_syscall syscall,
+ const u8 protocol)
+{
+ unsigned int h = 0;
+ struct list_head *l;
+ struct snet_event_entry *s;
+
+ /* computing its hash value */
+ h = jhash_2words(syscall, protocol, 0) % snet_evh_size;
+ l = &snet_evh[h];
+
+ list_for_each_entry(s, l, list) {
+ if ((s->se.protocol == protocol) &&
+ (s->se.syscall == syscall)) {
+ return s;
+ }
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int snet_event_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
+{
+ unsigned int i = 0, n = 0;
+ int ret = -1;
+ unsigned hashs_to_skip = cb->args[0];
+ unsigned events_to_skip = cb->args[1];
+ struct list_head *l;
+ struct snet_event_entry *s;
+
+ read_lock_bh(&snet_evh_lock);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < snet_evh_size; i++) {
+ if (i < hashs_to_skip)
+ continue;
+ l = &snet_evh[i];
+ n = 0;
+ list_for_each_entry(s, l, list) {
+ if (++n < events_to_skip)
+ continue;
+ ret = snet_nl_list_fill_info(skb,
+ NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).pid,
+ cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq,
+ NLM_F_MULTI,
+ s->se.protocol,
+ s->se.syscall);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto errout;
+ }
+ }
+
+errout:
+ read_unlock_bh(&snet_evh_lock);
+
+ cb->args[0] = i;
+ cb->args[1] = n;
+ return skb->len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * check if a event is registered or not
+ * return 1 if event is registered, 0 if not
+ */
+int snet_event_is_registered(const enum snet_syscall syscall, const u8 protocol)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ read_lock_bh(&snet_evh_lock);
+ if (__snet_event_lookup(syscall, protocol) != NULL)
+ ret = 1;
+ read_unlock_bh(&snet_evh_lock);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* adding a event */
+int snet_event_insert(const enum snet_syscall syscall, const u8 protocol)
+{
+ struct snet_event_entry *data = NULL;
+ unsigned int h = 0;
+ int err = 0;
+
+ data = kmem_cache_zalloc(snet_event_entry_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!data) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ write_lock_bh(&snet_evh_lock);
+ /* check if event is already registered */
+ if (__snet_event_lookup(syscall, protocol) != NULL) {
+ write_unlock_bh(&snet_evh_lock);
+ kmem_cache_free(snet_event_entry_cachep, data);
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ data->se.syscall = syscall;
+ data->se.protocol = protocol;
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&(data->list));
+ h = jhash_2words(data->se.syscall, data->se.protocol, 0) % snet_evh_size;
+ list_add_tail(&data->list, &snet_evh[h]);
+ write_unlock_bh(&snet_evh_lock);
+ pr_debug("[%u]=(syscall=%s, protocol=%u)\n",
+ h, snet_syscall_name(syscall), protocol);
+out:
+ return err;
+}
+
+/* removing a event */
+int snet_event_remove(const enum snet_syscall syscall, const u8 protocol)
+{
+ struct snet_event_entry *data = NULL;
+
+ write_lock_bh(&snet_evh_lock);
+ data = __snet_event_lookup(syscall, protocol);
+ if (data == NULL) {
+ write_unlock_bh(&snet_evh_lock);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ pr_debug("(syscall=%s, protocol=%u)\n",
+ snet_syscall_name(syscall), protocol);
+ list_del(&data->list);
+ write_unlock_bh(&snet_evh_lock);
+ kmem_cache_free(snet_event_entry_cachep, data);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* flushing all events */
+void snet_event_flush(void)
+{
+ unsigned int i = 0;
+
+ write_lock_bh(&snet_evh_lock);
+ for (i = 0; i < snet_evh_size; i++) {
+ struct snet_event_entry *data, *tmp;
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(data, tmp, &snet_evh[i], list) {
+ list_del(&data->list);
+ kmem_cache_free(snet_event_entry_cachep, data);
+ }
+ }
+ write_unlock_bh(&snet_evh_lock);
+ return;
+}
+
+/* init function */
+int snet_event_init(void)
+{
+ int err = 0, i = 0;
+
+ if (snet_evh_size == 0) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "snet: bad snet_evh_size value\n");
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ snet_evh = kzalloc(sizeof(struct list_head) * snet_evh_size,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!snet_evh) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING
+ "snet: can't alloc memory for snet_evh\n");
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < snet_evh_size; i++)
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&snet_evh[i]);
+
+ /* snet_event_entry_cachep is not destroyed */
+ snet_event_entry_cachep = kmem_cache_create("snet_event_entry",
+ sizeof(struct snet_event_entry),
+ 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+out:
+ return err;
+}
+
+/* exit function */
+void snet_event_exit(void)
+{
+ kfree(snet_evh);
+ snet_evh = NULL;
+}
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_event.h b/security/snet/snet_event.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fa991c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_event.h
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+#ifndef _SNET_EVENT_H
+#define _SNET_EVENT_H
+
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+
+extern unsigned int snet_evh_size;
+
+/* manipulate the events hash table */
+int snet_event_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb);
+int snet_event_is_registered(const enum snet_syscall syscall, const u8 protocol);
+int snet_event_insert(const enum snet_syscall syscall, const u8 protocol);
+int snet_event_remove(const enum snet_syscall syscall, const u8 protocol);
+void snet_event_flush(void);
+void snet_event_dumpall(void);
+
+/* init function */
+int snet_event_init(void);
+/* exit funtion */
+void snet_event_exit(void);
+
+#endif /* _SNET_EVENT_H */
--
1.7.4.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [RFC v4 03/11] snet: introduce snet_core
From: y @ 2011-05-05 13:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, jamal, Patrick McHardy,
Grzegorz Nosek, Samir Bellabes
In-Reply-To: <1304603961-2517-1-git-send-email-y>
From: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
This patch introduce snet_core.c, which provides functions to start and stop
snet's subsystems, and include/linux/snet.h, which provides interface with
userspace.
subsytems are:
- snet_hooks : LSM hooks
- snet_netlink : kernel-user communication (genetlink)
- snet_event : manages the list of protected syscalls
- snet_verdict : provides a waitqueue for syscalls and manage verdicts
from userspace
- snet_ticket : provides a granted-access ticket mecanism
Signed-off-by: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
---
include/linux/snet.h | 117 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/snet/snet_core.c | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 201 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 include/linux/snet.h
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_core.c
diff --git a/include/linux/snet.h b/include/linux/snet.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..580b6b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/snet.h
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+#ifndef _LINUX_SNET_H
+#define _LINUX_SNET_H
+
+#include <linux/in6.h>
+
+#define SNET_VERSION 0x1
+#define SNET_NAME "snet"
+
+enum snet_syscall {
+ SNET_SOCKET_CREATE = 0,
+ SNET_SOCKET_BIND,
+ SNET_SOCKET_CONNECT,
+ SNET_SOCKET_LISTEN,
+ SNET_SOCKET_ACCEPT,
+ SNET_SOCKET_POST_ACCEPT,
+ SNET_SOCKET_SENDMSG,
+ SNET_SOCKET_RECVMSG,
+ SNET_SOCKET_SOCK_RCV_SKB,
+ SNET_SOCKET_CLOSE,
+ SNET_SOCKET_INVALID,
+};
+
+#define SNET_NR_SOCKET_TYPES SNET_SOCKET_INVALID
+
+struct snet_event {
+ enum snet_syscall syscall;
+ u8 protocol;
+};
+
+enum snet_verdict {
+ SNET_VERDICT_GRANT = 0, /* grant the syscall */
+ SNET_VERDICT_DENY, /* deny the syscall */
+ SNET_VERDICT_PENDING, /* waiting for a decision */
+ SNET_VERDICT_NONE, /* no decision can be set */
+ SNET_VERDICT_INVALID,
+};
+
+#define SNET_NR_VERDICT_TYPES SNET_VERDICT_INVALID
+
+enum snet_ticket_mode {
+ SNET_TICKET_OFF = 0,
+ SNET_TICKET_FIX,
+ SNET_TICKET_EXTEND,
+ SNET_TICKET_INVALID,
+};
+
+/* genetlink commands */
+enum {
+ SNET_C_UNSPEC,
+ SNET_C_VERSION,
+ SNET_C_REGISTER,
+ SNET_C_UNREGISTER,
+ SNET_C_INSERT,
+ SNET_C_REMOVE,
+ SNET_C_FLUSH,
+ SNET_C_LIST,
+ SNET_C_VERDICT,
+ SNET_C_CONFIG,
+ __SNET_C_MAX,
+};
+
+#define SNET_C_MAX (__SNET_C_MAX - 1)
+
+/* genetlink attributes */
+enum {
+ SNET_A_UNSPEC,
+ SNET_A_VERSION, /* (NLA_U32) the snet protocol version */
+ SNET_A_VERDICT_ID,
+ SNET_A_FAMILY,
+ SNET_A_SYSCALL, /* (NLA_U8) a syscall identifier */
+ SNET_A_PROTOCOL, /* (NLA_U8) a protocol identifier */
+ SNET_A_UID,
+ SNET_A_PID,
+ SNET_A_TYPE,
+ SNET_A_IPV4SADDR,
+ SNET_A_IPV6SADDR,
+ SNET_A_IPV4DADDR,
+ SNET_A_IPV6DADDR,
+ SNET_A_SPORT,
+ SNET_A_DPORT,
+ SNET_A_VERDICT,
+ SNET_A_VERDICT_DELAY,
+ SNET_A_TICKET_DELAY,
+ SNET_A_TICKET_MODE,
+ __SNET_A_MAX,
+};
+
+#define SNET_A_MAX (__SNET_A_MAX - 1)
+
+#define SNET_GENL_NAME "SNET"
+#define SNET_GENL_VERSION SNET_VERSION
+
+struct snet_sock_half {
+ struct {
+ union {
+ __be32 ip;
+ struct in6_addr ip6;
+ };
+ } u3;
+ struct {
+ __be16 port;
+ } u;
+};
+
+struct snet_info {
+ u32 verdict_id;
+
+ enum snet_syscall syscall;
+ u8 protocol;
+ u8 family;
+
+ int type;
+ struct snet_sock_half src;
+ struct snet_sock_half dst;
+};
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_SNET_H */
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_core.c b/security/snet/snet_core.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c8bc435
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_core.c
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <net/genetlink.h>
+#include <linux/snet.h>
+#include "snet_hooks.h"
+#include "snet_event.h"
+#include "snet_verdict.h"
+#include "snet_ticket.h"
+#include "snet_utils.h"
+#include "snet_stats.h"
+
+unsigned int snet_evh_size = 16;
+module_param(snet_evh_size, uint, 0400);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(snet_evh_size, "Set the size of the event hash table");
+
+unsigned int snet_vdh_size = 16;
+module_param(snet_vdh_size, uint, 0400);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(snet_vdh_size, "Set the size of the verdict hash table");
+
+unsigned int snet_verdict_delay = 5;
+module_param(snet_verdict_delay, uint, 0600);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(snet_verdict_delay, "Set the timeout for verdicts in secs");
+
+unsigned int snet_verdict_policy = SNET_VERDICT_GRANT; /* permissive by default */
+module_param(snet_verdict_policy, uint, 0400);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(snet_verdict_policy, "Set the default verdict");
+
+unsigned int snet_ticket_delay = 15;
+module_param(snet_ticket_delay, uint, 0600);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(snet_ticket_delay, "Set the timeout for tickets in secs");
+
+unsigned int snet_ticket_mode = SNET_TICKET_FIX;
+module_param(snet_ticket_mode, uint, 0600);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(snet_ticket_mode, "Set the mode for tickets");
+
+static __init int snet_init(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ pr_debug("initializing: event_hash_size=%u "
+ "verdict_hash_size=%u verdict_delay=%usecs "
+ "default_policy=%s\n",
+ snet_evh_size, snet_vdh_size, snet_verdict_delay,
+ snet_verdict_name(snet_verdict_policy));
+
+ if (snet_verdict_policy >= SNET_VERDICT_INVALID) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "snet: bad snet_verdict_policy\n");
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto event_failed;
+ }
+
+ ret = snet_event_init();
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto event_failed;
+
+ ret = snet_verdict_init();
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto verdict_failed;
+
+ ret = snet_ticket_init();
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto ticket_failed;
+
+ snet_stats_init();
+ /* snet_hooks_init() returns 0 or execute panic() */
+ snet_hooks_init();
+
+ pr_debug("started\n");
+ return 0;
+
+ticket_failed:
+ snet_verdict_exit();
+verdict_failed:
+ snet_event_exit();
+event_failed:
+ pr_debug("stopped\n");
+ return ret;
+}
+
+security_initcall(snet_init);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("snet - Security for NETwork syscalls");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>");
--
1.7.4.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [RFC v4 08/11] snet: introduce snet_ticket
From: y @ 2011-05-05 13:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, jamal, Patrick McHardy,
Grzegorz Nosek, Samir Bellabes
In-Reply-To: <1304603961-2517-1-git-send-email-y>
From: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
this patch adds the snet's subsystem managing granted-access tickets
snet is using the term 'ticket' for refering to a structure which keeps
informations about verdict, coming from userspace.
generic informations:
timeout
syscall
protocol
verdict
protocol-dependant informations : (so some infos may not be used)
address family
socket type
source address
source port
distant address
distant port
ticket are attached to the "void *security" pointer of task_struct
there are 3 modes:
0. no ticket - SNET_TICKET_OFF
every syscalls has to be verified by userspace.
1. timeout fixed - SNET_TICKET_FIX
for each response from the userspace, we are creating a ticket,
attached to the task_struct, with the filled informations, and a
fixed timeout value (10 secs by default).
then before asking userspace, kernel mecanism is checking existing
tickets for the task_struct, if there is a granted-access ticket, we
are using the verdict value attached.
after the timeout value, the ticket is destroyed.
2. timeout with extendable value - SNET_TICKET_EXTEND
this is the same mecanism as 1, but every time a ticket is matched
and used, the timeout value is reset to the default value, so its
life is extended.
Signed-off-by: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
---
security/snet/snet_ticket.c | 195 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/snet/snet_ticket.h | 37 +++++++
security/snet/snet_ticket_helper.c | 127 +++++++++++++++++++++++
security/snet/snet_ticket_helper.h | 8 ++
4 files changed, 367 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_ticket.c
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_ticket.h
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_ticket_helper.c
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_ticket_helper.h
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_ticket.c b/security/snet/snet_ticket.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a260412
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_ticket.c
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/jhash.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/snet.h>
+#include "snet_ticket.h"
+#include "snet_ticket_helper.h"
+
+#define HSIZE 16
+
+static struct kmem_cache *snet_ticket_cachep;
+static struct kmem_cache *snet_task_security_cachep;
+
+enum snet_verdict snet_ticket_check(struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ struct snet_ticket *st = NULL;
+ unsigned int h = 0, verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+ struct list_head *l = NULL;
+ struct snet_task_security *tsec = NULL;
+
+ if (snet_ticket_mode == SNET_TICKET_OFF)
+ goto out;
+
+ tsec = (struct snet_task_security*) current_security();
+
+ h = jhash_2words(info->syscall, info->protocol, 0) % HSIZE;
+ l = &tsec->hash[h];
+
+ read_lock_bh(&tsec->lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(st, l, list) {
+ if (__ticket_check(st, info)) {
+ verdict = st->verdict;
+ pr_debug("snet_ticket found: ticket=%p tsec=%p\n",
+ st, st->tsec);
+ if (snet_ticket_mode == SNET_TICKET_EXTEND) {
+ mod_timer(&st->timeout,
+ jiffies + snet_ticket_delay * HZ);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ read_unlock_bh(&tsec->lock);
+out:
+ return verdict;
+}
+
+static void snet_ticket_timeout(unsigned long arg)
+{
+ struct snet_ticket *st = (struct snet_ticket*)arg;
+
+ pr_debug("snet_ticket_timeout: ticket=%p tsec=%p\n", st, st->tsec);
+
+ write_lock_bh(&st->tsec->lock);
+ list_del(&st->list);
+ write_unlock_bh(&st->tsec->lock);
+ kmem_cache_free(snet_ticket_cachep, st);
+ return;
+}
+
+static struct snet_ticket *snet_ticket_alloc(void)
+{
+ struct snet_ticket *st = NULL;
+
+ st = kmem_cache_zalloc(snet_ticket_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (st == NULL)
+ goto out;
+
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&st->list);
+ init_timer(&st->timeout);
+ st->timeout.expires = snet_ticket_delay * HZ;
+out:
+ return st;
+}
+
+static void snet_ticket_insert(struct snet_ticket *st)
+{
+ unsigned int h;
+ struct list_head *l;
+
+ h = jhash_2words(st->syscall, st->protocol, 0) % HSIZE;
+ l = &(st->tsec->hash[h]);
+
+ st->timeout.expires += jiffies;
+ add_timer(&st->timeout);
+
+ write_lock_bh(&(st->tsec->lock));
+ list_add_tail(&st->list, l);
+ write_unlock_bh(&(st->tsec->lock));
+ return;
+}
+
+void snet_ticket_create(struct snet_info *info, enum snet_verdict verdict)
+{
+ struct snet_ticket *st;
+ struct snet_task_security *tsec = NULL;
+
+ if (snet_ticket_mode == SNET_TICKET_OFF)
+ goto out;
+
+ tsec = (struct snet_task_security*) current_security();
+
+ st = snet_ticket_alloc();
+ if (st == NULL)
+ goto out;
+
+ st->tsec = tsec;
+ snet_ticket_fill(st, info, verdict);
+ setup_timer(&st->timeout, snet_ticket_timeout, (unsigned long)st);
+ snet_ticket_insert(st);
+out:
+ return;
+}
+
+int snet_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ unsigned int index = 0;
+ struct snet_task_security *tsec = NULL;
+
+ tsec = kmem_cache_zalloc(snet_task_security_cachep, gfp);
+ if (tsec == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ pr_debug("ticket_prepare_creds: pid=%u tsec=%p\n", current->pid, tsec);
+ rwlock_init(&tsec->lock);
+ for (index = 0; index < HSIZE; index++)
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsec->hash[index]);
+
+ new->security = tsec;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void snet_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
+{
+ struct snet_task_security *tsec = cred->security;
+ unsigned int index;
+
+ pr_debug("ticket_free_cred: pid=%u tsec=%p\n", current->pid, tsec);
+
+ write_lock_bh(&tsec->lock);
+ /* destroy all tickets */
+ for (index = 0; index < HSIZE; index++) {
+ struct snet_ticket *st, *tmp;
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(st, tmp, &tsec->hash[index], list) {
+ if (del_timer_sync(&st->timeout)) {
+ pr_debug("ticket_cred_free: [%u] ticket=%p tsec=%p\n",
+ index, st, st->tsec);
+ list_del(&st->list);
+ kmem_cache_free(snet_ticket_cachep, st);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ cred->security = NULL;
+ write_unlock_bh(&tsec->lock);
+ kmem_cache_free(snet_task_security_cachep, tsec);
+ return;
+}
+
+int snet_ticket_init(void)
+{
+ unsigned int index = 0;
+ struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
+ struct snet_task_security *tsec = NULL;
+
+ if (snet_ticket_mode >= SNET_TICKET_INVALID) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "snet: bad snet_ticket_mode\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if ((snet_ticket_mode == SNET_TICKET_FIX ||
+ snet_ticket_mode == SNET_TICKET_EXTEND) &&
+ (snet_ticket_delay == 0)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "snet: bad snet_ticket_delay\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* snet_ticket_cachep is not destroyed */
+ snet_ticket_cachep = kmem_cache_create("snet_ticket",
+ sizeof(struct snet_ticket),
+ 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+ /* snet_task_security_cachep is not destroyed */
+ snet_task_security_cachep = kmem_cache_create("snet_task_security",
+ sizeof(struct snet_task_security),
+ 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+
+ tsec = kmem_cache_zalloc(snet_task_security_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (tsec == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rwlock_init(&tsec->lock);
+ for (index = 0; index < HSIZE; index++)
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsec->hash[index]);
+
+ cred->security = tsec;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_ticket.h b/security/snet/snet_ticket.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b6d1020
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_ticket.h
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+#ifndef _SNET_TICKET_H
+#define _SNET_TICKET_H
+
+#include <linux/timer.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/snet.h>
+
+struct snet_task_security {
+ struct list_head hash[16];
+ rwlock_t lock;
+};
+
+struct snet_ticket {
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct snet_task_security *tsec;
+ struct timer_list timeout;
+
+ enum snet_syscall syscall;
+ u8 protocol;
+ u8 family;
+ int type;
+ struct snet_sock_half src;
+ struct snet_sock_half dst;
+ enum snet_verdict verdict;
+};
+
+extern unsigned int snet_ticket_delay;
+extern unsigned int snet_ticket_mode;
+
+void snet_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
+int snet_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
+enum snet_verdict snet_ticket_check(struct snet_info *info);
+void snet_ticket_create(struct snet_info *info, enum snet_verdict verdict);
+int snet_ticket_init(void);
+
+#endif /* _SNET_TICKET_H */
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_ticket_helper.c b/security/snet/snet_ticket_helper.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2dc9b94
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_ticket_helper.c
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/socket.h>
+#include <linux/snet.h>
+#include "snet_ticket.h"
+#include "snet_utils.h"
+
+static int check_create(struct snet_ticket *st, struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ return (st->type == info->type);
+}
+
+static int check_src(struct snet_ticket *st, struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ switch (info->family) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ if ((st->src.u3.ip == info->src.u3.ip) &&
+ (st->src.u.port == info->src.u.port))
+ return 1;
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ if ((!memcmp(&st->src.u3.ip6, &info->src.u3.ip6,
+ sizeof(info->src.u3.ip6))) &&
+ (st->src.u.port == info->src.u.port))
+ return 1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int check_dst(struct snet_ticket *st, struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ switch (info->family) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ if ((st->dst.u3.ip == info->dst.u3.ip) &&
+ (st->dst.u.port == info->dst.u.port))
+ return 1;
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ if ((!memcmp(&st->dst.u3.ip6, &info->dst.u3.ip6,
+ sizeof(info->dst.u3.ip6))) &&
+ (st->dst.u.port == info->dst.u.port))
+ return 1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int check_src_and_dst(struct snet_ticket *st, struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ return (check_src(st, info) && check_dst(st, info));
+}
+
+static int check_none(struct snet_ticket *st, struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int __ticket_check(struct snet_ticket *st, struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ static int (*ticket_df[])(struct snet_ticket *, struct snet_info *) = {
+ [SNET_SOCKET_CREATE] = &check_create,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_BIND] = &check_src,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_CONNECT] = &check_dst,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_LISTEN] = &check_src,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_ACCEPT] = &check_src,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_POST_ACCEPT] = &check_none,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_SENDMSG] = &check_src_and_dst,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_RECVMSG] = &check_src_and_dst,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_SOCK_RCV_SKB] = &check_src_and_dst,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_CLOSE] = &check_none,
+ };
+
+ if (info->syscall >= SNET_NR_SOCKET_TYPES)
+ return 0;
+ else {
+ if ((st->syscall == info->syscall) &&
+ (st->protocol == info->protocol) &&
+ (st->family == info->family) &&
+ ticket_df[info->syscall](st, info))
+ return 1;
+ else
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+void snet_ticket_fill(struct snet_ticket *st, struct snet_info *info,
+ enum snet_verdict verdict)
+{
+ st->syscall = info->syscall;
+ st->protocol = info->protocol;
+ st->family = info->family;
+ st->src.u.port = info->src.u.port;
+ st->dst.u.port = info->dst.u.port;
+ st->verdict = verdict;
+
+ switch (info->family) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ st->src.u3.ip = info->src.u3.ip;
+ st->dst.u3.ip = info->dst.u3.ip;
+ pr_debug("ticket=%p [syscall=%s protocol=%u "
+ "family=%u %pI4:%u->%pI4:%u] verdict=%s | tsec=%p pid=%u\n",
+ st, snet_syscall_name(st->syscall), st->protocol,
+ st->family, &st->src.u3.ip, st->src.u.port,
+ &st->dst.u3.ip, st->dst.u.port,
+ snet_verdict_name(st->verdict), st->tsec, current->pid);
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ memcpy(&st->src.u3.ip6, &info->src.u3.ip6,
+ sizeof(info->src.u3.ip6));
+ memcpy(&st->dst.u3.ip6, &info->dst.u3.ip6,
+ sizeof(info->dst.u3.ip6));
+ pr_debug("ticket=%p [syscall=%s protocol=%u "
+ "family=%u %pI6:%u->%pI6:%u] verdict=%s | tsec=%p pid=%u\n",
+ st, snet_syscall_name(st->syscall), st->protocol,
+ st->family, &st->src.u3.ip6, st->src.u.port,
+ &st->dst.u3.ip6, st->dst.u.port,
+ snet_verdict_name(st->verdict), st->tsec, current->pid);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return;
+}
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_ticket_helper.h b/security/snet/snet_ticket_helper.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..177bca5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_ticket_helper.h
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+#ifndef _SNET_TICKET_HELPER_H
+#define _SNET_TICKET_HELPER_H
+
+void snet_ticket_fill(struct snet_ticket *st, struct snet_info *info,
+ enum snet_verdict verdict);
+int __ticket_check(struct snet_ticket *st, struct snet_info *info);
+
+#endif /* _SNET_TICKET_HELPER_H */
--
1.7.4.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [RFC v4 00/11] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls
From: y @ 2011-05-05 13:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, jamal, Patrick McHardy,
Grzegorz Nosek, Samir Bellabes
From: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
Hello lsm and netdev people,
This set of patches is the version 4 of snet, which I would like to submit as a
RFC.
snet is a linux security module. It provides a mecanism defering syscall
security hooks and decision (verdict) to userspace.
snet has some subsystems :
- snet_core : init and exit the system
- snet_hooks : LSM hooks
- snet_netlink : kernel-user communication (genetlink)
- snet_event : manages the list of protected syscalls
- snet_verdict : provides a waitqueue for syscalls and manage verdicts
- snet_ticket : provides a granted-access ticket mecanism
I believe that snet will help to get over the classical configuration
complexity of others security modules, by providing interactivity to users.
I also think that monolithic strategy is broken with snet, as we can provide
security for others syscall's categories:
- sfs : security for filesystem,
- stask: security for task,
- smem : security for memory
..
In this way, and by putting abstraction on how this subsystems can talk to each
others, we may use the security combinaison we want: choose to run sfs,
stask, but not snet nor smem. Better, developpers may investigated how to build
another security subsystem for tasks, and use others existing (smem, snet..)
which they don't want to modify
I think that interactivity is very usefull for users, as they may be notify when
something is wrong and take decision, and from userspace, the decision may be
defered to another box. In this way, snet also have a advantage for mobile
devices as the policy decision will be push to a distant server, mobile device
will then wait for verdicts and as policy strategies are centralized.
Interactivity is *not* only clicking a Yes/No question, as said, we
can centralised previous locals LSM security subsytems, and make the
network aware of events occuring on it.
Finally, and a important point: snet integration respects the LSM framework idea
of using LSM hooks.
New feature from the previous version:
* Building a ticket mecanism for each task_struct using pointer void *security
Use the pointer (void*) security related to task_struct to provides
granted-acces tickets: if two identical requests are coming, ask the user
for the first one, store the result in a ticket and for the second request,
just look in the tickets owned by the task-struct
* send data buffer of sendmsg to userspace
this may provide a way to look inside the data (as a anti-virus do)
roadmap:
* find a way to send data buffer of sendmsg to userspace (using netfilter)
* adding other security systems
we can think about adding fork(), exec(), open(), close()..
I'm Ccing netfilter-devel, as snet may be seen as a way to do filtering.
v2..v3
* using kmem_cache instead of kmalloc
* remove attempt to send buffer socker to userspace
v3..v4
* add some statistics to count events in /proc/snet/snet_stats
Samir Bellabes (11):
lsm: add security_socket_closed()
lsm: reintroduce security_socket_post_accept()
snet: introduce snet_core
snet: introduce snet_event
snet: introduce snet_hooks
snet: introduce snet_netlink
snet: introduce snet_verdict
snet: introduce snet_ticket
snet: introduce snet_utils
snet: introduce snet_stats
snet: introduce security/snet, Makefile and Kconfig changes
include/linux/security.h | 23 +
include/linux/snet.h | 117 ++++++
net/socket.c | 3 +
security/Kconfig | 6 +
security/Makefile | 2 +
security/capability.c | 10 +
security/security.c | 10 +
security/snet/Kconfig | 11 +
security/snet/Makefile | 15 +
security/snet/snet_core.c | 84 ++++
security/snet/snet_event.c | 201 +++++++++
security/snet/snet_event.h | 21 +
security/snet/snet_hooks.c | 764 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/snet/snet_hooks.h | 10 +
security/snet/snet_netlink.c | 442 ++++++++++++++++++++
security/snet/snet_netlink.h | 17 +
security/snet/snet_netlink_helper.c | 220 ++++++++++
security/snet/snet_netlink_helper.h | 7 +
security/snet/snet_stats.c | 65 +++
security/snet/snet_stats.h | 57 +++
security/snet/snet_ticket.c | 195 +++++++++
security/snet/snet_ticket.h | 37 ++
security/snet/snet_ticket_helper.c | 127 ++++++
security/snet/snet_ticket_helper.h | 8 +
security/snet/snet_utils.c | 39 ++
security/snet/snet_utils.h | 9 +
security/snet/snet_verdict.c | 203 ++++++++++
security/snet/snet_verdict.h | 23 +
28 files changed, 2726 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 include/linux/snet.h
create mode 100644 security/snet/Kconfig
create mode 100644 security/snet/Makefile
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_core.c
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_event.c
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_event.h
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_hooks.c
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_hooks.h
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_netlink.c
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_netlink.h
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_netlink_helper.c
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_netlink_helper.h
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_stats.c
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_stats.h
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_ticket.c
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_ticket.h
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_ticket_helper.c
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_ticket_helper.h
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_utils.c
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_utils.h
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_verdict.c
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_verdict.h
--
1.7.4.1
^ permalink raw reply
* [RFC v4 11/11] snet: introduce security/snet, Makefile and Kconfig changes
From: y @ 2011-05-05 13:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, jamal, Patrick McHardy,
Grzegorz Nosek, Samir Bellabes
In-Reply-To: <1304603961-2517-1-git-send-email-y>
From: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
this patch creates folder security/snet and adds changes for Kconfig and Makefile
Signed-off-by: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
---
security/Kconfig | 6 ++++++
security/Makefile | 2 ++
security/snet/Kconfig | 11 +++++++++++
security/snet/Makefile | 15 +++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/snet/Kconfig
create mode 100644 security/snet/Makefile
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 95accd4..7e393c4 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ source security/selinux/Kconfig
source security/smack/Kconfig
source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
source security/apparmor/Kconfig
+source security/snet/Kconfig
source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -193,6 +194,7 @@ choice
default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
+ default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SNET if SECURITY_SNET
default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
help
@@ -211,6 +213,9 @@ choice
config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
+ config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SNET
+ bool "snet" if SECURITY_SNET=y
+
config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
@@ -222,6 +227,7 @@ config DEFAULT_SECURITY
default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
+ default "snet" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SNET
default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
endmenu
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index 8bb0fe9..9e769b2 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux
subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack
subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo
subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor
+subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SNET) += snet
# always enable default capabilities
obj-y += commoncap.o
@@ -21,6 +22,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack/built-in.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += lsm_audit.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo/built-in.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor/built-in.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SNET) += snet/built-in.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o
# Object integrity file lists
diff --git a/security/snet/Kconfig b/security/snet/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6dabd7d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+#
+# snet
+#
+
+config SECURITY_SNET
+ bool "snet - Security for NETwork syscalls"
+ depends on SECURITY_NETWORK
+ default n
+ ---help---
+ If this option is enabled, the kernel will include support for reporting
+ networking's syscalls to userspace and wait for a verdict
diff --git a/security/snet/Makefile b/security/snet/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..002c102
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+#
+# Makefile for building the Security Network Events module.
+#
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SNET) := snet.o
+
+snet-y := snet_event.o \
+ snet_netlink_helper.o \
+ snet_netlink.o \
+ snet_verdict.o \
+ snet_ticket_helper.o \
+ snet_ticket.o \
+ snet_hooks.o \
+ snet_core.o \
+ snet_stats.o \
+ snet_utils.o
--
1.7.4.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [RFC v4 10/11] snet: introduce snet_stats
From: y @ 2011-05-05 13:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, jamal, Patrick McHardy,
Grzegorz Nosek, Samir Bellabes
In-Reply-To: <1304603961-2517-1-git-send-email-y>
From: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
this patch adds a /proc/snet/snet_stats entry to show statistics about
snet. this patch adds also the functions to manage the statistics.
Signed-off-by: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
---
security/snet/snet_stats.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/snet/snet_stats.h | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_stats.c
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_stats.h
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_stats.c b/security/snet/snet_stats.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b946dda
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_stats.c
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
+#include "snet_stats.h"
+#include "snet_utils.h"
+
+extern struct net init_net;
+
+#define SNET_STATS_PROC_DIR "snet"
+#define SNET_STATS_PROC_INFO "snet_stats"
+
+static struct proc_dir_entry *snet_stats_dir;
+static struct proc_dir_entry *snet_stats_pde;
+struct snet_statistics snet_stats;
+
+static int snet_stats_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
+{
+ unsigned int sys = 0;
+ seq_printf(m, "snet statistics\n");
+
+ for (sys = SNET_SOCKET_CREATE; sys < SNET_NR_SOCKET_TYPES; sys++) {
+ unsigned int v = 0;
+ seq_printf(m, "%s {", snet_syscall_name(sys));
+
+ seq_printf(m, " Exec: %u ", SNET_STATS_GET(SNET_STATS_EXEC, sys));
+ seq_printf(m, " Unreg: %u ", SNET_STATS_GET(SNET_STATS_UNREG, sys));
+ for (v = SNET_VERDICT_GRANT; v < SNET_NR_VERDICT_TYPES; v++) {
+ seq_printf(m, " %s: %u ", snet_verdict_name(v),
+ SNET_STATS_GET(v, sys));
+ }
+ seq_printf(m, " Reg Error: %u ", SNET_STATS_GET(SNET_STATS_REG_ERROR, sys));
+ seq_printf(m, "}\n");
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int snet_stats_proc_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return single_open(file, snet_stats_show, NULL);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations snet_stats_proc_fops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .open = snet_stats_proc_open,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .release = single_release,
+};
+
+void snet_stats_init(void)
+{
+ snet_stats_dir = proc_mkdir(SNET_STATS_PROC_DIR, init_net.proc_net);
+ if (snet_stats_dir == NULL) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "snet: can't create /proc/%s\n",
+ SNET_STATS_PROC_DIR);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ snet_stats_pde = proc_create(SNET_STATS_PROC_INFO, 0644, snet_stats_dir,
+ &snet_stats_proc_fops);
+out:
+ return;
+}
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_stats.h b/security/snet/snet_stats.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..05ab06d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_stats.h
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+#ifndef _SNET_STATS_H
+#define _SNET_STATS_H
+
+#include <linux/snet.h>
+
+enum {
+ SNET_STATS_REG_GRANT = 0,
+ SNET_STATS_REG_DENY,
+ SNET_STATS_REG_PENDING,
+ SNET_STATS_REG_NONE,
+ SNET_STATS_REG_INVALID,
+ SNET_STATS_REG_ERROR,
+ SNET_STATS_UNREG,
+ SNET_STATS_EXEC,
+ __SNET_STATS_MAX
+};
+
+#define SNET_STATS_MAX __SNET_STATS_MAX
+
+struct snet_statistics {
+ atomic_t mibs[SNET_NR_SOCKET_TYPES+1][SNET_STATS_MAX];
+};
+
+extern struct snet_statistics snet_stats;
+#define SNET_STATS_INC(field, syscall) (atomic_inc(&snet_stats.mibs[syscall][field]))
+#define SNET_STATS_DEC(field, syscall) (atomic_dec(&snet_stats.mibs[syscall][field]))
+#define SNET_STATS_GET(field, syscall) (atomic_read(&snet_stats.mibs[syscall][field]))
+
+void snet_stats_init(void);
+
+static inline void snet_stats_inc_reg(const enum snet_verdict verdict,
+ const enum snet_syscall syscall)
+{
+ switch (verdict) {
+ case SNET_VERDICT_GRANT:
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_REG_GRANT, syscall);
+ break;
+ case SNET_VERDICT_DENY:
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_REG_DENY, syscall);
+ break;
+ case SNET_VERDICT_PENDING:
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_REG_PENDING, syscall);
+ break;
+ case SNET_VERDICT_NONE:
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_REG_NONE, syscall);
+ break;
+ case SNET_VERDICT_INVALID:
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_REG_INVALID, syscall);
+ break;
+ default:
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_REG_ERROR, syscall);
+ break;
+ }
+ return;
+};
+
+#endif
--
1.7.4.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [RFC v4 06/11] snet: introduce snet_netlink
From: y @ 2011-05-05 13:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, jamal, Patrick McHardy,
Grzegorz Nosek, Samir Bellabes
In-Reply-To: <1304603961-2517-1-git-send-email-y>
From: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
this patch adds the snet communication's subsystem.
snet_netlink is using genetlink for sending/receiving messages to/from userspace.
the genetlink operations permit to receive orders to manage the list of events
- events are values [syscall, protocol] - which is used to know which syscall
and protocol have to be protected. genl operations are also used to manage
communication of events to userspace, and to receive the related verdict
Signed-off-by: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
---
security/snet/snet_netlink.c | 442 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/snet/snet_netlink.h | 17 ++
security/snet/snet_netlink_helper.c | 220 +++++++++++++++++
security/snet/snet_netlink_helper.h | 7 +
4 files changed, 686 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_netlink.c
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_netlink.h
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_netlink_helper.c
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_netlink_helper.h
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_netlink.c b/security/snet/snet_netlink.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0d6cd8b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_netlink.c
@@ -0,0 +1,442 @@
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <net/genetlink.h>
+#include <linux/in6.h>
+#include <linux/snet.h>
+#include "snet_netlink.h"
+#include "snet_netlink_helper.h"
+#include "snet_verdict.h"
+#include "snet_event.h"
+#include "snet_utils.h"
+
+atomic_t snet_nl_seq = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+uint32_t snet_nl_pid;
+static struct genl_family snet_genl_family;
+
+/*
+ * snet genetlink
+ */
+int snet_nl_send_event(struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ struct sk_buff *skb_rsp;
+ void *msg_head;
+ int ret = 0, sbs = -1;
+ size_t size = 0;
+
+ sbs = snet_nl_size_by_syscall(info);
+ if (sbs < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ size = sbs +
+ 2 * nla_total_size(sizeof(u8)) +
+ 1 * nla_total_size(sizeof(u16)) +
+ (info->verdict_id ? 3 : 2) * nla_total_size(sizeof(u32));
+
+ skb_rsp = genlmsg_new(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (skb_rsp == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ msg_head = genlmsg_put(skb_rsp, snet_nl_pid,
+ atomic_inc_return(&snet_nl_seq),
+ &snet_genl_family, 0, SNET_C_VERDICT);
+ if (msg_head == NULL)
+ goto nla_put_failure;
+
+ pr_debug("verdict_id=0x%x syscall=%s protocol=%u "
+ "family=%u uid=%u pid=%u\n",
+ info->verdict_id, snet_syscall_name(info->syscall),
+ info->protocol, info->family, current_uid(), current->pid);
+
+ if (info->verdict_id)
+ NLA_PUT_U32(skb_rsp, SNET_A_VERDICT_ID, info->verdict_id);
+ NLA_PUT_U16(skb_rsp, SNET_A_SYSCALL, info->syscall);
+ NLA_PUT_U8(skb_rsp, SNET_A_PROTOCOL, info->protocol);
+ NLA_PUT_U8(skb_rsp, SNET_A_FAMILY, info->family);
+ NLA_PUT_U32(skb_rsp, SNET_A_UID, current_uid());
+ NLA_PUT_U32(skb_rsp, SNET_A_PID, current->pid);
+
+ ret = snet_nl_fill_by_syscall(skb_rsp, info);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto nla_put_failure;
+
+ ret = genlmsg_end(skb_rsp, msg_head);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto nla_put_failure;
+
+ return genlmsg_unicast(&init_net, skb_rsp, snet_nl_pid);
+
+nla_put_failure:
+ kfree_skb(skb_rsp);
+ return -ECONNABORTED;
+}
+
+/*
+ * snet genetlink functions
+ */
+
+static struct genl_family snet_genl_family = {
+ .id = GENL_ID_GENERATE,
+ .hdrsize = 0,
+ .name = SNET_GENL_NAME,
+ .version = SNET_GENL_VERSION,
+ .maxattr = SNET_A_MAX,
+};
+
+static const struct nla_policy snet_genl_policy[SNET_A_MAX + 1] = {
+ [SNET_A_VERSION] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
+ [SNET_A_VERDICT_ID] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
+ [SNET_A_FAMILY] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
+ [SNET_A_SYSCALL] = { .type = NLA_U16 },
+ [SNET_A_PROTOCOL] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
+ [SNET_A_UID] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
+ [SNET_A_PID] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
+ [SNET_A_TYPE] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
+ [SNET_A_IPV4SADDR] = { .type = NLA_BINARY,
+ .len = sizeof(struct in_addr) },
+ [SNET_A_IPV6SADDR] = { .type = NLA_BINARY,
+ .len = sizeof(struct in6_addr) },
+ [SNET_A_IPV4DADDR] = { .type = NLA_BINARY,
+ .len = sizeof(struct in_addr) },
+ [SNET_A_IPV6DADDR] = { .type = NLA_BINARY,
+ .len = sizeof(struct in6_addr) },
+ [SNET_A_SPORT] = { .type = NLA_U16 },
+ [SNET_A_DPORT] = { .type = NLA_U16 },
+ [SNET_A_VERDICT] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
+ [SNET_A_VERDICT_DELAY] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
+ [SNET_A_TICKET_DELAY] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
+ [SNET_A_TICKET_MODE] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
+};
+
+/**
+ * snet_nl_version - Handle a VERSION message
+ * @skb: the NETLINK buffer
+ * @info: the Generic NETLINK info block
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Process a user generated VERSION message and respond accordingly.
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ */
+static int snet_nl_version(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ struct sk_buff *skb_rsp = NULL;
+ void *msg_head;
+
+ atomic_set(&snet_nl_seq, info->snd_seq);
+
+ skb_rsp = genlmsg_new(NLMSG_GOODSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (skb_rsp == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ msg_head = genlmsg_put_reply(skb_rsp, info, &snet_genl_family,
+ 0, SNET_C_VERSION);
+ if (msg_head == NULL)
+ goto nla_put_failure;
+
+ NLA_PUT_U32(skb_rsp, SNET_A_VERSION, SNET_VERSION);
+
+ ret = genlmsg_end(skb_rsp, msg_head);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto nla_put_failure;
+
+ ret = genlmsg_reply(skb_rsp, info);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto nla_put_failure;
+ return 0;
+
+nla_put_failure:
+ kfree_skb(skb_rsp);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * snet_nl_register - Handle a REGISTER message
+ * @skb: the NETLINK buffer
+ * @info: the Generic NETLINK info block
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Notify the kernel that an application is listening for events.
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ */
+static int snet_nl_register(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ u32 version = 0;
+
+ atomic_set(&snet_nl_seq, info->snd_seq);
+
+ if (!info->attrs[SNET_A_VERSION]) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ version = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[SNET_A_VERSION]);
+
+ if (version != SNET_VERSION) {
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (snet_nl_pid > 0) {
+ ret = -ECONNREFUSED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ snet_nl_pid = info->snd_pid;
+ pr_debug("pid=%u\n", snet_nl_pid);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * snet_nl_unregister - Handle a UNREGISTER message
+ * @skb: the NETLINK buffer
+ * @info: the Generic NETLINK info block
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Notify the kernel that the application is no more listening for events.
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ */
+static int snet_nl_unregister(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ atomic_set(&snet_nl_seq, info->snd_seq);
+
+ if (snet_nl_pid == 0) {
+ ret = -ENOTCONN;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ snet_nl_pid = 0;
+ pr_debug("pid=%u\n", snet_nl_pid);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * snet_nl_insert - Handle a INSERT message
+ * @skb: the NETLINK buffer
+ * @info: the Generic NETLINK info block
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Insert a new event to the events' hashtable. Returns zero on success,
+ * negative values on failure.
+ */
+static int snet_nl_insert(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ enum snet_syscall syscall;
+ u8 protocol;
+
+ atomic_set(&snet_nl_seq, info->snd_seq);
+
+ if (!info->attrs[SNET_A_SYSCALL] || !info->attrs[SNET_A_PROTOCOL]) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ syscall = nla_get_u16(info->attrs[SNET_A_SYSCALL]);
+ protocol = nla_get_u8(info->attrs[SNET_A_PROTOCOL]);
+ ret = snet_event_insert(syscall, protocol);
+ pr_debug("syscall=%s protocol=%u insert=%s\n",
+ snet_syscall_name(syscall), protocol,
+ (ret == 0) ? "success" : "failed");
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * snet_nl_remove - Handle a REMOVE message
+ * @skb: the NETLINK buffer
+ * @info: the Generic NETLINK info block
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Remove a event from the events' hastable. Returns zero on success,
+ * negative values on failure.
+ */
+static int snet_nl_remove(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ enum snet_syscall syscall;
+ u8 protocol;
+
+ atomic_set(&snet_nl_seq, info->snd_seq);
+
+ if (!info->attrs[SNET_A_SYSCALL] || !info->attrs[SNET_A_PROTOCOL]) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ syscall = nla_get_u16(info->attrs[SNET_A_SYSCALL]);
+ protocol = nla_get_u8(info->attrs[SNET_A_PROTOCOL]);
+ ret = snet_event_remove(syscall, protocol);
+ pr_debug("syscall=%s protocol=%u remove=%s\n",
+ snet_syscall_name(syscall), protocol,
+ (ret == 0) ? "success" : "failed");
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * snet_nl_flush - Handle a FLUSH message
+ * @skb: the NETLINK buffer
+ * @info: the Generic NETLINK info block
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Remove all events from the hashtable. Returns zero on success,
+ * negative values on failure.
+ */
+static int snet_nl_flush(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
+{
+ atomic_set(&snet_nl_seq, info->snd_seq);
+ snet_event_flush();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int snet_nl_list_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 pid, u32 seq,
+ u32 flags, u8 protocol, enum snet_syscall syscall)
+{
+ void *hdr;
+
+ hdr = genlmsg_put(skb, pid, seq, &snet_genl_family, flags, SNET_C_LIST);
+ if (hdr == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ NLA_PUT_U16(skb, SNET_A_SYSCALL, syscall);
+ NLA_PUT_U8(skb, SNET_A_PROTOCOL, protocol);
+
+ return genlmsg_end(skb, hdr);
+
+nla_put_failure:
+ genlmsg_cancel(skb, hdr);
+ return -EMSGSIZE;
+}
+/**
+ * snet_nl_list - Handle a LIST message
+ * @skb: the NETLINK buffer
+ * @cb:
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Process a user LIST message and respond. Returns zero on success,
+ * and negative values on error.
+ */
+static int snet_nl_list(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
+{
+ unsigned int len = 0;
+
+ atomic_set(&snet_nl_seq, cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq);
+ len = snet_event_fill_info(skb, cb);
+ return len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * snet_nl_verdict - Handle a VERDICT message
+ * @skb: the NETLINK buffer
+ * @info the Generic NETLINK info block
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Provides userspace with a VERDICT message, ie we are sending informations
+ * with this command. Userspace is sending the appropriate verdict for the
+ * event. Returns zero on success,and negative values on error.
+ */
+static int snet_nl_verdict(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ u32 verdict_id;
+ enum snet_verdict verdict;
+
+ atomic_set(&snet_nl_seq, info->snd_seq);
+
+ if (snet_nl_pid == 0) {
+ ret = -ENOTCONN;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!info->attrs[SNET_A_VERDICT_ID] || !info->attrs[SNET_A_VERDICT]) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ verdict_id = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[SNET_A_VERDICT_ID]);
+ verdict = nla_get_u8(info->attrs[SNET_A_VERDICT]);
+ ret = snet_verdict_set(verdict_id, verdict);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int snet_nl_config(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct genl_info *info)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ atomic_set(&snet_nl_seq, info->snd_seq);
+
+ if (info->attrs[SNET_A_VERDICT_DELAY]) {
+ unsigned int new = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[SNET_A_VERDICT_DELAY]);
+ if (new == 0) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ snet_verdict_delay = new;
+ pr_debug("snet_nl_config: verdict_delay=%u\n", snet_verdict_delay);
+ }
+ if (info->attrs[SNET_A_TICKET_DELAY]) {
+ unsigned int new = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[SNET_A_TICKET_DELAY]);
+ if (new == 0) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ snet_ticket_delay = new;
+ pr_debug("snet_nl_config: ticket_delay=%u\n", snet_ticket_delay);
+ }
+ if (info->attrs[SNET_A_TICKET_MODE]) {
+ unsigned int new = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[SNET_A_TICKET_MODE]);
+ if (new >= SNET_TICKET_INVALID) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ snet_ticket_mode = new;
+ pr_debug("snet_nl_config: ticket_mode=%u\n", snet_ticket_mode);
+ }
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#define SNET_GENL_OPS(_cmd, _flags, _policy, _op, _opname) \
+ { \
+ .cmd = _cmd, \
+ .flags = _flags, \
+ .policy = _policy, \
+ ._op = snet_nl_##_opname, \
+ }
+
+static struct genl_ops snet_genl_ops[] = {
+ SNET_GENL_OPS(SNET_C_VERSION, GENL_ADMIN_PERM, snet_genl_policy,
+ doit, version),
+ SNET_GENL_OPS(SNET_C_REGISTER, GENL_ADMIN_PERM, snet_genl_policy,
+ doit, register),
+ SNET_GENL_OPS(SNET_C_UNREGISTER, GENL_ADMIN_PERM, snet_genl_policy,
+ doit, unregister),
+ SNET_GENL_OPS(SNET_C_INSERT, GENL_ADMIN_PERM, snet_genl_policy,
+ doit, insert),
+ SNET_GENL_OPS(SNET_C_REMOVE, GENL_ADMIN_PERM, snet_genl_policy,
+ doit, remove),
+ SNET_GENL_OPS(SNET_C_FLUSH, GENL_ADMIN_PERM, snet_genl_policy,
+ doit, flush),
+ SNET_GENL_OPS(SNET_C_LIST, GENL_ADMIN_PERM, snet_genl_policy,
+ dumpit, list),
+ SNET_GENL_OPS(SNET_C_VERDICT, GENL_ADMIN_PERM, snet_genl_policy,
+ doit, verdict),
+ SNET_GENL_OPS(SNET_C_CONFIG, GENL_ADMIN_PERM, snet_genl_policy,
+ doit, config),
+};
+
+#undef SNET_GENL_OPS
+
+static __init int snet_netlink_init(void)
+{
+ return genl_register_family_with_ops(&snet_genl_family,
+ snet_genl_ops,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(snet_genl_ops));
+}
+
+void snet_netlink_exit(void)
+{
+ genl_unregister_family(&snet_genl_family);
+}
+
+__initcall(snet_netlink_init);
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_netlink.h b/security/snet/snet_netlink.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5e80d7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_netlink.h
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+#ifndef _SNET_NETLINK_H
+#define _SNET_NETLINK_H
+
+#include <linux/in6.h>
+
+extern unsigned int snet_verdict_delay;
+extern unsigned int snet_ticket_delay;
+extern unsigned int snet_ticket_mode;
+
+int snet_nl_send_event(struct snet_info *info);
+
+int snet_nl_list_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 pid, u32 seq,
+ u32 flags, u8 protocol, enum snet_syscall syscall);
+
+void snet_netlink_exit(void);
+
+#endif /* _SNET_NETLINK_H */
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_netlink_helper.c b/security/snet/snet_netlink_helper.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d7d743c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_netlink_helper.c
@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
+#include <net/netlink.h>
+#include <net/genetlink.h>
+#include <linux/in6.h>
+#include <linux/snet.h>
+
+static int fill_src(struct sk_buff *skb_rsp, struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ int ret;
+ switch (info->family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+ ret = nla_put(skb_rsp, SNET_A_IPV4SADDR,
+ sizeof(struct in_addr), &(info->src.u3.ip));
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case PF_INET6:
+ ret = nla_put(skb_rsp, SNET_A_IPV6SADDR,
+ sizeof(struct in6_addr), &(info->src.u3.ip6));
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ ret = nla_put_u16(skb_rsp, SNET_A_SPORT, info->src.u.port);
+out:
+ return ret;
+
+}
+
+static int fill_dst(struct sk_buff *skb_rsp, struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ int ret;
+ switch (info->family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+ ret = nla_put(skb_rsp, SNET_A_IPV4DADDR,
+ sizeof(struct in_addr), &(info->dst.u3.ip));
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case PF_INET6:
+ ret = nla_put(skb_rsp, SNET_A_IPV6DADDR,
+ sizeof(struct in6_addr), &(info->dst.u3.ip6));
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ ret = nla_put_u16(skb_rsp, SNET_A_DPORT, info->dst.u.port);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int snet_fill_create(struct sk_buff *skb_rsp, struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ int ret;
+ ret = nla_put_u8(skb_rsp, SNET_A_TYPE, info->type);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int snet_fill_bind(struct sk_buff *skb_rsp, struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ return fill_src(skb_rsp, info);
+}
+
+static int snet_fill_connect(struct sk_buff *skb_rsp, struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = fill_src(skb_rsp, info);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto out;
+ ret = fill_dst(skb_rsp, info);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int snet_fill_listen(struct sk_buff *skb_rsp, struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ return fill_src(skb_rsp, info);
+}
+
+static int snet_fill_accept(struct sk_buff *skb_rsp, struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ return fill_src(skb_rsp, info);
+}
+
+static int snet_fill_post_accept(struct sk_buff *skb_rsp,
+ struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = fill_src(skb_rsp, info);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto out;
+ ret = fill_dst(skb_rsp, info);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int snet_fill_sendmsg(struct sk_buff *skb_rsp, struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = fill_src(skb_rsp, info);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto out;
+ ret = fill_dst(skb_rsp, info);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int snet_fill_recvmsg(struct sk_buff *skb_rsp, struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = fill_src(skb_rsp, info);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto out;
+ ret = fill_dst(skb_rsp, info);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int snet_fill_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_buff *skb_rsp,
+ struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = fill_src(skb_rsp, info);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto out;
+ ret = fill_dst(skb_rsp, info);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int snet_fill_close(struct sk_buff *skb_rsp, struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = fill_src(skb_rsp, info);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto out;
+ ret = fill_dst(skb_rsp, info);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int snet_nl_fill_by_syscall(struct sk_buff *skb_rsp, struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ static int (*snet_df[])(struct sk_buff *, struct snet_info *) = {
+ [SNET_SOCKET_CREATE] = &snet_fill_create,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_BIND] = &snet_fill_bind,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_CONNECT] = &snet_fill_connect,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_LISTEN] = &snet_fill_listen,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_ACCEPT] = &snet_fill_accept,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_POST_ACCEPT] = &snet_fill_post_accept,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_SENDMSG] = &snet_fill_sendmsg,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_RECVMSG] = &snet_fill_recvmsg,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_SOCK_RCV_SKB] = &snet_fill_sock_rcv_skb,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_CLOSE] = &snet_fill_close,
+ };
+
+ if (info->syscall >= SNET_NR_SOCKET_TYPES)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ else
+ return snet_df[info->syscall](skb_rsp, info);
+}
+
+int snet_nl_size_by_syscall(struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ unsigned int size_addr4_port = nla_total_size(sizeof(struct in_addr)) +
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(u16));
+ unsigned int size_addr6_port = nla_total_size(sizeof(struct in6_addr)) +
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(u16));
+
+ unsigned int sbs4[] = {
+ [SNET_SOCKET_CREATE] = nla_total_size(sizeof(u8)),
+ [SNET_SOCKET_BIND] = size_addr4_port,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_CONNECT] = 2 * size_addr4_port,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_LISTEN] = size_addr4_port,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_ACCEPT] = size_addr4_port,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_POST_ACCEPT] = 2 * size_addr4_port,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_SENDMSG] = 2 * size_addr4_port,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_RECVMSG] = 2 * size_addr4_port,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_SOCK_RCV_SKB] = 2 * size_addr4_port,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_CLOSE] = 2 * size_addr4_port,
+ };
+
+ unsigned int sbs6[] = {
+ [SNET_SOCKET_CREATE] = nla_total_size(sizeof(u8)),
+ [SNET_SOCKET_BIND] = size_addr6_port,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_CONNECT] = 2 * size_addr6_port,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_LISTEN] = size_addr6_port,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_ACCEPT] = size_addr6_port,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_POST_ACCEPT] = 2 * size_addr6_port,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_SENDMSG] = 2 * size_addr6_port,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_RECVMSG] = 2 * size_addr6_port,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_SOCK_RCV_SKB] = 2 * size_addr6_port,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_CLOSE] = 2 * size_addr6_port,
+ };
+
+ if (info->syscall >= SNET_NR_SOCKET_TYPES)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ else {
+ switch (info->family) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ return sbs4[info->syscall];
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ return sbs6[info->syscall];
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+}
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_netlink_helper.h b/security/snet/snet_netlink_helper.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d12e563
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_netlink_helper.h
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+#ifndef _SNET_NETLINK_HELPER_H
+#define _SNET_NETLINK_HELPER_H
+
+int snet_nl_fill_by_syscall(struct sk_buff *skb_rsp, struct snet_info *info);
+int snet_nl_size_by_syscall(struct snet_info *info);
+
+#endif /* SNET_NETLINK_HELPER_H */
--
1.7.4.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [RFC v4 05/11] snet: introduce snet_hooks
From: y @ 2011-05-05 13:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, jamal, Patrick McHardy,
Grzegorz Nosek, Samir Bellabes
In-Reply-To: <1304603961-2517-1-git-send-email-y>
From: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
This patch adds the snet LSM's subsystem
snet_hooks provides the security hook's functions and the security_operations
structure. Currently hook functions are only related to network stack.
For each hook function, there is a generic mecanism:
0. check if the event [syscall, protocol] is registered
1. prepare informations for userspace
2. send informations to userspace (snet_netlink)
3. wait for verdict from userspace (snet_verdict)
4. apply verdict for the syscall
steps 3 and 4 are only valid for LSM hooks which are returning a value (a way to
'filter' the syscall). For hooks returning 'void', steps 3 and 4 don't exist,
but snet sends security informations to userspace (step 2) to update the global
security policy.
Signed-off-by: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
---
security/snet/snet_hooks.c | 764 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/snet/snet_hooks.h | 10 +
2 files changed, 774 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_hooks.c
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_hooks.h
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_hooks.c b/security/snet/snet_hooks.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1d2f9b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_hooks.c
@@ -0,0 +1,764 @@
+/*
+ * snet_hook.c
+ *
+ * here are interesting informations which can be picked up from hooks.
+ *
+ *
+ * SOCKET_CREATE:
+ * family, type, protocol
+ * SOCKET_BIND:
+ * family, protocol, saddr, sport
+ * SOCKET_CONNECT:
+ * family, protocol, saddr, sport, daddr, dport
+ * SOCKET_LISTEN:
+ * family, protocol, saddr, sport
+ * SOCKET_ACCEPT:
+ * family, protocol, saddr, sport
+ *
+ * SOCKET_SENDMSG:
+ * SOCKET_RECVMSG:
+ * SOCKET_SOCK_RCV_SKB:
+ *
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/net.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/in6.h>
+#include <net/inet_sock.h>
+#include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/snet.h>
+#include <linux/uio.h>
+#include "snet_hooks.h"
+#include "snet_verdict.h"
+#include "snet_netlink.h"
+#include "snet_event.h"
+#include "snet_ticket.h"
+#include "snet_stats.h"
+
+static inline void snet_pr_tuple(struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ switch (info->family) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ pr_debug("%pI4:%u->%pI4:%u\n",
+ &info->src.u3.ip, info->src.u.port,
+ &info->dst.u3.ip, info->dst.u.port);
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ pr_debug("%pI6:%u->%pI6:%u\n",
+ &info->src.u3.ip6, info->src.u.port,
+ &info->dst.u3.ip6, info->dst.u.port);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return;
+}
+
+static inline int snet_check_listeners(enum snet_verdict *verdict)
+{
+ if (snet_nl_pid == 0 || snet_nl_pid == current->pid ) {
+ if (verdict != NULL)
+ *verdict = SNET_VERDICT_GRANT;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void snet_do_verdict(enum snet_verdict *verdict, struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ if (info->verdict_id == 0)
+ return;
+ /* sending networking informations to userspace */
+ if (snet_nl_send_event(info) == 0)
+ /* waiting for userspace reply or timeout */
+ *verdict = snet_verdict_wait(info->verdict_id);
+ /* removing verdict */
+ snet_verdict_remove(info->verdict_id);
+ return;
+}
+
+static int snet_do_send_event(struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ return snet_nl_send_event(info);
+}
+
+/*
+ * security operations helper functions
+ */
+
+/*
+ * security operations functions members
+ */
+
+static int snet_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
+{
+ enum snet_verdict verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+
+ /* if (kern) */
+ /* ; /\* do something smart *\/ */
+
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_EXEC, SNET_SOCKET_CREATE);
+
+ if (snet_check_listeners(&verdict) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (snet_event_is_registered(SNET_SOCKET_CREATE, protocol)) {
+ struct snet_info info;
+
+ /* inserting verdict PENDING */
+ info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
+
+ /* prepare networking informations for userspace */
+ info.syscall = SNET_SOCKET_CREATE;
+ info.protocol = protocol;
+ info.family = family;
+ info.type = type;
+
+ pr_debug("family=%u type=%u protocol=%u kern=%u\n",
+ family, type, protocol, kern);
+
+ snet_do_verdict(&verdict, &info);
+ snet_stats_inc_reg(verdict, SNET_SOCKET_CREATE);
+ } else {
+ verdict = SNET_VERDICT_GRANT;
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_UNREG, SNET_SOCKET_CREATE);
+ }
+
+ if (verdict == SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ verdict = snet_verdict_policy;
+
+out:
+ return verdict;
+}
+
+static int snet_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
+ struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+ enum snet_verdict verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+ u8 protocol = 0;
+
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_EXEC, SNET_SOCKET_BIND);
+
+ if (snet_check_listeners(&verdict) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ protocol = sock->sk->sk_protocol;
+
+ if (snet_event_is_registered(SNET_SOCKET_BIND, protocol)) {
+ struct snet_info info;
+ struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sock->sk);
+ struct sockaddr_in *a = (struct sockaddr_in *) address;
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *a6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) address;
+
+ /* prepare networking informations for userspace */
+ info.syscall = SNET_SOCKET_BIND;
+ info.protocol = protocol;
+ info.family = sock->sk->sk_family;
+ info.dst.u.port = ntohs(inet->inet_dport);
+
+ switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+ info.src.u3.ip = a->sin_addr.s_addr;
+ info.dst.u3.ip = inet->inet_daddr;
+ info.src.u.port = ntohs(a->sin_port);
+ /* check tickets */
+ verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info) ;
+ if (verdict != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ goto out;
+ /* inserting verdict PENDING */
+ info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
+ break;
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+ case PF_INET6:
+ memcpy(&info.src.u3.ip6, (void *)&a6->sin6_addr,
+ sizeof(info.src.u3.ip6));
+ memcpy(&info.dst.u3.ip6, (void *)&inet->pinet6->daddr,
+ sizeof(info.dst.u3.ip6));
+ info.src.u.port = ntohs(a6->sin6_port);
+ /* check tickets */
+ verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info);
+ if (verdict != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ goto out;
+ /* inserting verdict PENDING */
+ info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+ goto skip_send_wait;
+ break;
+ }
+ snet_pr_tuple(&info);
+ snet_do_verdict(&verdict, &info);
+ /* create ticket */
+ snet_ticket_create(&info, verdict);
+ snet_stats_inc_reg(verdict, SNET_SOCKET_BIND);
+ } else {
+ verdict = SNET_VERDICT_GRANT;
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_UNREG, SNET_SOCKET_BIND);
+ }
+
+skip_send_wait:
+ if (verdict == SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ verdict = snet_verdict_policy;
+out:
+ return verdict;
+}
+
+static int snet_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
+ struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+ enum snet_verdict verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+ u8 protocol = 0;
+
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_EXEC, SNET_SOCKET_CONNECT);
+
+ if (snet_check_listeners(&verdict) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ protocol = sock->sk->sk_protocol;
+
+ if (snet_event_is_registered(SNET_SOCKET_CONNECT, protocol)) {
+ struct snet_info info;
+ struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sock->sk);
+ struct sockaddr_in *a = (struct sockaddr_in *) address;
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *a6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) address;
+
+ /* prepare networking informations for userspace */
+ memset(&info, 0, sizeof(struct snet_info));
+ info.syscall = SNET_SOCKET_CONNECT;
+ info.protocol = protocol;
+ info.family = sock->sk->sk_family;
+ info.src.u.port = ntohs(inet->inet_sport);
+
+ switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+ info.src.u3.ip = inet->inet_saddr;
+ info.dst.u3.ip = a->sin_addr.s_addr;
+ info.dst.u.port = ntohs(a->sin_port);
+ /* check tickets */
+ verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info);
+ if (verdict != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ goto out;
+ /* inserting verdict PENDING */
+ info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
+ break;
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+ case PF_INET6:
+ memcpy(&info.src.u3.ip6, (void *)&inet->pinet6->saddr,
+ sizeof(info.src.u3.ip6));
+ memcpy(&info.dst.u3.ip6, (void *)&a6->sin6_addr,
+ sizeof(info.dst.u3.ip6));
+ info.dst.u.port = ntohs(a6->sin6_port);
+ /* check tickets */
+ verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info);
+ if (verdict != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ goto out;
+ /* inserting verdict PENDING */
+ info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+ goto skip_send_wait;
+ break;
+ }
+ snet_pr_tuple(&info);
+ snet_do_verdict(&verdict, &info);
+ /* create ticket */
+ snet_ticket_create(&info, verdict);
+ snet_stats_inc_reg(verdict, SNET_SOCKET_CONNECT);
+ } else {
+ verdict = SNET_VERDICT_GRANT;
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_UNREG, SNET_SOCKET_CONNECT);
+ }
+
+skip_send_wait:
+ if (verdict == SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ verdict = snet_verdict_policy;
+out:
+ return verdict;
+}
+
+static int snet_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
+{
+ enum snet_verdict verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+ u8 protocol = 0;
+
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_EXEC, SNET_SOCKET_LISTEN);
+
+ if (snet_check_listeners(&verdict) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ protocol = sock->sk->sk_protocol;
+
+ if (snet_event_is_registered(SNET_SOCKET_LISTEN, protocol)) {
+ struct snet_info info;
+ struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sock->sk);
+
+ /* prepare networking informations for userspace */
+ memset(&info, 0, sizeof(struct snet_info));
+ info.syscall = SNET_SOCKET_LISTEN;
+ info.protocol = protocol;
+ info.family = sock->sk->sk_family;
+ info.src.u.port = ntohs(inet->inet_sport);
+ info.dst.u.port = ntohs(inet->inet_dport);
+
+ switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+ info.src.u3.ip = inet->inet_saddr;
+ info.dst.u3.ip = inet->inet_daddr;
+ /* check tickets */
+ verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info);
+ if (verdict != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ goto out;
+ /* inserting verdict PENDING */
+ info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
+ break;
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+ case PF_INET6:
+ memcpy(&info.src.u3.ip6, (void *)&inet->pinet6->saddr,
+ sizeof(info.src.u3.ip6));
+ memcpy(&info.dst.u3.ip6, (void *)&inet->pinet6->daddr,
+ sizeof(info.dst.u3.ip6));
+ /* check tickets */
+ verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info);
+ if (verdict != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ goto out;
+ /* inserting verdict PENDING */
+ info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+ goto skip_send_wait;
+ break;
+ }
+ snet_pr_tuple(&info);
+ snet_do_verdict(&verdict, &info);
+ /* create ticket */
+ snet_ticket_create(&info, verdict);
+ snet_stats_inc_reg(verdict, SNET_SOCKET_LISTEN);
+ } else {
+ verdict = SNET_VERDICT_GRANT;
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_UNREG, SNET_SOCKET_LISTEN);
+ }
+
+skip_send_wait:
+ if (verdict == SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ verdict = snet_verdict_policy;
+out:
+ return verdict;
+}
+
+static int snet_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
+{
+ enum snet_verdict verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+ u8 protocol = 0;
+
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_EXEC, SNET_SOCKET_ACCEPT);
+
+ if (snet_check_listeners(&verdict) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ protocol = sock->sk->sk_protocol;
+
+ if (snet_event_is_registered(SNET_SOCKET_ACCEPT, protocol)) {
+ struct snet_info info;
+ struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sock->sk);
+
+ /* prepare networking informations for userspace */
+ info.syscall = SNET_SOCKET_ACCEPT;
+ info.protocol = protocol;
+ info.family = sock->sk->sk_family;
+ info.src.u.port = ntohs(inet->inet_sport);
+ info.dst.u.port = ntohs(inet->inet_dport);
+
+ switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+ info.src.u3.ip = inet->inet_saddr;
+ info.dst.u3.ip = inet->inet_daddr;
+ /* check tickets */
+ verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info);
+ if (verdict != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ goto out;
+ /* inserting verdict PENDING */
+ info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
+ break;
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+ case PF_INET6:
+ memcpy(&info.src.u3.ip6, (void *)&inet->pinet6->saddr,
+ sizeof(info.src.u3.ip6));
+ memcpy(&info.dst.u3.ip6, (void *)&inet->pinet6->daddr,
+ sizeof(info.dst.u3.ip6));
+ /* check tickets */
+ verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info);
+ if (verdict != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ goto out;
+ /* inserting verdict PENDING */
+ info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+ goto skip_send_wait;
+ break;
+ }
+ snet_pr_tuple(&info);
+ snet_do_verdict(&verdict, &info);
+ /* create ticket */
+ snet_ticket_create(&info, verdict);
+ snet_stats_inc_reg(verdict, SNET_SOCKET_ACCEPT);
+ } else {
+ verdict = SNET_VERDICT_GRANT;
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_UNREG, SNET_SOCKET_ACCEPT);
+ }
+
+skip_send_wait:
+ if (verdict == SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ verdict = snet_verdict_policy;
+out:
+ return verdict;
+}
+
+static void snet_socket_post_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
+{
+ u8 protocol = 0;
+
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_EXEC, SNET_SOCKET_POST_ACCEPT);
+
+ if (snet_check_listeners(NULL) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ protocol = sock->sk->sk_protocol;
+
+ if (snet_event_is_registered(SNET_SOCKET_POST_ACCEPT, protocol)) {
+ struct snet_info info;
+ struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(newsock->sk);
+
+ /* prepare networking informations for userspace */
+ info.syscall = SNET_SOCKET_POST_ACCEPT;
+ info.protocol = protocol;
+ info.family = sock->sk->sk_family;
+ info.verdict_id = 0;
+ info.src.u.port = ntohs(inet->inet_sport);
+ info.dst.u.port = ntohs(inet->inet_dport);
+
+ switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+ info.src.u3.ip = inet->inet_saddr;
+ info.dst.u3.ip = inet->inet_daddr;
+ break;
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+ case PF_INET6:
+ memcpy(&info.src.u3.ip6, (void *)&inet->pinet6->saddr,
+ sizeof(info.src.u3.ip6));
+ memcpy(&info.dst.u3.ip6, (void *)&inet->pinet6->daddr,
+ sizeof(info.dst.u3.ip6));
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ }
+ snet_pr_tuple(&info);
+ if (snet_do_send_event(&info) < 0)
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_REG_ERROR,
+ SNET_SOCKET_POST_ACCEPT);
+ else
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_REG_GRANT,
+ SNET_SOCKET_POST_ACCEPT);
+ }
+out:
+ return;
+}
+
+static int snet_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
+ struct msghdr *msg, int size)
+{
+ enum snet_verdict verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+ u8 protocol = 0;
+
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_EXEC, SNET_SOCKET_SENDMSG);
+
+ if (snet_check_listeners(&verdict) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ protocol = sock->sk->sk_protocol;
+
+ if (snet_event_is_registered(SNET_SOCKET_SENDMSG, protocol)) {
+ struct snet_info info;
+ struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sock->sk);
+
+ /* prepare networking informations for userspace */
+ info.syscall = SNET_SOCKET_SENDMSG;
+ info.protocol = protocol;
+ info.family = sock->sk->sk_family;
+ info.src.u.port = ntohs(inet->inet_sport);
+ info.dst.u.port = ntohs(inet->inet_dport);
+
+ switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+ info.src.u3.ip = inet->inet_saddr;
+ info.dst.u3.ip = inet->inet_daddr;
+ /* check tickets */
+ verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info);
+ if (verdict != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ goto out;
+ /* inserting verdict PENDING */
+ info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
+ break;
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+ case PF_INET6:
+ memcpy(&info.src.u3.ip6, (void *)&inet->pinet6->saddr,
+ sizeof(info.src.u3.ip6));
+ memcpy(&info.dst.u3.ip6, (void *)&inet->pinet6->daddr,
+ sizeof(info.dst.u3.ip6));
+ /* check tickets */
+ verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info);
+ if (verdict != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ goto out;
+ /* inserting verdict PENDING */
+ info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+ goto skip_send_wait;
+ break;
+ }
+ snet_pr_tuple(&info);
+ snet_do_verdict(&verdict, &info);
+ /* create ticket */
+ snet_ticket_create(&info, verdict);
+ snet_stats_inc_reg(verdict, SNET_SOCKET_SENDMSG);
+ } else {
+ verdict = SNET_VERDICT_GRANT;
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_UNREG, SNET_SOCKET_SENDMSG);
+ }
+
+skip_send_wait:
+ if (verdict == SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ verdict = snet_verdict_policy;
+out:
+ return verdict;
+}
+
+static int snet_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
+ struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags)
+{
+ enum snet_verdict verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+ u8 protocol = 0;
+
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_EXEC, SNET_SOCKET_RECVMSG);
+
+ if (snet_check_listeners(&verdict) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ protocol = sock->sk->sk_protocol;
+
+ if (snet_event_is_registered(SNET_SOCKET_RECVMSG, protocol)) {
+ struct snet_info info;
+ struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sock->sk);
+
+ /* prepare networking informations for userspace */
+ info.syscall = SNET_SOCKET_RECVMSG;
+ info.protocol = protocol;
+ info.family = sock->sk->sk_family;
+ info.src.u.port = ntohs(inet->inet_sport);
+ info.dst.u.port = ntohs(inet->inet_dport);
+
+ switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+ info.src.u3.ip = inet->inet_saddr;
+ info.dst.u3.ip = inet->inet_daddr;
+ /* check tickets */
+ verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info);
+ if (verdict != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ goto out;
+ /* inserting verdict PENDING */
+ info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
+ break;
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+ case PF_INET6:
+ memcpy(&info.src.u3.ip6, (void *)&inet->pinet6->saddr,
+ sizeof(info.src.u3.ip6));
+ memcpy(&info.dst.u3.ip6, (void *)&inet->pinet6->daddr,
+ sizeof(info.dst.u3.ip6));
+ /* check tickets */
+ verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info);
+ if (verdict != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ goto out;
+ /* inserting verdict PENDING */
+ info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+ goto skip_send_wait;
+ break;
+ }
+ snet_pr_tuple(&info);
+ snet_do_verdict(&verdict, &info);
+ /* create ticket */
+ snet_ticket_create(&info, verdict);
+ snet_stats_inc_reg(verdict, SNET_SOCKET_RECVMSG);
+ } else {
+ verdict = SNET_VERDICT_GRANT;
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_UNREG, SNET_SOCKET_RECVMSG);
+ }
+
+skip_send_wait:
+ if (verdict == SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ verdict = snet_verdict_policy;
+out:
+ return verdict;
+}
+
+static int snet_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ enum snet_verdict verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+ u8 protocol = 0;
+
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_EXEC, SNET_SOCKET_SOCK_RCV_SKB);
+
+ if (snet_check_listeners(&verdict) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ protocol = sk->sk_protocol;
+
+ if (snet_event_is_registered(SNET_SOCKET_SOCK_RCV_SKB, protocol)) {
+ struct snet_info info;
+ struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
+
+ /* prepare networking informations for userspace */
+ info.syscall = SNET_SOCKET_SOCK_RCV_SKB;
+ info.protocol = protocol;
+ info.family = sk->sk_family;
+ info.src.u.port = ntohs(inet->inet_sport);
+ info.dst.u.port = ntohs(inet->inet_dport);
+
+ switch (sk->sk_family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+ /* inserting verdict PENDING */
+ /* info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert(); */
+
+ info.src.u3.ip = inet->inet_saddr;
+ info.dst.u3.ip = inet->inet_daddr;
+ break;
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+ case PF_INET6:
+ /* inserting verdict PENDING */
+ /* info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert(); */
+
+ memcpy(&info.src.u3.ip6, (void *)&inet->pinet6->saddr,
+ sizeof(info.src.u3.ip6));
+ memcpy(&info.dst.u3.ip6, (void *)&inet->pinet6->daddr,
+ sizeof(info.dst.u3.ip6));
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+ goto skip_send_wait;
+ break;
+ }
+ snet_pr_tuple(&info);
+ /* SNET_DOC_VERDICT(info); */
+ } else {
+ verdict = SNET_VERDICT_GRANT;
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_UNREG, SNET_SOCKET_SOCK_RCV_SKB);
+ }
+
+skip_send_wait:
+ if (verdict == SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ verdict = snet_verdict_policy;
+out:
+ return verdict;
+}
+
+static void snet_socket_close(struct socket *sock)
+{
+ u8 protocol = 0;
+
+ if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_EXEC, SNET_SOCKET_CLOSE);
+
+ if (snet_check_listeners(NULL) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ protocol = sock->sk->sk_protocol;
+
+ if (snet_event_is_registered(SNET_SOCKET_CLOSE, protocol)) {
+ struct snet_info info;
+ struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sock->sk);
+
+ /* prepare networking informations for userspace */
+ info.syscall = SNET_SOCKET_CLOSE;
+ info.protocol = protocol;
+ info.family = sock->sk->sk_family;
+ info.verdict_id = 0;
+ info.src.u.port = ntohs(inet->inet_sport);
+ info.dst.u.port = ntohs(inet->inet_dport);
+
+ switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+ info.src.u3.ip = inet->inet_saddr;
+ info.dst.u3.ip = inet->inet_daddr;
+ break;
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+ case PF_INET6:
+ memcpy(&info.src.u3.ip6, (void *)&inet->pinet6->saddr,
+ sizeof(info.src.u3.ip6));
+ memcpy(&info.dst.u3.ip6, (void *)&inet->pinet6->daddr,
+ sizeof(info.dst.u3.ip6));
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ }
+ snet_pr_tuple(&info);
+ if (snet_do_send_event(&info) < 0)
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_REG_ERROR, SNET_SOCKET_CLOSE);
+ else
+ SNET_STATS_INC(SNET_STATS_REG_GRANT, SNET_SOCKET_CLOSE);
+ }
+out:
+ return;
+}
+
+static struct security_operations snet_security_ops = {
+ .name = "snet",
+
+ .socket_create = snet_socket_create,
+ .socket_bind = snet_socket_bind,
+ .socket_connect = snet_socket_connect,
+ .socket_listen = snet_socket_listen,
+ .socket_accept = snet_socket_accept,
+ .socket_post_accept = snet_socket_post_accept,
+ .socket_sendmsg = snet_socket_sendmsg,
+ .socket_recvmsg = snet_socket_recvmsg,
+ .socket_sock_rcv_skb = snet_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
+ .socket_close = snet_socket_close,
+
+ .cred_prepare = snet_prepare_creds,
+ .cred_free = snet_cred_free,
+};
+
+int snet_hooks_init(void)
+{
+ if (!security_module_enable(&snet_security_ops))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (register_security(&snet_security_ops))
+ panic("snet: failed to register security_ops\n");
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_hooks.h b/security/snet/snet_hooks.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..05fe5e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_hooks.h
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+#ifndef _SNET_HOOKS_H
+#define _SNET_HOOKS_H
+
+extern uint32_t snet_nl_pid;
+extern unsigned int snet_verdict_policy;
+
+/* init function */
+int snet_hooks_init(void);
+
+#endif /* _SNET_HOOK_H */
--
1.7.4.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [RFC v4 07/11] snet: introduce snet_verdict
From: y @ 2011-05-05 13:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, jamal, Patrick McHardy,
Grzegorz Nosek, Samir Bellabes
In-Reply-To: <1304603961-2517-1-git-send-email-y>
From: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
This patch adds the snet's subsystem responsive of managing verdicts
snet is using the word 'verdict' for the returning value of LSM hooks.
Different states exist (grant/deny/pending/none).
This patch introduces a hashtable 'verdict_hash' and operations (set/get/search..)
in order to manage verdicts. Syscalls are waiting, inside a classical waitqueue,
for theirs verdicts or for a timeout. Timeout value and the default verdict
policy are configurable at boot or by the snet_netlink subsystem.
With the help of the communication's subsystem, verdicts are coming from userspace
Signed-off-by: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
---
security/snet/snet_verdict.c | 203 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/snet/snet_verdict.h | 23 +++++
2 files changed, 226 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_verdict.c
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_verdict.h
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_verdict.c b/security/snet/snet_verdict.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b0811ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_verdict.c
@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/wait.h>
+#include <asm/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/snet.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include "snet_verdict.h"
+
+static struct list_head *snet_vdh;
+static rwlock_t snet_vdh_lock = __RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED();
+
+struct snet_verdict_entry {
+ struct list_head list;
+ u32 verdict_id;
+ enum snet_verdict verdict;
+};
+
+static atomic_t value = ATOMIC_INIT(1);
+
+/* when waiting for a verdict, process is added to this queue */
+static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(snet_wq);
+
+static struct kmem_cache *snet_verdict_entry_cachep;
+
+/* lookup for a verdict - before using this function, lock snet_vdh_lock */
+static struct snet_verdict_entry *__snet_verdict_lookup(const u32 verdict_id)
+{
+ unsigned int h = 0;
+ struct list_head *l = NULL;
+ struct snet_verdict_entry *s = NULL;
+
+ h = verdict_id % snet_vdh_size;
+ l = &snet_vdh[h];
+
+ list_for_each_entry(s, l, list) {
+ if (s->verdict_id == verdict_id) {
+ return s;
+ }
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const enum snet_verdict snet_verdict_wait(const u32 verdict_id)
+{
+ enum snet_verdict verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+ long ret = 0;
+
+ ret = wait_event_timeout(snet_wq,
+ (verdict = snet_verdict_get(verdict_id))
+ != SNET_VERDICT_PENDING,
+ snet_verdict_delay * HZ);
+ if (ret)
+ return snet_verdict_get(verdict_id);
+ else
+ return SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+}
+
+const enum snet_verdict snet_verdict_get(const u32 verdict_id)
+{
+ enum snet_verdict v = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+ struct snet_verdict_entry *data = NULL;
+
+ read_lock_bh(&snet_vdh_lock);
+ data = __snet_verdict_lookup(verdict_id);
+ if (data != NULL)
+ v = data->verdict;
+
+ read_unlock_bh(&snet_vdh_lock);
+ return v;
+}
+
+int snet_verdict_set(const u32 verdict_id, const enum snet_verdict verdict)
+{
+ struct snet_verdict_entry *data = NULL;
+ int ret = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (verdict >= SNET_NR_VERDICT_TYPES)
+ goto out;
+
+ write_lock_bh(&snet_vdh_lock);
+ data = __snet_verdict_lookup(verdict_id);
+ if (data != NULL) {
+ /* if verdict is already set because of
+ timeout, we won't modify it */
+ if (data->verdict == SNET_VERDICT_PENDING) {
+ data->verdict = verdict;
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ write_unlock_bh(&snet_vdh_lock);
+ wake_up(&snet_wq);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int snet_verdict_remove(const u32 verdict_id)
+{
+ struct snet_verdict_entry *data = NULL;
+
+ write_lock_bh(&snet_vdh_lock);
+ data = __snet_verdict_lookup(verdict_id);
+ if (data == NULL) {
+ write_unlock_bh(&snet_vdh_lock);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ pr_debug("(verdict_id=%u)\n", data->verdict_id);
+ list_del(&data->list);
+ write_unlock_bh(&snet_vdh_lock);
+ kmem_cache_free(snet_verdict_entry_cachep, data);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int snet_verdict_insert(void)
+{
+ struct snet_verdict_entry *data = NULL;
+ unsigned int h = 0;
+ u32 verdict_id = 0;
+
+ data = kmem_cache_zalloc(snet_verdict_entry_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ do {
+ verdict_id = atomic_inc_return(&value);
+ } while (verdict_id == 0);
+
+ data->verdict_id = verdict_id;
+ data->verdict = SNET_VERDICT_PENDING;
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&(data->list));
+ h = data->verdict_id % snet_vdh_size;
+
+ write_lock_bh(&snet_vdh_lock);
+ list_add_tail(&data->list, &snet_vdh[h]);
+ pr_debug("[%u]=(verdict_id=%u)\n", h, data->verdict_id);
+ write_unlock_bh(&snet_vdh_lock);
+
+ return verdict_id;
+}
+
+void snet_verdict_flush(void)
+{
+ unsigned int i = 0;
+
+ write_lock_bh(&snet_vdh_lock);
+ for (i = 0; i < snet_vdh_size; i++) {
+ struct snet_verdict_entry *data, *tmp;
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(data, tmp, &snet_vdh[i], list) {
+ list_del(&data->list);
+ kmem_cache_free(snet_verdict_entry_cachep, data);
+ }
+ }
+ write_unlock_bh(&snet_vdh_lock);
+ return;
+}
+
+/* init function */
+int snet_verdict_init(void)
+{
+ int err = 0, i = 0;
+
+ if (snet_vdh_size == 0) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "snet: bad snet_vdh_size value\n");
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (snet_verdict_delay == 0) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "snet: bad snet_verdict_delay value\n");
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ snet_vdh = kzalloc(sizeof(struct list_head) * snet_vdh_size,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!snet_vdh) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING
+ "snet: can't alloc memory for verdict\n");
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < snet_vdh_size; i++)
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&snet_vdh[i]);
+
+ /* snet_verdict_entry_cachep is not destroyed */
+ snet_verdict_entry_cachep = kmem_cache_create("snet_verdict_entry",
+ sizeof(struct snet_verdict_entry),
+ 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+out:
+ return err;
+}
+
+/* exit function */
+void snet_verdict_exit(void)
+{
+ if (snet_vdh) {
+ kfree(snet_vdh);
+ snet_vdh = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return;
+}
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_verdict.h b/security/snet/snet_verdict.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..07e8638
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_verdict.h
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+#ifndef _SNET_VERDICT_H
+#define _SNET_VERDICT_H
+
+extern unsigned int snet_vdh_size;
+extern unsigned int snet_verdict_delay;
+
+/* helper functions */
+const enum snet_verdict snet_verdict_wait(const u32 verdict_id);
+
+/* manipulate the verdicts hash table */
+const enum snet_verdict snet_verdict_get(const u32 verdict_id);
+int snet_verdict_set(const u32 verdict_id, const enum snet_verdict verdict);
+int snet_verdict_insert(void);
+int snet_verdict_remove(const u32 verdict_id);
+int snet_verdict_insert(void);
+void snet_verdict_flush(void);
+
+/* init function */
+int snet_verdict_init(void);
+/* exit function */
+void snet_verdict_exit(void);
+
+#endif /* _SNET_VERDICT_H */
--
1.7.4.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [RFC v4 09/11] snet: introduce snet_utils
From: y @ 2011-05-05 13:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, jamal, Patrick McHardy,
Grzegorz Nosek, Samir Bellabes
In-Reply-To: <1304603961-2517-1-git-send-email-y>
From: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
This patch provides helper functions for other subsystems
Signed-off-by: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
---
security/snet/snet_utils.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/snet/snet_utils.h | 9 +++++++++
2 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_utils.c
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_utils.h
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_utils.c b/security/snet/snet_utils.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4e80263
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_utils.c
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/snet.h>
+
+const char *snet_verdict_name(const enum snet_verdict cmd)
+{
+ static const char *const verdict_name[] = {
+ [SNET_VERDICT_GRANT] = "Grant",
+ [SNET_VERDICT_DENY] = "Deny",
+ [SNET_VERDICT_PENDING] = "Pending",
+ [SNET_VERDICT_NONE] = "None",
+ [SNET_VERDICT_INVALID] = "Invalid",
+ };
+
+ if (cmd >= SNET_NR_VERDICT_TYPES)
+ return "ERROR";
+ else
+ return verdict_name[cmd];
+}
+
+const char *snet_syscall_name(const enum snet_syscall sys)
+{
+ static const char *const syscall_name[] = {
+ [SNET_SOCKET_CREATE] = "Create",
+ [SNET_SOCKET_BIND] = "Bind",
+ [SNET_SOCKET_CONNECT] = "Connect",
+ [SNET_SOCKET_LISTEN] = "Listen",
+ [SNET_SOCKET_ACCEPT] = "Accept",
+ [SNET_SOCKET_POST_ACCEPT] = "Post Accept",
+ [SNET_SOCKET_SENDMSG] = "Sendmsg",
+ [SNET_SOCKET_RECVMSG] = "Recvmsg",
+ [SNET_SOCKET_SOCK_RCV_SKB] = "Sock Rcv Skb",
+ [SNET_SOCKET_CLOSE] = "Close",
+ };
+
+ if (sys >= SNET_NR_SOCKET_TYPES)
+ return "ERROR";
+ else
+ return syscall_name[sys];
+}
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_utils.h b/security/snet/snet_utils.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..01e515f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_utils.h
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+#ifndef _SNET_UTILS_H
+#define _SNET_UTILS_H
+
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+
+const char *snet_verdict_name(const enum snet_verdict cmd);
+const char *snet_syscall_name(const enum snet_syscall sys);
+
+#endif /* _SNET_UTILS_H */
--
1.7.4.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [RFC v4 02/11] lsm: reintroduce security_socket_post_accept()
From: y @ 2011-05-05 13:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, jamal, Patrick McHardy,
Grzegorz Nosek, Samir Bellabes
In-Reply-To: <1304603961-2517-1-git-send-email-y>
From: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
snet needs to reintroduce this hook, as it was designed to be: a hook for
updating security informations on objects.
Originally, This was a direct revert of commit
8651d5c0b1f874c5b8307ae2b858bc40f9f02482.
But from the comment of Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> :
> Please move security_socket_post_accept() to before fd_install().
> Otherwise, other threads which share fd tables can use
> security-informations-not-yet-updated accept()ed sockets.
Signed-off-by: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 13 +++++++++++++
net/socket.c | 2 ++
security/capability.c | 5 +++++
security/security.c | 5 +++++
4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index da0d59e..02effe5 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -875,6 +875,11 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
* @sock contains the listening socket structure.
* @newsock contains the newly created server socket for connection.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_post_accept:
+ * This hook allows a security module to copy security
+ * information into the newly created socket's inode.
+ * @sock contains the listening socket structure.
+ * @newsock contains the newly created server socket for connection.
* @socket_sendmsg:
* Check permission before transmitting a message to another socket.
* @sock contains the socket structure.
@@ -1587,6 +1592,8 @@ struct security_operations {
struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen);
int (*socket_listen) (struct socket *sock, int backlog);
int (*socket_accept) (struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock);
+ void (*socket_post_accept) (struct socket *sock,
+ struct socket *newsock);
int (*socket_sendmsg) (struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, int size);
int (*socket_recvmsg) (struct socket *sock,
@@ -2555,6 +2562,7 @@ int security_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addr
int security_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen);
int security_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog);
int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock);
+void security_socket_post_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock);
int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size);
int security_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
int size, int flags);
@@ -2640,6 +2648,11 @@ static inline int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock,
return 0;
}
+static inline void security_socket_post_accept(struct socket *sock,
+ struct socket *newsock)
+{
+}
+
static inline int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, int size)
{
diff --git a/net/socket.c b/net/socket.c
index d588e9e..7807904 100644
--- a/net/socket.c
+++ b/net/socket.c
@@ -1535,6 +1535,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(accept4, int, fd, struct sockaddr __user *, upeer_sockaddr,
goto out_fd;
}
+ security_socket_post_accept(sock, newsock);
+
/* File flags are not inherited via accept() unlike another OSes. */
fd_install(newfd, newfile);
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 1f8bbe2..da68c60 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -593,6 +593,10 @@ static int cap_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
return 0;
}
+static void cap_socket_post_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
+{
+}
+
static int cap_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size)
{
return 0;
@@ -1022,6 +1026,7 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_connect);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_listen);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_accept);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_post_accept);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_sendmsg);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_recvmsg);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_getsockname);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 84187d8..eda2b75 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1038,6 +1038,11 @@ int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
return security_ops->socket_accept(sock, newsock);
}
+void security_socket_post_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
+{
+ security_ops->socket_post_accept(sock, newsock);
+}
+
int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size)
{
return security_ops->socket_sendmsg(sock, msg, size);
--
1.7.4.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: ARM, AF_PACKET: caching problems on Marvell Kirkwood
From: Phil Sutter @ 2011-05-05 14:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-arm-kernel, netdev, ne
Cc: Johann Baudy, Lennert Buytenhek, Nicolas Pitre
In-Reply-To: <20110408130643.GA8730@orbit.nwl.cc>
Hi,
Hasn't anyone experienced this bug but me? Can anyone reproduce the
described behaviour on his Kirkwood-based (or even generic ARM) machine?
I am still not sure if this is a problem of just my CPU or common
amongst Kirkwood/VIPT/ARM machines.
My workaround looks like this:
| diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
| index b5362e9..0672f50 100644
| --- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
| +++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
| @@ -1298,10 +1298,13 @@ static int packet_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
| {
| struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
| struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
| - if (po->tx_ring.pg_vec)
| - return tpacket_snd(po, msg);
| - else
| - return packet_snd(sock, msg, len);
| + int rc;
| +
| + flush_cache_all();
| + rc = po->tx_ring.pg_vec ? tpacket_snd(po, msg) :
| + packet_snd(sock, msg, len);
| + flush_cache_all();
| + return rc;
| }
|
| /*
Greetings, Phil
(Full-quoting here because I've added the TX ring author and the Kirkwood
maintainers to Cc.)
On Fri, Apr 08, 2011 at 03:06:43PM +0200, Phil Sutter wrote:
> Dear lists,
>
> I am experiencing severe caching issues using the TX_RING feature of
> AF_PACKET on a Kirkwood-based system (i.e., OpenRD). This may likely be
> a bug of the CPU/SoC itself, at least it reacts a bit picky when using
> the preload data instruction (pld) in rather useless cases (but that's a
> different story).
>
> There is simple testing code at the end of this email, effectively just
> preparing a packet in the TX_RING and triggering it's delivery once per
> second. The experienced symptom is that sporadically nothing goes out in
> one iteration, and two packets in the following one.
>
> It looks like the kernel doesn't get the changed value of tp_status in
> time, although userspace sees the correct value. Note that moving the
> sleep(1) from the end of the loop to just before calling sendto() fixes
> the problem.
>
> Another (more useful) workaround is to call flush_cache_all() at the
> beginning of packet_sendmsg() in net/packet/af_packet.c. I was not able
> to fix this with some more specific flushing at that place. Anyway, the
> call to flush_dcache_page() from __packet_get_status() in the same
> source file is meant to do the trick I guess. But somehow doesn't.
>
> Feedback regardles of which kind is highly appreciated, of course!
>
> Greetings, Phil
>
> ------------------[start of packet_mmap_test.c]--------------------
> #include <stdint.h>
> #include <stdio.h>
> #include <stdlib.h>
> #include <string.h>
> #include <linux/if_ether.h>
> #include <linux/if_packet.h>
> #include <net/if.h>
> #include <sys/ioctl.h>
> #include <sys/mman.h>
> #include <sys/socket.h>
> #include <sys/types.h>
>
> #define PERROR_EXIT(rc, mesg) { \
> perror(mesg); \
> return rc; \
> }
>
> int main(void)
> {
> uint32_t size;
> struct sockaddr_ll sa;
> struct ifreq ifr;
> int index;
> int tmp;
> int fd;
> struct tpacket_req packet_req;
> struct tpacket2_hdr * ps_header_start, *ps_header;
>
> if ((fd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_DGRAM, htons(ETH_P_ALL))) < 0)
> PERROR_EXIT(EXIT_FAILURE, "socket");
>
> /* retrieve eth0's interface index number */
> strncpy (ifr.ifr_name, "eth0", sizeof(ifr.ifr_name));
> if (ioctl(fd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &ifr) < 0)
> PERROR_EXIT(EXIT_FAILURE, "ioctl(SIOCGIFINDEX)");
>
> /* set sockaddr info */
> memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
> sa.sll_family = AF_PACKET;
> sa.sll_protocol = ETH_P_ALL;
> sa.sll_ifindex = ifr.ifr_ifindex;
>
> /* bind port */
> if (bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&sa, sizeof(sa)) < 0)
> PERROR_EXIT(EXIT_FAILURE, "bind()");
>
> tmp = TPACKET_V2;
> if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_VERSION, &tmp, sizeof(tmp)) < 0)
> PERROR_EXIT(EXIT_FAILURE, "setsockopt(PACKET_VERSION)");
>
> /* set packet loss option */
> tmp = 1;
> if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_LOSS, &tmp, sizeof(tmp)) < 0)
> PERROR_EXIT(EXIT_FAILURE, "setsockopt(PACKET_LOSS)");
>
> /* prepare Tx ring request */
> packet_req.tp_block_size = 1024 * 8;
> packet_req.tp_frame_size = 1024 * 8;
> packet_req.tp_block_nr = 1024;
> packet_req.tp_frame_nr = 1024;
>
> /* send TX ring request */
> if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_TX_RING,
> &packet_req, sizeof(packet_req)) < 0)
> PERROR_EXIT(EXIT_FAILURE, "setsockopt: PACKET_TX_RING");
>
> /* calculate memory to mmap in the kernel */
> size = packet_req.tp_block_size * packet_req.tp_block_nr;
>
> /* mmap Tx ring buffers memory */
> ps_header_start = mmap(0, size,
> PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
> if (ps_header_start < 0)
> PERROR_EXIT(EXIT_FAILURE, "mmap");
>
> /* fill peer sockaddr for SOCK_DGRAM */
> sa.sll_family = AF_PACKET;
> sa.sll_protocol = htons(ETH_P_IP);
> sa.sll_ifindex = ifr.ifr_ifindex;
> sa.sll_halen = ETH_ALEN;
> memset(&sa.sll_addr, 0xff, ETH_ALEN);
>
> ps_header = ps_header_start;
> while (1) {
> int sendlen, j;
>
> char *data = (void*)ps_header + TPACKET_HDRLEN
> - sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll);
>
> switch((volatile uint32_t)ps_header->tp_status)
> {
> case TP_STATUS_AVAILABLE:
> memset(data, 0x23, 150);
> break;
>
> case TP_STATUS_WRONG_FORMAT:
> printf("An error has occured during transfer\n");
> exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
> break;
>
> default:
> printf("Buffer is not available, aborting\n");
> exit(1);
> break;
> }
> ps_header->tp_len = 150;
> ps_header->tp_status = TP_STATUS_SEND_REQUEST;
>
> sendlen = sendto(fd, NULL, 0, 0,
> (struct sockaddr *)&sa, sizeof(sa));
> if (sendlen < 0)
> perror("sendto");
> else if (sendlen == 0)
> printf("sendto(): nothing sent!\n");
> else
> printf("sendto(): sent %d bytes out\n", sendlen);
>
> #define ST_IS(x) ((volatile uint32_t)ps_header->tp_status == x)
> printf("tp_status after sending: %s\n",
> ST_IS(TP_STATUS_AVAILABLE) ? "AVAILABLE" :
> ST_IS(TP_STATUS_SEND_REQUEST) ? "SEND_REQUEST" :
> ST_IS(TP_STATUS_WRONG_FORMAT) ? "WRONG_FORMAT" :
> "unknown");
> #undef ST_IS
>
> ps_header = (void *)ps_header + packet_req.tp_frame_size;
> if (ps_header >= ps_header_start + size)
> ps_header = ps_header_start;
>
> sleep(1);
> }
> return 0;
> }
> --------------------[end of packet_mmap_test.c]--------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> linux-arm-kernel mailing list
> linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
> http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RFC v3 02/10] Revert "lsm: Remove the socket_post_accept() hook"
From: Paul Moore @ 2011-05-05 14:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tetsuo Handa
Cc: sam, linux-security-module, linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel,
hadi, kaber, zbr, root
In-Reply-To: <201105041128.BAB13061.LMHVtOSOQOFFJF@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
On Tuesday, May 03, 2011 10:28:24 PM Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Tuesday, May 03, 2011 10:24:15 AM Samir Bellabes wrote:
> > > snet needs to reintroduce this hook, as it was designed to be: a hook
> > > for updating security informations on objects.
> >
> > Looking at this and 5/10 again, it seems that you should be able to do
> > what you need with the sock_graft() hook. Am I missing something?
> >
> > My apologies if we've already discussed this approach previously ...
>
> static void snet_socket_post_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket
> *newsock) {
> static void snet_do_send_event(struct snet_info *info)
> {
> int snet_nl_send_event(struct snet_info *info)
> {
> skb_rsp = genlmsg_new(size, GFP_KERNEL);
> genlmsg_unicast()
> }
> }
> }
>
> First problem with using snet_do_send_event() from security_sock_graft() is
> that we have to use GFP_ATOMIC rather than GFP_KERNEL because we are inside
> write_lock_bh()/write_unlock_bh().
I guess I don't see that as being a blocker ...
> static inline int genlmsg_unicast(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, u32
> pid) {
> static inline int nlmsg_unicast(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32
> pid) {
> int netlink_unicast(struct sock *ssk, struct sk_buff *skb,
> u32 pid, MSG_DONTWAIT)
> {
> int netlink_attachskb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
> long *timeo, struct sock *ssk)
> {
> if (!*timeo) {
> return -EAGAIN;
> }
> }
> }
> }
>
> Second problem is that genlmsg_unicast() might return -EAGAIN because we
> can't sleep inside write_lock_bh()/write_unlock_bh().
Ah yes, the real problem. I forgot that snet relied on a user space tool. I
tend to agree with others who have suggested this is not the right approach,
but I understand why you want the post_accept() hook; thanks for reminding me.
--
paul moore
linux @ hp
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: ath5k regression associating with APs in 2.6.38
From: Nick Kossifidis @ 2011-05-05 14:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Nick Kossifidis, John W. Linville, Jiri Slaby, Luis R. Rodriguez,
Bob Copeland
In-Reply-To: <20110505135207.GA13727@thinkpad-t410>
2011/5/5 Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>:
> On Wed, May 04, 2011 at 11:09:03PM +0300, Nick Kossifidis wrote:
>> 2011/5/4 Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>:
>> > On Wed, May 04, 2011 at 01:27:17PM -0400, John W. Linville wrote:
>> >> On Wed, May 04, 2011 at 10:38:19AM -0500, Seth Forshee wrote:
>> >> > I've been investigating some reports of a regression in associating with
>> >> > APs with AR2413 in 2.6.38. Association repeatedly fails with some
>> >> > "direct probe to x timed out" messages (see syslog excerpt below),
>> >> > although it will generally associate eventually, after many tries.
>> >> >
>> >> > Bisection identifies 8aec7af (ath5k: Support synth-only channel change
>> >> > for AR2413/AR5413) as offending commit. Prior to this commit there are
>> >> > no direct probe messages at all in the logs. I've also found that
>> >> > forcing fast to false at the top of ath5k_hw_reset() fixes the issue.
>> >> > I'm not sure what the connection is between this commit and the
>> >> > timeouts. Any suggestions?
>> >>
>> >> Have you tried reverting that commit on top of 2.6.38? Can you
>> >> recreate the issue with 2.6.39-rc6 (or later)?
>> >
>> > I started to revert that commit, but it wasn't straight-forward due to
>> > later changes. Forcing fast to false in ath5k_hw_reset() acts as a
>> > functional revert of sorts since that should force it back to a full
>> > reset for all channel changes, and it's much simpler than working out
>> > the right way to revert the commit. I think the results suggest strongly
>> > that a revert is likely to fix the problem. I can finish the work to
>> > revert if you'd still like to see the results.
>> >
>> > Testing a previous .39-rc kernel still exhibited the failure. I don't
>> > recall which one it was and apparently forgot to make note of it. I'll
>> > request testing against rc6.
>> >
>> > Thanks,
>> > Seth
>> >
>>
>> Do you get scan results ?
>> Can you enable ATH5K_DEBUG_RESET and see what you get ?
>
> 2.6.39-rc6 still fails. A more comprehensive log with ATH5K_DEBUG_RESET
> enabled is below.
>
> Scanning looks to be failing according to this log. I was thinking that
> I saw successfull scans in some of the previous logs, but I'll have to
> go back and check to be sure.
>
> Thanks,
> Seth
>
>
> kernel: [ 23.421242] ath5k 0000:06:02.0: PCI INT A -> GSI 22 (level, low) -> IRQ 22
> kernel: [ 23.421312] ath5k 0000:06:02.0: registered as 'phy0'
> kernel: [ 24.132959] ath: EEPROM regdomain: 0x63
> kernel: [ 24.132962] ath: EEPROM indicates we should expect a direct regpair map
> kernel: [ 24.132967] ath: Country alpha2 being used: 00
> kernel: [ 24.132969] ath: Regpair used: 0x63
> kernel: [ 24.136125] cfg80211: Updating information on frequency 2412 MHz for a 20 MHz width channel with regulatory rule:
> kernel: [ 24.136131] cfg80211: 2402000 KHz - 2472000 KHz @ KHz), (N/A mBi, 2000 mBm)
> kernel: [ 24.136134] cfg80211: Updating information on frequency 2417 MHz for a 20 MHz width channel with regulatory rule:
> kernel: [ 24.136137] cfg80211: 2402000 KHz - 2472000 KHz @ KHz), (N/A mBi, 2000 mBm)
> kernel: [ 24.136140] cfg80211: Updating information on frequency 2422 MHz for a 20 MHz width channel with regulatory rule:
> kernel: [ 24.136143] cfg80211: 2402000 KHz - 2472000 KHz @ KHz), (N/A mBi, 2000 mBm)
> kernel: [ 24.136146] cfg80211: Updating information on frequency 2427 MHz for a 20 MHz width channel with regulatory rule:
> kernel: [ 24.136149] cfg80211: 2402000 KHz - 2472000 KHz @ KHz), (N/A mBi, 2000 mBm)
> kernel: [ 24.136151] cfg80211: Updating information on frequency 2432 MHz for a 20 MHz width channel with regulatory rule:
> kernel: [ 24.136155] cfg80211: 2402000 KHz - 2472000 KHz @ KHz), (N/A mBi, 2000 mBm)
> kernel: [ 24.136157] cfg80211: Updating information on frequency 2437 MHz for a 20 MHz width channel with regulatory rule:
> kernel: [ 24.136160] cfg80211: 2402000 KHz - 2472000 KHz @ KHz), (N/A mBi, 2000 mBm)
> kernel: [ 24.136163] cfg80211: Updating information on frequency 2442 MHz for a 20 MHz width channel with regulatory rule:
> kernel: [ 24.136166] cfg80211: 2402000 KHz - 2472000 KHz @ KHz), (N/A mBi, 2000 mBm)
> kernel: [ 24.136168] cfg80211: Updating information on frequency 2447 MHz for a 20 MHz width channel with regulatory rule:
> kernel: [ 24.136172] cfg80211: 2402000 KHz - 2472000 KHz @ KHz), (N/A mBi, 2000 mBm)
> kernel: [ 24.136174] cfg80211: Updating information on frequency 2452 MHz for a 20 MHz width channel with regulatory rule:
> kernel: [ 24.136177] cfg80211: 2402000 KHz - 2472000 KHz @ KHz), (N/A mBi, 2000 mBm)
> kernel: [ 24.136180] cfg80211: Updating information on frequency 2457 MHz for a 20 MHz width channel with regulatory rule:
> kernel: [ 24.136183] cfg80211: 2402000 KHz - 2472000 KHz @ KHz), (N/A mBi, 2000 mBm)
> kernel: [ 24.136186] cfg80211: Updating information on frequency 2462 MHz for a 20 MHz width channel with regulatory rule:
> kernel: [ 24.136189] cfg80211: 2402000 KHz - 2472000 KHz @ KHz), (N/A mBi, 2000 mBm)
> kernel: [ 24.136191] cfg80211: Updating information on frequency 2467 MHz for a 20 MHz width channel with regulatory rule:
> kernel: [ 24.136195] cfg80211: 2457000 KHz - 2482000 KHz @ KHz), (N/A mBi, 2000 mBm)
> kernel: [ 24.136197] cfg80211: Updating information on frequency 2472 MHz for a 20 MHz width channel with regulatory rule:
> kernel: [ 24.136200] cfg80211: 2457000 KHz - 2482000 KHz @ KHz), (N/A mBi, 2000 mBm)
> kernel: [ 24.136203] cfg80211: Disabling freq 2484 MHz as custom regd has no rule that fits a 20 MHz wide channel
> kernel: [ 24.136404] cfg80211: Ignoring regulatory request Set by core since the driver uses its own custom regulatory domain
> kernel: [ 24.393924] ieee80211 phy0: Selected rate control algorithm 'minstrel_ht'
> kernel: [ 24.394588] ath5k phy0: Atheros AR2413 chip found (MAC: 0x78, PHY: 0x45)
> ...
> NetworkManager[725]: <info> (wlan0): driver supports SSID scans (scan_capa 0x01).
> NetworkManager[725]: <info> (wlan0): new 802.11 WiFi device (driver: 'ath5k' ifindex: 3)
> NetworkManager[725]: <info> (wlan0): exported as /org/freedesktop/NetworkManager/Devices/1
> NetworkManager[725]: <info> (wlan0): now managed
> NetworkManager[725]: <info> (wlan0): device state change: 1 -> 2 (reason 2)
> NetworkManager[725]: <info> (wlan0): bringing up device.
> NetworkManager[725]: <info> (wlan0): preparing device.
> NetworkManager[725]: <info> (wlan0): deactivating device (reason: 2).
> NetworkManager[725]: supplicant_interface_acquire: assertion `mgr_state == NM_SUPPLICANT_MANAGER_STATE_IDLE' failed
> kernel: [ 25.149294] ADDRCONF(NETDEV_UP): wlan0: link is not ready
> ...
> NetworkManager[725]: <info> Trying to start the supplicant...
> ...
> NetworkManager[725]: <info> (wlan0): supplicant manager state: down -> idle
> NetworkManager[725]: <info> (wlan0): device state change: 2 -> 3 (reason 0)
> NetworkManager[725]: <info> (wlan0): supplicant interface state: starting -> ready
> ...
> NetworkManager[725]: <info> (wlan0): device state change: 3 -> 2 (reason 0)
> NetworkManager[725]: <info> (wlan0): deactivating device (reason: 0).
> NetworkManager[725]: <info> (wlan0): taking down device.
> NetworkManager[725]: <info> (wlan0): bringing up device.
> kernel: [ 104.430292] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_init_hw:2522): mode 2
> kernel: [ 104.430297] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_stop_locked:2481): invalid 0
> kernel: [ 104.431000] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
> kernel: [ 104.434475] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
> kernel: [ 104.434683] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rfkill_disable:42): rfkill disable (gpio:0 polarity:0)
> kernel: [ 104.435759] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2412 -> 2412 MHz)
> kernel: [ 104.435762] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
> kernel: [ 104.436845] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
> kernel: [ 104.437191] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_conf_tx:602): Configure tx [queue 0], aifs: 2, cw_min: 7, cw_max: 15, txop: 102
> kernel: [ 104.437212] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_conf_tx:602): Configure tx [queue 1], aifs: 2, cw_min: 15, cw_max: 31, txop: 188
> kernel: [ 104.438337] ADDRCONF(NETDEV_UP): wlan0: link is not ready
> NetworkManager[725]: <info> (wlan0): supplicant interface state: starting -> ready
> NetworkManager[725]: <info> (wlan0): device state change: 2 -> 3 (reason 42)
> wpa_supplicant[745]: Failed to initiate AP scan.
> kernel: [ 125.188087] net_ratelimit: 41 callbacks suppressed
> kernel: [ 125.188100] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2412 -> 2417 MHz)
> kernel: [ 125.188109] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
> kernel: [ 125.291007] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
> kernel: [ 125.344076] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2417 -> 2422 MHz)
> kernel: [ 125.344090] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
> kernel: [ 125.447014] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
> kernel: [ 125.500078] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2422 -> 2427 MHz)
> kernel: [ 125.500091] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
> kernel: [ 125.602999] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
> kernel: [ 125.656070] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2427 -> 2432 MHz)
> kernel: [ 155.188052] net_ratelimit: 29 callbacks suppressed
> kernel: [ 155.188058] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2412 -> 2417 MHz)
> kernel: [ 155.188061] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
> kernel: [ 155.290844] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
> kernel: [ 155.344032] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2417 -> 2422 MHz)
> kernel: [ 155.344038] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
> kernel: [ 155.446810] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
> kernel: [ 155.500031] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2422 -> 2427 MHz)
> kernel: [ 155.500036] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
> kernel: [ 155.602811] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
> kernel: [ 155.656033] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2427 -> 2432 MHz)
> kernel: [ 195.184088] net_ratelimit: 29 callbacks suppressed
> kernel: [ 195.184102] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2412 -> 2417 MHz)
> kernel: [ 195.184110] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
> kernel: [ 195.287022] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
> kernel: [ 195.340066] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2417 -> 2422 MHz)
> kernel: [ 195.340079] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
> kernel: [ 195.442967] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
> kernel: [ 195.496076] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2422 -> 2427 MHz)
> kernel: [ 195.496088] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
> kernel: [ 195.599009] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
> kernel: [ 195.652078] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2427 -> 2432 MHz)
> kernel: [ 245.188077] net_ratelimit: 29 callbacks suppressed
> kernel: [ 245.188091] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2412 -> 2417 MHz)
> kernel: [ 245.188100] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
> kernel: [ 245.290997] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
> kernel: [ 245.344084] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2417 -> 2422 MHz)
> kernel: [ 245.344092] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
> kernel: [ 245.446882] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
> kernel: [ 245.500053] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2422 -> 2427 MHz)
> kernel: [ 245.500058] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
> kernel: [ 245.602808] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
> kernel: [ 245.656046] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2427 -> 2432 MHz)
> kernel: [ 305.188050] net_ratelimit: 29 callbacks suppressed
> kernel: [ 305.188063] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2412 -> 2417 MHz)
> kernel: [ 305.188071] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
> kernel: [ 305.290945] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
> kernel: [ 305.344070] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2417 -> 2422 MHz)
> kernel: [ 305.344082] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
> kernel: [ 305.446943] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
> kernel: [ 305.500047] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2422 -> 2427 MHz)
> kernel: [ 305.500058] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
> kernel: [ 305.602967] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
> kernel: [ 305.656090] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2427 -> 2432 MHz)
> NetworkManager[725]: <info> (wlan0): device state change: 3 -> 2 (reason 0)
> NetworkManager[725]: <info> (wlan0): deactivating device (reason: 0).
> NetworkManager[725]: <info> (wlan0): taking down device.
> kernel: [ 310.887530] net_ratelimit: 29 callbacks suppressed
> kernel: [ 310.887535] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_stop_locked:2481): invalid 0
> kernel: [ 310.990264] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_stop_hw:2619): putting device to sleep
> kernel: [ 310.990554] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rfkill_enable:51): rfkill enable (gpio:0 polarity:0)
> NetworkManager[725]: <info> (wlan0): bringing up device.
> kernel: [ 315.755891] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_init_hw:2522): mode 2
> kernel: [ 315.755903] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_stop_locked:2481): invalid 0
> kernel: [ 315.756624] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
> kernel: [ 315.760236] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
> kernel: [ 315.760474] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rfkill_disable:42): rfkill disable (gpio:0 polarity:0)
> kernel: [ 315.762566] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2412 -> 2412 MHz)
> kernel: [ 315.762574] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
> kernel: [ 315.764972] ADDRCONF(NETDEV_UP): wlan0: link is not ready
> NetworkManager[725]: <info> (wlan0): supplicant interface state: starting -> ready
> NetworkManager[725]: <info> (wlan0): device state change: 2 -> 3 (reason 42)
> wpa_supplicant[745]: Failed to initiate AP scan.
> kernel: [ 316.036068] net_ratelimit: 8 callbacks suppressed
> kernel: [ 316.036080] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2417 -> 2422 MHz)
> kernel: [ 316.036089] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
> kernel: [ 316.140039] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
> kernel: [ 316.196067] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2422 -> 2427 MHz)
> kernel: [ 316.196079] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
> kernel: [ 316.298940] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
> kernel: [ 316.352063] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2427 -> 2432 MHz)
> kernel: [ 316.352071] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
> kernel: [ 316.455003] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
> kernel: [ 316.508080] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2432 -> 2437 MHz)
> kernel: [ 336.188067] net_ratelimit: 26 callbacks suppressed
> kernel: [ 336.188080] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2412 -> 2417 MHz)
> kernel: [ 336.188088] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
> kernel: [ 336.290966] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
> kernel: [ 336.344059] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2417 -> 2422 MHz)
> kernel: [ 336.344068] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
> kernel: [ 336.446912] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
> kernel: [ 336.500068] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2422 -> 2427 MHz)
> kernel: [ 336.500077] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
> kernel: [ 336.602937] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
> kernel: [ 336.656058] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2427 -> 2432 MHz)
> kernel: [ 366.188084] net_ratelimit: 29 callbacks suppressed
> kernel: [ 366.188097] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2412 -> 2417 MHz)
> kernel: [ 366.188105] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
> kernel: [ 366.290999] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
> kernel: [ 366.344099] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2417 -> 2422 MHz)
> kernel: [ 366.344112] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
> kernel: [ 366.447030] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
> kernel: [ 366.500094] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2422 -> 2427 MHz)
> kernel: [ 366.500106] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
> kernel: [ 366.603008] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
> kernel: [ 366.656103] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2427 -> 2432 MHz)
>
>
Hmm I don't see any errors from reset/phy code, can you disable
Network Manager/wpa-supplicant and test connection on an open network
using iw ? It 'll give us a better picture...
If iw doesn't return any scan results we are probably hitting a PHY/RF
error specific to your device (not all vendors follow the reference
design). Maybe we should follow a blacklist/whitelist approach for
this feature.
--
GPG ID: 0xD21DB2DB
As you read this post global entropy rises. Have Fun ;-)
Nick
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: ath5k regression associating with APs in 2.6.38
From: Seth Forshee @ 2011-05-05 14:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Nick Kossifidis
Cc: John W. Linville, Jiri Slaby, Luis R. Rodriguez, Bob Copeland,
linux-wireless, ath5k-devel, netdev, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <BANLkTinkiTQU2k7vBEc0JPGa01AUVCvp2Q@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, May 05, 2011 at 05:30:42PM +0300, Nick Kossifidis wrote:
> Hmm I don't see any errors from reset/phy code, can you disable
> Network Manager/wpa-supplicant and test connection on an open network
> using iw ? It 'll give us a better picture...
>
> If iw doesn't return any scan results we are probably hitting a PHY/RF
> error specific to your device (not all vendors follow the reference
> design). Maybe we should follow a blacklist/whitelist approach for
> this feature.
Will do. I just got another log from my tester, which is more typical of
what he's been getting. I've pasted a portion of it below. The full log
can be viewed at
https://launchpadlibrarian.net/71137619/20110504_020639rc6%23201105050227_boot4_syslog
Thanks,
Seth
May 5 08:57:16 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> (wlan0): new 802.11 WiFi device (driver: 'ath5k' ifindex: 3)
May 5 08:57:16 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> (wlan0): exported as /org/freedesktop/NetworkManager/Devices/1
May 5 08:57:16 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> (wlan0): now managed
May 5 08:57:16 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> (wlan0): device state change: 1 -> 2 (reason 2)
May 5 08:57:16 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> (wlan0): bringing up device.
May 5 08:57:16 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> (wlan0): preparing device.
May 5 08:57:16 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> (wlan0): deactivating device (reason: 2).
May 5 08:57:16 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: supplicant_interface_acquire: assertion `mgr_state == NM_SUPPLICANT_MANAGER_STATE_IDLE' failed
May 5 08:57:16 AcerAspire5100 kernel: [ 25.844302] ADDRCONF(NETDEV_UP): wlan0: link is not ready
May 5 08:57:16 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> modem-manager is now available
May 5 08:57:16 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <warn> bluez error getting default adapter: The name org.bluez was not provided by any .service files
May 5 08:57:16 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> Trying to start the supplicant...
May 5 08:57:16 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> (wlan0): supplicant manager state: down -> idle
May 5 08:57:16 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> (wlan0): device state change: 2 -> 3 (reason 0)
May 5 08:57:16 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> (wlan0): supplicant interface state: starting -> ready
...
May 5 08:57:38 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> Activation (wlan0) starting connection 'Auto aureola'
May 5 08:57:38 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> (wlan0): device state change: 3 -> 4 (reason 0)
May 5 08:57:38 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> Activation (wlan0) Stage 1 of 5 (Device Prepare) scheduled...
May 5 08:57:38 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> Activation (wlan0) Stage 1 of 5 (Device Prepare) started...
May 5 08:57:38 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> Activation (wlan0) Stage 2 of 5 (Device Configure) scheduled...
May 5 08:57:38 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> Activation (wlan0) Stage 1 of 5 (Device Prepare) complete.
May 5 08:57:38 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> Activation (wlan0) Stage 2 of 5 (Device Configure) starting...
May 5 08:57:38 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> (wlan0): device state change: 4 -> 5 (reason 0)
May 5 08:57:38 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> Activation (wlan0/wireless): access point 'Auto aureola' has security, but secrets are required.
May 5 08:57:38 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> (wlan0): device state change: 5 -> 6 (reason 0)
May 5 08:57:38 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> Activation (wlan0) Stage 2 of 5 (Device Configure) complete.
May 5 08:57:39 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> Activation (wlan0) Stage 1 of 5 (Device Prepare) scheduled...
May 5 08:57:39 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> Activation (wlan0) Stage 1 of 5 (Device Prepare) started...
May 5 08:57:39 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> (wlan0): device state change: 6 -> 4 (reason 0)
May 5 08:57:39 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> Activation (wlan0) Stage 2 of 5 (Device Configure) scheduled...
May 5 08:57:39 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> Activation (wlan0) Stage 1 of 5 (Device Prepare) complete.
May 5 08:57:39 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> Activation (wlan0) Stage 2 of 5 (Device Configure) starting...
May 5 08:57:39 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> (wlan0): device state change: 4 -> 5 (reason 0)
May 5 08:57:39 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> Activation (wlan0/wireless): connection 'Auto aureola' has security, and secrets exist. No new secrets needed.
May 5 08:57:39 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> Config: added 'ssid' value 'aureola'
May 5 08:57:39 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> Config: added 'scan_ssid' value '1'
May 5 08:57:39 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> Config: added 'key_mgmt' value 'WPA-PSK'
May 5 08:57:39 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> Config: added 'psk' value '<omitted>'
May 5 08:57:39 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: nm_setting_802_1x_get_pkcs11_engine_path: assertion `NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X (setting)' failed
May 5 08:57:39 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: nm_setting_802_1x_get_pkcs11_module_path: assertion `NM_IS_SETTING_802_1X (setting)' failed
May 5 08:57:39 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> Activation (wlan0) Stage 2 of 5 (Device Configure) complete.
May 5 08:57:39 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> Config: set interface ap_scan to 1
May 5 08:57:39 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> (wlan0): supplicant connection state: inactive -> scanning
May 5 08:57:41 AcerAspire5100 wpa_supplicant[734]: Trying to associate with c0:3f:0e:b9:f3:b2 (SSID='aureola' freq=2452 MHz)
May 5 08:57:41 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> (wlan0): supplicant connection state: scanning -> associating
May 5 08:57:41 AcerAspire5100 kernel: [ 51.261113] wlan0: direct probe to c0:3f:0e:b9:f3:b2 (try 1/3)
May 5 08:57:41 AcerAspire5100 kernel: [ 51.460049] wlan0: direct probe to c0:3f:0e:b9:f3:b2 (try 2/3)
May 5 08:57:41 AcerAspire5100 kernel: [ 51.660091] wlan0: direct probe to c0:3f:0e:b9:f3:b2 (try 3/3)
May 5 08:57:42 AcerAspire5100 kernel: [ 51.860048] wlan0: direct probe to c0:3f:0e:b9:f3:b2 timed out
May 5 08:57:51 AcerAspire5100 wpa_supplicant[734]: Authentication with c0:3f:0e:b9:f3:b2 timed out.
May 5 08:57:51 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> (wlan0): supplicant connection state: associating -> disconnected
May 5 08:57:51 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> (wlan0): supplicant connection state: disconnected -> scanning
May 5 08:57:51 AcerAspire5100 kernel: [ 61.396045] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2452 -> 2412 MHz)
May 5 08:57:51 AcerAspire5100 kernel: [ 61.396051] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
May 5 08:57:51 AcerAspire5100 kernel: [ 61.397135] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
May 5 08:57:51 AcerAspire5100 kernel: [ 61.452053] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2412 -> 2417 MHz)
May 5 08:57:51 AcerAspire5100 kernel: [ 61.452059] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
May 5 08:57:51 AcerAspire5100 kernel: [ 61.453143] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
May 5 08:57:51 AcerAspire5100 kernel: [ 61.508053] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2417 -> 2422 MHz)
May 5 08:57:51 AcerAspire5100 kernel: [ 61.508059] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
May 5 08:57:51 AcerAspire5100 kernel: [ 61.509143] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
May 5 08:57:51 AcerAspire5100 kernel: [ 61.564045] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2422 -> 2427 MHz)
May 5 08:57:52 AcerAspire5100 wpa_supplicant[734]: Trying to associate with c0:3f:0e:b9:f3:b2 (SSID='aureola' freq=2452 MHz)
May 5 08:57:52 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> (wlan0): supplicant connection state: scanning -> associating
May 5 08:57:52 AcerAspire5100 kernel: [ 62.364741] wlan0: direct probe to c0:3f:0e:b9:f3:b2 (try 1/3)
May 5 08:57:52 AcerAspire5100 kernel: [ 62.564061] wlan0: direct probe to c0:3f:0e:b9:f3:b2 (try 2/3)
May 5 08:57:53 AcerAspire5100 kernel: [ 62.764058] wlan0: direct probe to c0:3f:0e:b9:f3:b2 (try 3/3)
May 5 08:57:53 AcerAspire5100 kernel: [ 62.964061] wlan0: direct probe to c0:3f:0e:b9:f3:b2 timed out
May 5 08:58:02 AcerAspire5100 wpa_supplicant[734]: Authentication with c0:3f:0e:b9:f3:b2 timed out.
May 5 08:58:02 AcerAspire5100 NetworkManager[703]: <info> (wlan0): supplicant connection state: associating -> disconnected
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: ARM, AF_PACKET: caching problems on Marvell Kirkwood
From: Eric Dumazet @ 2011-05-05 14:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Phil Sutter
Cc: linux-arm-kernel, netdev, ne, Johann Baudy, Lennert Buytenhek,
Nicolas Pitre
In-Reply-To: <20110505141107.GC30443@orbit.nwl.cc>
Le jeudi 05 mai 2011 à 16:11 +0200, Phil Sutter a écrit :
> Hi,
>
> Hasn't anyone experienced this bug but me? Can anyone reproduce the
> described behaviour on his Kirkwood-based (or even generic ARM) machine?
> I am still not sure if this is a problem of just my CPU or common
> amongst Kirkwood/VIPT/ARM machines.
>
> My workaround looks like this:
> | diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
> | index b5362e9..0672f50 100644
> | --- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
> | +++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
> | @@ -1298,10 +1298,13 @@ static int packet_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
> | {
> | struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
> | struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
> | - if (po->tx_ring.pg_vec)
> | - return tpacket_snd(po, msg);
> | - else
> | - return packet_snd(sock, msg, len);
> | + int rc;
> | +
> | + flush_cache_all();
> | + rc = po->tx_ring.pg_vec ? tpacket_snd(po, msg) :
> | + packet_snd(sock, msg, len);
> | + flush_cache_all();
> | + return rc;
> | }
> |
> | /*
>
> Greetings, Phil
>
> (Full-quoting here because I've added the TX ring author and the Kirkwood
> maintainers to Cc.)
>
> On Fri, Apr 08, 2011 at 03:06:43PM +0200, Phil Sutter wrote:
> > Dear lists,
> >
> > I am experiencing severe caching issues using the TX_RING feature of
> > AF_PACKET on a Kirkwood-based system (i.e., OpenRD). This may likely be
> > a bug of the CPU/SoC itself, at least it reacts a bit picky when using
> > the preload data instruction (pld) in rather useless cases (but that's a
> > different story).
> >
> > There is simple testing code at the end of this email, effectively just
> > preparing a packet in the TX_RING and triggering it's delivery once per
> > second. The experienced symptom is that sporadically nothing goes out in
> > one iteration, and two packets in the following one.
> >
> > It looks like the kernel doesn't get the changed value of tp_status in
> > time, although userspace sees the correct value. Note that moving the
> > sleep(1) from the end of the loop to just before calling sendto() fixes
> > the problem.
> >
> > Another (more useful) workaround is to call flush_cache_all() at the
> > beginning of packet_sendmsg() in net/packet/af_packet.c. I was not able
> > to fix this with some more specific flushing at that place. Anyway, the
> > call to flush_dcache_page() from __packet_get_status() in the same
> > source file is meant to do the trick I guess. But somehow doesn't.
> >
> > Feedback regardles of which kind is highly appreciated, of course!
> >
> > Greetings, Phil
> >
> > ------------------[start of packet_mmap_test.c]--------------------
> > #include <stdint.h>
> > #include <stdio.h>
> > #include <stdlib.h>
> > #include <string.h>
> > #include <linux/if_ether.h>
> > #include <linux/if_packet.h>
> > #include <net/if.h>
> > #include <sys/ioctl.h>
> > #include <sys/mman.h>
> > #include <sys/socket.h>
> > #include <sys/types.h>
> >
> > #define PERROR_EXIT(rc, mesg) { \
> > perror(mesg); \
> > return rc; \
> > }
> >
> > int main(void)
> > {
> > uint32_t size;
> > struct sockaddr_ll sa;
> > struct ifreq ifr;
> > int index;
> > int tmp;
> > int fd;
> > struct tpacket_req packet_req;
> > struct tpacket2_hdr * ps_header_start, *ps_header;
> >
> > if ((fd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_DGRAM, htons(ETH_P_ALL))) < 0)
> > PERROR_EXIT(EXIT_FAILURE, "socket");
> >
> > /* retrieve eth0's interface index number */
> > strncpy (ifr.ifr_name, "eth0", sizeof(ifr.ifr_name));
> > if (ioctl(fd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &ifr) < 0)
> > PERROR_EXIT(EXIT_FAILURE, "ioctl(SIOCGIFINDEX)");
> >
> > /* set sockaddr info */
> > memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
> > sa.sll_family = AF_PACKET;
> > sa.sll_protocol = ETH_P_ALL;
> > sa.sll_ifindex = ifr.ifr_ifindex;
> >
> > /* bind port */
> > if (bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&sa, sizeof(sa)) < 0)
> > PERROR_EXIT(EXIT_FAILURE, "bind()");
> >
> > tmp = TPACKET_V2;
> > if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_VERSION, &tmp, sizeof(tmp)) < 0)
> > PERROR_EXIT(EXIT_FAILURE, "setsockopt(PACKET_VERSION)");
> >
> > /* set packet loss option */
> > tmp = 1;
> > if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_LOSS, &tmp, sizeof(tmp)) < 0)
> > PERROR_EXIT(EXIT_FAILURE, "setsockopt(PACKET_LOSS)");
> >
> > /* prepare Tx ring request */
> > packet_req.tp_block_size = 1024 * 8;
> > packet_req.tp_frame_size = 1024 * 8;
> > packet_req.tp_block_nr = 1024;
> > packet_req.tp_frame_nr = 1024;
> >
> > /* send TX ring request */
> > if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_TX_RING,
> > &packet_req, sizeof(packet_req)) < 0)
> > PERROR_EXIT(EXIT_FAILURE, "setsockopt: PACKET_TX_RING");
> >
> > /* calculate memory to mmap in the kernel */
> > size = packet_req.tp_block_size * packet_req.tp_block_nr;
> >
> > /* mmap Tx ring buffers memory */
> > ps_header_start = mmap(0, size,
> > PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
> > if (ps_header_start < 0)
> > PERROR_EXIT(EXIT_FAILURE, "mmap");
> >
> > /* fill peer sockaddr for SOCK_DGRAM */
> > sa.sll_family = AF_PACKET;
> > sa.sll_protocol = htons(ETH_P_IP);
> > sa.sll_ifindex = ifr.ifr_ifindex;
> > sa.sll_halen = ETH_ALEN;
> > memset(&sa.sll_addr, 0xff, ETH_ALEN);
> >
> > ps_header = ps_header_start;
> > while (1) {
> > int sendlen, j;
> >
> > char *data = (void*)ps_header + TPACKET_HDRLEN
> > - sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll);
> >
> > switch((volatile uint32_t)ps_header->tp_status)
> > {
> > case TP_STATUS_AVAILABLE:
> > memset(data, 0x23, 150);
> > break;
> >
> > case TP_STATUS_WRONG_FORMAT:
> > printf("An error has occured during transfer\n");
> > exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
> > break;
> >
> > default:
> > printf("Buffer is not available, aborting\n");
> > exit(1);
> > break;
> > }
> > ps_header->tp_len = 150;
> > ps_header->tp_status = TP_STATUS_SEND_REQUEST;
> >
> > sendlen = sendto(fd, NULL, 0, 0,
> > (struct sockaddr *)&sa, sizeof(sa));
> > if (sendlen < 0)
> > perror("sendto");
> > else if (sendlen == 0)
> > printf("sendto(): nothing sent!\n");
> > else
> > printf("sendto(): sent %d bytes out\n", sendlen);
> >
> > #define ST_IS(x) ((volatile uint32_t)ps_header->tp_status == x)
> > printf("tp_status after sending: %s\n",
> > ST_IS(TP_STATUS_AVAILABLE) ? "AVAILABLE" :
> > ST_IS(TP_STATUS_SEND_REQUEST) ? "SEND_REQUEST" :
> > ST_IS(TP_STATUS_WRONG_FORMAT) ? "WRONG_FORMAT" :
> > "unknown");
> > #undef ST_IS
> >
> > ps_header = (void *)ps_header + packet_req.tp_frame_size;
> > if (ps_header >= ps_header_start + size)
> > ps_header = ps_header_start;
> >
> > sleep(1);
> > }
> > return 0;
> > }
> > --------------------[end of packet_mmap_test.c]--------------------
Hi Phil
I assume you use latest linux-2.6 or net-next-2.6 ?
Could you try to force vmalloc() use ?
diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index b5362e9..0b5a89c 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -2383,7 +2383,7 @@ static inline char *alloc_one_pg_vec_page(unsigned long order)
gfp_t gfp_flags = GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_COMP |
__GFP_ZERO | __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_NORETRY;
- buffer = (char *) __get_free_pages(gfp_flags, order);
+ buffer = NULL;
if (buffer)
return buffer;
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: ath5k regression associating with APs in 2.6.38
From: Justin P. Mattock @ 2011-05-05 15:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Nick Kossifidis
Cc: John W. Linville, Jiri Slaby, Luis R. Rodriguez, Bob Copeland,
linux-wireless, ath5k-devel, netdev, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <BANLkTinkiTQU2k7vBEc0JPGa01AUVCvp2Q@mail.gmail.com>
On 05/05/2011 07:30 AM, Nick Kossifidis wrote:
> 2011/5/5 Seth Forshee<seth.forshee@canonical.com>:
>> On Wed, May 04, 2011 at 11:09:03PM +0300, Nick Kossifidis wrote:
>>> 2011/5/4 Seth Forshee<seth.forshee@canonical.com>:
>>>> On Wed, May 04, 2011 at 01:27:17PM -0400, John W. Linville wrote:
>>>>> On Wed, May 04, 2011 at 10:38:19AM -0500, Seth Forshee wrote:
>>>>>> I've been investigating some reports of a regression in associating with
>>>>>> APs with AR2413 in 2.6.38. Association repeatedly fails with some
>>>>>> "direct probe to x timed out" messages (see syslog excerpt below),
>>>>>> although it will generally associate eventually, after many tries.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Bisection identifies 8aec7af (ath5k: Support synth-only channel change
>>>>>> for AR2413/AR5413) as offending commit. Prior to this commit there are
>>>>>> no direct probe messages at all in the logs. I've also found that
>>>>>> forcing fast to false at the top of ath5k_hw_reset() fixes the issue.
>>>>>> I'm not sure what the connection is between this commit and the
>>>>>> timeouts. Any suggestions?
>>>>>
>>>>> Have you tried reverting that commit on top of 2.6.38? Can you
>>>>> recreate the issue with 2.6.39-rc6 (or later)?
>>>>
>>>> I started to revert that commit, but it wasn't straight-forward due to
>>>> later changes. Forcing fast to false in ath5k_hw_reset() acts as a
>>>> functional revert of sorts since that should force it back to a full
>>>> reset for all channel changes, and it's much simpler than working out
>>>> the right way to revert the commit. I think the results suggest strongly
>>>> that a revert is likely to fix the problem. I can finish the work to
>>>> revert if you'd still like to see the results.
>>>>
>>>> Testing a previous .39-rc kernel still exhibited the failure. I don't
>>>> recall which one it was and apparently forgot to make note of it. I'll
>>>> request testing against rc6.
>>>>
>>>> Thanks,
>>>> Seth
>>>>
>>>
>>> Do you get scan results ?
>>> Can you enable ATH5K_DEBUG_RESET and see what you get ?
>>
>> 2.6.39-rc6 still fails. A more comprehensive log with ATH5K_DEBUG_RESET
>> enabled is below.
>>
>> Scanning looks to be failing according to this log. I was thinking that
>> I saw successfull scans in some of the previous logs, but I'll have to
>> go back and check to be sure.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Seth
>>
>>
>> kernel: [ 23.421242] ath5k 0000:06:02.0: PCI INT A -> GSI 22 (level, low) -> IRQ 22
>> kernel: [ 23.421312] ath5k 0000:06:02.0: registered as 'phy0'
>> kernel: [ 24.132959] ath: EEPROM regdomain: 0x63
>> kernel: [ 24.132962] ath: EEPROM indicates we should expect a direct regpair map
>> kernel: [ 24.132967] ath: Country alpha2 being used: 00
>> kernel: [ 24.132969] ath: Regpair used: 0x63
>> kernel: [ 24.136125] cfg80211: Updating information on frequency 2412 MHz for a 20 MHz width channel with regulatory rule:
>> kernel: [ 24.136131] cfg80211: 2402000 KHz - 2472000 KHz @ KHz), (N/A mBi, 2000 mBm)
>> kernel: [ 24.136134] cfg80211: Updating information on frequency 2417 MHz for a 20 MHz width channel with regulatory rule:
>> kernel: [ 24.136137] cfg80211: 2402000 KHz - 2472000 KHz @ KHz), (N/A mBi, 2000 mBm)
>> kernel: [ 24.136140] cfg80211: Updating information on frequency 2422 MHz for a 20 MHz width channel with regulatory rule:
>> kernel: [ 24.136143] cfg80211: 2402000 KHz - 2472000 KHz @ KHz), (N/A mBi, 2000 mBm)
>> kernel: [ 24.136146] cfg80211: Updating information on frequency 2427 MHz for a 20 MHz width channel with regulatory rule:
>> kernel: [ 24.136149] cfg80211: 2402000 KHz - 2472000 KHz @ KHz), (N/A mBi, 2000 mBm)
>> kernel: [ 24.136151] cfg80211: Updating information on frequency 2432 MHz for a 20 MHz width channel with regulatory rule:
>> kernel: [ 24.136155] cfg80211: 2402000 KHz - 2472000 KHz @ KHz), (N/A mBi, 2000 mBm)
>> kernel: [ 24.136157] cfg80211: Updating information on frequency 2437 MHz for a 20 MHz width channel with regulatory rule:
>> kernel: [ 24.136160] cfg80211: 2402000 KHz - 2472000 KHz @ KHz), (N/A mBi, 2000 mBm)
>> kernel: [ 24.136163] cfg80211: Updating information on frequency 2442 MHz for a 20 MHz width channel with regulatory rule:
>> kernel: [ 24.136166] cfg80211: 2402000 KHz - 2472000 KHz @ KHz), (N/A mBi, 2000 mBm)
>> kernel: [ 24.136168] cfg80211: Updating information on frequency 2447 MHz for a 20 MHz width channel with regulatory rule:
>> kernel: [ 24.136172] cfg80211: 2402000 KHz - 2472000 KHz @ KHz), (N/A mBi, 2000 mBm)
>> kernel: [ 24.136174] cfg80211: Updating information on frequency 2452 MHz for a 20 MHz width channel with regulatory rule:
>> kernel: [ 24.136177] cfg80211: 2402000 KHz - 2472000 KHz @ KHz), (N/A mBi, 2000 mBm)
>> kernel: [ 24.136180] cfg80211: Updating information on frequency 2457 MHz for a 20 MHz width channel with regulatory rule:
>> kernel: [ 24.136183] cfg80211: 2402000 KHz - 2472000 KHz @ KHz), (N/A mBi, 2000 mBm)
>> kernel: [ 24.136186] cfg80211: Updating information on frequency 2462 MHz for a 20 MHz width channel with regulatory rule:
>> kernel: [ 24.136189] cfg80211: 2402000 KHz - 2472000 KHz @ KHz), (N/A mBi, 2000 mBm)
>> kernel: [ 24.136191] cfg80211: Updating information on frequency 2467 MHz for a 20 MHz width channel with regulatory rule:
>> kernel: [ 24.136195] cfg80211: 2457000 KHz - 2482000 KHz @ KHz), (N/A mBi, 2000 mBm)
>> kernel: [ 24.136197] cfg80211: Updating information on frequency 2472 MHz for a 20 MHz width channel with regulatory rule:
>> kernel: [ 24.136200] cfg80211: 2457000 KHz - 2482000 KHz @ KHz), (N/A mBi, 2000 mBm)
>> kernel: [ 24.136203] cfg80211: Disabling freq 2484 MHz as custom regd has no rule that fits a 20 MHz wide channel
>> kernel: [ 24.136404] cfg80211: Ignoring regulatory request Set by core since the driver uses its own custom regulatory domain
>> kernel: [ 24.393924] ieee80211 phy0: Selected rate control algorithm 'minstrel_ht'
>> kernel: [ 24.394588] ath5k phy0: Atheros AR2413 chip found (MAC: 0x78, PHY: 0x45)
>> ...
>> NetworkManager[725]:<info> (wlan0): driver supports SSID scans (scan_capa 0x01).
>> NetworkManager[725]:<info> (wlan0): new 802.11 WiFi device (driver: 'ath5k' ifindex: 3)
>> NetworkManager[725]:<info> (wlan0): exported as /org/freedesktop/NetworkManager/Devices/1
>> NetworkManager[725]:<info> (wlan0): now managed
>> NetworkManager[725]:<info> (wlan0): device state change: 1 -> 2 (reason 2)
>> NetworkManager[725]:<info> (wlan0): bringing up device.
>> NetworkManager[725]:<info> (wlan0): preparing device.
>> NetworkManager[725]:<info> (wlan0): deactivating device (reason: 2).
>> NetworkManager[725]: supplicant_interface_acquire: assertion `mgr_state == NM_SUPPLICANT_MANAGER_STATE_IDLE' failed
>> kernel: [ 25.149294] ADDRCONF(NETDEV_UP): wlan0: link is not ready
>> ...
>> NetworkManager[725]:<info> Trying to start the supplicant...
>> ...
>> NetworkManager[725]:<info> (wlan0): supplicant manager state: down -> idle
>> NetworkManager[725]:<info> (wlan0): device state change: 2 -> 3 (reason 0)
>> NetworkManager[725]:<info> (wlan0): supplicant interface state: starting -> ready
>> ...
>> NetworkManager[725]:<info> (wlan0): device state change: 3 -> 2 (reason 0)
>> NetworkManager[725]:<info> (wlan0): deactivating device (reason: 0).
>> NetworkManager[725]:<info> (wlan0): taking down device.
>> NetworkManager[725]:<info> (wlan0): bringing up device.
>> kernel: [ 104.430292] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_init_hw:2522): mode 2
>> kernel: [ 104.430297] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_stop_locked:2481): invalid 0
>> kernel: [ 104.431000] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
>> kernel: [ 104.434475] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
>> kernel: [ 104.434683] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rfkill_disable:42): rfkill disable (gpio:0 polarity:0)
>> kernel: [ 104.435759] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2412 -> 2412 MHz)
>> kernel: [ 104.435762] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
>> kernel: [ 104.436845] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
>> kernel: [ 104.437191] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_conf_tx:602): Configure tx [queue 0], aifs: 2, cw_min: 7, cw_max: 15, txop: 102
>> kernel: [ 104.437212] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_conf_tx:602): Configure tx [queue 1], aifs: 2, cw_min: 15, cw_max: 31, txop: 188
>> kernel: [ 104.438337] ADDRCONF(NETDEV_UP): wlan0: link is not ready
>> NetworkManager[725]:<info> (wlan0): supplicant interface state: starting -> ready
>> NetworkManager[725]:<info> (wlan0): device state change: 2 -> 3 (reason 42)
>> wpa_supplicant[745]: Failed to initiate AP scan.
>> kernel: [ 125.188087] net_ratelimit: 41 callbacks suppressed
>> kernel: [ 125.188100] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2412 -> 2417 MHz)
>> kernel: [ 125.188109] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
>> kernel: [ 125.291007] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
>> kernel: [ 125.344076] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2417 -> 2422 MHz)
>> kernel: [ 125.344090] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
>> kernel: [ 125.447014] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
>> kernel: [ 125.500078] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2422 -> 2427 MHz)
>> kernel: [ 125.500091] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
>> kernel: [ 125.602999] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
>> kernel: [ 125.656070] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2427 -> 2432 MHz)
>> kernel: [ 155.188052] net_ratelimit: 29 callbacks suppressed
>> kernel: [ 155.188058] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2412 -> 2417 MHz)
>> kernel: [ 155.188061] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
>> kernel: [ 155.290844] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
>> kernel: [ 155.344032] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2417 -> 2422 MHz)
>> kernel: [ 155.344038] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
>> kernel: [ 155.446810] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
>> kernel: [ 155.500031] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2422 -> 2427 MHz)
>> kernel: [ 155.500036] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
>> kernel: [ 155.602811] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
>> kernel: [ 155.656033] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2427 -> 2432 MHz)
>> kernel: [ 195.184088] net_ratelimit: 29 callbacks suppressed
>> kernel: [ 195.184102] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2412 -> 2417 MHz)
>> kernel: [ 195.184110] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
>> kernel: [ 195.287022] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
>> kernel: [ 195.340066] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2417 -> 2422 MHz)
>> kernel: [ 195.340079] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
>> kernel: [ 195.442967] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
>> kernel: [ 195.496076] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2422 -> 2427 MHz)
>> kernel: [ 195.496088] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
>> kernel: [ 195.599009] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
>> kernel: [ 195.652078] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2427 -> 2432 MHz)
>> kernel: [ 245.188077] net_ratelimit: 29 callbacks suppressed
>> kernel: [ 245.188091] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2412 -> 2417 MHz)
>> kernel: [ 245.188100] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
>> kernel: [ 245.290997] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
>> kernel: [ 245.344084] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2417 -> 2422 MHz)
>> kernel: [ 245.344092] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
>> kernel: [ 245.446882] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
>> kernel: [ 245.500053] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2422 -> 2427 MHz)
>> kernel: [ 245.500058] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
>> kernel: [ 245.602808] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
>> kernel: [ 245.656046] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2427 -> 2432 MHz)
>> kernel: [ 305.188050] net_ratelimit: 29 callbacks suppressed
>> kernel: [ 305.188063] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2412 -> 2417 MHz)
>> kernel: [ 305.188071] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
>> kernel: [ 305.290945] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
>> kernel: [ 305.344070] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2417 -> 2422 MHz)
>> kernel: [ 305.344082] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
>> kernel: [ 305.446943] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
>> kernel: [ 305.500047] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2422 -> 2427 MHz)
>> kernel: [ 305.500058] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
>> kernel: [ 305.602967] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
>> kernel: [ 305.656090] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2427 -> 2432 MHz)
>> NetworkManager[725]:<info> (wlan0): device state change: 3 -> 2 (reason 0)
>> NetworkManager[725]:<info> (wlan0): deactivating device (reason: 0).
>> NetworkManager[725]:<info> (wlan0): taking down device.
>> kernel: [ 310.887530] net_ratelimit: 29 callbacks suppressed
>> kernel: [ 310.887535] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_stop_locked:2481): invalid 0
>> kernel: [ 310.990264] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_stop_hw:2619): putting device to sleep
>> kernel: [ 310.990554] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rfkill_enable:51): rfkill enable (gpio:0 polarity:0)
>> NetworkManager[725]:<info> (wlan0): bringing up device.
>> kernel: [ 315.755891] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_init_hw:2522): mode 2
>> kernel: [ 315.755903] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_stop_locked:2481): invalid 0
>> kernel: [ 315.756624] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
>> kernel: [ 315.760236] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
>> kernel: [ 315.760474] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rfkill_disable:42): rfkill disable (gpio:0 polarity:0)
>> kernel: [ 315.762566] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2412 -> 2412 MHz)
>> kernel: [ 315.762574] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
>> kernel: [ 315.764972] ADDRCONF(NETDEV_UP): wlan0: link is not ready
>> NetworkManager[725]:<info> (wlan0): supplicant interface state: starting -> ready
>> NetworkManager[725]:<info> (wlan0): device state change: 2 -> 3 (reason 42)
>> wpa_supplicant[745]: Failed to initiate AP scan.
>> kernel: [ 316.036068] net_ratelimit: 8 callbacks suppressed
>> kernel: [ 316.036080] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2417 -> 2422 MHz)
>> kernel: [ 316.036089] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
>> kernel: [ 316.140039] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
>> kernel: [ 316.196067] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2422 -> 2427 MHz)
>> kernel: [ 316.196079] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
>> kernel: [ 316.298940] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
>> kernel: [ 316.352063] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2427 -> 2432 MHz)
>> kernel: [ 316.352071] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
>> kernel: [ 316.455003] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
>> kernel: [ 316.508080] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2432 -> 2437 MHz)
>> kernel: [ 336.188067] net_ratelimit: 26 callbacks suppressed
>> kernel: [ 336.188080] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2412 -> 2417 MHz)
>> kernel: [ 336.188088] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
>> kernel: [ 336.290966] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
>> kernel: [ 336.344059] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2417 -> 2422 MHz)
>> kernel: [ 336.344068] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
>> kernel: [ 336.446912] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
>> kernel: [ 336.500068] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2422 -> 2427 MHz)
>> kernel: [ 336.500077] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
>> kernel: [ 336.602937] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
>> kernel: [ 336.656058] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2427 -> 2432 MHz)
>> kernel: [ 366.188084] net_ratelimit: 29 callbacks suppressed
>> kernel: [ 366.188097] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2412 -> 2417 MHz)
>> kernel: [ 366.188105] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
>> kernel: [ 366.290999] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
>> kernel: [ 366.344099] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2417 -> 2422 MHz)
>> kernel: [ 366.344112] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
>> kernel: [ 366.447030] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
>> kernel: [ 366.500094] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2422 -> 2427 MHz)
>> kernel: [ 366.500106] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_reset:2648): resetting
>> kernel: [ 366.603008] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_rx_start:1099): cachelsz 32 rx_bufsize 2368
>> kernel: [ 366.656103] ath5k phy0: (ath5k_chan_set:434): channel set, resetting (2427 -> 2432 MHz)
>>
>>
>
> Hmm I don't see any errors from reset/phy code, can you disable
> Network Manager/wpa-supplicant and test connection on an open network
> using iw ? It 'll give us a better picture...
>
> If iw doesn't return any scan results we are probably hitting a PHY/RF
> error specific to your device (not all vendors follow the reference
> design). Maybe we should follow a blacklist/whitelist approach for
> this feature.
>
yeah Im getting this over here with my macbook pro. all of a sudden
internet craps out, unable to reconnect.. reboot is the only way to get
back online.
dmesg here:
http://fpaste.org/mwGn/
I can try bisecting, but might take a while due to this occuring every
few days or so.
Justin P. Mattock
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 0/3] virtio and vhost-net performance enhancements
From: Michael S. Tsirkin @ 2011-05-05 15:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Rusty Russell, Carsten Otte, Christian Borntraeger, linux390,
Martin Schwidefsky, Heiko Carstens, Shirley Ma, lguest,
linux-kernel, virtualization, netdev, linux-s390, kvm,
Krishna Kumar, Tom Lendacky, steved, habanero
In-Reply-To: <cover.1304541918.git.mst@redhat.com>
Here are a couple of minor fixes suggested on list.
Applies on top of the previous patchset.
As before result pushed here:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mst/vhost.git vhost-net-next-event-idx-v1
Michael S. Tsirkin (3):
virtio: fix avail event support
virtio_ring: check used_event offset
virtio_ring: need_event api comment fix
drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c | 2 +-
include/linux/virtio_ring.h | 10 ++++++++--
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--
1.7.5.53.gc233e
^ permalink raw reply
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