* Re: [patch net-next-2.6 v2] net: consolidate and fix ethtool_ops->get_settings calling
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2011-09-02 18:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jiri Pirko
Cc: netdev, ralf, fubar, andy, kaber, bprakash, JBottomley,
robert.w.love, davem, shemminger, decot, mirq-linux,
alexander.h.duyck, amit.salecha, eric.dumazet, therbert, paulmck,
laijs, xiaosuo, greearb, loke.chetan, linux-mips, linux-scsi,
devel, bridge
In-Reply-To: <20110902122630.GC1991@minipsycho>
On Fri, 2011-09-02 at 14:26 +0200, Jiri Pirko wrote:
> This patch does several things:
> - introduces __ethtool_get_settings which is called from ethtool code and
> from dev_ethtool_get_settings() as well.
> - dev_ethtool_get_settings() becomes rtnl wrapper for
> __ethtool_get_settings()
[...]
I don't like this locking change. Most other dev_*() functions require
the caller to hold RTNL, and it will break any OOT module calling
dev_ethtool_get_settings() without producing any warning at compile
time. Why not put an ASSERT_RTNL() in it instead?
The rest of this looks fine.
Ben.
--
Ben Hutchings, Staff Engineer, Solarflare
Not speaking for my employer; that's the marketing department's job.
They asked us to note that Solarflare product names are trademarked.
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH] net: change capability used by socket options IP{,V6}_TRANSPARENT
From: Maciej Żenczykowski @ 2011-09-02 19:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Maciej Żenczykowski
Cc: netdev, Maciej Żenczykowski, Balazs Scheidler
In-Reply-To: <1314953022.26692.182.camel@bzorp>
From: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Up till now the IP{,V6}_TRANSPARENT socket options (which actually set
the same bit in the socket struct) have required CAP_NET_ADMIN
privileges to set or clear the option.
- we make clearing the bit not require any privileges.
- we deprecate using CAP_NET_ADMIN for this purpose.
- we introduce a new capability CAP_NET_TRANSPARENT,
which is tailored to allow setting just this bit.
- we allow either one of CAP_NET_TRANSPARENT or CAP_NET_RAW
to set this bit, because raw sockets already effectively
allow you to emulate socket transparency, and make the
transition easier for apps not desiring to use a brand
new capability (because of header file or glibc support)
- we print a warning (but allow it) if you try to set
the socket option with CAP_NET_ADMIN privs, but without
either one of CAP_NET_TRANSPARENT or CAP_NET_RAW.
The reason for introducing a new capability is that while
transparent sockets are potentially dangerous (and can let you
spoof your source IP on traffic), they don't normally give you
the full 'freedom' of eavesdropping and/or spoofing that raw sockets
give you.
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
CC: Balazs Scheidler <bazsi@balabit.hu>
---
include/linux/capability.h | 13 +++++++++----
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++----
net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
3 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index c421123..a115ed4 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
/* Allow modification of routing tables */
/* Allow setting arbitrary process / process group ownership on
sockets */
-/* Allow binding to any address for transparent proxying */
+/* Allow binding to any address for transparent proxying (deprecated) */
/* Allow setting TOS (type of service) */
/* Allow setting promiscuous mode */
/* Allow clearing driver statistics */
@@ -210,6 +210,7 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
/* Allow use of RAW sockets */
/* Allow use of PACKET sockets */
+/* Allow binding to any address for transparent proxying */
#define CAP_NET_RAW 13
@@ -332,7 +333,7 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
#define CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL 30
-#define CAP_SETFCAP 31
+#define CAP_SETFCAP 31
/* Override MAC access.
The base kernel enforces no MAC policy.
@@ -357,10 +358,14 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
/* Allow triggering something that will wake the system */
-#define CAP_WAKE_ALARM 35
+#define CAP_WAKE_ALARM 35
+
+/* Allow binding to any address for transparent proxying */
+
+#define CAP_NET_TRANSPARENT 36
-#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_WAKE_ALARM
+#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_NET_TRANSPARENT
#define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 8905e92..44efa39 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -961,12 +961,30 @@ mc_msf_out:
break;
case IP_TRANSPARENT:
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
- err = -EPERM;
- break;
- }
if (optlen < 1)
goto e_inval;
+ /* Always allow clearing the transparent proxy socket option.
+ * The pre-3.2 permission for setting this was CAP_NET_ADMIN,
+ * and this is still supported - but deprecated. As of Linux
+ * 3.2 the proper permission is one of CAP_NET_TRANSPARENT
+ * (preferred, a new capability) or CAP_NET_RAW. The latter
+ * is supported to make the transition easier (and because
+ * raw sockets already effectively allow one to emulate
+ * socket transparency).
+ */
+ if (!!val && !capable(CAP_NET_TRANSPARENT)
+ && !capable(CAP_NET_RAW)) {
+ if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
+ err = -EPERM;
+ break;
+ }
+ printk_once(KERN_WARNING "%s (%d): "
+ "deprecated: attempt to set socket option "
+ "IP_TRANSPARENT with CAP_NET_ADMIN but "
+ "without either one of CAP_NET_TRANSPARENT "
+ "or CAP_NET_RAW.\n",
+ current->comm, task_pid_nr(current));
+ }
inet->transparent = !!val;
break;
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
index 147ede38..c840098 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
@@ -343,13 +343,32 @@ static int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
break;
case IPV6_TRANSPARENT:
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
- retv = -EPERM;
- break;
- }
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
goto e_inval;
- /* we don't have a separate transparent bit for IPV6 we use the one in the IPv4 socket */
+ /* Always allow clearing the transparent proxy socket option.
+ * The pre-3.2 permission for setting this was CAP_NET_ADMIN,
+ * and this is still supported - but deprecated. As of Linux
+ * 3.2 the proper permission is one of CAP_NET_TRANSPARENT
+ * (preferred, a new capability) or CAP_NET_RAW. The latter
+ * is supported to make the transition easier (and because
+ * raw sockets already effectively allow one to emulate
+ * socket transparency).
+ */
+ if (valbool && !capable(CAP_NET_TRANSPARENT)
+ && !capable(CAP_NET_RAW)) {
+ if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
+ retv = -EPERM;
+ break;
+ }
+ printk_once(KERN_WARNING "%s (%d): "
+ "deprecated: attempt to set socket option "
+ "IPV6_TRANSPARENT with CAP_NET_ADMIN but "
+ "without either one of CAP_NET_TRANSPARENT "
+ "or CAP_NET_RAW.\n",
+ current->comm, task_pid_nr(current));
+ }
+ /* we don't have a separate transparent bit for IPV6 we use the
+ * one in the IPv4 socket */
inet_sk(sk)->transparent = valbool;
retv = 0;
break;
--
1.7.3.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 08/15] af_netlink.c: make netlink_capable userns-aware
From: Serge Hallyn @ 2011-09-02 19:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: akpm, segooon, linux-kernel, netdev, containers, dhowells,
ebiederm, rdunlap
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn, Eric Dumazet
In-Reply-To: <1314993400-6910-1-git-send-email-serge@hallyn.com>
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
netlink_capable should check for permissions against the user
namespace owning the socket in question.
Changelog:
Per Eric Dumazet advice, use sock_net(sk) instead of #ifdef.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
---
net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 5 +++--
1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
index 0a4db02..3cc0bbe 100644
--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
@@ -580,8 +580,9 @@ retry:
static inline int netlink_capable(struct socket *sock, unsigned int flag)
{
- return (nl_table[sock->sk->sk_protocol].nl_nonroot & flag) ||
- capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN);
+ if (nl_table[sock->sk->sk_protocol].nl_nonroot & flag)
+ return 1;
+ return ns_capable(sock_net(sock->sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN);
}
static void
--
1.7.5.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 13/15] userns: net: make many network capable calls targeted
From: Serge Hallyn @ 2011-09-02 19:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: akpm, segooon, linux-kernel, netdev, containers, dhowells,
ebiederm, rdunlap
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn
In-Reply-To: <1314993400-6910-1-git-send-email-serge@hallyn.com>
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
When privilege is protected a namespaced network resource, then having
the required privilege targed toward the user namespace which owns the
resource suffices.
As with other patches, a big concern here is that we be cleanly separating
the cases where privilege protects a network resource from cases where
privilege can lead to laxer constraints on input and, subsequently,
the ability to corrupt, crash, or own the host kernel.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
---
net/8021q/vlan.c | 12 ++++++------
net/bridge/br_ioctl.c | 22 +++++++++++-----------
net/bridge/br_sysfs_br.c | 8 ++++----
net/bridge/br_sysfs_if.c | 2 +-
net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c | 8 ++++----
net/core/ethtool.c | 2 +-
net/ipv4/arp.c | 2 +-
net/ipv4/devinet.c | 4 ++--
net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c | 2 +-
net/ipv4/ip_options.c | 6 +++---
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 4 ++--
net/ipv4/ipip.c | 4 ++--
net/ipv4/ipmr.c | 2 +-
net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 8 ++++----
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 8 ++++----
net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c | 2 +-
net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c | 4 ++--
net/packet/af_packet.c | 2 +-
18 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/8021q/vlan.c b/net/8021q/vlan.c
index 8970ba1..7d12f63 100644
--- a/net/8021q/vlan.c
+++ b/net/8021q/vlan.c
@@ -558,7 +558,7 @@ static int vlan_ioctl_handler(struct net *net, void __user *arg)
switch (args.cmd) {
case SET_VLAN_INGRESS_PRIORITY_CMD:
err = -EPERM;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
break;
vlan_dev_set_ingress_priority(dev,
args.u.skb_priority,
@@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ static int vlan_ioctl_handler(struct net *net, void __user *arg)
case SET_VLAN_EGRESS_PRIORITY_CMD:
err = -EPERM;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
break;
err = vlan_dev_set_egress_priority(dev,
args.u.skb_priority,
@@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ static int vlan_ioctl_handler(struct net *net, void __user *arg)
case SET_VLAN_FLAG_CMD:
err = -EPERM;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
break;
err = vlan_dev_change_flags(dev,
args.vlan_qos ? args.u.flag : 0,
@@ -586,7 +586,7 @@ static int vlan_ioctl_handler(struct net *net, void __user *arg)
case SET_VLAN_NAME_TYPE_CMD:
err = -EPERM;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
break;
if ((args.u.name_type >= 0) &&
(args.u.name_type < VLAN_NAME_TYPE_HIGHEST)) {
@@ -602,14 +602,14 @@ static int vlan_ioctl_handler(struct net *net, void __user *arg)
case ADD_VLAN_CMD:
err = -EPERM;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
break;
err = register_vlan_device(dev, args.u.VID);
break;
case DEL_VLAN_CMD:
err = -EPERM;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
break;
unregister_vlan_dev(dev, NULL);
err = 0;
diff --git a/net/bridge/br_ioctl.c b/net/bridge/br_ioctl.c
index 7222fe1..c82f9cb 100644
--- a/net/bridge/br_ioctl.c
+++ b/net/bridge/br_ioctl.c
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static int add_del_if(struct net_bridge *br, int ifindex, int isadd)
struct net_device *dev;
int ret;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(dev_net(br->dev)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
dev = __dev_get_by_index(dev_net(br->dev), ifindex);
@@ -178,25 +178,25 @@ static int old_dev_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *rq, int cmd)
}
case BRCTL_SET_BRIDGE_FORWARD_DELAY:
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(dev_net(dev)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return br_set_forward_delay(br, args[1]);
case BRCTL_SET_BRIDGE_HELLO_TIME:
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(dev_net(dev)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return br_set_hello_time(br, args[1]);
case BRCTL_SET_BRIDGE_MAX_AGE:
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(dev_net(dev)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return br_set_max_age(br, args[1]);
case BRCTL_SET_AGEING_TIME:
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(dev_net(dev)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
br->ageing_time = clock_t_to_jiffies(args[1]);
@@ -236,14 +236,14 @@ static int old_dev_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *rq, int cmd)
}
case BRCTL_SET_BRIDGE_STP_STATE:
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(dev_net(dev)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
br_stp_set_enabled(br, args[1]);
return 0;
case BRCTL_SET_BRIDGE_PRIORITY:
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(dev_net(dev)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
spin_lock_bh(&br->lock);
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ static int old_dev_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *rq, int cmd)
struct net_bridge_port *p;
int ret;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(dev_net(dev)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
spin_lock_bh(&br->lock);
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ static int old_dev_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *rq, int cmd)
struct net_bridge_port *p;
int ret;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(dev_net(dev)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
spin_lock_bh(&br->lock);
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ static int old_deviceless(struct net *net, void __user *uarg)
{
char buf[IFNAMSIZ];
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (copy_from_user(buf, (void __user *)args[1], IFNAMSIZ))
@@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ int br_ioctl_deviceless_stub(struct net *net, unsigned int cmd, void __user *uar
{
char buf[IFNAMSIZ];
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (copy_from_user(buf, uarg, IFNAMSIZ))
diff --git a/net/bridge/br_sysfs_br.c b/net/bridge/br_sysfs_br.c
index 68b893e..7f4fa3a 100644
--- a/net/bridge/br_sysfs_br.c
+++ b/net/bridge/br_sysfs_br.c
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ static ssize_t store_bridge_parm(struct device *d,
unsigned long val;
int err;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(dev_net(br->dev)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
val = simple_strtoul(buf, &endp, 0);
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static ssize_t store_stp_state(struct device *d,
char *endp;
unsigned long val;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(dev_net(br->dev)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
val = simple_strtoul(buf, &endp, 0);
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ static ssize_t store_group_addr(struct device *d,
unsigned new_addr[6];
int i;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(dev_net(br->dev)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (sscanf(buf, "%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x",
@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ static ssize_t store_flush(struct device *d,
{
struct net_bridge *br = to_bridge(d);
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(dev_net(br->dev)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
br_fdb_flush(br);
diff --git a/net/bridge/br_sysfs_if.c b/net/bridge/br_sysfs_if.c
index 6229b62..9cb4d2e 100644
--- a/net/bridge/br_sysfs_if.c
+++ b/net/bridge/br_sysfs_if.c
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ static ssize_t brport_store(struct kobject * kobj,
char *endp;
unsigned long val;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(dev_net(p->br->dev)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
val = simple_strtoul(buf, &endp, 0);
diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
index 5864cc4..cc1198b 100644
--- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
+++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
@@ -1463,7 +1463,7 @@ static int do_ebt_set_ctl(struct sock *sk,
{
int ret;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
switch(cmd) {
@@ -1485,7 +1485,7 @@ static int do_ebt_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len)
struct ebt_replace tmp;
struct ebt_table *t;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (copy_from_user(&tmp, user, sizeof(tmp)))
@@ -2276,7 +2276,7 @@ static int compat_do_ebt_set_ctl(struct sock *sk,
{
int ret;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
switch (cmd) {
@@ -2299,7 +2299,7 @@ static int compat_do_ebt_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd,
struct compat_ebt_replace tmp;
struct ebt_table *t;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
/* try real handler in case userland supplied needed padding */
diff --git a/net/core/ethtool.c b/net/core/ethtool.c
index 6cdba5f..56878bf 100644
--- a/net/core/ethtool.c
+++ b/net/core/ethtool.c
@@ -1676,7 +1676,7 @@ int dev_ethtool(struct net *net, struct ifreq *ifr)
case ETHTOOL_GFEATURES:
break;
default:
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/arp.c b/net/ipv4/arp.c
index 96a164a..023ad24 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/arp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/arp.c
@@ -1175,7 +1175,7 @@ int arp_ioctl(struct net *net, unsigned int cmd, void __user *arg)
switch (cmd) {
case SIOCDARP:
case SIOCSARP:
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
case SIOCGARP:
err = copy_from_user(&r, arg, sizeof(struct arpreq));
diff --git a/net/ipv4/devinet.c b/net/ipv4/devinet.c
index bc19bd0..93b5b0b 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/devinet.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/devinet.c
@@ -728,7 +728,7 @@ int devinet_ioctl(struct net *net, unsigned int cmd, void __user *arg)
case SIOCSIFFLAGS:
ret = -EACCES;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
goto out;
break;
case SIOCSIFADDR: /* Set interface address (and family) */
@@ -736,7 +736,7 @@ int devinet_ioctl(struct net *net, unsigned int cmd, void __user *arg)
case SIOCSIFDSTADDR: /* Set the destination address */
case SIOCSIFNETMASK: /* Set the netmask for the interface */
ret = -EACCES;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
goto out;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (sin->sin_family != AF_INET)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c b/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c
index 92fc5f6..8f34a07 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ int ip_rt_ioctl(struct net *net, unsigned int cmd, void __user *arg)
switch (cmd) {
case SIOCADDRT: /* Add a route */
case SIOCDELRT: /* Delete a route */
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (copy_from_user(&rt, arg, sizeof(rt)))
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_options.c b/net/ipv4/ip_options.c
index ec93335..21df700 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_options.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_options.c
@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ int ip_options_compile(struct net *net,
optptr[2] += 8;
break;
default:
- if (!skb && !capable(CAP_NET_RAW)) {
+ if (!skb && !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW)) {
pp_ptr = optptr + 3;
goto error;
}
@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ int ip_options_compile(struct net *net,
opt->router_alert = optptr - iph;
break;
case IPOPT_CIPSO:
- if ((!skb && !capable(CAP_NET_RAW)) || opt->cipso) {
+ if ((!skb && !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW)) || opt->cipso) {
pp_ptr = optptr;
goto error;
}
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ int ip_options_compile(struct net *net,
case IPOPT_SEC:
case IPOPT_SID:
default:
- if (!skb && !capable(CAP_NET_RAW)) {
+ if (!skb && !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW)) {
pp_ptr = optptr;
goto error;
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 8905e92..6408507 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -955,13 +955,13 @@ mc_msf_out:
case IP_IPSEC_POLICY:
case IP_XFRM_POLICY:
err = -EPERM;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
break;
err = xfrm_user_policy(sk, optname, optval, optlen);
break;
case IP_TRANSPARENT:
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
+ if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
err = -EPERM;
break;
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ipip.c b/net/ipv4/ipip.c
index 378b20b..6725832 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ipip.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ipip.c
@@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ ipip_tunnel_ioctl (struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *ifr, int cmd)
case SIOCADDTUNNEL:
case SIOCCHGTUNNEL:
err = -EPERM;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
goto done;
err = -EFAULT;
@@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ ipip_tunnel_ioctl (struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *ifr, int cmd)
case SIOCDELTUNNEL:
err = -EPERM;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
goto done;
if (dev == ipn->fb_tunnel_dev) {
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ipmr.c b/net/ipv4/ipmr.c
index 58e8791..309aa0c 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ipmr.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ipmr.c
@@ -1204,7 +1204,7 @@ int ip_mroute_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int optname, char __user *optval, unsi
if (optname != MRT_INIT) {
if (sk != rcu_dereference_raw(mrt->mroute_sk) &&
- !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EACCES;
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
index fd7a3f6..acc908f 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
@@ -1534,7 +1534,7 @@ static int compat_do_arpt_set_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user,
{
int ret;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
switch (cmd) {
@@ -1678,7 +1678,7 @@ static int compat_do_arpt_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user,
{
int ret;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
switch (cmd) {
@@ -1699,7 +1699,7 @@ static int do_arpt_set_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, unsigned
{
int ret;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
switch (cmd) {
@@ -1723,7 +1723,7 @@ static int do_arpt_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len
{
int ret;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
switch (cmd) {
diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
index 24e556e..72f2cde 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
@@ -1847,7 +1847,7 @@ compat_do_ipt_set_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user,
{
int ret;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
switch (cmd) {
@@ -1962,7 +1962,7 @@ compat_do_ipt_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len)
{
int ret;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
switch (cmd) {
@@ -1984,7 +1984,7 @@ do_ipt_set_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, unsigned int len)
{
int ret;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
switch (cmd) {
@@ -2009,7 +2009,7 @@ do_ipt_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len)
{
int ret;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
switch (cmd) {
diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c
index d7e86ef..38d69a5 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c
@@ -1596,7 +1596,7 @@ ip_set_sockfn_get(struct sock *sk, int optval, void __user *user, int *len)
void *data;
int copylen = *len, ret = 0;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (optval != SO_IP_SET)
return -EBADF;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c
index 2b771dc..db224ef 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c
@@ -2284,7 +2284,7 @@ do_ip_vs_set_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, unsigned int len)
struct ip_vs_dest_user *udest_compat;
struct ip_vs_dest_user_kern udest;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (cmd < IP_VS_BASE_CTL || cmd > IP_VS_SO_SET_MAX)
@@ -2566,7 +2566,7 @@ do_ip_vs_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len)
struct netns_ipvs *ipvs = net_ipvs(net);
BUG_ON(!net);
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (cmd < IP_VS_BASE_CTL || cmd > IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX)
diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index c698cec..c2e6bb6 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -1793,7 +1793,7 @@ static int packet_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
__be16 proto = (__force __be16)protocol; /* weird, but documented */
int err;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_RAW))
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW))
return -EPERM;
if (sock->type != SOCK_DGRAM && sock->type != SOCK_RAW &&
sock->type != SOCK_PACKET)
--
1.7.5.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* user namespaces v3: continue targetting capabilities
From: Serge Hallyn @ 2011-09-02 19:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: akpm, segooon, linux-kernel, netdev, containers, dhowells,
ebiederm, rdunlap
This was last sent Jul 26, and incorporates feedback from that thread.
The last patch, 0015-make-kernel-signal.c-user-ns-safe-v2.patch, is new,
so could stand extra scrutiny.
This patchset is a basis for Eric's set which allows assigning a
filesystem to a user namespace
(http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/linux-userns-devel.git),
which is the last hurdle to starting to employ user namespaces to help
constrain root in a container. So if there is no more major feedback,
I'd love to see this get a spin in -mm so we can proceed with that.
[ v2 intro message: ]
here is a set of patches to continue targetting capabilities
where appropriate. This set goes about as far as is possible
without making the VFS user namespace aware, meaning that the
VFS can provide a namespaced view of userids, i.e init_user_ns
sees file owner 500, while child user ns sees file owner 0 or
1000. (There are a few other things, like siginfos, which can
be addressed before we address the VFS).
With this set applied, you can create and configure veth netdevs
if your user namespace owns your network namespace (and you are
privileged), but not otherwise.
Some simple testcases can be found at
https://code.launchpad.net/~serge-hallyn/+junk/usernstests with
packages at
https://launchpad.net/~serge-hallyn/+archive/userns-natty
Feedback very much appreciated.
^ permalink raw reply
* (unknown),
From: Serge Hallyn @ 2011-09-02 19:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: akpm, segooon, linux-kernel, netdev, containers, dhowells,
ebiederm, rdunlap
Cc: Serge Hallyn
In-Reply-To: <1314993400-6910-1-git-send-email-serge@hallyn.com>
GIT: [PATCH 01/15] add Documentation/namespaces/user_namespace.txt (v3)
GIT: [PATCH 02/15] user ns: setns: move capable checks into per-ns attach
GIT: [PATCH 03/15] keyctl: check capabilities against key's user_ns
GIT: [PATCH 04/15] user_ns: convert fs/attr.c to targeted capabilities
GIT: [PATCH 05/15] userns: clamp down users of cap_raised
GIT: [PATCH 06/15] user namespace: make each net (net_ns) belong to a
GIT: [PATCH 07/15] user namespace: use net->user_ns for some capable
GIT: [PATCH 08/15] af_netlink.c: make netlink_capable userns-aware
GIT: [PATCH 09/15] user ns: convert ipv6 to targeted capabilities
GIT: [PATCH 10/15] net/core/scm.c: target capable() calls to user_ns
GIT: [PATCH 11/15] userns: make some net-sysfs capable calls targeted
GIT: [PATCH 12/15] user_ns: target af_key capability check
GIT: [PATCH 13/15] userns: net: make many network capable calls targeted
GIT: [PATCH 14/15] net: pass user_ns to cap_netlink_recv()
GIT: [PATCH 15/15] make kernel/signal.c user ns safe (v2)
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 01/15] add Documentation/namespaces/user_namespace.txt (v3)
From: Serge Hallyn @ 2011-09-02 19:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: akpm, segooon, linux-kernel, netdev, containers, dhowells,
ebiederm, rdunlap
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn, Serge E. Hallyn
In-Reply-To: <1314993400-6910-1-git-send-email-serge@hallyn.com>
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Quoting David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com):
> Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net> wrote:
>
> > > +Any task in or resource belonging to the initial user namespace will, to this
> > > +new task, appear to belong to UID and GID -1 - which is usually known as
> >
> > that extra hyphen is confusing. how about:
> >
> > to UID and GID -1, which is
>
> 'which are'.
>
> David
This will hold some info about the design. Currently it contains
future todos, issues and questions.
Changelog:
jul 26: incorporate feedback from David Howells.
jul 29: incorporate feedback from Randy Dunlap.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
---
Documentation/namespaces/user_namespace.txt | 107 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/namespaces/user_namespace.txt
diff --git a/Documentation/namespaces/user_namespace.txt b/Documentation/namespaces/user_namespace.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b0bc480
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/namespaces/user_namespace.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+Description
+===========
+
+Traditionally, each task is owned by a user ID (UID) and belongs to one or more
+groups (GID). Both are simple numeric IDs, though userspace usually translates
+them to names. The user namespace allows tasks to have different views of the
+UIDs and GIDs associated with tasks and other resources. (See 'UID mapping'
+below for more.)
+
+The user namespace is a simple hierarchical one. The system starts with all
+tasks belonging to the initial user namespace. A task creates a new user
+namespace by passing the CLONE_NEWUSER flag to clone(2). This requires the
+creating task to have the CAP_SETUID, CAP_SETGID, and CAP_CHOWN capabilities,
+but it does not need to be running as root. The clone(2) call will result in a
+new task which to itself appears to be running as UID and GID 0, but to its
+creator seems to have the creator's credentials.
+
+To this new task, any resource belonging to the initial user namespace will
+appear to belong to user and group 'nobody', which are UID and GID -1.
+Permission to open such files will be granted according to world access
+permissions. UID comparisons and group membership checks will return false,
+and privilege will be denied.
+
+When a task belonging to (for example) userid 500 in the initial user namespace
+creates a new user namespace, even though the new task will see itself as
+belonging to UID 0, any task in the initial user namespace will see it as
+belonging to UID 500. Therefore, UID 500 in the initial user namespace will be
+able to kill the new task. Files created by the new user will (eventually) be
+seen by tasks in its own user namespace as belonging to UID 0, but to tasks in
+the initial user namespace as belonging to UID 500.
+
+Note that this userid mapping for the VFS is not yet implemented, though the
+lkml and containers mailing list archives will show several previous
+prototypes. In the end, those got hung up waiting on the concept of targeted
+capabilities to be developed, which, thanks to the insight of Eric Biederman,
+they finally did.
+
+Relationship between the User namespace and other namespaces
+============================================================
+
+Other namespaces, such as UTS and network, are owned by a user namespace. When
+such a namespace is created, it is assigned to the user namespace of the task
+by which it was created. Therefore, attempts to exercise privilege to
+resources in, for instance, a particular network namespace, can be properly
+validated by checking whether the caller has the needed privilege (i.e.
+CAP_NET_ADMIN) targeted to the user namespace which owns the network namespace.
+This is done using the ns_capable() function.
+
+As an example, if a new task is cloned with a private user namespace but
+no private network namespace, then the task's network namespace is owned
+by the parent user namespace. The new task has no privilege to the
+parent user namespace, so it will not be able to create or configure
+network devices. If, instead, the task were cloned with both private
+user and network namespaces, then the private network namespace is owned
+by the private user namespace, and so root in the new user namespace
+will have privilege targeted to the network namespace. It will be able
+to create and configure network devices.
+
+UID Mapping
+===========
+The current plan (see 'flexible UID mapping' at
+https://wiki.ubuntu.com/UserNamespace) is:
+
+The UID/GID stored on disk will be that in the init_user_ns. Most likely
+UID/GID in other namespaces will be stored in xattrs. But Eric was advocating
+(a few years ago) leaving the details up to filesystems while providing a lib/
+stock implementation. See the thread around here:
+http://www.mail-archive.com/devel@openvz.org/msg09331.html
+
+
+Working notes
+=============
+Capability checks for actions related to syslog must be against the
+init_user_ns until syslog is containerized.
+
+Same is true for reboot and power, control groups, devices, and time.
+
+Perf actions (kernel/event/core.c for instance) will always be constrained to
+init_user_ns.
+
+Q:
+Is accounting considered properly containerized with respect to pidns? (it
+appears to be). If so, then we can change the capable() check in
+kernel/acct.c to 'ns_capable(current_pid_ns()->user_ns, CAP_PACCT)'
+
+Q:
+For things like nice and schedaffinity, we could allow root in a container to
+control those, and leave only cgroups to constrain the container. I'm not sure
+whether that is right, or whether it violates admin expectations.
+
+I deferred some of commoncap.c. I'm punting on xattr stuff as they take
+dentries, not inodes.
+
+For drivers/tty/tty_io.c and drivers/tty/vt/vt.c, we'll want to (for some of
+them) target the capability checks at the user_ns owning the tty. That will
+have to wait until we get userns owning files straightened out.
+
+We need to figure out how to label devices. Should we just toss a user_ns
+right into struct device?
+
+capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN) checks are always to be against init_user_ns, unless
+some day LSMs were to be containerized, near zero chance.
+
+inode_owner_or_capable() should probably take an optional ns and cap parameter.
+If cap is 0, then CAP_FOWNER is checked. If ns is NULL, we derive the ns from
+inode. But if ns is provided, then callers who need to derive
+inode_userns(inode) anyway can save a few cycles.
--
1.7.5.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 02/15] user ns: setns: move capable checks into per-ns attach helper
From: Serge Hallyn @ 2011-09-02 19:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: akpm-3NddpPZAyC0, segooon-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w,
linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
netdev-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA,
dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA, ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w
In-Reply-To: <1314993400-6910-1-git-send-email-serge-A9i7LUbDfNHQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge-A9i7LUbDfNHQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
---
ipc/namespace.c | 7 +++++++
kernel/fork.c | 5 +++++
kernel/nsproxy.c | 11 ++++++++---
kernel/utsname.c | 7 +++++++
net/core/net_namespace.c | 7 +++++++
5 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ipc/namespace.c b/ipc/namespace.c
index ce0a647..a0a7609 100644
--- a/ipc/namespace.c
+++ b/ipc/namespace.c
@@ -163,6 +163,13 @@ static void ipcns_put(void *ns)
static int ipcns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *ns)
{
+#if 0
+ struct ipc_namespace *newns = ns;
+ if (!ns_capable(newns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+#else
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+#endif
+ return -1;
/* Ditch state from the old ipc namespace */
exit_sem(current);
put_ipc_ns(nsproxy->ipc_ns);
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 8e6b6f4..ca712f5 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -1489,8 +1489,13 @@ long do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags,
/* hopefully this check will go away when userns support is
* complete
*/
+#if 0
+ if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || !nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID) ||
+ !nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))
+#else
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || !capable(CAP_SETUID) ||
!capable(CAP_SETGID))
+#endif
return -EPERM;
}
diff --git a/kernel/nsproxy.c b/kernel/nsproxy.c
index 9aeab4b..e274577 100644
--- a/kernel/nsproxy.c
+++ b/kernel/nsproxy.c
@@ -134,7 +134,11 @@ int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
CLONE_NEWPID | CLONE_NEWNET)))
return 0;
+#if 0
+ if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+#else
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+#endif
err = -EPERM;
goto out;
}
@@ -191,7 +195,11 @@ int unshare_nsproxy_namespaces(unsigned long unshare_flags,
CLONE_NEWNET)))
return 0;
+#if 0
+ if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+#else
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+#endif
return -EPERM;
*new_nsp = create_new_namespaces(unshare_flags, current,
@@ -241,9 +249,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setns, int, fd, int, nstype)
struct file *file;
int err;
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return -EPERM;
-
file = proc_ns_fget(fd);
if (IS_ERR(file))
return PTR_ERR(file);
diff --git a/kernel/utsname.c b/kernel/utsname.c
index bff131b..4638a54 100644
--- a/kernel/utsname.c
+++ b/kernel/utsname.c
@@ -104,6 +104,13 @@ static void utsns_put(void *ns)
static int utsns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *ns)
{
+#if 0
+ struct uts_namespace *newns = ns;
+ if (!ns_capable(newns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+#else
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+#endif
+ return -1;
get_uts_ns(ns);
put_uts_ns(nsproxy->uts_ns);
nsproxy->uts_ns = ns;
diff --git a/net/core/net_namespace.c b/net/core/net_namespace.c
index 5bbdbf0..6f6698d 100644
--- a/net/core/net_namespace.c
+++ b/net/core/net_namespace.c
@@ -620,6 +620,13 @@ static void netns_put(void *ns)
static int netns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *ns)
{
+#if 0
+ struct net *net = ns;
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+#else
+ if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+#endif
+ return -1;
put_net(nsproxy->net_ns);
nsproxy->net_ns = get_net(ns);
return 0;
--
1.7.5.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 03/15] keyctl: check capabilities against key's user_ns
From: Serge Hallyn @ 2011-09-02 19:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: akpm-3NddpPZAyC0, segooon-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w,
linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
netdev-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA,
dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA, ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w
In-Reply-To: <1314993400-6910-1-git-send-email-serge-A9i7LUbDfNHQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
ATM, task should only be able to get his own user_ns's keys
anyway, so nsown_capable should also work, but there is no
advantage to doing that, while using key's user_ns is clearer.
changelog: jun 6:
compile fix: keyctl.c (key_user, not key has user_ns)
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
---
security/keys/keyctl.c | 5 +++--
1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index eca5191..fa7d420 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -745,7 +745,7 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
ret = -EACCES;
down_write(&key->sem);
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+ if (!ns_capable(key->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
/* only the sysadmin can chown a key to some other UID */
if (uid != (uid_t) -1 && key->uid != uid)
goto error_put;
@@ -852,7 +852,8 @@ long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t id, key_perm_t perm)
down_write(&key->sem);
/* if we're not the sysadmin, we can only change a key that we own */
- if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || key->uid == current_fsuid()) {
+ if (ns_capable(key->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
+ key->uid == current_fsuid()) {
key->perm = perm;
ret = 0;
}
--
1.7.5.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 04/15] user_ns: convert fs/attr.c to targeted capabilities
From: Serge Hallyn @ 2011-09-02 19:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: akpm-3NddpPZAyC0, segooon-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w,
linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
netdev-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA,
dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA, ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w
In-Reply-To: <1314993400-6910-1-git-send-email-serge-A9i7LUbDfNHQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
---
fs/attr.c | 20 +++++++++++++-------
1 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
index 538e279..e0cf46a 100644
--- a/fs/attr.c
+++ b/fs/attr.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
int inode_change_ok(const struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr)
{
unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
+ struct user_namespace *ns;
/*
* First check size constraints. These can't be overriden using
@@ -44,26 +45,28 @@ int inode_change_ok(const struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr)
if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
return 0;
+ ns = inode_userns(inode);
/* Make sure a caller can chown. */
if ((ia_valid & ATTR_UID) &&
- (current_fsuid() != inode->i_uid ||
- attr->ia_uid != inode->i_uid) && !capable(CAP_CHOWN))
+ (ns != current_user_ns() || current_fsuid() != inode->i_uid ||
+ attr->ia_uid != inode->i_uid) && !ns_capable(ns, CAP_CHOWN))
return -EPERM;
/* Make sure caller can chgrp. */
if ((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) &&
- (current_fsuid() != inode->i_uid ||
+ (ns != current_user_ns() || current_fsuid() != inode->i_uid ||
(!in_group_p(attr->ia_gid) && attr->ia_gid != inode->i_gid)) &&
- !capable(CAP_CHOWN))
+ !ns_capable(ns, CAP_CHOWN))
return -EPERM;
/* Make sure a caller can chmod. */
if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
+ gid_t gid = (ia_valid & ATTR_GID) ? attr->ia_gid : inode->i_gid;
if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
return -EPERM;
/* Also check the setgid bit! */
- if (!in_group_p((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) ? attr->ia_gid :
- inode->i_gid) && !capable(CAP_FSETID))
+ if ((ns != current_user_ns() || !in_group_p(gid)) &&
+ !ns_capable(ns, CAP_FSETID))
attr->ia_mode &= ~S_ISGID;
}
@@ -154,9 +157,12 @@ void setattr_copy(struct inode *inode, const struct iattr *attr)
inode->i_sb->s_time_gran);
if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
umode_t mode = attr->ia_mode;
+ struct user_namespace *ns = inode_userns(inode);
- if (!in_group_p(inode->i_gid) && !capable(CAP_FSETID))
+ if ((ns != current_user_ns() || !in_group_p(inode->i_gid)) &&
+ !ns_capable(ns, CAP_FSETID))
mode &= ~S_ISGID;
+
inode->i_mode = mode;
}
}
--
1.7.5.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 05/15] userns: clamp down users of cap_raised
From: Serge Hallyn @ 2011-09-02 19:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: akpm-3NddpPZAyC0, segooon-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w,
linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
netdev-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA,
dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA, ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w
In-Reply-To: <1314993400-6910-1-git-send-email-serge-A9i7LUbDfNHQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
A few modules are using cap_raised(current_cap(), cap) to authorize
actions, but the privilege should be applicable against the initial
user namespace. Refuse privilege if the caller is not in init_user_ns.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
---
drivers/block/drbd/drbd_nl.c | 5 +++++
drivers/md/dm-log-userspace-transfer.c | 3 +++
drivers/staging/pohmelfs/config.c | 3 +++
drivers/video/uvesafb.c | 3 +++
4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/block/drbd/drbd_nl.c b/drivers/block/drbd/drbd_nl.c
index 0feab26..9a87a14 100644
--- a/drivers/block/drbd/drbd_nl.c
+++ b/drivers/block/drbd/drbd_nl.c
@@ -2297,6 +2297,11 @@ static void drbd_connector_callback(struct cn_msg *req, struct netlink_skb_parms
return;
}
+ if (current_user_ns() != &init_user_ns) {
+ retcode = ERR_PERM;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
if (!cap_raised(current_cap(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
retcode = ERR_PERM;
goto fail;
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-log-userspace-transfer.c b/drivers/md/dm-log-userspace-transfer.c
index 1f23e04..140ca81 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-log-userspace-transfer.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-log-userspace-transfer.c
@@ -134,6 +134,9 @@ static void cn_ulog_callback(struct cn_msg *msg, struct netlink_skb_parms *nsp)
{
struct dm_ulog_request *tfr = (struct dm_ulog_request *)(msg + 1);
+ if (current_user_ns() != &init_user_ns)
+ return;
+
if (!cap_raised(current_cap(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return;
diff --git a/drivers/staging/pohmelfs/config.c b/drivers/staging/pohmelfs/config.c
index b6c42cb..cd259d0 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/pohmelfs/config.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/pohmelfs/config.c
@@ -525,6 +525,9 @@ static void pohmelfs_cn_callback(struct cn_msg *msg, struct netlink_skb_parms *n
{
int err;
+ if (current_user_ns() != &init_user_ns)
+ return;
+
if (!cap_raised(current_cap(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return;
diff --git a/drivers/video/uvesafb.c b/drivers/video/uvesafb.c
index 7f8472c..71dab8e 100644
--- a/drivers/video/uvesafb.c
+++ b/drivers/video/uvesafb.c
@@ -73,6 +73,9 @@ static void uvesafb_cn_callback(struct cn_msg *msg, struct netlink_skb_parms *ns
struct uvesafb_task *utask;
struct uvesafb_ktask *task;
+ if (current_user_ns() != &init_user_ns)
+ return;
+
if (!cap_raised(current_cap(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return;
--
1.7.5.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 06/15] user namespace: make each net (net_ns) belong to a user_ns
From: Serge Hallyn @ 2011-09-02 19:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: akpm-3NddpPZAyC0, segooon-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w,
linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
netdev-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA,
dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA, ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w
In-Reply-To: <1314993400-6910-1-git-send-email-serge-A9i7LUbDfNHQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
This way we can target capabilites at the user_ns which created the
net ns.
Changelog:
jul 8: nsproxy: don't assign netns->userns if not cloning.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
---
include/net/net_namespace.h | 2 ++
kernel/nsproxy.c | 2 ++
net/core/net_namespace.c | 3 +++
3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/net_namespace.h b/include/net/net_namespace.h
index 3bb6fa0..d91fe5f 100644
--- a/include/net/net_namespace.h
+++ b/include/net/net_namespace.h
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ struct ctl_table_header;
struct net_generic;
struct sock;
struct netns_ipvs;
+struct user_namespace;
#define NETDEV_HASHBITS 8
@@ -101,6 +102,7 @@ struct net {
struct netns_xfrm xfrm;
#endif
struct netns_ipvs *ipvs;
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns;
};
diff --git a/kernel/nsproxy.c b/kernel/nsproxy.c
index e274577..752b477 100644
--- a/kernel/nsproxy.c
+++ b/kernel/nsproxy.c
@@ -95,6 +95,8 @@ static struct nsproxy *create_new_namespaces(unsigned long flags,
err = PTR_ERR(new_nsp->net_ns);
goto out_net;
}
+ if (flags & CLONE_NEWNET)
+ new_nsp->net_ns->user_ns = get_user_ns(task_cred_xxx(tsk, user_ns));
return new_nsp;
diff --git a/net/core/net_namespace.c b/net/core/net_namespace.c
index 6f6698d..5ca95cc 100644
--- a/net/core/net_namespace.c
+++ b/net/core/net_namespace.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include <net/net_namespace.h>
#include <net/netns/generic.h>
@@ -209,6 +210,7 @@ static void net_free(struct net *net)
}
#endif
kfree(net->gen);
+ put_user_ns(net->user_ns);
kmem_cache_free(net_cachep, net);
}
@@ -389,6 +391,7 @@ static int __init net_ns_init(void)
rcu_assign_pointer(init_net.gen, ng);
mutex_lock(&net_mutex);
+ init_net.user_ns = &init_user_ns;
if (setup_net(&init_net))
panic("Could not setup the initial network namespace");
--
1.7.5.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 07/15] user namespace: use net->user_ns for some capable calls under net/
From: Serge Hallyn @ 2011-09-02 19:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: akpm, segooon, linux-kernel, netdev, containers, dhowells,
ebiederm, rdunlap
Cc: Serge Hallyn
In-Reply-To: <1314993400-6910-1-git-send-email-serge@hallyn.com>
From: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Just a partial conversion to show how the previous patch is expected to
be used.
Changelog:
6/28/11: fix typo in net/core/sock.c
7/08/11: don't target capability which authorizes module loading
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
---
net/core/dev.c | 4 ++--
net/core/sock.c | 14 ++++++++------
2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c
index 17d67b5..6ae955f 100644
--- a/net/core/dev.c
+++ b/net/core/dev.c
@@ -5014,7 +5014,7 @@ int dev_ioctl(struct net *net, unsigned int cmd, void __user *arg)
case SIOCGMIIPHY:
case SIOCGMIIREG:
case SIOCSIFNAME:
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
dev_load(net, ifr.ifr_name);
rtnl_lock();
@@ -5053,7 +5053,7 @@ int dev_ioctl(struct net *net, unsigned int cmd, void __user *arg)
case SIOCBRADDIF:
case SIOCBRDELIF:
case SIOCSHWTSTAMP:
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
/* fall through */
case SIOCBONDSLAVEINFOQUERY:
diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c
index bc745d0..0f31675 100644
--- a/net/core/sock.c
+++ b/net/core/sock.c
@@ -420,7 +420,7 @@ static int sock_bindtodevice(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval, int optlen)
/* Sorry... */
ret = -EPERM;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_RAW))
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW))
goto out;
ret = -EINVAL;
@@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ int sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
int valbool;
struct linger ling;
int ret = 0;
+ struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
/*
* Options without arguments
@@ -508,7 +509,7 @@ int sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
switch (optname) {
case SO_DEBUG:
- if (val && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (val && !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
ret = -EACCES;
else
sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_DBG, valbool);
@@ -551,7 +552,7 @@ set_sndbuf:
break;
case SO_SNDBUFFORCE:
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
ret = -EPERM;
break;
}
@@ -589,7 +590,7 @@ set_rcvbuf:
break;
case SO_RCVBUFFORCE:
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
ret = -EPERM;
break;
}
@@ -612,7 +613,8 @@ set_rcvbuf:
break;
case SO_PRIORITY:
- if ((val >= 0 && val <= 6) || capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if ((val >= 0 && val <= 6) ||
+ ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
sk->sk_priority = val;
else
ret = -EPERM;
@@ -729,7 +731,7 @@ set_rcvbuf:
clear_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags);
break;
case SO_MARK:
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
ret = -EPERM;
else
sk->sk_mark = val;
--
1.7.5.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 09/15] user ns: convert ipv6 to targeted capabilities
From: Serge Hallyn @ 2011-09-02 19:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: akpm, segooon, linux-kernel, netdev, containers, dhowells,
ebiederm, rdunlap
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn
In-Reply-To: <1314993400-6910-1-git-send-email-serge@hallyn.com>
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
---
net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 4 ++--
net/ipv6/af_inet6.c | 6 ++++--
net/ipv6/datagram.c | 6 +++---
net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c | 24 ++++++++++++++----------
net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c | 4 ++--
net/ipv6/ip6mr.c | 2 +-
net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c | 7 ++++---
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 8 ++++----
net/ipv6/route.c | 2 +-
net/ipv6/sit.c | 10 +++++-----
10 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
index f012ebd..871e5cf 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
@@ -2230,7 +2230,7 @@ int addrconf_add_ifaddr(struct net *net, void __user *arg)
struct in6_ifreq ireq;
int err;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (copy_from_user(&ireq, arg, sizeof(struct in6_ifreq)))
@@ -2249,7 +2249,7 @@ int addrconf_del_ifaddr(struct net *net, void __user *arg)
struct in6_ifreq ireq;
int err;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (copy_from_user(&ireq, arg, sizeof(struct in6_ifreq)))
diff --git a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
index 3b5669a..1854ffe 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
@@ -160,7 +160,8 @@ lookup_protocol:
}
err = -EPERM;
- if (sock->type == SOCK_RAW && !kern && !capable(CAP_NET_RAW))
+ if (sock->type == SOCK_RAW && !kern &&
+ !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW))
goto out_rcu_unlock;
sock->ops = answer->ops;
@@ -281,7 +282,8 @@ int inet6_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
return -EINVAL;
snum = ntohs(addr->sin6_port);
- if (snum && snum < PROT_SOCK && !capable(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE))
+ if (snum && snum < PROT_SOCK &&
+ !ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE))
return -EACCES;
lock_sock(sk);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/datagram.c b/net/ipv6/datagram.c
index 9ef1831..33b1b0f 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/datagram.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/datagram.c
@@ -701,7 +701,7 @@ int datagram_send_ctl(struct net *net,
err = -EINVAL;
goto exit_f;
}
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_RAW)) {
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW)) {
err = -EPERM;
goto exit_f;
}
@@ -721,7 +721,7 @@ int datagram_send_ctl(struct net *net,
err = -EINVAL;
goto exit_f;
}
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_RAW)) {
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW)) {
err = -EPERM;
goto exit_f;
}
@@ -746,7 +746,7 @@ int datagram_send_ctl(struct net *net,
err = -EINVAL;
goto exit_f;
}
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_RAW)) {
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW)) {
err = -EPERM;
goto exit_f;
}
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c
index f3caf1b..4726c02 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c
@@ -294,21 +294,22 @@ struct ipv6_txoptions *fl6_merge_options(struct ipv6_txoptions * opt_space,
return opt_space;
}
-static unsigned long check_linger(unsigned long ttl)
+static unsigned long check_linger(unsigned long ttl, struct user_namespace *ns)
{
if (ttl < FL_MIN_LINGER)
return FL_MIN_LINGER*HZ;
- if (ttl > FL_MAX_LINGER && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (ttl > FL_MAX_LINGER && !ns_capable(ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return 0;
return ttl*HZ;
}
-static int fl6_renew(struct ip6_flowlabel *fl, unsigned long linger, unsigned long expires)
+static int fl6_renew(struct ip6_flowlabel *fl, unsigned long linger,
+ unsigned long expires, struct user_namespace *ns)
{
- linger = check_linger(linger);
+ linger = check_linger(linger, ns);
if (!linger)
return -EPERM;
- expires = check_linger(expires);
+ expires = check_linger(expires, ns);
if (!expires)
return -EPERM;
fl->lastuse = jiffies;
@@ -375,7 +376,7 @@ fl_create(struct net *net, struct in6_flowlabel_req *freq, char __user *optval,
fl->fl_net = hold_net(net);
fl->expires = jiffies;
- err = fl6_renew(fl, freq->flr_linger, freq->flr_expires);
+ err = fl6_renew(fl, freq->flr_linger, freq->flr_expires, net->user_ns);
if (err)
goto done;
fl->share = freq->flr_share;
@@ -425,7 +426,7 @@ static int mem_check(struct sock *sk)
if (room <= 0 ||
((count >= FL_MAX_PER_SOCK ||
(count > 0 && room < FL_MAX_SIZE/2) || room < FL_MAX_SIZE/4) &&
- !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)))
+ !ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)))
return -ENOBUFS;
return 0;
@@ -507,17 +508,20 @@ int ipv6_flowlabel_opt(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval, int optlen)
read_lock_bh(&ip6_sk_fl_lock);
for (sfl = np->ipv6_fl_list; sfl; sfl = sfl->next) {
if (sfl->fl->label == freq.flr_label) {
- err = fl6_renew(sfl->fl, freq.flr_linger, freq.flr_expires);
+ err = fl6_renew(sfl->fl, freq.flr_linger, freq.flr_expires,
+ net->user_ns);
read_unlock_bh(&ip6_sk_fl_lock);
return err;
}
}
read_unlock_bh(&ip6_sk_fl_lock);
- if (freq.flr_share == IPV6_FL_S_NONE && capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
+ if (freq.flr_share == IPV6_FL_S_NONE &&
+ ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
fl = fl_lookup(net, freq.flr_label);
if (fl) {
- err = fl6_renew(fl, freq.flr_linger, freq.flr_expires);
+ err = fl6_renew(fl, freq.flr_linger, freq.flr_expires,
+ net->user_ns);
fl_release(fl);
return err;
}
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c
index 0bc9888..c430d69 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c
@@ -1269,7 +1269,7 @@ ip6_tnl_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *ifr, int cmd)
case SIOCADDTUNNEL:
case SIOCCHGTUNNEL:
err = -EPERM;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(dev_net(dev)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
break;
err = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&p, ifr->ifr_ifru.ifru_data, sizeof (p)))
@@ -1304,7 +1304,7 @@ ip6_tnl_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *ifr, int cmd)
break;
case SIOCDELTUNNEL:
err = -EPERM;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(dev_net(dev)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
break;
if (dev == ip6n->fb_tnl_dev) {
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c
index 705c828..1649ccd 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c
@@ -1582,7 +1582,7 @@ int ip6_mroute_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int optname, char __user *optval, uns
return -ENOENT;
if (optname != MRT6_INIT) {
- if (sk != mrt->mroute6_sk && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (sk != mrt->mroute6_sk && !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EACCES;
}
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
index 147ede38..485e181 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ static int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
break;
case IPV6_TRANSPARENT:
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
retv = -EPERM;
break;
}
@@ -381,7 +381,8 @@ static int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
/* hop-by-hop / destination options are privileged option */
retv = -EPERM;
- if (optname != IPV6_RTHDR && !capable(CAP_NET_RAW))
+ if (optname != IPV6_RTHDR &&
+ !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW))
break;
opt = ipv6_renew_options(sk, np->opt, optname,
@@ -725,7 +726,7 @@ done:
case IPV6_IPSEC_POLICY:
case IPV6_XFRM_POLICY:
retv = -EPERM;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
break;
retv = xfrm_user_policy(sk, optname, optval, optlen);
break;
diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
index 94874b0..7fce7d8 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
@@ -1869,7 +1869,7 @@ compat_do_ip6t_set_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user,
{
int ret;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
switch (cmd) {
@@ -1984,7 +1984,7 @@ compat_do_ip6t_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len)
{
int ret;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
switch (cmd) {
@@ -2006,7 +2006,7 @@ do_ip6t_set_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, unsigned int len)
{
int ret;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
switch (cmd) {
@@ -2031,7 +2031,7 @@ do_ip6t_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len)
{
int ret;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
switch (cmd) {
diff --git a/net/ipv6/route.c b/net/ipv6/route.c
index 9e69eb0..f00c18d 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/route.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/route.c
@@ -1938,7 +1938,7 @@ int ipv6_route_ioctl(struct net *net, unsigned int cmd, void __user *arg)
switch(cmd) {
case SIOCADDRT: /* Add a route */
case SIOCDELRT: /* Delete a route */
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
err = copy_from_user(&rtmsg, arg,
sizeof(struct in6_rtmsg));
diff --git a/net/ipv6/sit.c b/net/ipv6/sit.c
index 00b15ac..7438711 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/sit.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/sit.c
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ static int ipip6_tunnel_get_prl(struct ip_tunnel *t,
/* For simple GET or for root users,
* we try harder to allocate.
*/
- kp = (cmax <= 1 || capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) ?
+ kp = (cmax <= 1 || ns_capable(dev_net(t->dev)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) ?
kcalloc(cmax, sizeof(*kp), GFP_KERNEL) :
NULL;
@@ -929,7 +929,7 @@ ipip6_tunnel_ioctl (struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *ifr, int cmd)
case SIOCADDTUNNEL:
case SIOCCHGTUNNEL:
err = -EPERM;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(dev_net(dev)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
goto done;
err = -EFAULT;
@@ -988,7 +988,7 @@ ipip6_tunnel_ioctl (struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *ifr, int cmd)
case SIOCDELTUNNEL:
err = -EPERM;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(dev_net(dev)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
goto done;
if (dev == sitn->fb_tunnel_dev) {
@@ -1021,7 +1021,7 @@ ipip6_tunnel_ioctl (struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *ifr, int cmd)
case SIOCDELPRL:
case SIOCCHGPRL:
err = -EPERM;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(dev_net(dev)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
goto done;
err = -EINVAL;
if (dev == sitn->fb_tunnel_dev)
@@ -1050,7 +1050,7 @@ ipip6_tunnel_ioctl (struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *ifr, int cmd)
case SIOCCHG6RD:
case SIOCDEL6RD:
err = -EPERM;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(dev_net(dev)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
goto done;
err = -EFAULT;
--
1.7.5.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 10/15] net/core/scm.c: target capable() calls to user_ns owning the net_ns
From: Serge Hallyn @ 2011-09-02 19:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: akpm, segooon, linux-kernel, netdev, containers, dhowells,
ebiederm, rdunlap
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn
In-Reply-To: <1314993400-6910-1-git-send-email-serge@hallyn.com>
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
The uid/gid comparisons don't have to be pulled out. This just seemed
more easily proved correct.
Changelog:
mark struct cred arg const
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
---
net/core/scm.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
1 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/core/scm.c b/net/core/scm.c
index 811b53f..4f376bf 100644
--- a/net/core/scm.c
+++ b/net/core/scm.c
@@ -43,17 +43,44 @@
* setu(g)id.
*/
-static __inline__ int scm_check_creds(struct ucred *creds)
+static __inline__ bool uidequiv(const struct cred *src, struct ucred *tgt,
+ struct user_namespace *ns)
+{
+ if (src->user_ns != ns)
+ goto check_capable;
+ if (src->uid == tgt->uid || src->euid == tgt->uid ||
+ src->suid == tgt->uid)
+ return true;
+check_capable:
+ if (ns_capable(ns, CAP_SETUID))
+ return true;
+ return false;
+}
+
+static __inline__ bool gidequiv(const struct cred *src, struct ucred *tgt,
+ struct user_namespace *ns)
+{
+ if (src->user_ns != ns)
+ goto check_capable;
+ if (src->gid == tgt->gid || src->egid == tgt->gid ||
+ src->sgid == tgt->gid)
+ return true;
+check_capable:
+ if (ns_capable(ns, CAP_SETGID))
+ return true;
+ return false;
+}
+
+static __inline__ int scm_check_creds(struct ucred *creds, struct socket *sock)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ struct user_namespace *ns = sock_net(sock->sk)->user_ns;
- if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) &&
- ((creds->uid == cred->uid || creds->uid == cred->euid ||
- creds->uid == cred->suid) || capable(CAP_SETUID)) &&
- ((creds->gid == cred->gid || creds->gid == cred->egid ||
- creds->gid == cred->sgid) || capable(CAP_SETGID))) {
+ if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) || ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) &&
+ uidequiv(cred, creds, ns) && gidequiv(cred, creds, ns)) {
return 0;
}
+
return -EPERM;
}
@@ -169,7 +196,7 @@ int __scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *p)
if (cmsg->cmsg_len != CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct ucred)))
goto error;
memcpy(&p->creds, CMSG_DATA(cmsg), sizeof(struct ucred));
- err = scm_check_creds(&p->creds);
+ err = scm_check_creds(&p->creds, sock);
if (err)
goto error;
--
1.7.5.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 11/15] userns: make some net-sysfs capable calls targeted
From: Serge Hallyn @ 2011-09-02 19:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: akpm-3NddpPZAyC0, segooon-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w,
linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
netdev-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA,
dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA, ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w
In-Reply-To: <1314993400-6910-1-git-send-email-serge-A9i7LUbDfNHQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
Changelog: jul 1: fix compilation errors (net_device != net)
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
---
net/core/net-sysfs.c | 4 ++--
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/core/net-sysfs.c b/net/core/net-sysfs.c
index 1683e5d..876915b 100644
--- a/net/core/net-sysfs.c
+++ b/net/core/net-sysfs.c
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ static ssize_t netdev_store(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
unsigned long new;
int ret = -EINVAL;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(dev_net(net)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
new = simple_strtoul(buf, &endp, 0);
@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ static ssize_t store_ifalias(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
size_t count = len;
ssize_t ret;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(dev_net(netdev)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
/* ignore trailing newline */
--
1.7.5.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 12/15] user_ns: target af_key capability check
From: Serge Hallyn @ 2011-09-02 19:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: akpm-3NddpPZAyC0, segooon-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w,
linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
netdev-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA,
dhowells-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA, ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w
In-Reply-To: <1314993400-6910-1-git-send-email-serge-A9i7LUbDfNHQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
This presumes that it really is complete wrt network namespaces. Looking
at the code it appears to be.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
---
net/key/af_key.c | 2 +-
1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/key/af_key.c b/net/key/af_key.c
index 1e733e9..1f90f4e 100644
--- a/net/key/af_key.c
+++ b/net/key/af_key.c
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ static int pfkey_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
struct sock *sk;
int err;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (sock->type != SOCK_RAW)
return -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
--
1.7.5.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 14/15] net: pass user_ns to cap_netlink_recv()
From: Serge Hallyn @ 2011-09-02 19:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: akpm, segooon, linux-kernel, netdev, containers, dhowells,
ebiederm, rdunlap
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn
In-Reply-To: <1314993400-6910-1-git-send-email-serge@hallyn.com>
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
and make cap_netlink_recv() userns-aware
cap_netlink_recv() was granting privilege if a capability is in
current_cap(), regardless of the user namespace. Fix that by
targeting the capability check against the user namespace which
owns the skb.
Because sock_net is static inline defined in net/sock.h, which we
don't want to #include at the cap_netlink_recv function (commoncap.h).
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
---
drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c | 3 ++-
include/linux/security.h | 14 +++++++++-----
kernel/audit.c | 6 ++++--
net/core/rtnetlink.c | 3 ++-
net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c | 3 ++-
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_queue.c | 3 ++-
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_queue.c | 3 ++-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c | 2 +-
net/netlink/genetlink.c | 2 +-
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 2 +-
security/commoncap.c | 6 ++----
security/security.c | 4 ++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 5 +++--
13 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c b/drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c
index 26a8a45..0aa2e57 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c
@@ -111,7 +111,8 @@ scsi_nl_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb)
goto next_msg;
}
- if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+ if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+ sock_net(skb->sk)->user_ns)) {
err = -EPERM;
goto next_msg;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index ebd2a53..cfa1f47 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -95,7 +95,8 @@ struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx;
struct seq_file;
extern int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
-extern int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap);
+extern int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap,
+ struct user_namespace *ns);
void reset_security_ops(void);
@@ -797,6 +798,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
* @skb.
* @skb contains the sk_buff structure for the netlink message.
* @cap indicates the capability required
+ * @ns is the user namespace which owns skb
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
*
* Security hooks for Unix domain networking.
@@ -1557,7 +1559,8 @@ struct security_operations {
struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter);
int (*netlink_send) (struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
- int (*netlink_recv) (struct sk_buff *skb, int cap);
+ int (*netlink_recv) (struct sk_buff *skb, int cap,
+ struct user_namespace *ns);
void (*d_instantiate) (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode);
@@ -1806,7 +1809,7 @@ void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode);
int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size);
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
-int security_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap);
+int security_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap, struct user_namespace *ns);
int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
@@ -2498,9 +2501,10 @@ static inline int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
return cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
}
-static inline int security_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
+static inline int security_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap,
+ struct user_namespace *ns)
{
- return cap_netlink_recv(skb, cap);
+ return cap_netlink_recv(skb, cap, ns);
}
static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 0a1355c..48144c4 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -601,13 +601,15 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type)
case AUDIT_TTY_SET:
case AUDIT_TRIM:
case AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIV:
- if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
+ if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL,
+ sock_net(skb->sk)->user_ns))
err = -EPERM;
break;
case AUDIT_USER:
case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG:
case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2 ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2:
- if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
+ if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_AUDIT_WRITE,
+ sock_net(skb->sk)->user_ns))
err = -EPERM;
break;
default: /* bad msg */
diff --git a/net/core/rtnetlink.c b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
index 99d9e95..4a444de 100644
--- a/net/core/rtnetlink.c
+++ b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
@@ -1931,7 +1931,8 @@ static int rtnetlink_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
sz_idx = type>>2;
kind = type&3;
- if (kind != 2 && security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (kind != 2 && security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN,
+ net->user_ns))
return -EPERM;
if (kind == 2 && nlh->nlmsg_flags&NLM_F_DUMP) {
diff --git a/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c b/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c
index 69975e0..2d052ab 100644
--- a/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c
+++ b/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c
@@ -108,7 +108,8 @@ static inline void dnrmg_receive_user_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
if (nlh->nlmsg_len < sizeof(*nlh) || skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len)
return;
- if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN,
+ sock_net(skb->sk)->user_ns))
RCV_SKB_FAIL(-EPERM);
/* Eventually we might send routing messages too */
diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_queue.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_queue.c
index 5c9b9d9..51d7c52 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_queue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_queue.c
@@ -432,7 +432,8 @@ __ipq_rcv_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
if (type <= IPQM_BASE)
return;
- if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN,
+ sock_net(skb->sk)->user_ns))
RCV_SKB_FAIL(-EPERM);
spin_lock_bh(&queue_lock);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_queue.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_queue.c
index 2493948..8206bf3 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_queue.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_queue.c
@@ -433,7 +433,8 @@ __ipq_rcv_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
if (type <= IPQM_BASE)
return;
- if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN,
+ sock_net(skb->sk)->user_ns))
RCV_SKB_FAIL(-EPERM);
spin_lock_bh(&queue_lock);
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c
index 1905976..bcaff9d 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ static int nfnetlink_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
const struct nfnetlink_subsystem *ss;
int type, err;
- if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN, net->user_ns))
return -EPERM;
/* All the messages must at least contain nfgenmsg */
diff --git a/net/netlink/genetlink.c b/net/netlink/genetlink.c
index 482fa57..00a101c 100644
--- a/net/netlink/genetlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/genetlink.c
@@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ static int genl_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if ((ops->flags & GENL_ADMIN_PERM) &&
- security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN, net->user_ns))
return -EPERM;
if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_DUMP) {
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index 0256b8a..1808e1e 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -2290,7 +2290,7 @@ static int xfrm_user_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
link = &xfrm_dispatch[type];
/* All operations require privileges, even GET */
- if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN, net->user_ns))
return -EPERM;
if ((type == (XFRM_MSG_GETSA - XFRM_MSG_BASE) ||
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index a93b3b7..1e48e6a 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -56,11 +56,9 @@ int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
return 0;
}
-int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
+int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap, struct user_namespace *ns)
{
- if (!cap_raised(current_cap(), cap))
- return -EPERM;
- return 0;
+ return security_capable(ns, current_cred(), cap);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 0e4fccf..0a1453e 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -941,9 +941,9 @@ int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
return security_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
}
-int security_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
+int security_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap, struct user_namespace *ns)
{
- return security_ops->netlink_recv(skb, cap);
+ return security_ops->netlink_recv(skb, cap, ns);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_netlink_recv);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 266a229..fe290bb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4723,13 +4723,14 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
}
-static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
+static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability,
+ struct user_namespace *ns)
{
int err;
struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid;
- err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
+ err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability, ns);
if (err)
return err;
--
1.7.5.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 15/15] make kernel/signal.c user ns safe (v2)
From: Serge Hallyn @ 2011-09-02 19:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: akpm, segooon, linux-kernel, netdev, containers, dhowells,
ebiederm, rdunlap
Cc: Serge Hallyn
In-Reply-To: <1314993400-6910-1-git-send-email-serge@hallyn.com>
From: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
---
kernel/signal.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
index 291c970..c07b970 100644
--- a/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/freezer.h>
#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
#include <trace/events/signal.h>
@@ -1073,7 +1074,8 @@ static int __send_signal(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct task_struct *t,
q->info.si_code = SI_USER;
q->info.si_pid = task_tgid_nr_ns(current,
task_active_pid_ns(t));
- q->info.si_uid = current_uid();
+ q->info.si_uid = user_ns_map_uid(task_cred_xxx(t, user_ns),
+ current_cred(), current_uid());
break;
case (unsigned long) SEND_SIG_PRIV:
q->info.si_signo = sig;
@@ -1363,6 +1365,11 @@ int kill_pid_info_as_uid(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct pid *pid,
goto out_unlock;
}
pcred = __task_cred(p);
+ /*
+ * this is called (only) from drivers/usb/core/devio.c.
+ * Do we need to add user_ns to urb and usb_device, so
+ * we can pass them in here?
+ */
if (si_fromuser(info) &&
euid != pcred->suid && euid != pcred->uid &&
uid != pcred->suid && uid != pcred->uid) {
@@ -1618,7 +1625,8 @@ bool do_notify_parent(struct task_struct *tsk, int sig)
*/
rcu_read_lock();
info.si_pid = task_pid_nr_ns(tsk, tsk->parent->nsproxy->pid_ns);
- info.si_uid = __task_cred(tsk)->uid;
+ info.si_uid = user_ns_map_uid(task_cred_xxx(tsk->parent, user_ns),
+ __task_cred(tsk), __task_cred(tsk)->uid);
rcu_read_unlock();
info.si_utime = cputime_to_clock_t(cputime_add(tsk->utime,
@@ -1688,6 +1696,7 @@ static void do_notify_parent_cldstop(struct task_struct *tsk,
unsigned long flags;
struct task_struct *parent;
struct sighand_struct *sighand;
+ const struct cred *cred;
if (for_ptracer) {
parent = tsk->parent;
@@ -1703,7 +1712,9 @@ static void do_notify_parent_cldstop(struct task_struct *tsk,
*/
rcu_read_lock();
info.si_pid = task_pid_nr_ns(tsk, parent->nsproxy->pid_ns);
- info.si_uid = __task_cred(tsk)->uid;
+ cred = __task_cred(tsk);
+ info.si_uid = user_ns_map_uid(task_cred_xxx(parent, user_ns),
+ cred, cred->uid);
rcu_read_unlock();
info.si_utime = cputime_to_clock_t(tsk->utime);
@@ -2122,7 +2133,10 @@ static int ptrace_signal(int signr, siginfo_t *info,
info->si_errno = 0;
info->si_code = SI_USER;
info->si_pid = task_pid_vnr(current->parent);
- info->si_uid = task_uid(current->parent);
+ /* we can cache cred if this performs poorly */
+ info->si_uid = user_ns_map_uid(current_user_ns(),
+ __task_cred(current->parent),
+ task_uid(current->parent));
}
/* If the (new) signal is now blocked, requeue it. */
@@ -2552,6 +2566,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(rt_sigpending, sigset_t __user *, set, size_t, sigsetsize)
#ifndef HAVE_ARCH_COPY_SIGINFO_TO_USER
+/*
+ * send_signal has converted the sender's uid to the receiver
+ * task user namespace, so no need to convert here
+ */
int copy_siginfo_to_user(siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
{
int err;
--
1.7.5.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [patch net-next-2.6 v2] net: consolidate and fix ethtool_ops->get_settings calling
From: Jiri Pirko @ 2011-09-02 20:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ben Hutchings
Cc: netdev, ralf, fubar, andy, kaber, bprakash, JBottomley,
robert.w.love, davem, shemminger, decot, mirq-linux,
alexander.h.duyck, amit.salecha, eric.dumazet, therbert, paulmck,
laijs, xiaosuo, greearb, loke.chetan, linux-mips, linux-scsi,
devel, bridge
In-Reply-To: <1314989161.3419.5.camel@bwh-desktop>
Fri, Sep 02, 2011 at 08:46:01PM CEST, bhutchings@solarflare.com wrote:
>On Fri, 2011-09-02 at 14:26 +0200, Jiri Pirko wrote:
>> This patch does several things:
>> - introduces __ethtool_get_settings which is called from ethtool code and
>> from dev_ethtool_get_settings() as well.
>> - dev_ethtool_get_settings() becomes rtnl wrapper for
>> __ethtool_get_settings()
>[...]
>
>I don't like this locking change. Most other dev_*() functions require
>the caller to hold RTNL, and it will break any OOT module calling
>dev_ethtool_get_settings() without producing any warning at compile
>time. Why not put an ASSERT_RTNL() in it instead?
Hmm. Okay, then I would remove dev_ethtool_get_settings() from
net/core/dev.c and only put __ethtool_get_settings() to
net/core/ethtool.c. Makes more sense to me to have it there...
ASSERT_RTNL woudl be good there as well.
>
>The rest of this looks fine.
>
>Ben.
>
>--
>Ben Hutchings, Staff Engineer, Solarflare
>Not speaking for my employer; that's the marketing department's job.
>They asked us to note that Solarflare product names are trademarked.
>
^ permalink raw reply
* [RFC, 1/2] ethtool: Implement private flags interface for ethtool application.
From: Carolyn Wyborny @ 2011-09-02 20:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bhutchings, davem; +Cc: netdev
This patch completes the user space implementation of the private
flags inteface in ethtool. Using -b/-B options.
Signed-off-by: Carolyn Wyborny <carolyn.wyborny@intel.com>
---
ethtool.8.in | 16 +++++++++
ethtool.c | 98 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ethtool.8.in b/ethtool.8.in
index 7a0bd43..ebcb233 100644
--- a/ethtool.8.in
+++ b/ethtool.8.in
@@ -134,6 +134,13 @@ ethtool \- query or control network driver and hardware settings
.B2 rx on off
.B2 tx on off
.HP
+.B ethtool \-b|\-\-show\-priv\-flags
+.I ethX
+.HP
+.B ethtool \-B|\-\-set\-priv\-flags
+.I ethX
+.BN bit
+.HP
.B ethtool \-c|\-\-show\-coalesce
.I ethX
.HP
@@ -342,6 +349,15 @@ Specifies whether RX pause should be enabled.
.A2 tx on off
Specifies whether TX pause should be enabled.
.TP
+.B \-b \-\-show\-priv_flags
+Queries the specified network device for private flags set.
+.TP
+.B \-B \-\-set\-priv_flags
+Changes the private flags of the specified network device.
+.TP
+.BI bit \ N
+Sets the specific bit number in the private flagsg field.
+.TP
.B \-c \-\-show\-coalesce
Queries the specified network device for coalescing information.
.TP
diff --git a/ethtool.c b/ethtool.c
index 943dfb7..4702d04 100644
--- a/ethtool.c
+++ b/ethtool.c
@@ -99,6 +99,8 @@ static int do_flash(int fd, struct ifreq *ifr);
static int do_permaddr(int fd, struct ifreq *ifr);
static int do_getfwdump(int fd, struct ifreq *ifr);
static int do_setfwdump(int fd, struct ifreq *ifr);
+static int do_gpflags(int fd, struct ifreq *ifr);
+static int do_spflags(int fd, struct ifreq *ifr);
static int send_ioctl(int fd, struct ifreq *ifr);
@@ -133,6 +135,8 @@ static enum {
MODE_PERMADDR,
MODE_SET_DUMP,
MODE_GET_DUMP,
+ MODE_GET_PFLAGS,
+ MODE_SET_PFLAGS,
} mode = MODE_GSET;
static struct option {
@@ -157,6 +161,9 @@ static struct option {
" [ autoneg on|off ]\n"
" [ rx on|off ]\n"
" [ tx on|off ]\n" },
+ { "-b", "--show-pflags", MODE_GET_PFLAGS, "Show private flags set." },
+ { "-B", "--set-pflags", MODE_SET_PFLAGS, "Set private flags.",
+ " [value N | bit N]\n" },
{ "-c", "--show-coalesce", MODE_GCOALESCE, "Show coalesce options" },
{ "-C", "--coalesce", MODE_SCOALESCE, "Set coalesce options",
" [adaptive-rx on|off]\n"
@@ -405,6 +412,11 @@ static int rx_class_rule_del = -1;
static int rx_class_rule_added = 0;
static struct ethtool_rx_flow_spec rx_rule_fs;
+static u32 priv_flags;
+static int priv_flags_changed;
+static u32 priv_flags_val_wanted;
+static u8 priv_flags_bit_wanted;
+
static enum {
ONLINE=0,
OFFLINE,
@@ -552,6 +564,10 @@ static struct cmdline_info cmdline_msglvl[] = {
NETIF_MSG_WOL, &msglvl_mask },
};
+static struct cmdline_info cmdline_pflags[] = {
+ { "value", CMDL_U32, &priv_flags_val_wanted, &priv_flags },
+};
+
static long long
get_int_range(char *str, int base, long long min, long long max)
{
@@ -800,7 +816,9 @@ static void parse_cmdline(int argc, char **argp)
(mode == MODE_FLASHDEV) ||
(mode == MODE_PERMADDR) ||
(mode == MODE_SET_DUMP) ||
- (mode == MODE_GET_DUMP)) {
+ (mode == MODE_GET_DUMP) ||
+ (mode == MODE_GET_PFLAGS) ||
+ (mode == MODE_SET_PFLAGS)) {
devname = argp[i];
break;
}
@@ -884,6 +902,28 @@ static void parse_cmdline(int argc, char **argp)
i = argc;
break;
}
+ if (mode == MODE_SET_PFLAGS) {
+ if (!strcmp(argp[i], "value")) {
+ priv_flags_changed = 1;
+ i++;
+ if (i >= argc)
+ exit_bad_args();
+ priv_flags_val_wanted =
+ get_u32(argp[i], 0);
+ } else if (!strcmp(argp[i], "bit")) {
+ priv_flags_changed = 1;
+ i++;
+ if (i >= argc)
+ exit_bad_args();
+ priv_flags_bit_wanted =
+ get_int(argp[i], 0);
+ priv_flags_val_wanted =
+ (1 >> priv_flags_bit_wanted);
+ } else
+ exit_bad_args();
+ i = argc;
+ break;
+ }
if (mode == MODE_SCLSRULE) {
if (!strcmp(argp[i], "flow-type")) {
i += 1;
@@ -1957,6 +1997,10 @@ static int doit(void)
return do_getfwdump(fd, &ifr);
} else if (mode == MODE_SET_DUMP) {
return do_setfwdump(fd, &ifr);
+ } else if (mode == MODE_GET_PFLAGS) {
+ return do_gpflags(fd, &ifr);
+ } else if (mode == MODE_SET_PFLAGS) {
+ return do_spflags(fd, &ifr);
}
return 69;
@@ -3346,6 +3390,58 @@ static int do_setfwdump(int fd, struct ifreq *ifr)
return 0;
}
+static int do_gpflags(int fd, struct ifreq *ifr)
+{
+ int err;
+ struct ethtool_value eval;
+
+ eval.cmd = ETHTOOL_GPFLAGS;
+ ifr->ifr_data = (caddr_t)&eval;
+ err = send_ioctl(fd, ifr);
+ if (err) {
+ perror("Cannot get device private flags");
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stdout, " Current flags set: 0x%08x (%d)\n"
+ " ",
+ eval.data, eval.data);
+ print_flags(cmdline_pflags, ARRAY_SIZE(cmdline_pflags),
+ eval.data);
+ fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+ }
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int do_spflags(int fd, struct ifreq *ifr)
+{
+ struct ethtool_value eval;
+ int err, changed = 0;
+ eval.cmd = ETHTOOL_GPFLAGS;
+ ifr->ifr_data = (caddr_t)&eval;
+ err = send_ioctl(fd, ifr);
+ if (err) {
+ perror("Cannot get device private flags");
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ priv_flags = eval.data;
+ do_generic_set(cmdline_pflags, ARRAY_SIZE(cmdline_pflags),
+ &changed);
+ if (!changed) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "No private flags have changed, aborting\n");
+ return 1;
+ } else {
+ eval.cmd = ETHTOOL_SPFLAGS;
+ eval.data = priv_flags_val_wanted;
+ ifr->ifr_data = (caddr_t)&eval;
+ err = send_ioctl(fd, ifr);
+ if (err) {
+ perror("Cannot set device private flags.\n");
+ return err;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
static int send_ioctl(int fd, struct ifreq *ifr)
{
return ioctl(fd, SIOCETHTOOL, ifr);
--
1.7.4.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [RFC, 2/2] igb: Implementation of ethtool priv_flags for igb driver.
From: Carolyn Wyborny @ 2011-09-02 20:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bhutchings, davem; +Cc: netdev
In-Reply-To: <1314996631-4773-1-git-send-email-carolyn.wyborny@intel.com>
This patch adds igb driver support for the ethtool private flags
interface. Two features are initially configured for private flags
support as an example for use with the implementation in ethtoool
application.
Signed-off-by: Carolyn Wyborny <carolyn.wyborny@intel.com>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb.h | 2 +
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_ethtool.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c | 1 +
3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb.h
index bb47ed1..a8be3eb 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb.h
@@ -360,6 +360,7 @@ struct igb_adapter {
u32 rss_queues;
u32 wvbr;
int node;
+ u32 pflags;
};
#define IGB_FLAG_HAS_MSI (1 << 0)
@@ -367,6 +368,7 @@ struct igb_adapter {
#define IGB_FLAG_QUAD_PORT_A (1 << 2)
#define IGB_FLAG_QUEUE_PAIRS (1 << 3)
#define IGB_FLAG_DMAC (1 << 4)
+#define IGB_FLAG_EEE (1 << 5)
/* DMA Coalescing defines */
#define IGB_MIN_TXPBSIZE 20408
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_ethtool.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_ethtool.c
index 64fb4ef..3a251c7 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_ethtool.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_ethtool.c
@@ -696,6 +696,9 @@ static void igb_get_drvinfo(struct net_device *netdev,
drvinfo->testinfo_len = IGB_TEST_LEN;
drvinfo->regdump_len = igb_get_regs_len(netdev);
drvinfo->eedump_len = igb_get_eeprom_len(netdev);
+#ifdef ETHTOOL_GPFLAGS
+ drvinfo->n_priv_flags = 2;
+#endif
}
static void igb_get_ringparam(struct net_device *netdev,
@@ -2171,6 +2174,29 @@ static void igb_get_strings(struct net_device *netdev, u32 stringset, u8 *data)
}
}
+static int igb_set_pflags(struct net_device *netdev, u32 data)
+{
+ u32 supported_flags = IGB_FLAG_EEE;
+ struct igb_adapter *adapter = netdev_priv(netdev);
+
+ if (data & supported_flags) {
+ adapter->pflags = data;
+ } else {
+ printk(KERN_INFO, "set_pflags:flag not supported..");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static u32 igb_get_pflags(struct net_device *netdev)
+{
+ struct igb_adapter *adapter = netdev_priv(netdev);
+
+ return adapter->pflags;
+
+}
+
static const struct ethtool_ops igb_ethtool_ops = {
.get_settings = igb_get_settings,
.set_settings = igb_set_settings,
@@ -2197,6 +2223,8 @@ static const struct ethtool_ops igb_ethtool_ops = {
.get_ethtool_stats = igb_get_ethtool_stats,
.get_coalesce = igb_get_coalesce,
.set_coalesce = igb_set_coalesce,
+ .get_priv_flags = igb_get_pflags,
+ .set_priv_flags = igb_set_pflags,
};
void igb_set_ethtool_ops(struct net_device *netdev)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c
index 289861c..a534f32 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c
@@ -2175,6 +2175,7 @@ static int __devinit igb_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev,
switch (hw->mac.type) {
case e1000_i350:
igb_set_eee_i350(hw);
+ adapter->pflags |= IGB_FLAG_EEE;
break;
default:
break;
--
1.7.4.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [RFC, 1/2] ethtool: Implement private flags interface for ethtool application.
From: David Miller @ 2011-09-02 20:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: carolyn.wyborny; +Cc: bhutchings, netdev
In-Reply-To: <1314996631-4773-1-git-send-email-carolyn.wyborny@intel.com>
From: Carolyn Wyborny <carolyn.wyborny@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2011 13:50:30 -0700
> This patch completes the user space implementation of the private
> flags inteface in ethtool. Using -b/-B options.
>
> Signed-off-by: Carolyn Wyborny <carolyn.wyborny@intel.com>
The only use case you show here is something generic which other
chips have, Energy Efficient Ethernet.
Making an attribute private which is present widely amonst various
networking chips makes no sense at all.
It deserved a generic ethtool flag.
^ permalink raw reply
* RE: [RFC, 1/2] ethtool: Implement private flags interface for ethtool application.
From: Wyborny, Carolyn @ 2011-09-02 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Miller; +Cc: bhutchings@solarflare.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org
In-Reply-To: <20110902.165524.1076389492712310664.davem@davemloft.net>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: David Miller [mailto:davem@davemloft.net]
>Sent: Friday, September 02, 2011 1:55 PM
>To: Wyborny, Carolyn
>Cc: bhutchings@solarflare.com; netdev@vger.kernel.org
>Subject: Re: [RFC, 1/2] ethtool: Implement private flags interface for
>ethtool application.
>
>From: Carolyn Wyborny <carolyn.wyborny@intel.com>
>Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2011 13:50:30 -0700
>
>> This patch completes the user space implementation of the private
>> flags inteface in ethtool. Using -b/-B options.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Carolyn Wyborny <carolyn.wyborny@intel.com>
>
>The only use case you show here is something generic which other
>chips have, Energy Efficient Ethernet.
>
>Making an attribute private which is present widely amonst various
>networking chips makes no sense at all.
>
>It deserved a generic ethtool flag.
Fair enough on this particular feature, but does that negate the implementation suggestion altogether? I can send an updated feature implementation for the use case using DMA Coalescing if that will help.
Thanks,
Carolyn
Carolyn Wyborny
Linux Development
LAN Access Division
Intel Corporation
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RFC, 1/2] ethtool: Implement private flags interface for ethtool application.
From: Michał Mirosław @ 2011-09-02 21:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Wyborny, Carolyn
Cc: David Miller, bhutchings@solarflare.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org
In-Reply-To: <EDC0E76513226749BFBC9C3FB031318F0173FF8607@orsmsx508.amr.corp.intel.com>
2011/9/2 Wyborny, Carolyn <carolyn.wyborny@intel.com>:
>>-----Original Message-----
>>From: David Miller [mailto:davem@davemloft.net]
>>Sent: Friday, September 02, 2011 1:55 PM
>>To: Wyborny, Carolyn
>>Cc: bhutchings@solarflare.com; netdev@vger.kernel.org
>>Subject: Re: [RFC, 1/2] ethtool: Implement private flags interface for
>>ethtool application.
>>
>>From: Carolyn Wyborny <carolyn.wyborny@intel.com>
>>Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2011 13:50:30 -0700
>>
>>> This patch completes the user space implementation of the private
>>> flags inteface in ethtool. Using -b/-B options.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Carolyn Wyborny <carolyn.wyborny@intel.com>
>>
>>The only use case you show here is something generic which other
>>chips have, Energy Efficient Ethernet.
>>
>>Making an attribute private which is present widely amonst various
>>networking chips makes no sense at all.
>>
>>It deserved a generic ethtool flag.
>
> Fair enough on this particular feature, but does that negate the implementation suggestion altogether? I can send an updated feature implementation for the use case using DMA Coalescing if that will help.
I would rather see this as an extension to ETHTOOL_[GS]FEATURES. Its
semantics allow easy expanding to handle device-private flags without
changing anything on userspace side.
Best Regards,
Michał Mirosław
^ permalink raw reply
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