* Re: [PATCH] mac80211: port CCMP to cryptoapi's CCM driver
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2013-10-08 13:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Laight
Cc: Johannes Berg, linux-wireless, netdev, Patch Tracking,
John Linville
In-Reply-To: <AE90C24D6B3A694183C094C60CF0A2F6026B737B@saturn3.aculab.com>
On 8 October 2013 15:01, David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> wrote:
>> Hmm, thanks I guess. I'll need to review this in more detail, but I have
>> a question first:
>>
>> > + /* allocate the variable sized aead_request on the stack */
>> > + int l = DIV_ROUND_UP(crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm),
>> > + sizeof(struct aead_request));
>> > + struct aead_request req[1 + l];
>>
>> This looks a bit odd, why round up first and then add one? Why even
>> bother using a struct array rather than some local struct like
>
> Is it even a good idea to be allocating variable sized items
> on the kernel stack?
>
> There has to be enough stack available for the maximum number
> of entries - so there is little point in dynamically sizing it.
>
The result of crypto_aead_reqsize() has nothing to do with the input
or output data, it is a property of the particular implementation of
ccm(aes) that is being used. In the generic case (ccm.c),
it always returns the size of this struct
struct crypto_ccm_req_priv_ctx {
u8 odata[16];
u8 idata[16];
u8 auth_tag[16];
u32 ilen;
u32 flags;
struct scatterlist src[2];
struct scatterlist dst[2];
struct ablkcipher_request abreq;
};
while the particular implementation that I am working on for ARM64
always has size 0. Note that this is data that would otherwise be
allocated on the stack, but in the case of aead, which supports an
asynchronous interface (which this code does not use btw), the data is
attached to the end of the aead_request struct instead.
The alternative is to allocate it dynamically using GFP_ATOMIC and
free it at the end of the function, but in this particular case I
don't think that makes much sense tbh
--
Ard.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 1/2] cgroup: netprio: remove unnecessary task_netprioidx
From: Neil Horman @ 2013-10-08 13:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Gao feng
Cc: netdev-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, cgroups-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
jhs-jkUAjuhPggJWk0Htik3J/w, davem-fT/PcQaiUtIeIZ0/mPfg9Q,
tj-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A, lizefan-hv44wF8Li93QT0dZR+AlfA,
daniel.wagner-98C5kh4wR6ohFhg+JK9F0w
In-Reply-To: <1381201520-25938-1-git-send-email-gaofeng-BthXqXjhjHXQFUHtdCDX3A@public.gmane.org>
On Tue, Oct 08, 2013 at 11:05:19AM +0800, Gao feng wrote:
> Since the tasks have been migrated to the cgroup,
> there is no need to call task_netprioidx to get
> task's cgroup id.
>
> Signed-off-by: Gao feng <gaofeng-BthXqXjhjHXQFUHtdCDX3A@public.gmane.org>
> ---
> net/core/netprio_cgroup.c | 3 +--
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/core/netprio_cgroup.c b/net/core/netprio_cgroup.c
> index d9cd627..9b7cf6c 100644
> --- a/net/core/netprio_cgroup.c
> +++ b/net/core/netprio_cgroup.c
> @@ -222,11 +222,10 @@ static void net_prio_attach(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css,
> struct cgroup_taskset *tset)
> {
> struct task_struct *p;
> - void *v;
> + void *v = (void *)(unsigned long)css->cgroup->id;
>
> cgroup_taskset_for_each(p, css, tset) {
> task_lock(p);
> - v = (void *)(unsigned long)task_netprioidx(p);
> iterate_fd(p->files, 0, update_netprio, v);
> task_unlock(p);
> }
> --
> 1.8.3.1
>
>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman-2XuSBdqkA4R54TAoqtyWWQ@public.gmane.org>
^ permalink raw reply
* RE: [PATCH net-next v2 1/5] xen-netback: add IPv6 checksum offload to guest
From: Paul Durrant @ 2013-10-08 13:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Wei Liu
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xen.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, Wei Liu,
David Vrabel, Ian Campbell
In-Reply-To: <20131008131000.GH28411@zion.uk.xensource.com>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Wei Liu [mailto:wei.liu2@citrix.com]
> Sent: 08 October 2013 14:10
> To: Paul Durrant
> Cc: xen-devel@lists.xen.org; netdev@vger.kernel.org; Wei Liu; David Vrabel;
> Ian Campbell
> Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next v2 1/5] xen-netback: add IPv6 checksum
> offload to guest
>
> On Tue, Oct 08, 2013 at 11:58:12AM +0100, Paul Durrant wrote:
> > Check xenstore flag feature-ipv6-csum-offload to determine if a
> > guest is happy to accept IPv6 packets with only partial checksum.
> > Also check analogous feature-ip-csum-offload to determone if a
>
> determone -> determine
>
Ok.
> > guest is happy to accept IPv4 packets with only partial checksum
> > as a replacement for a negated feature-no-csum-offload value and
> > add a comment to deprecate use of feature-no-csum-offload.
> >
> [...]
> > @@ -306,7 +308,7 @@ struct xenvif *xenvif_alloc(struct device *parent,
> domid_t domid,
> > vif->domid = domid;
> > vif->handle = handle;
> > vif->can_sg = 1;
> > - vif->csum = 1;
> > + vif->ip_csum = 1;
>
> Not setting a default value for vif->ipv6_csum?
>
The default is 0 so no need.
> > vif->dev = dev;
> >
> [...]
> > + /* Before feature-ipv6-csum-offload was introduced, checksum
> offload
> > + * was turned on by a zero value in (or lack of)
> > + * feature-no-csum-offload. Therefore, for compatibility, assume
> > + * that if feature-ip-csum-offload is missing that IP (v4) offload
> > + * is turned on. If this is not the case then the flag will be
> > + * cleared when we subsequently sample feature-no-csum-offload.
> > + */
> > + if (xenbus_scanf(XBT_NIL, dev->otherend, "feature-ip-csum-
> offload",
> > + "%d", &val) < 0)
> > + val = 1;
> > + vif->ip_csum = !!val;
> > +
> > + if (xenbus_scanf(XBT_NIL, dev->otherend, "feature-ipv6-csum-
> offload",
> > + "%d", &val) < 0)
> > + val = 0;
> > + vif->ipv6_csum = !!val;
> > +
> > + /* This is deprecated. Frontends should set IP v4 and v6 checksum
> > + * offload using feature-ip-csum-offload and
> > + * feature-ipv6-csum-offload respectively.
> > + */
>
> These comments on feature flags should also be synchronized to master
> netif.h in Xen and Linux's header. We've been trying to document thing
> along the way for quite some time and the long term benifit is big.
>
Ok. That sounds like a good idea. I'll add a patch to do that.
> > if (xenbus_scanf(XBT_NIL, dev->otherend, "feature-no-csum-
> offload",
> > "%d", &val) < 0)
> > val = 0;
> > - vif->csum = !val;
> > + if (val)
> > + vif->ip_csum = 0;
>
> Do you also need to set vif->ipv6_csum to 0? I don't think a frontend
> which cannot deal with V4 csum offload has the ability to deal with V6
> csum offload.
>
I was just trying to preserve the existing semantic of feature-no-csum-offload, which only affects v4. Since it's deprecated, should we add a new semantic?
Paul
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH net-next v2 1/5] xen-netback: add IPv6 checksum offload to guest
From: Wei Liu @ 2013-10-08 13:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Durrant; +Cc: xen-devel, netdev, Wei Liu, David Vrabel, Ian Campbell
In-Reply-To: <1381229896-18657-2-git-send-email-paul.durrant@citrix.com>
On Tue, Oct 08, 2013 at 11:58:12AM +0100, Paul Durrant wrote:
> Check xenstore flag feature-ipv6-csum-offload to determine if a
> guest is happy to accept IPv6 packets with only partial checksum.
> Also check analogous feature-ip-csum-offload to determone if a
determone -> determine
> guest is happy to accept IPv4 packets with only partial checksum
> as a replacement for a negated feature-no-csum-offload value and
> add a comment to deprecate use of feature-no-csum-offload.
>
[...]
> @@ -306,7 +308,7 @@ struct xenvif *xenvif_alloc(struct device *parent, domid_t domid,
> vif->domid = domid;
> vif->handle = handle;
> vif->can_sg = 1;
> - vif->csum = 1;
> + vif->ip_csum = 1;
Not setting a default value for vif->ipv6_csum?
> vif->dev = dev;
>
[...]
> + /* Before feature-ipv6-csum-offload was introduced, checksum offload
> + * was turned on by a zero value in (or lack of)
> + * feature-no-csum-offload. Therefore, for compatibility, assume
> + * that if feature-ip-csum-offload is missing that IP (v4) offload
> + * is turned on. If this is not the case then the flag will be
> + * cleared when we subsequently sample feature-no-csum-offload.
> + */
> + if (xenbus_scanf(XBT_NIL, dev->otherend, "feature-ip-csum-offload",
> + "%d", &val) < 0)
> + val = 1;
> + vif->ip_csum = !!val;
> +
> + if (xenbus_scanf(XBT_NIL, dev->otherend, "feature-ipv6-csum-offload",
> + "%d", &val) < 0)
> + val = 0;
> + vif->ipv6_csum = !!val;
> +
> + /* This is deprecated. Frontends should set IP v4 and v6 checksum
> + * offload using feature-ip-csum-offload and
> + * feature-ipv6-csum-offload respectively.
> + */
These comments on feature flags should also be synchronized to master
netif.h in Xen and Linux's header. We've been trying to document thing
along the way for quite some time and the long term benifit is big.
> if (xenbus_scanf(XBT_NIL, dev->otherend, "feature-no-csum-offload",
> "%d", &val) < 0)
> val = 0;
> - vif->csum = !val;
> + if (val)
> + vif->ip_csum = 0;
Do you also need to set vif->ipv6_csum to 0? I don't think a frontend
which cannot deal with V4 csum offload has the ability to deal with V6
csum offload.
Wei.
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH iproute2] xfrm: enable to set non-wildcard mark 0 on SAs and SPs
From: Christophe Gouault @ 2013-10-08 12:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: shemminger; +Cc: netdev, Christophe Gouault
ip xfrm considers that the user-defined mark is "any" as soon as
(mark.v & mark.m == 0), which prevents from specifying non-wildcard
marks that include the value 0 (typically 0/0xffffffff).
Yet, matching exactly mark 0 is useful for instance to separate
vti policies from global policies.
Always configure the user mark if mark.m != 0.
Signed-off-by: Christophe Gouault <christophe.gouault@6wind.com>
---
ip/xfrm_policy.c | 2 +-
ip/xfrm_state.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ip/xfrm_policy.c b/ip/xfrm_policy.c
index 36e33c9..a8d8b98 100644
--- a/ip/xfrm_policy.c
+++ b/ip/xfrm_policy.c
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ static int xfrm_policy_modify(int cmd, unsigned flags, int argc, char **argv)
(void *)tmpls_buf, tmpls_len);
}
- if (mark.m & mark.v) {
+ if (mark.m) {
int r = addattr_l(&req.n, sizeof(req.buf), XFRMA_MARK,
(void *)&mark, sizeof(mark));
if (r < 0) {
diff --git a/ip/xfrm_state.c b/ip/xfrm_state.c
index f4ad4cb..c4d2bf6 100644
--- a/ip/xfrm_state.c
+++ b/ip/xfrm_state.c
@@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ static int xfrm_state_modify(int cmd, unsigned flags, int argc, char **argv)
exit(1);
}
- if (mark.m & mark.v) {
+ if (mark.m) {
int r = addattr_l(&req.n, sizeof(req.buf), XFRMA_MARK,
(void *)&mark, sizeof(mark));
if (r < 0) {
--
1.7.10.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* RE: [PATCH] mac80211: port CCMP to cryptoapi's CCM driver
From: David Laight @ 2013-10-08 13:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Johannes Berg, Ard Biesheuvel
Cc: linux-wireless-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
netdev-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, patches-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A,
linville-2XuSBdqkA4R54TAoqtyWWQ
In-Reply-To: <1381233152.13359.10.camel-8Nb76shvtaUJvtFkdXX2HixXY32XiHfO@public.gmane.org>
> Hmm, thanks I guess. I'll need to review this in more detail, but I have
> a question first:
>
> > + /* allocate the variable sized aead_request on the stack */
> > + int l = DIV_ROUND_UP(crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm),
> > + sizeof(struct aead_request));
> > + struct aead_request req[1 + l];
>
> This looks a bit odd, why round up first and then add one? Why even
> bother using a struct array rather than some local struct like
Is it even a good idea to be allocating variable sized items
on the kernel stack?
There has to be enough stack available for the maximum number
of entries - so there is little point in dynamically sizing it.
David
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: Neterion and UFO handling [was: Re: [PATCH] ipv6: udp packets following an UFO enqueued packet need also be handled by UFO]
From: Eric Dumazet @ 2013-10-08 13:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jon Mason
Cc: Jiri Pirko, netdev, yoshfuji, David Miller, kuznet, jmorris,
kaber, herbert
In-Reply-To: <CAPoiz9wxxvHfmmMOCvPstzT51BafGfU1u5umxBQ8kqqCE=OzbQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, 2013-10-08 at 01:07 -0700, Jon Mason wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 9:27 AM, Hannes Frederic Sowa
> <hannes@stressinduktion.org> wrote:
> > Hi!
> >
> > I have a question regarding UFO and the neterion driver, which as the only one
> > advertises hardware UFO support:
> >
> > The patch discusses in this thread
> > http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/284348/focus=285405 could change
> > some semantics how packets are constructed before submitted to the driver.
> >
> > We currently guarantee that we have the MAC/IP/UDP header in skb->data and the
> > payload is attached in the skb's frags. With the changes discussed in this
> > thread it is possible that we also append to skb->data some amount of data
> > which is not targeted for the header. From reading the driver sources it seems
> > the hardware interprets the skb->data to skb_headlen as the header, so we
> > could include some data in the fragments more than once.
>
> From my reading of the HW Spec and a quick look at the driver, it
> appears that the driver is using one entry in the TX ring for the
> header and another for the body of the packet to be fragmented (which
> is what the hardware wants). I don't understand what you are saying,
> but if you are asking if simply appending a new header & data to the
> end of skb->data will get it out on the wire correct, I don't believe
> it will.
>
> I do have hardware that I can try the patch on, if you can walk me
> through the use case (unless it is as easy as setup an IPv6 connection
> and ping).
I think this behavior is quite common. Driver should certainly already
do the right thing, as TCP frames can have the same property.
bnx2x for example splits skb->head if it contains payload after headers.
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.c
if (unlikely(skb_headlen(skb) > hlen)) {
nbd++;
bd_prod = bnx2x_tx_split(bp, txdata, tx_buf,
&tx_start_bd, hlen,
bd_prod);
}
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH net RFC 1/2] netdevice: add might_sleep() call to napi_disable
From: Amir Vadai @ 2013-10-08 12:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jacob Keller
Cc: netdev, Alex Duyck, Hyong-Youb Kim, Dmitry Kravkov, Eliezer Tamir
In-Reply-To: <20130918201949.8697.50700.stgit@jekeller-desk1.amr.corp.intel.com>
On 18/09/2013 23:20, Jacob Keller wrote:
> napi_disable potentially calls msleep(1) if the NAPI_STATE_SCHED bit is
> previously set by something else. Because it does not always call msleep, it
> was difficult to track down a bug related to calling napi_disable within
> local_bh_disable()d context. This patch adds a might_sleep() call to the
> napi_disable routine in order to aid in the future debugging of similar issues.
> This will cause a BUG in drivers which have implemented busy polling in a
> similar fashion to ixgbe, and which call napi_disable inside the
> local_bh_disable()d section where the vector napi lock is taken.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
> Cc: Eliezer Tamir <eliezer.tamir@linux.intel.com>
> Cc: Alex Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com>
> Cc: Hyong-Youb Kim <hykim@myri.com>
> Cc: Amir Vadai <amirv@mellanox.com>
> Cc: Dmitry Kravkov <dmitry@broadcom.com>
> ---
> include/linux/netdevice.h | 2 ++
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/netdevice.h b/include/linux/netdevice.h
> index 3de49ac..81dab00 100644
> --- a/include/linux/netdevice.h
> +++ b/include/linux/netdevice.h
> @@ -483,6 +483,8 @@ extern void napi_hash_del(struct napi_struct *napi);
> */
> static inline void napi_disable(struct napi_struct *n)
> {
> + might_sleep();
> +
> set_bit(NAPI_STATE_DISABLE, &n->state);
> while (test_and_set_bit(NAPI_STATE_SCHED, &n->state))
> msleep(1);
>
Works ok with mlx4_en driver.
Acked-By: Amir Vadai <amirv@mellanox.com>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH RFC 00/77] Re-design MSI/MSI-X interrupts enablement pattern
From: Alexander Gordeev @ 2013-10-08 12:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tejun Heo
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt, Ben Hutchings, linux-kernel,
Bjorn Helgaas, Ralf Baechle, Michael Ellerman, Martin Schwidefsky,
Ingo Molnar, Dan Williams, Andy King, Jon Mason, Matt Porter,
linux-pci, linux-mips, linuxppc-dev, linux390, linux-s390, x86,
linux-ide, iss_storagedev, linux-nvme, linux-rdma, netdev,
e1000-devel
In-Reply-To: <20131007180111.GC2481@htj.dyndns.org>
On Mon, Oct 07, 2013 at 02:01:11PM -0400, Tejun Heo wrote:
> > What about introducing pci_lock_msi() and pci_unlock_msi() and let device
> > drivers care about their ranges and specifics in race-safe manner?
> > I do not call to introduce it right now (since it appears pSeries has not
> > been hitting the race for years) just as a possible alternative to Ben's
> > proposal.
>
> I don't think the same race condition would happen with the loop.
We need to distinguish the contexts we're discussing.
If we talk about pSeries quota, then the current pSeries pci_enable_msix()
implementation is racy internally and could fail if the quota went down
*while* pci_enable_msix() is executing. In this case the loop will have to
exit rather than retry with a lower number (what number?).
In this regard the new scheme does not bring anything new and relies on
the fact this race does not hit and therefore does not worry.
If we talk about quota as it has to be, then yes - the loop scheme seems
more preferable.
Overall, looks like we just need to fix the pSeries implementation,
if the guys want it, he-he :)
> The problem case is where multiple msi(x) allocation fails completely
> because the global limit went down before inquiry and allocation. In
> the loop based interface, it'd retry with the lower number.
I am probably missing something here. If the global limit went down before
inquiry then the inquiry will get what is available and try to allocate with
than number.
--
Regards,
Alexander Gordeev
agordeev@redhat.com
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] mac80211: port CCMP to cryptoapi's CCM driver
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2013-10-08 12:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Johannes Berg; +Cc: linux-wireless, netdev, Patch Tracking, John Linville
In-Reply-To: <1381234564.13359.11.camel@jlt4.sipsolutions.net>
On 8 October 2013 14:16, Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> wrote:
> On Tue, 2013-10-08 at 14:00 +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>
>> BTW I should probably have mentioned that this is fully tested code:
>> my zd1211 works happily with it using pairwise CCMP with no
>> regressions in performance.
>
> Good to know. Not that I think zd1211 is a good device for performance
> tests (you'd have to measure CPU utilisation in some way), but
> ultimately it doesn't really matter as all the high-performance devices
> need hardware crypto anyway.
>
I agree. I am not saying the typical performance of a zd1211 is a
meaningful quantity, just that this particular device performs
identically before and after applying this patch, which suggests that
it is not creating lots of corrupted frames or messing up the
authentication.
Regards,
--
Ard.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] mac80211: port CCMP to cryptoapi's CCM driver
From: Johannes Berg @ 2013-10-08 12:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ard Biesheuvel
Cc: linux-wireless-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
netdev-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, Patch Tracking,
linville-2XuSBdqkA4R54TAoqtyWWQ
In-Reply-To: <CAKv+Gu9-ddqyuGg=NDFoWzNko+0uMG_po6WnzTc7g3DAzx=_dQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
On Tue, 2013-10-08 at 14:00 +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> BTW I should probably have mentioned that this is fully tested code:
> my zd1211 works happily with it using pairwise CCMP with no
> regressions in performance.
Good to know. Not that I think zd1211 is a good device for performance
tests (you'd have to measure CPU utilisation in some way), but
ultimately it doesn't really matter as all the high-performance devices
need hardware crypto anyway.
johannes
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-wireless" in
the body of a message to majordomo-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] mac80211: port CCMP to cryptoapi's CCM driver
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2013-10-08 12:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Johannes Berg; +Cc: linux-wireless, netdev, Patch Tracking, linville
In-Reply-To: <1381233152.13359.10.camel@jlt4.sipsolutions.net>
On 8 October 2013 13:52, Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> wrote:
> On Tue, 2013-10-08 at 13:31 +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>
> Hmm, thanks I guess. I'll need to review this in more detail, but I have
> a question first:
>
>> + /* allocate the variable sized aead_request on the stack */
>> + int l = DIV_ROUND_UP(crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm),
>> + sizeof(struct aead_request));
>> + struct aead_request req[1 + l];
>
> This looks a bit odd, why round up first and then add one? Why even
> bother using a struct array rather than some local struct like
>
> struct {
> struct aead_request req;
> u8 data[crypto_aed_reqsize(tfm)];
> } req_data;
>
> or so?
>
Yes, that looks much better. I will put that in my v2, let me know if
you have more questions/comments.
BTW I should probably have mentioned that this is fully tested code:
my zd1211 works happily with it using pairwise CCMP with no
regressions in performance.
Cheers,
Ard.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] mac80211: port CCMP to cryptoapi's CCM driver
From: Johannes Berg @ 2013-10-08 11:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ard Biesheuvel; +Cc: linux-wireless, netdev, patches, linville
In-Reply-To: <1381231915-24232-1-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
On Tue, 2013-10-08 at 13:31 +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
Hmm, thanks I guess. I'll need to review this in more detail, but I have
a question first:
> + /* allocate the variable sized aead_request on the stack */
> + int l = DIV_ROUND_UP(crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm),
> + sizeof(struct aead_request));
> + struct aead_request req[1 + l];
This looks a bit odd, why round up first and then add one? Why even
bother using a struct array rather than some local struct like
struct {
struct aead_request req;
u8 data[crypto_aed_reqsize(tfm)];
} req_data;
or so?
johannes
^ permalink raw reply
* You've won a Prize
From: Microsoft Iberica SL @ 2013-10-08 12:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
You've won a Prize
MICROSOFT IBERICA SL"
YOU 'VE WON.
ATTN:MICROSOFT IBERICA SL
Your email has won (EUR244,000,00)
(TWO HUNDRED AND FOURTY FOUR THOUSAND EURO)
Batch number:XL73276498AM
Ref number:QR352899526KC
This is a millennium scientific computer game in which
email addresses were used.It is a promotional program aimed at
encouraging internet users,therefore you do not need to buy ticket to enter
for it.
For further development,clarification and procedure please
Contact:Dr Eduardo Sanchez,
Email contact:payingroll446@yahoo.com.hk
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH] mac80211: port CCMP to cryptoapi's CCM driver
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2013-10-08 11:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-wireless, netdev; +Cc: patches, johannes, linville, Ard Biesheuvel
Use the generic CCM aead chaining mode driver rather than a local
implementation that sits right on top of the core AES cipher.
This allows the use of accelerated implementations of either
CCM as a whole or the CTR mode which it encapsulates.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
net/mac80211/Kconfig | 1 +
net/mac80211/aes_ccm.c | 165 +++++++++++++++++--------------------------------
net/mac80211/aes_ccm.h | 8 +--
net/mac80211/key.h | 2 +-
net/mac80211/wpa.c | 24 +++----
5 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 129 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/mac80211/Kconfig b/net/mac80211/Kconfig
index 62535fe..dc31ec3 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/Kconfig
+++ b/net/mac80211/Kconfig
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ config MAC80211
select CRYPTO
select CRYPTO_ARC4
select CRYPTO_AES
+ select CRYPTO_CCM
select CRC32
select AVERAGE
---help---
diff --git a/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.c b/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.c
index be7614b9..ef808d7 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.c
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
* Copyright 2003-2004, Instant802 Networks, Inc.
* Copyright 2005-2006, Devicescape Software, Inc.
*
+ * Rewrite: Copyright (C) 2013 Linaro Ltd <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
+ *
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
* published by the Free Software Foundation.
@@ -17,134 +19,77 @@
#include "key.h"
#include "aes_ccm.h"
-static void aes_ccm_prepare(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *scratch, u8 *a)
+void ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
+ u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *cdata, u8 *mic)
{
- int i;
- u8 *b_0, *aad, *b, *s_0;
+ struct scatterlist assoc, pt, ct[2];
- b_0 = scratch + 3 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
- aad = scratch + 4 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
- b = scratch;
- s_0 = scratch + AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ /* allocate the variable sized aead_request on the stack */
+ int l = DIV_ROUND_UP(crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm),
+ sizeof(struct aead_request));
+ struct aead_request req[1 + l];
- crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, b, b_0);
+ memset(req, 0, sizeof(*req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm));
- /* Extra Authenticate-only data (always two AES blocks) */
- for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; i++)
- aad[i] ^= b[i];
- crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, b, aad);
+ sg_init_one(&pt, data, data_len);
+ sg_init_one(&assoc, &aad[2], be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)aad));
+ sg_init_table(ct, 2);
+ sg_set_buf(&ct[0], cdata, data_len);
+ sg_set_buf(&ct[1], mic, IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN);
- aad += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ aead_request_set_tfm(req, tfm);
+ aead_request_set_crypt(req, &pt, ct, data_len, b_0);
+ aead_request_set_assoc(req, &assoc, assoc.length);
- for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; i++)
- aad[i] ^= b[i];
- crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, a, aad);
+ crypto_aead_encrypt(req);
+}
- /* Mask out bits from auth-only-b_0 */
- b_0[0] &= 0x07;
+int ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
+ u8 *cdata, size_t data_len, u8 *mic, u8 *data)
+{
+ struct scatterlist assoc, pt, ct[2];
- /* S_0 is used to encrypt T (= MIC) */
- b_0[14] = 0;
- b_0[15] = 0;
- crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, s_0, b_0);
-}
+ /* allocate the variable sized aead_request on the stack */
+ int l = DIV_ROUND_UP(crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm),
+ sizeof(struct aead_request));
+ struct aead_request req[1 + l];
+ memset(req, 0, sizeof(*req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm));
-void ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *scratch,
- u8 *data, size_t data_len,
- u8 *cdata, u8 *mic)
-{
- int i, j, last_len, num_blocks;
- u8 *pos, *cpos, *b, *s_0, *e, *b_0;
-
- b = scratch;
- s_0 = scratch + AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
- e = scratch + 2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
- b_0 = scratch + 3 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-
- num_blocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(data_len, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
- last_len = data_len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
- aes_ccm_prepare(tfm, scratch, b);
-
- /* Process payload blocks */
- pos = data;
- cpos = cdata;
- for (j = 1; j <= num_blocks; j++) {
- int blen = (j == num_blocks && last_len) ?
- last_len : AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-
- /* Authentication followed by encryption */
- for (i = 0; i < blen; i++)
- b[i] ^= pos[i];
- crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, b, b);
-
- b_0[14] = (j >> 8) & 0xff;
- b_0[15] = j & 0xff;
- crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, e, b_0);
- for (i = 0; i < blen; i++)
- *cpos++ = *pos++ ^ e[i];
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN; i++)
- mic[i] = b[i] ^ s_0[i];
-}
+ sg_init_one(&pt, data, data_len);
+ sg_init_one(&assoc, &aad[2], be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)aad));
+ sg_init_table(ct, 2);
+ sg_set_buf(&ct[0], cdata, data_len);
+ sg_set_buf(&ct[1], mic, IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN);
+ aead_request_set_tfm(req, tfm);
+ aead_request_set_crypt(req, ct, &pt, data_len + IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN,
+ b_0);
+ aead_request_set_assoc(req, &assoc, assoc.length);
-int ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *scratch,
- u8 *cdata, size_t data_len, u8 *mic, u8 *data)
-{
- int i, j, last_len, num_blocks;
- u8 *pos, *cpos, *b, *s_0, *a, *b_0;
-
- b = scratch;
- s_0 = scratch + AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
- a = scratch + 2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
- b_0 = scratch + 3 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-
- num_blocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(data_len, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
- last_len = data_len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
- aes_ccm_prepare(tfm, scratch, a);
-
- /* Process payload blocks */
- cpos = cdata;
- pos = data;
- for (j = 1; j <= num_blocks; j++) {
- int blen = (j == num_blocks && last_len) ?
- last_len : AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-
- /* Decryption followed by authentication */
- b_0[14] = (j >> 8) & 0xff;
- b_0[15] = j & 0xff;
- crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, b, b_0);
- for (i = 0; i < blen; i++) {
- *pos = *cpos++ ^ b[i];
- a[i] ^= *pos++;
- }
- crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, a, a);
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN; i++) {
- if ((mic[i] ^ s_0[i]) != a[i])
- return -1;
- }
-
- return 0;
+ return crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
}
-
-struct crypto_cipher *ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[])
+struct crypto_aead *ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[])
{
- struct crypto_cipher *tfm;
+ struct crypto_aead *tfm;
+ int err;
- tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
- if (!IS_ERR(tfm))
- crypto_cipher_setkey(tfm, key, WLAN_KEY_LEN_CCMP);
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_aead("ccm(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+ return tfm;
- return tfm;
-}
+ err = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm, key, WLAN_KEY_LEN_CCMP);
+ if (!err)
+ err = crypto_aead_setauthsize(tfm, IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN);
+ if (!err)
+ return tfm;
+ crypto_free_aead(tfm);
+ return ERR_PTR(err);
+}
-void ieee80211_aes_key_free(struct crypto_cipher *tfm)
+void ieee80211_aes_key_free(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
{
- crypto_free_cipher(tfm);
+ crypto_free_aead(tfm);
}
diff --git a/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.h b/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.h
index 5b7d744..52650b3 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.h
@@ -12,13 +12,13 @@
#include <linux/crypto.h>
-struct crypto_cipher *ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[]);
-void ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *scratch,
+struct crypto_aead *ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[]);
+void ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
u8 *data, size_t data_len,
u8 *cdata, u8 *mic);
-int ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *scratch,
+int ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
u8 *cdata, size_t data_len,
u8 *mic, u8 *data);
-void ieee80211_aes_key_free(struct crypto_cipher *tfm);
+void ieee80211_aes_key_free(struct crypto_aead *tfm);
#endif /* AES_CCM_H */
diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.h b/net/mac80211/key.h
index 036d57e..aaae0ed 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/key.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/key.h
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ struct ieee80211_key {
* Management frames.
*/
u8 rx_pn[IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS + 1][IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN];
- struct crypto_cipher *tfm;
+ struct crypto_aead *tfm;
u32 replays; /* dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplays */
} ccmp;
struct {
diff --git a/net/mac80211/wpa.c b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
index c9edfcb..c39ee61 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
@@ -301,22 +301,16 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
}
-static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *scratch,
+static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
int encrypted)
{
__le16 mask_fc;
int a4_included, mgmt;
u8 qos_tid;
- u8 *b_0, *aad;
u16 data_len, len_a;
unsigned int hdrlen;
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
- memset(scratch, 0, 6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-
- b_0 = scratch + 3 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
- aad = scratch + 4 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-
/*
* Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt)
* Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected
@@ -343,7 +337,7 @@ static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *scratch,
data_len -= IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN;
/* First block, b_0 */
- b_0[0] = 0x59; /* flags: Adata: 1, M: 011, L: 001 */
+ b_0[0] = 0x1; /* set L := 1, M and Adata flags are implied */
/* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN
* Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7)
*/
@@ -407,7 +401,8 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
u8 *pos;
u8 pn[6];
u64 pn64;
- u8 scratch[6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
if (info->control.hw_key &&
!(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
@@ -460,8 +455,8 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
return 0;
pos += IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN;
- ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, scratch, 0);
- ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, scratch, pos, len,
+ ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad, 0);
+ ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, pos, len,
pos, skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN));
return 0;
@@ -525,12 +520,13 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
}
if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
- u8 scratch[6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
- ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, scratch, 1);
+ ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad, 1);
if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(
- key->u.ccmp.tfm, scratch,
+ key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad,
skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN,
data_len,
skb->data + skb->len - IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN,
--
1.8.1.2
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH net-next v2 2/5] xen-netback: Add support for IPv6 checksum offload from guest
From: Paul Durrant @ 2013-10-08 10:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel, netdev; +Cc: Paul Durrant, Wei Liu, David Vrabel, Ian Campbell
In-Reply-To: <1381229896-18657-1-git-send-email-paul.durrant@citrix.com>
For performance of VM to VM traffic on a single host it is better to avoid
calculation of TCP/UDP checksum in the sending frontend. To allow this this
patch adds the code necessary to set up partial checksum for IPv6 packets
and xenstore flag feature-ipv6-csum-offload to advertise that fact to
frontends.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
---
drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c | 224 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c | 9 ++
2 files changed, 191 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
index f3e591c..35b1fa6 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
@@ -109,15 +109,10 @@ static inline unsigned long idx_to_kaddr(struct xenvif *vif,
return (unsigned long)pfn_to_kaddr(idx_to_pfn(vif, idx));
}
-/*
- * This is the amount of packet we copy rather than map, so that the
- * guest can't fiddle with the contents of the headers while we do
- * packet processing on them (netfilter, routing, etc).
+/* This is a miniumum size for the linear area to avoid lots of
+ * calls to __pskb_pull_tail() as we set up checksum offsets.
*/
-#define PKT_PROT_LEN (ETH_HLEN + \
- VLAN_HLEN + \
- sizeof(struct iphdr) + MAX_IPOPTLEN + \
- sizeof(struct tcphdr) + MAX_TCP_OPTION_SPACE)
+#define PKT_PROT_LEN 128
static u16 frag_get_pending_idx(skb_frag_t *frag)
{
@@ -1118,61 +1113,72 @@ static int xenvif_set_skb_gso(struct xenvif *vif,
return 0;
}
-static int checksum_setup(struct xenvif *vif, struct sk_buff *skb)
+static inline void maybe_pull_tail(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int len)
{
- struct iphdr *iph;
+ if (skb_is_nonlinear(skb) && skb_headlen(skb) < len) {
+ int target = min_t(int, skb->len, len);
+ __pskb_pull_tail(skb, target - skb_headlen(skb));
+ }
+}
+
+static int checksum_setup_ip(struct xenvif *vif, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ int recalculate_partial_csum)
+{
+ struct iphdr *iph = (void *)skb->data;
+ unsigned int header_size;
+ unsigned int off;
int err = -EPROTO;
- int recalculate_partial_csum = 0;
- /*
- * A GSO SKB must be CHECKSUM_PARTIAL. However some buggy
- * peers can fail to set NETRXF_csum_blank when sending a GSO
- * frame. In this case force the SKB to CHECKSUM_PARTIAL and
- * recalculate the partial checksum.
- */
- if (skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_PARTIAL && skb_is_gso(skb)) {
- vif->rx_gso_checksum_fixup++;
- skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
- recalculate_partial_csum = 1;
- }
+ off = sizeof(struct iphdr);
- /* A non-CHECKSUM_PARTIAL SKB does not require setup. */
- if (skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_PARTIAL)
- return 0;
+ header_size = skb->network_header + off + MAX_IPOPTLEN;
+ maybe_pull_tail(skb, header_size);
- if (skb->protocol != htons(ETH_P_IP))
- goto out;
+ off = iph->ihl * 4;
- iph = (void *)skb->data;
switch (iph->protocol) {
case IPPROTO_TCP:
- if (!skb_partial_csum_set(skb, 4 * iph->ihl,
+ if (!skb_partial_csum_set(skb, off,
offsetof(struct tcphdr, check)))
goto out;
if (recalculate_partial_csum) {
struct tcphdr *tcph = tcp_hdr(skb);
+
+ header_size = skb->network_header +
+ off +
+ sizeof(struct tcphdr) +
+ MAX_TCP_OPTION_SPACE;
+ maybe_pull_tail(skb, header_size);
+
tcph->check = ~csum_tcpudp_magic(iph->saddr, iph->daddr,
- skb->len - iph->ihl*4,
+ skb->len - off,
IPPROTO_TCP, 0);
}
break;
case IPPROTO_UDP:
- if (!skb_partial_csum_set(skb, 4 * iph->ihl,
+ if (!skb_partial_csum_set(skb, off,
offsetof(struct udphdr, check)))
goto out;
if (recalculate_partial_csum) {
struct udphdr *udph = udp_hdr(skb);
+
+ header_size = skb->network_header +
+ off +
+ sizeof(struct udphdr);
+ maybe_pull_tail(skb, header_size);
+
udph->check = ~csum_tcpudp_magic(iph->saddr, iph->daddr,
- skb->len - iph->ihl*4,
+ skb->len - off,
IPPROTO_UDP, 0);
}
break;
default:
if (net_ratelimit())
netdev_err(vif->dev,
- "Attempting to checksum a non-TCP/UDP packet, dropping a protocol %d packet\n",
+ "Attempting to checksum a non-TCP/UDP packet, "
+ "dropping a protocol %d packet\n",
iph->protocol);
goto out;
}
@@ -1183,6 +1189,148 @@ out:
return err;
}
+static int checksum_setup_ipv6(struct xenvif *vif, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ int recalculate_partial_csum)
+{
+ int err = -EPROTO;
+ struct ipv6hdr *ipv6h = (void *)skb->data;
+ u8 nexthdr;
+ unsigned int header_size;
+ unsigned int off;
+ bool done;
+
+ done = false;
+ off = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr);
+
+ header_size = skb->network_header + off;
+ maybe_pull_tail(skb, header_size);
+
+ nexthdr = ipv6h->nexthdr;
+
+ while ((off <= sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + ntohs(ipv6h->payload_len)) &&
+ !done) {
+ /* We only access at most the first 2 bytes of any option header
+ * to determine the next one.
+ */
+ header_size = skb->network_header + off + 2;
+ maybe_pull_tail(skb, header_size);
+
+ switch (nexthdr) {
+ case IPPROTO_FRAGMENT: {
+ struct frag_hdr *hp = (void *)(skb->data + off);
+
+ nexthdr = hp->nexthdr;
+ off += 8;
+ break;
+ }
+ case IPPROTO_DSTOPTS:
+ case IPPROTO_HOPOPTS:
+ case IPPROTO_ROUTING: {
+ struct ipv6_opt_hdr *hp = (void *)(skb->data + off);
+
+ nexthdr = hp->nexthdr;
+ off += ipv6_optlen(hp);
+ break;
+ }
+ case IPPROTO_AH: {
+ struct ip_auth_hdr *hp = (void *)(skb->data + off);
+
+ nexthdr = hp->nexthdr;
+ off += (hp->hdrlen+2)<<2;
+ break;
+ }
+ default:
+ done = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!done)
+ goto out;
+
+ switch (nexthdr) {
+ case IPPROTO_TCP:
+ if (!skb_partial_csum_set(skb, off,
+ offsetof(struct tcphdr, check)))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (recalculate_partial_csum) {
+ struct tcphdr *tcph = tcp_hdr(skb);
+
+ header_size = skb->network_header +
+ off +
+ sizeof(struct tcphdr) +
+ MAX_TCP_OPTION_SPACE;
+ maybe_pull_tail(skb, header_size);
+
+ tcph->check = ~csum_ipv6_magic(&ipv6h->saddr,
+ &ipv6h->daddr,
+ skb->len - off,
+ IPPROTO_TCP, 0);
+ }
+ break;
+ case IPPROTO_UDP:
+ if (!skb_partial_csum_set(skb, off,
+ offsetof(struct udphdr, check)))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (recalculate_partial_csum) {
+ struct udphdr *udph = udp_hdr(skb);
+
+ header_size = skb->network_header +
+ off +
+ sizeof(struct udphdr);
+ maybe_pull_tail(skb, header_size);
+
+ udph->check = ~csum_ipv6_magic(&ipv6h->saddr,
+ &ipv6h->daddr,
+ skb->len - off,
+ IPPROTO_UDP, 0);
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ if (net_ratelimit())
+ netdev_err(vif->dev,
+ "Attempting to checksum a non-TCP/UDP packet, "
+ "dropping a protocol %d packet\n",
+ nexthdr);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ err = 0;
+
+out:
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int checksum_setup(struct xenvif *vif, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ int err = -EPROTO;
+ int recalculate_partial_csum = 0;
+
+ /* A GSO SKB must be CHECKSUM_PARTIAL. However some buggy
+ * peers can fail to set NETRXF_csum_blank when sending a GSO
+ * frame. In this case force the SKB to CHECKSUM_PARTIAL and
+ * recalculate the partial checksum.
+ */
+ if (skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_PARTIAL && skb_is_gso(skb)) {
+ vif->rx_gso_checksum_fixup++;
+ skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
+ recalculate_partial_csum = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* A non-CHECKSUM_PARTIAL SKB does not require setup. */
+ if (skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_PARTIAL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+ err = checksum_setup_ip(vif, skb, recalculate_partial_csum);
+ else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
+ err = checksum_setup_ipv6(vif, skb, recalculate_partial_csum);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
static bool tx_credit_exceeded(struct xenvif *vif, unsigned size)
{
unsigned long now = jiffies;
@@ -1428,15 +1576,7 @@ static int xenvif_tx_submit(struct xenvif *vif, int budget)
xenvif_fill_frags(vif, skb);
- /*
- * If the initial fragment was < PKT_PROT_LEN then
- * pull through some bytes from the other fragments to
- * increase the linear region to PKT_PROT_LEN bytes.
- */
- if (skb_headlen(skb) < PKT_PROT_LEN && skb_is_nonlinear(skb)) {
- int target = min_t(int, skb->len, PKT_PROT_LEN);
- __pskb_pull_tail(skb, target - skb_headlen(skb));
- }
+ maybe_pull_tail(skb, PKT_PROT_LEN);
skb->dev = vif->dev;
skb->protocol = eth_type_trans(skb, skb->dev);
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c
index 5e45b00..dff423b 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c
@@ -101,6 +101,15 @@ static int netback_probe(struct xenbus_device *dev,
goto abort_transaction;
}
+ /* We support partial checksum setup for IPv6 packets */
+ err = xenbus_printf(xbt, dev->nodename,
+ "feature-ipv6-csum-offload",
+ "%d", 1);
+ if (err) {
+ message = "writing feature-ipv6-csum-offload";
+ goto abort_transaction;
+ }
+
/* We support rx-copy path. */
err = xenbus_printf(xbt, dev->nodename,
"feature-rx-copy", "%d", 1);
--
1.7.10.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH net-next v2 5/5] xen-netback: enable IPv6 TCP GSO to the guest
From: Paul Durrant @ 2013-10-08 10:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel, netdev; +Cc: Paul Durrant, Wei Liu, David Vrabel, Ian Campbell
In-Reply-To: <1381229896-18657-1-git-send-email-paul.durrant@citrix.com>
This patch adds code to handle SKB_GSO_TCPV6 skbs and construct appropriate
extra or prefix segments to pass the large packet to the frontend. New
xenstore flags, feature-gso-tcpv6 and feature-gso-tcpv6-prefix, are sampled
to determine if the frontend is capable of handling such packets.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
---
drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h | 6 +++--
drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c | 8 ++++--
drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++--
4 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h b/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h
index b4a9a3c..720b1ca 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ struct pending_tx_info {
struct xenvif_rx_meta {
int id;
int size;
+ int gso_type;
int gso_size;
};
@@ -150,9 +151,10 @@ struct xenvif {
u8 fe_dev_addr[6];
/* Frontend feature information. */
+ int gso_mask;
+ int gso_prefix_mask;
+
u8 can_sg:1;
- u8 gso:1;
- u8 gso_prefix:1;
u8 ip_csum:1;
u8 ipv6_csum:1;
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c
index cb0d8ea..3d11387 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c
@@ -214,8 +214,12 @@ static netdev_features_t xenvif_fix_features(struct net_device *dev,
if (!vif->can_sg)
features &= ~NETIF_F_SG;
- if (!vif->gso && !vif->gso_prefix)
+ if (~(vif->gso_mask | vif->gso_prefix_mask) &
+ (1 << XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_TCPV4))
features &= ~NETIF_F_TSO;
+ if (~(vif->gso_mask | vif->gso_prefix_mask) &
+ (1 << XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_TCPV6))
+ features &= ~NETIF_F_TSO6;
if (!vif->ip_csum)
features &= ~NETIF_F_IP_CSUM;
if (!vif->ipv6_csum)
@@ -320,7 +324,7 @@ struct xenvif *xenvif_alloc(struct device *parent, domid_t domid,
dev->netdev_ops = &xenvif_netdev_ops;
dev->hw_features = NETIF_F_SG |
NETIF_F_IP_CSUM | NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM |
- NETIF_F_TSO;
+ NETIF_F_TSO | NETIF_F_TSO6;
dev->features = dev->hw_features | NETIF_F_RXCSUM;
SET_ETHTOOL_OPS(dev, &xenvif_ethtool_ops);
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
index ac42f73..ee0d55c 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ static int max_required_rx_slots(struct xenvif *vif)
int max = DIV_ROUND_UP(vif->dev->mtu, PAGE_SIZE);
/* XXX FIXME: RX path dependent on MAX_SKB_FRAGS */
- if (vif->can_sg || vif->gso || vif->gso_prefix)
+ if (vif->can_sg || vif->gso_mask || vif->gso_prefix_mask)
max += MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1; /* extra_info + frags */
return max;
@@ -334,6 +334,7 @@ static void xenvif_gop_frag_copy(struct xenvif *vif, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct gnttab_copy *copy_gop;
struct xenvif_rx_meta *meta;
unsigned long bytes;
+ int gso_type;
/* Data must not cross a page boundary. */
BUG_ON(size + offset > PAGE_SIZE<<compound_order(page));
@@ -392,7 +393,14 @@ static void xenvif_gop_frag_copy(struct xenvif *vif, struct sk_buff *skb,
}
/* Leave a gap for the GSO descriptor. */
- if (*head && skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size && !vif->gso_prefix)
+ if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCPV4)
+ gso_type = XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_TCPV4;
+ else if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCPV6)
+ gso_type = XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_TCPV6;
+ else
+ gso_type = 0;
+
+ if (*head && ((1 << gso_type) & vif->gso_prefix_mask))
vif->rx.req_cons++;
*head = 0; /* There must be something in this buffer now. */
@@ -423,14 +431,28 @@ static int xenvif_gop_skb(struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned char *data;
int head = 1;
int old_meta_prod;
+ int gso_type;
+ int gso_size;
old_meta_prod = npo->meta_prod;
+ if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCPV4) {
+ gso_type = XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_TCPV4;
+ gso_size = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size;
+ } else if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCPV6) {
+ gso_type = XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_TCPV6;
+ gso_size = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size;
+ } else {
+ gso_type = 0;
+ gso_size = 0;
+ }
+
/* Set up a GSO prefix descriptor, if necessary */
- if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size && vif->gso_prefix) {
+ if ((1 << gso_type) & vif->gso_prefix_mask) {
req = RING_GET_REQUEST(&vif->rx, vif->rx.req_cons++);
meta = npo->meta + npo->meta_prod++;
- meta->gso_size = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size;
+ meta->gso_type = gso_type;
+ meta->gso_size = gso_size;
meta->size = 0;
meta->id = req->id;
}
@@ -438,10 +460,13 @@ static int xenvif_gop_skb(struct sk_buff *skb,
req = RING_GET_REQUEST(&vif->rx, vif->rx.req_cons++);
meta = npo->meta + npo->meta_prod++;
- if (!vif->gso_prefix)
- meta->gso_size = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size;
- else
+ if ((1 << gso_type) & vif->gso_mask) {
+ meta->gso_type = gso_type;
+ meta->gso_size = gso_size;
+ } else {
+ meta->gso_type = 0;
meta->gso_size = 0;
+ }
meta->size = 0;
meta->id = req->id;
@@ -587,7 +612,8 @@ void xenvif_rx_action(struct xenvif *vif)
vif = netdev_priv(skb->dev);
- if (vif->meta[npo.meta_cons].gso_size && vif->gso_prefix) {
+ if ((1 << vif->meta[npo.meta_cons].gso_type) &
+ vif->gso_prefix_mask) {
resp = RING_GET_RESPONSE(&vif->rx,
vif->rx.rsp_prod_pvt++);
@@ -624,7 +650,8 @@ void xenvif_rx_action(struct xenvif *vif)
vif->meta[npo.meta_cons].size,
flags);
- if (vif->meta[npo.meta_cons].gso_size && !vif->gso_prefix) {
+ if ((1 << vif->meta[npo.meta_cons].gso_type) &
+ vif->gso_mask) {
struct xen_netif_extra_info *gso =
(struct xen_netif_extra_info *)
RING_GET_RESPONSE(&vif->rx,
@@ -632,8 +659,8 @@ void xenvif_rx_action(struct xenvif *vif)
resp->flags |= XEN_NETRXF_extra_info;
+ gso->u.gso.type = vif->meta[npo.meta_cons].gso_type;
gso->u.gso.size = vif->meta[npo.meta_cons].gso_size;
- gso->u.gso.type = XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_TCPV4;
gso->u.gso.pad = 0;
gso->u.gso.features = 0;
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c
index 389fa72..4894256 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c
@@ -573,15 +573,40 @@ static int connect_rings(struct backend_info *be)
val = 0;
vif->can_sg = !!val;
+ vif->gso_mask = 0;
+ vif->gso_prefix_mask = 0;
+
if (xenbus_scanf(XBT_NIL, dev->otherend, "feature-gso-tcpv4",
"%d", &val) < 0)
val = 0;
- vif->gso = !!val;
+ if (val)
+ vif->gso_mask = 1 << XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_TCPV4;
if (xenbus_scanf(XBT_NIL, dev->otherend, "feature-gso-tcpv4-prefix",
"%d", &val) < 0)
val = 0;
- vif->gso_prefix = !!val;
+ if (val)
+ vif->gso_prefix_mask = 1 << XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_TCPV4;
+
+ if (xenbus_scanf(XBT_NIL, dev->otherend, "feature-gso-tcpv6",
+ "%d", &val) < 0)
+ val = 0;
+ if (val)
+ vif->gso_mask = 1 << XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_TCPV6;
+
+ if (xenbus_scanf(XBT_NIL, dev->otherend, "feature-gso-tcpv6-prefix",
+ "%d", &val) < 0)
+ val = 0;
+ if (val)
+ vif->gso_prefix_mask = 1 << XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_TCPV6;
+
+ if (vif->gso_mask & vif->gso_prefix_mask) {
+ xenbus_dev_fatal(dev, err,
+ "%s: gso and gso prefix flags are not "
+ "mutually exclusive",
+ dev->otherend);
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
/* Before feature-ipv6-csum-offload was introduced, checksum offload
* was turned on by a zero value in (or lack of)
--
1.7.10.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH net-next v2 3/5] xen-netback: Unconditionally set NETIF_F_RXCSUM
From: Paul Durrant @ 2013-10-08 10:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel, netdev; +Cc: Paul Durrant, Wei Liu, David Vrabel, Ian Campbell
In-Reply-To: <1381229896-18657-1-git-send-email-paul.durrant@citrix.com>
There is no mechanism to insist that a guest always generates a packet
with good checksum (at least for IPv4) so we must handle checksum
offloading from the guest and hence should set NETIF_F_RXCSUM.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
---
drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c
index 8e92783..cb0d8ea 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c
@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ struct xenvif *xenvif_alloc(struct device *parent, domid_t domid,
dev->hw_features = NETIF_F_SG |
NETIF_F_IP_CSUM | NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM |
NETIF_F_TSO;
- dev->features = dev->hw_features;
+ dev->features = dev->hw_features | NETIF_F_RXCSUM;
SET_ETHTOOL_OPS(dev, &xenvif_ethtool_ops);
dev->tx_queue_len = XENVIF_QUEUE_LENGTH;
--
1.7.10.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH net-next v2 4/5] xen-netback: handle IPv6 TCP GSO packets from the guest
From: Paul Durrant @ 2013-10-08 10:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel, netdev; +Cc: Paul Durrant, Wei Liu, David Vrabel, Ian Campbell
In-Reply-To: <1381229896-18657-1-git-send-email-paul.durrant@citrix.com>
This patch a xenstore flag, festure-gso-tcpv6, to adevrtise netback can
handle IPv6 TCP GSO packets and creates SKB_GSO_TCPV6 skbs if the frontend
passes an extra segment with the new type XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_TCPV6 added to
netif.h.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
---
drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c | 11 ++++++++---
drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c | 7 +++++++
include/xen/interface/io/netif.h | 3 ++-
3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
index 35b1fa6..ac42f73 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
@@ -1096,15 +1096,20 @@ static int xenvif_set_skb_gso(struct xenvif *vif,
return -EINVAL;
}
- /* Currently only TCPv4 S.O. is supported. */
- if (gso->u.gso.type != XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_TCPV4) {
+ switch (gso->u.gso.type) {
+ case XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_TCPV4:
+ skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = SKB_GSO_TCPV4;
+ break;
+ case XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_TCPV6:
+ skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = SKB_GSO_TCPV6;
+ break;
+ default:
netdev_err(vif->dev, "Bad GSO type %d.\n", gso->u.gso.type);
xenvif_fatal_tx_err(vif);
return -EINVAL;
}
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = gso->u.gso.size;
- skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = SKB_GSO_TCPV4;
/* Header must be checked, and gso_segs computed. */
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type |= SKB_GSO_DODGY;
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c
index dff423b..389fa72 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c
@@ -101,6 +101,13 @@ static int netback_probe(struct xenbus_device *dev,
goto abort_transaction;
}
+ err = xenbus_printf(xbt, dev->nodename, "feature-gso-tcpv6",
+ "%d", sg);
+ if (err) {
+ message = "writing feature-gso-tcpv6";
+ goto abort_transaction;
+ }
+
/* We support partial checksum setup for IPv6 packets */
err = xenbus_printf(xbt, dev->nodename,
"feature-ipv6-csum-offload",
diff --git a/include/xen/interface/io/netif.h b/include/xen/interface/io/netif.h
index eb262e3..c19cc06 100644
--- a/include/xen/interface/io/netif.h
+++ b/include/xen/interface/io/netif.h
@@ -95,8 +95,9 @@ struct xen_netif_tx_request {
#define _XEN_NETIF_EXTRA_FLAG_MORE (0)
#define XEN_NETIF_EXTRA_FLAG_MORE (1U<<_XEN_NETIF_EXTRA_FLAG_MORE)
-/* GSO types - only TCPv4 currently supported. */
+/* GSO types */
#define XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_TCPV4 (1)
+#define XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_TCPV6 (2)
/*
* This structure needs to fit within both netif_tx_request and
--
1.7.10.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH net-next v2 1/5] xen-netback: add IPv6 checksum offload to guest
From: Paul Durrant @ 2013-10-08 10:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel, netdev; +Cc: Paul Durrant, Wei Liu, David Vrabel, Ian Campbell
In-Reply-To: <1381229896-18657-1-git-send-email-paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Check xenstore flag feature-ipv6-csum-offload to determine if a
guest is happy to accept IPv6 packets with only partial checksum.
Also check analogous feature-ip-csum-offload to determone if a
guest is happy to accept IPv4 packets with only partial checksum
as a replacement for a negated feature-no-csum-offload value and
add a comment to deprecate use of feature-no-csum-offload.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
---
drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h | 3 ++-
drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c | 10 +++++++---
drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h b/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h
index 5715318..b4a9a3c 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h
@@ -153,7 +153,8 @@ struct xenvif {
u8 can_sg:1;
u8 gso:1;
u8 gso_prefix:1;
- u8 csum:1;
+ u8 ip_csum:1;
+ u8 ipv6_csum:1;
/* Internal feature information. */
u8 can_queue:1; /* can queue packets for receiver? */
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c
index 01bb854..8e92783 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c
@@ -216,8 +216,10 @@ static netdev_features_t xenvif_fix_features(struct net_device *dev,
features &= ~NETIF_F_SG;
if (!vif->gso && !vif->gso_prefix)
features &= ~NETIF_F_TSO;
- if (!vif->csum)
+ if (!vif->ip_csum)
features &= ~NETIF_F_IP_CSUM;
+ if (!vif->ipv6_csum)
+ features &= ~NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM;
return features;
}
@@ -306,7 +308,7 @@ struct xenvif *xenvif_alloc(struct device *parent, domid_t domid,
vif->domid = domid;
vif->handle = handle;
vif->can_sg = 1;
- vif->csum = 1;
+ vif->ip_csum = 1;
vif->dev = dev;
vif->credit_bytes = vif->remaining_credit = ~0UL;
@@ -316,7 +318,9 @@ struct xenvif *xenvif_alloc(struct device *parent, domid_t domid,
vif->credit_timeout.expires = jiffies;
dev->netdev_ops = &xenvif_netdev_ops;
- dev->hw_features = NETIF_F_SG | NETIF_F_IP_CSUM | NETIF_F_TSO;
+ dev->hw_features = NETIF_F_SG |
+ NETIF_F_IP_CSUM | NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM |
+ NETIF_F_TSO;
dev->features = dev->hw_features;
SET_ETHTOOL_OPS(dev, &xenvif_ethtool_ops);
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c
index b45bce2..5e45b00 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c
@@ -567,10 +567,32 @@ static int connect_rings(struct backend_info *be)
val = 0;
vif->gso_prefix = !!val;
+ /* Before feature-ipv6-csum-offload was introduced, checksum offload
+ * was turned on by a zero value in (or lack of)
+ * feature-no-csum-offload. Therefore, for compatibility, assume
+ * that if feature-ip-csum-offload is missing that IP (v4) offload
+ * is turned on. If this is not the case then the flag will be
+ * cleared when we subsequently sample feature-no-csum-offload.
+ */
+ if (xenbus_scanf(XBT_NIL, dev->otherend, "feature-ip-csum-offload",
+ "%d", &val) < 0)
+ val = 1;
+ vif->ip_csum = !!val;
+
+ if (xenbus_scanf(XBT_NIL, dev->otherend, "feature-ipv6-csum-offload",
+ "%d", &val) < 0)
+ val = 0;
+ vif->ipv6_csum = !!val;
+
+ /* This is deprecated. Frontends should set IP v4 and v6 checksum
+ * offload using feature-ip-csum-offload and
+ * feature-ipv6-csum-offload respectively.
+ */
if (xenbus_scanf(XBT_NIL, dev->otherend, "feature-no-csum-offload",
"%d", &val) < 0)
val = 0;
- vif->csum = !val;
+ if (val)
+ vif->ip_csum = 0;
/* Map the shared frame, irq etc. */
err = xenvif_connect(vif, tx_ring_ref, rx_ring_ref,
--
1.7.10.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH net-next v2 0/5] xen-netback: IPv6 offload support
From: Paul Durrant @ 2013-10-08 10:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel, netdev
This patch series adds support for checksum and large packet offloads into
xen-netback.
Testing has mainly been done using the Microsoft network hardware
certification suite running in Server 2008R2 VMs with Citrix PV frontends.
v2:
- Fixed Wei's email address in Cc lines
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH net-next 5/5] xen-netback: enable IPv6 TCP GSO to the guest
From: Paul Durrant @ 2013-10-08 10:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel, netdev; +Cc: Paul Durrant, Wei Liu, David Vrabel, Ian Campbell
In-Reply-To: <1381229081-17814-1-git-send-email-paul.durrant@citrix.com>
This patch adds code to handle SKB_GSO_TCPV6 skbs and construct appropriate
extra or prefix segments to pass the large packet to the frontend. New
xenstore flags, feature-gso-tcpv6 and feature-gso-tcpv6-prefix, are sampled
to determine if the frontend is capable of handling such packets.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liuw2@citrix.com>
Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
---
drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h | 6 +++--
drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c | 8 ++++--
drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++--
4 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h b/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h
index b4a9a3c..720b1ca 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ struct pending_tx_info {
struct xenvif_rx_meta {
int id;
int size;
+ int gso_type;
int gso_size;
};
@@ -150,9 +151,10 @@ struct xenvif {
u8 fe_dev_addr[6];
/* Frontend feature information. */
+ int gso_mask;
+ int gso_prefix_mask;
+
u8 can_sg:1;
- u8 gso:1;
- u8 gso_prefix:1;
u8 ip_csum:1;
u8 ipv6_csum:1;
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c
index cb0d8ea..3d11387 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c
@@ -214,8 +214,12 @@ static netdev_features_t xenvif_fix_features(struct net_device *dev,
if (!vif->can_sg)
features &= ~NETIF_F_SG;
- if (!vif->gso && !vif->gso_prefix)
+ if (~(vif->gso_mask | vif->gso_prefix_mask) &
+ (1 << XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_TCPV4))
features &= ~NETIF_F_TSO;
+ if (~(vif->gso_mask | vif->gso_prefix_mask) &
+ (1 << XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_TCPV6))
+ features &= ~NETIF_F_TSO6;
if (!vif->ip_csum)
features &= ~NETIF_F_IP_CSUM;
if (!vif->ipv6_csum)
@@ -320,7 +324,7 @@ struct xenvif *xenvif_alloc(struct device *parent, domid_t domid,
dev->netdev_ops = &xenvif_netdev_ops;
dev->hw_features = NETIF_F_SG |
NETIF_F_IP_CSUM | NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM |
- NETIF_F_TSO;
+ NETIF_F_TSO | NETIF_F_TSO6;
dev->features = dev->hw_features | NETIF_F_RXCSUM;
SET_ETHTOOL_OPS(dev, &xenvif_ethtool_ops);
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
index ac42f73..ee0d55c 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ static int max_required_rx_slots(struct xenvif *vif)
int max = DIV_ROUND_UP(vif->dev->mtu, PAGE_SIZE);
/* XXX FIXME: RX path dependent on MAX_SKB_FRAGS */
- if (vif->can_sg || vif->gso || vif->gso_prefix)
+ if (vif->can_sg || vif->gso_mask || vif->gso_prefix_mask)
max += MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1; /* extra_info + frags */
return max;
@@ -334,6 +334,7 @@ static void xenvif_gop_frag_copy(struct xenvif *vif, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct gnttab_copy *copy_gop;
struct xenvif_rx_meta *meta;
unsigned long bytes;
+ int gso_type;
/* Data must not cross a page boundary. */
BUG_ON(size + offset > PAGE_SIZE<<compound_order(page));
@@ -392,7 +393,14 @@ static void xenvif_gop_frag_copy(struct xenvif *vif, struct sk_buff *skb,
}
/* Leave a gap for the GSO descriptor. */
- if (*head && skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size && !vif->gso_prefix)
+ if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCPV4)
+ gso_type = XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_TCPV4;
+ else if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCPV6)
+ gso_type = XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_TCPV6;
+ else
+ gso_type = 0;
+
+ if (*head && ((1 << gso_type) & vif->gso_prefix_mask))
vif->rx.req_cons++;
*head = 0; /* There must be something in this buffer now. */
@@ -423,14 +431,28 @@ static int xenvif_gop_skb(struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned char *data;
int head = 1;
int old_meta_prod;
+ int gso_type;
+ int gso_size;
old_meta_prod = npo->meta_prod;
+ if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCPV4) {
+ gso_type = XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_TCPV4;
+ gso_size = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size;
+ } else if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCPV6) {
+ gso_type = XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_TCPV6;
+ gso_size = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size;
+ } else {
+ gso_type = 0;
+ gso_size = 0;
+ }
+
/* Set up a GSO prefix descriptor, if necessary */
- if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size && vif->gso_prefix) {
+ if ((1 << gso_type) & vif->gso_prefix_mask) {
req = RING_GET_REQUEST(&vif->rx, vif->rx.req_cons++);
meta = npo->meta + npo->meta_prod++;
- meta->gso_size = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size;
+ meta->gso_type = gso_type;
+ meta->gso_size = gso_size;
meta->size = 0;
meta->id = req->id;
}
@@ -438,10 +460,13 @@ static int xenvif_gop_skb(struct sk_buff *skb,
req = RING_GET_REQUEST(&vif->rx, vif->rx.req_cons++);
meta = npo->meta + npo->meta_prod++;
- if (!vif->gso_prefix)
- meta->gso_size = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size;
- else
+ if ((1 << gso_type) & vif->gso_mask) {
+ meta->gso_type = gso_type;
+ meta->gso_size = gso_size;
+ } else {
+ meta->gso_type = 0;
meta->gso_size = 0;
+ }
meta->size = 0;
meta->id = req->id;
@@ -587,7 +612,8 @@ void xenvif_rx_action(struct xenvif *vif)
vif = netdev_priv(skb->dev);
- if (vif->meta[npo.meta_cons].gso_size && vif->gso_prefix) {
+ if ((1 << vif->meta[npo.meta_cons].gso_type) &
+ vif->gso_prefix_mask) {
resp = RING_GET_RESPONSE(&vif->rx,
vif->rx.rsp_prod_pvt++);
@@ -624,7 +650,8 @@ void xenvif_rx_action(struct xenvif *vif)
vif->meta[npo.meta_cons].size,
flags);
- if (vif->meta[npo.meta_cons].gso_size && !vif->gso_prefix) {
+ if ((1 << vif->meta[npo.meta_cons].gso_type) &
+ vif->gso_mask) {
struct xen_netif_extra_info *gso =
(struct xen_netif_extra_info *)
RING_GET_RESPONSE(&vif->rx,
@@ -632,8 +659,8 @@ void xenvif_rx_action(struct xenvif *vif)
resp->flags |= XEN_NETRXF_extra_info;
+ gso->u.gso.type = vif->meta[npo.meta_cons].gso_type;
gso->u.gso.size = vif->meta[npo.meta_cons].gso_size;
- gso->u.gso.type = XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_TCPV4;
gso->u.gso.pad = 0;
gso->u.gso.features = 0;
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c
index 389fa72..4894256 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c
@@ -573,15 +573,40 @@ static int connect_rings(struct backend_info *be)
val = 0;
vif->can_sg = !!val;
+ vif->gso_mask = 0;
+ vif->gso_prefix_mask = 0;
+
if (xenbus_scanf(XBT_NIL, dev->otherend, "feature-gso-tcpv4",
"%d", &val) < 0)
val = 0;
- vif->gso = !!val;
+ if (val)
+ vif->gso_mask = 1 << XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_TCPV4;
if (xenbus_scanf(XBT_NIL, dev->otherend, "feature-gso-tcpv4-prefix",
"%d", &val) < 0)
val = 0;
- vif->gso_prefix = !!val;
+ if (val)
+ vif->gso_prefix_mask = 1 << XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_TCPV4;
+
+ if (xenbus_scanf(XBT_NIL, dev->otherend, "feature-gso-tcpv6",
+ "%d", &val) < 0)
+ val = 0;
+ if (val)
+ vif->gso_mask = 1 << XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_TCPV6;
+
+ if (xenbus_scanf(XBT_NIL, dev->otherend, "feature-gso-tcpv6-prefix",
+ "%d", &val) < 0)
+ val = 0;
+ if (val)
+ vif->gso_prefix_mask = 1 << XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_TCPV6;
+
+ if (vif->gso_mask & vif->gso_prefix_mask) {
+ xenbus_dev_fatal(dev, err,
+ "%s: gso and gso prefix flags are not "
+ "mutually exclusive",
+ dev->otherend);
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
/* Before feature-ipv6-csum-offload was introduced, checksum offload
* was turned on by a zero value in (or lack of)
--
1.7.10.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH net-next 3/5] xen-netback: Unconditionally set NETIF_F_RXCSUM
From: Paul Durrant @ 2013-10-08 10:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel, netdev; +Cc: Paul Durrant, Wei Liu, David Vrabel, Ian Campbell
In-Reply-To: <1381229081-17814-1-git-send-email-paul.durrant@citrix.com>
There is no mechanism to insist that a guest always generates a packet
with good checksum (at least for IPv4) so we must handle checksum
offloading from the guest and hence should set NETIF_F_RXCSUM.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liuw2@citrix.com>
Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
---
drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c
index 8e92783..cb0d8ea 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c
@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ struct xenvif *xenvif_alloc(struct device *parent, domid_t domid,
dev->hw_features = NETIF_F_SG |
NETIF_F_IP_CSUM | NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM |
NETIF_F_TSO;
- dev->features = dev->hw_features;
+ dev->features = dev->hw_features | NETIF_F_RXCSUM;
SET_ETHTOOL_OPS(dev, &xenvif_ethtool_ops);
dev->tx_queue_len = XENVIF_QUEUE_LENGTH;
--
1.7.10.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH net-next 4/5] xen-netback: handle IPv6 TCP GSO packets from the guest
From: Paul Durrant @ 2013-10-08 10:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel, netdev; +Cc: Paul Durrant, Wei Liu, David Vrabel, Ian Campbell
In-Reply-To: <1381229081-17814-1-git-send-email-paul.durrant@citrix.com>
This patch a xenstore flag, festure-gso-tcpv6, to adevrtise netback can
handle IPv6 TCP GSO packets and creates SKB_GSO_TCPV6 skbs if the frontend
passes an extra segment with the new type XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_TCPV6 added to
netif.h.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liuw2@citrix.com>
Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
---
drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c | 11 ++++++++---
drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c | 7 +++++++
include/xen/interface/io/netif.h | 3 ++-
3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
index 35b1fa6..ac42f73 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
@@ -1096,15 +1096,20 @@ static int xenvif_set_skb_gso(struct xenvif *vif,
return -EINVAL;
}
- /* Currently only TCPv4 S.O. is supported. */
- if (gso->u.gso.type != XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_TCPV4) {
+ switch (gso->u.gso.type) {
+ case XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_TCPV4:
+ skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = SKB_GSO_TCPV4;
+ break;
+ case XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_TCPV6:
+ skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = SKB_GSO_TCPV6;
+ break;
+ default:
netdev_err(vif->dev, "Bad GSO type %d.\n", gso->u.gso.type);
xenvif_fatal_tx_err(vif);
return -EINVAL;
}
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = gso->u.gso.size;
- skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = SKB_GSO_TCPV4;
/* Header must be checked, and gso_segs computed. */
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type |= SKB_GSO_DODGY;
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c
index dff423b..389fa72 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c
@@ -101,6 +101,13 @@ static int netback_probe(struct xenbus_device *dev,
goto abort_transaction;
}
+ err = xenbus_printf(xbt, dev->nodename, "feature-gso-tcpv6",
+ "%d", sg);
+ if (err) {
+ message = "writing feature-gso-tcpv6";
+ goto abort_transaction;
+ }
+
/* We support partial checksum setup for IPv6 packets */
err = xenbus_printf(xbt, dev->nodename,
"feature-ipv6-csum-offload",
diff --git a/include/xen/interface/io/netif.h b/include/xen/interface/io/netif.h
index eb262e3..c19cc06 100644
--- a/include/xen/interface/io/netif.h
+++ b/include/xen/interface/io/netif.h
@@ -95,8 +95,9 @@ struct xen_netif_tx_request {
#define _XEN_NETIF_EXTRA_FLAG_MORE (0)
#define XEN_NETIF_EXTRA_FLAG_MORE (1U<<_XEN_NETIF_EXTRA_FLAG_MORE)
-/* GSO types - only TCPv4 currently supported. */
+/* GSO types */
#define XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_TCPV4 (1)
+#define XEN_NETIF_GSO_TYPE_TCPV6 (2)
/*
* This structure needs to fit within both netif_tx_request and
--
1.7.10.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH net-next 2/5] xen-netback: Add support for IPv6 checksum offload from guest
From: Paul Durrant @ 2013-10-08 10:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel, netdev; +Cc: Paul Durrant, Wei Liu, David Vrabel, Ian Campbell
In-Reply-To: <1381229081-17814-1-git-send-email-paul.durrant@citrix.com>
For performance of VM to VM traffic on a single host it is better to avoid
calculation of TCP/UDP checksum in the sending frontend. To allow this this
patch adds the code necessary to set up partial checksum for IPv6 packets
and xenstore flag feature-ipv6-csum-offload to advertise that fact to
frontends.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liuw2@citrix.com>
Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
---
drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c | 224 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c | 9 ++
2 files changed, 191 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
index f3e591c..35b1fa6 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
@@ -109,15 +109,10 @@ static inline unsigned long idx_to_kaddr(struct xenvif *vif,
return (unsigned long)pfn_to_kaddr(idx_to_pfn(vif, idx));
}
-/*
- * This is the amount of packet we copy rather than map, so that the
- * guest can't fiddle with the contents of the headers while we do
- * packet processing on them (netfilter, routing, etc).
+/* This is a miniumum size for the linear area to avoid lots of
+ * calls to __pskb_pull_tail() as we set up checksum offsets.
*/
-#define PKT_PROT_LEN (ETH_HLEN + \
- VLAN_HLEN + \
- sizeof(struct iphdr) + MAX_IPOPTLEN + \
- sizeof(struct tcphdr) + MAX_TCP_OPTION_SPACE)
+#define PKT_PROT_LEN 128
static u16 frag_get_pending_idx(skb_frag_t *frag)
{
@@ -1118,61 +1113,72 @@ static int xenvif_set_skb_gso(struct xenvif *vif,
return 0;
}
-static int checksum_setup(struct xenvif *vif, struct sk_buff *skb)
+static inline void maybe_pull_tail(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int len)
{
- struct iphdr *iph;
+ if (skb_is_nonlinear(skb) && skb_headlen(skb) < len) {
+ int target = min_t(int, skb->len, len);
+ __pskb_pull_tail(skb, target - skb_headlen(skb));
+ }
+}
+
+static int checksum_setup_ip(struct xenvif *vif, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ int recalculate_partial_csum)
+{
+ struct iphdr *iph = (void *)skb->data;
+ unsigned int header_size;
+ unsigned int off;
int err = -EPROTO;
- int recalculate_partial_csum = 0;
- /*
- * A GSO SKB must be CHECKSUM_PARTIAL. However some buggy
- * peers can fail to set NETRXF_csum_blank when sending a GSO
- * frame. In this case force the SKB to CHECKSUM_PARTIAL and
- * recalculate the partial checksum.
- */
- if (skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_PARTIAL && skb_is_gso(skb)) {
- vif->rx_gso_checksum_fixup++;
- skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
- recalculate_partial_csum = 1;
- }
+ off = sizeof(struct iphdr);
- /* A non-CHECKSUM_PARTIAL SKB does not require setup. */
- if (skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_PARTIAL)
- return 0;
+ header_size = skb->network_header + off + MAX_IPOPTLEN;
+ maybe_pull_tail(skb, header_size);
- if (skb->protocol != htons(ETH_P_IP))
- goto out;
+ off = iph->ihl * 4;
- iph = (void *)skb->data;
switch (iph->protocol) {
case IPPROTO_TCP:
- if (!skb_partial_csum_set(skb, 4 * iph->ihl,
+ if (!skb_partial_csum_set(skb, off,
offsetof(struct tcphdr, check)))
goto out;
if (recalculate_partial_csum) {
struct tcphdr *tcph = tcp_hdr(skb);
+
+ header_size = skb->network_header +
+ off +
+ sizeof(struct tcphdr) +
+ MAX_TCP_OPTION_SPACE;
+ maybe_pull_tail(skb, header_size);
+
tcph->check = ~csum_tcpudp_magic(iph->saddr, iph->daddr,
- skb->len - iph->ihl*4,
+ skb->len - off,
IPPROTO_TCP, 0);
}
break;
case IPPROTO_UDP:
- if (!skb_partial_csum_set(skb, 4 * iph->ihl,
+ if (!skb_partial_csum_set(skb, off,
offsetof(struct udphdr, check)))
goto out;
if (recalculate_partial_csum) {
struct udphdr *udph = udp_hdr(skb);
+
+ header_size = skb->network_header +
+ off +
+ sizeof(struct udphdr);
+ maybe_pull_tail(skb, header_size);
+
udph->check = ~csum_tcpudp_magic(iph->saddr, iph->daddr,
- skb->len - iph->ihl*4,
+ skb->len - off,
IPPROTO_UDP, 0);
}
break;
default:
if (net_ratelimit())
netdev_err(vif->dev,
- "Attempting to checksum a non-TCP/UDP packet, dropping a protocol %d packet\n",
+ "Attempting to checksum a non-TCP/UDP packet, "
+ "dropping a protocol %d packet\n",
iph->protocol);
goto out;
}
@@ -1183,6 +1189,148 @@ out:
return err;
}
+static int checksum_setup_ipv6(struct xenvif *vif, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ int recalculate_partial_csum)
+{
+ int err = -EPROTO;
+ struct ipv6hdr *ipv6h = (void *)skb->data;
+ u8 nexthdr;
+ unsigned int header_size;
+ unsigned int off;
+ bool done;
+
+ done = false;
+ off = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr);
+
+ header_size = skb->network_header + off;
+ maybe_pull_tail(skb, header_size);
+
+ nexthdr = ipv6h->nexthdr;
+
+ while ((off <= sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + ntohs(ipv6h->payload_len)) &&
+ !done) {
+ /* We only access at most the first 2 bytes of any option header
+ * to determine the next one.
+ */
+ header_size = skb->network_header + off + 2;
+ maybe_pull_tail(skb, header_size);
+
+ switch (nexthdr) {
+ case IPPROTO_FRAGMENT: {
+ struct frag_hdr *hp = (void *)(skb->data + off);
+
+ nexthdr = hp->nexthdr;
+ off += 8;
+ break;
+ }
+ case IPPROTO_DSTOPTS:
+ case IPPROTO_HOPOPTS:
+ case IPPROTO_ROUTING: {
+ struct ipv6_opt_hdr *hp = (void *)(skb->data + off);
+
+ nexthdr = hp->nexthdr;
+ off += ipv6_optlen(hp);
+ break;
+ }
+ case IPPROTO_AH: {
+ struct ip_auth_hdr *hp = (void *)(skb->data + off);
+
+ nexthdr = hp->nexthdr;
+ off += (hp->hdrlen+2)<<2;
+ break;
+ }
+ default:
+ done = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!done)
+ goto out;
+
+ switch (nexthdr) {
+ case IPPROTO_TCP:
+ if (!skb_partial_csum_set(skb, off,
+ offsetof(struct tcphdr, check)))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (recalculate_partial_csum) {
+ struct tcphdr *tcph = tcp_hdr(skb);
+
+ header_size = skb->network_header +
+ off +
+ sizeof(struct tcphdr) +
+ MAX_TCP_OPTION_SPACE;
+ maybe_pull_tail(skb, header_size);
+
+ tcph->check = ~csum_ipv6_magic(&ipv6h->saddr,
+ &ipv6h->daddr,
+ skb->len - off,
+ IPPROTO_TCP, 0);
+ }
+ break;
+ case IPPROTO_UDP:
+ if (!skb_partial_csum_set(skb, off,
+ offsetof(struct udphdr, check)))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (recalculate_partial_csum) {
+ struct udphdr *udph = udp_hdr(skb);
+
+ header_size = skb->network_header +
+ off +
+ sizeof(struct udphdr);
+ maybe_pull_tail(skb, header_size);
+
+ udph->check = ~csum_ipv6_magic(&ipv6h->saddr,
+ &ipv6h->daddr,
+ skb->len - off,
+ IPPROTO_UDP, 0);
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ if (net_ratelimit())
+ netdev_err(vif->dev,
+ "Attempting to checksum a non-TCP/UDP packet, "
+ "dropping a protocol %d packet\n",
+ nexthdr);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ err = 0;
+
+out:
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int checksum_setup(struct xenvif *vif, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ int err = -EPROTO;
+ int recalculate_partial_csum = 0;
+
+ /* A GSO SKB must be CHECKSUM_PARTIAL. However some buggy
+ * peers can fail to set NETRXF_csum_blank when sending a GSO
+ * frame. In this case force the SKB to CHECKSUM_PARTIAL and
+ * recalculate the partial checksum.
+ */
+ if (skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_PARTIAL && skb_is_gso(skb)) {
+ vif->rx_gso_checksum_fixup++;
+ skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
+ recalculate_partial_csum = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* A non-CHECKSUM_PARTIAL SKB does not require setup. */
+ if (skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_PARTIAL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+ err = checksum_setup_ip(vif, skb, recalculate_partial_csum);
+ else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
+ err = checksum_setup_ipv6(vif, skb, recalculate_partial_csum);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
static bool tx_credit_exceeded(struct xenvif *vif, unsigned size)
{
unsigned long now = jiffies;
@@ -1428,15 +1576,7 @@ static int xenvif_tx_submit(struct xenvif *vif, int budget)
xenvif_fill_frags(vif, skb);
- /*
- * If the initial fragment was < PKT_PROT_LEN then
- * pull through some bytes from the other fragments to
- * increase the linear region to PKT_PROT_LEN bytes.
- */
- if (skb_headlen(skb) < PKT_PROT_LEN && skb_is_nonlinear(skb)) {
- int target = min_t(int, skb->len, PKT_PROT_LEN);
- __pskb_pull_tail(skb, target - skb_headlen(skb));
- }
+ maybe_pull_tail(skb, PKT_PROT_LEN);
skb->dev = vif->dev;
skb->protocol = eth_type_trans(skb, skb->dev);
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c
index 5e45b00..dff423b 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/xenbus.c
@@ -101,6 +101,15 @@ static int netback_probe(struct xenbus_device *dev,
goto abort_transaction;
}
+ /* We support partial checksum setup for IPv6 packets */
+ err = xenbus_printf(xbt, dev->nodename,
+ "feature-ipv6-csum-offload",
+ "%d", 1);
+ if (err) {
+ message = "writing feature-ipv6-csum-offload";
+ goto abort_transaction;
+ }
+
/* We support rx-copy path. */
err = xenbus_printf(xbt, dev->nodename,
"feature-rx-copy", "%d", 1);
--
1.7.10.4
^ permalink raw reply related
page: next (older) | prev (newer) | latest
- recent:[subjects (threaded)|topics (new)|topics (active)]
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox