* [PATCH net-next v3 1/9] ipv4: split inet_ehashfn to hash functions per compilation unit
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa @ 2013-10-17 5:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev; +Cc: linux-kernel, Eric Dumazet, David S. Miller
In-Reply-To: <1381987923-1524-1-git-send-email-hannes@stressinduktion.org>
This duplicates a bit of code but let's us easily introduce
separate secret keys later. The separate compilation units are
ipv4/inet_hashtabbles.o, ipv4/udp.o and rds/connection.o.
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
---
include/net/inet_sock.h | 22 ++++++----------------
net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
net/ipv4/udp.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
net/rds/connection.c | 6 +++---
4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/inet_sock.h b/include/net/inet_sock.h
index 06da91e..7a6c7f8 100644
--- a/include/net/inet_sock.h
+++ b/include/net/inet_sock.h
@@ -208,26 +208,16 @@ extern u32 inet_ehash_secret;
extern u32 ipv6_hash_secret;
void build_ehash_secret(void);
-static inline unsigned int inet_ehashfn(struct net *net,
- const __be32 laddr, const __u16 lport,
- const __be32 faddr, const __be16 fport)
+static inline unsigned int __inet_ehashfn(const __be32 laddr,
+ const __u16 lport,
+ const __be32 faddr,
+ const __be16 fport,
+ u32 initval)
{
return jhash_3words((__force __u32) laddr,
(__force __u32) faddr,
((__u32) lport) << 16 | (__force __u32)fport,
- inet_ehash_secret + net_hash_mix(net));
-}
-
-static inline int inet_sk_ehashfn(const struct sock *sk)
-{
- const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
- const __be32 laddr = inet->inet_rcv_saddr;
- const __u16 lport = inet->inet_num;
- const __be32 faddr = inet->inet_daddr;
- const __be16 fport = inet->inet_dport;
- struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
-
- return inet_ehashfn(net, laddr, lport, faddr, fport);
+ initval);
}
static inline struct request_sock *inet_reqsk_alloc(struct request_sock_ops *ops)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
index a4b66bb..18aa668 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
@@ -24,6 +24,27 @@
#include <net/secure_seq.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
+static unsigned int inet_ehashfn(struct net *net, const __be32 laddr,
+ const __u16 lport, const __be32 faddr,
+ const __be16 fport)
+{
+ return __inet_ehashfn(laddr, lport, faddr, fport,
+ inet_ehash_secret + net_hash_mix(net));
+}
+
+
+static unsigned int inet_sk_ehashfn(const struct sock *sk)
+{
+ const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
+ const __be32 laddr = inet->inet_rcv_saddr;
+ const __u16 lport = inet->inet_num;
+ const __be32 faddr = inet->inet_daddr;
+ const __be16 fport = inet->inet_dport;
+ struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
+
+ return inet_ehashfn(net, laddr, lport, faddr, fport);
+}
+
/*
* Allocate and initialize a new local port bind bucket.
* The bindhash mutex for snum's hash chain must be held here.
diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp.c b/net/ipv4/udp.c
index 9f27bb8..b4437c7 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/udp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/udp.c
@@ -407,6 +407,14 @@ static inline int compute_score2(struct sock *sk, struct net *net,
return score;
}
+static unsigned int udp_ehashfn(struct net *net, const __be32 laddr,
+ const __u16 lport, const __be32 faddr,
+ const __be16 fport)
+{
+ return __inet_ehashfn(laddr, lport, faddr, fport,
+ inet_ehash_secret + net_hash_mix(net));
+}
+
/* called with read_rcu_lock() */
static struct sock *udp4_lib_lookup2(struct net *net,
@@ -430,8 +438,8 @@ begin:
badness = score;
reuseport = sk->sk_reuseport;
if (reuseport) {
- hash = inet_ehashfn(net, daddr, hnum,
- saddr, sport);
+ hash = udp_ehashfn(net, daddr, hnum,
+ saddr, sport);
matches = 1;
}
} else if (score == badness && reuseport) {
@@ -511,8 +519,8 @@ begin:
badness = score;
reuseport = sk->sk_reuseport;
if (reuseport) {
- hash = inet_ehashfn(net, daddr, hnum,
- saddr, sport);
+ hash = udp_ehashfn(net, daddr, hnum,
+ saddr, sport);
matches = 1;
}
} else if (score == badness && reuseport) {
diff --git a/net/rds/connection.c b/net/rds/connection.c
index 642ad42..45e2366 100644
--- a/net/rds/connection.c
+++ b/net/rds/connection.c
@@ -52,9 +52,9 @@ static struct kmem_cache *rds_conn_slab;
static struct hlist_head *rds_conn_bucket(__be32 laddr, __be32 faddr)
{
/* Pass NULL, don't need struct net for hash */
- unsigned long hash = inet_ehashfn(NULL,
- be32_to_cpu(laddr), 0,
- be32_to_cpu(faddr), 0);
+ unsigned long hash = __inet_ehashfn(be32_to_cpu(laddr), 0,
+ be32_to_cpu(faddr), 0,
+ inet_ehash_secret);
return &rds_conn_hash[hash & RDS_CONNECTION_HASH_MASK];
}
--
1.8.3.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH net-next v3 2/9] ipv6: split inet6_ehashfn to hash functions per compilation unit
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa @ 2013-10-17 5:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev; +Cc: linux-kernel, Eric Dumazet, David S. Miller
In-Reply-To: <1381987923-1524-1-git-send-email-hannes@stressinduktion.org>
This patch splits the inet6_ehashfn into separate ones in
ipv6/inet6_hashtables.o and ipv6/udp.o to ease the introduction of
seperate secrets keys later.
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
---
include/net/inet6_hashtables.h | 28 +++++++---------------------
include/net/ipv6.h | 4 ++--
net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
net/ipv6/udp.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++----
4 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/inet6_hashtables.h b/include/net/inet6_hashtables.h
index a105d1a..ae06135 100644
--- a/include/net/inet6_hashtables.h
+++ b/include/net/inet6_hashtables.h
@@ -28,28 +28,14 @@
struct inet_hashinfo;
-static inline unsigned int inet6_ehashfn(struct net *net,
- const struct in6_addr *laddr, const u16 lport,
- const struct in6_addr *faddr, const __be16 fport)
+static inline unsigned int __inet6_ehashfn(const u32 lhash,
+ const u16 lport,
+ const u32 fhash,
+ const __be16 fport,
+ const u32 initval)
{
- u32 ports = (((u32)lport) << 16) | (__force u32)fport;
-
- return jhash_3words((__force u32)laddr->s6_addr32[3],
- ipv6_addr_jhash(faddr),
- ports,
- inet_ehash_secret + net_hash_mix(net));
-}
-
-static inline int inet6_sk_ehashfn(const struct sock *sk)
-{
- const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
- const struct in6_addr *laddr = &sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr;
- const struct in6_addr *faddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
- const __u16 lport = inet->inet_num;
- const __be16 fport = inet->inet_dport;
- struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
-
- return inet6_ehashfn(net, laddr, lport, faddr, fport);
+ const u32 ports = (((u32)lport) << 16) | (__force u32)fport;
+ return jhash_3words(lhash, fhash, ports, initval);
}
int __inet6_hash(struct sock *sk, struct inet_timewait_sock *twp);
diff --git a/include/net/ipv6.h b/include/net/ipv6.h
index fe1c7f6..a35055f 100644
--- a/include/net/ipv6.h
+++ b/include/net/ipv6.h
@@ -539,14 +539,14 @@ static inline u32 ipv6_addr_hash(const struct in6_addr *a)
}
/* more secured version of ipv6_addr_hash() */
-static inline u32 ipv6_addr_jhash(const struct in6_addr *a)
+static inline u32 __ipv6_addr_jhash(const struct in6_addr *a, const u32 initval)
{
u32 v = (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[0] ^ (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[1];
return jhash_3words(v,
(__force u32)a->s6_addr32[2],
(__force u32)a->s6_addr32[3],
- ipv6_hash_secret);
+ initval);
}
static inline bool ipv6_addr_loopback(const struct in6_addr *a)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c b/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c
index 842d833..fa7dd38 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c
@@ -23,6 +23,30 @@
#include <net/secure_seq.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
+static unsigned int inet6_ehashfn(struct net *net,
+ const struct in6_addr *laddr,
+ const u16 lport,
+ const struct in6_addr *faddr,
+ const __be16 fport)
+{
+ const u32 lhash = (__force u32)laddr->s6_addr32[3];
+ const u32 fhash = __ipv6_addr_jhash(faddr, ipv6_hash_secret);
+ return __inet6_ehashfn(lhash, lport, fhash, fport,
+ inet_ehash_secret + net_hash_mix(net));
+}
+
+static int inet6_sk_ehashfn(const struct sock *sk)
+{
+ const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
+ const struct in6_addr *laddr = &sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr;
+ const struct in6_addr *faddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
+ const __u16 lport = inet->inet_num;
+ const __be16 fport = inet->inet_dport;
+ struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
+
+ return inet6_ehashfn(net, laddr, lport, faddr, fport);
+}
+
int __inet6_hash(struct sock *sk, struct inet_timewait_sock *tw)
{
struct inet_hashinfo *hashinfo = sk->sk_prot->h.hashinfo;
diff --git a/net/ipv6/udp.c b/net/ipv6/udp.c
index b496de1..324bd36 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/udp.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/udp.c
@@ -53,6 +53,18 @@
#include <trace/events/skb.h>
#include "udp_impl.h"
+static unsigned int udp6_ehashfn(struct net *net,
+ const struct in6_addr *laddr,
+ const u16 lport,
+ const struct in6_addr *faddr,
+ const __be16 fport)
+{
+ const u32 lhash = (__force u32)laddr->s6_addr32[3];
+ const u32 fhash = __ipv6_addr_jhash(faddr, ipv6_hash_secret);
+ return __inet6_ehashfn(lhash, lport, fhash, fport,
+ inet_ehash_secret + net_hash_mix(net));
+}
+
int ipv6_rcv_saddr_equal(const struct sock *sk, const struct sock *sk2)
{
const struct in6_addr *sk2_rcv_saddr6 = inet6_rcv_saddr(sk2);
@@ -214,8 +226,8 @@ begin:
badness = score;
reuseport = sk->sk_reuseport;
if (reuseport) {
- hash = inet6_ehashfn(net, daddr, hnum,
- saddr, sport);
+ hash = udp6_ehashfn(net, daddr, hnum,
+ saddr, sport);
matches = 1;
} else if (score == SCORE2_MAX)
goto exact_match;
@@ -295,8 +307,8 @@ begin:
badness = score;
reuseport = sk->sk_reuseport;
if (reuseport) {
- hash = inet6_ehashfn(net, daddr, hnum,
- saddr, sport);
+ hash = udp6_ehashfn(net, daddr, hnum,
+ saddr, sport);
matches = 1;
}
} else if (score == badness && reuseport) {
--
1.8.3.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH net-next v3 3/9] static_key: WARN on usage before jump_label_init was called
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa @ 2013-10-17 5:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev; +Cc: linux-kernel, Steven Rostedt, Peter Zijlstra, Andi Kleen
In-Reply-To: <1381987923-1524-1-git-send-email-hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Based on a patch from Andi Kleen.
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
---
include/linux/jump_label.h | 10 ++++++++++
include/linux/jump_label_ratelimit.h | 2 ++
init/main.c | 7 +++++++
kernel/jump_label.c | 5 +++++
4 files changed, 24 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/jump_label.h b/include/linux/jump_label.h
index a507907..e96be72 100644
--- a/include/linux/jump_label.h
+++ b/include/linux/jump_label.h
@@ -48,6 +48,13 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/compiler.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+
+extern bool static_key_initialized;
+
+#define STATIC_KEY_CHECK_USE() WARN(!static_key_initialized, \
+ "%s used before call to jump_label_init", \
+ __func__)
#if defined(CC_HAVE_ASM_GOTO) && defined(CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL)
@@ -128,6 +135,7 @@ struct static_key {
static __always_inline void jump_label_init(void)
{
+ static_key_initialized = true;
}
static __always_inline bool static_key_false(struct static_key *key)
@@ -146,11 +154,13 @@ static __always_inline bool static_key_true(struct static_key *key)
static inline void static_key_slow_inc(struct static_key *key)
{
+ STATIC_KEY_CHECK_USE();
atomic_inc(&key->enabled);
}
static inline void static_key_slow_dec(struct static_key *key)
{
+ STATIC_KEY_CHECK_USE();
atomic_dec(&key->enabled);
}
diff --git a/include/linux/jump_label_ratelimit.h b/include/linux/jump_label_ratelimit.h
index 1137883..089f70f 100644
--- a/include/linux/jump_label_ratelimit.h
+++ b/include/linux/jump_label_ratelimit.h
@@ -23,12 +23,14 @@ struct static_key_deferred {
};
static inline void static_key_slow_dec_deferred(struct static_key_deferred *key)
{
+ STATIC_KEY_CHECK_USE();
static_key_slow_dec(&key->key);
}
static inline void
jump_label_rate_limit(struct static_key_deferred *key,
unsigned long rl)
{
+ STATIC_KEY_CHECK_USE();
}
#endif /* HAVE_JUMP_LABEL */
#endif /* _LINUX_JUMP_LABEL_RATELIMIT_H */
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index af310af..27bbec1a 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -136,6 +136,13 @@ static char *execute_command;
static char *ramdisk_execute_command;
/*
+ * Used to generate warnings if static_key manipulation functions are used
+ * before jump_label_init is called.
+ */
+bool static_key_initialized __read_mostly = false;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(static_key_initialized);
+
+/*
* If set, this is an indication to the drivers that reset the underlying
* device before going ahead with the initialization otherwise driver might
* rely on the BIOS and skip the reset operation.
diff --git a/kernel/jump_label.c b/kernel/jump_label.c
index 297a924..9019f15 100644
--- a/kernel/jump_label.c
+++ b/kernel/jump_label.c
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ static void jump_label_update(struct static_key *key, int enable);
void static_key_slow_inc(struct static_key *key)
{
+ STATIC_KEY_CHECK_USE();
if (atomic_inc_not_zero(&key->enabled))
return;
@@ -103,12 +104,14 @@ static void jump_label_update_timeout(struct work_struct *work)
void static_key_slow_dec(struct static_key *key)
{
+ STATIC_KEY_CHECK_USE();
__static_key_slow_dec(key, 0, NULL);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(static_key_slow_dec);
void static_key_slow_dec_deferred(struct static_key_deferred *key)
{
+ STATIC_KEY_CHECK_USE();
__static_key_slow_dec(&key->key, key->timeout, &key->work);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(static_key_slow_dec_deferred);
@@ -116,6 +119,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(static_key_slow_dec_deferred);
void jump_label_rate_limit(struct static_key_deferred *key,
unsigned long rl)
{
+ STATIC_KEY_CHECK_USE();
key->timeout = rl;
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&key->work, jump_label_update_timeout);
}
@@ -212,6 +216,7 @@ void __init jump_label_init(void)
key->next = NULL;
#endif
}
+ static_key_initialized = true;
jump_label_unlock();
}
--
1.8.3.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH net-next v3 4/9] x86/jump_label: expect default_nop if static_key gets enabled on boot-up
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa @ 2013-10-17 5:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev
Cc: linux-kernel, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin,
Steven Rostedt, Jason Baron, Peter Zijlstra, Eric Dumazet,
David S. Miller, x86
In-Reply-To: <1381987923-1524-1-git-send-email-hannes@stressinduktion.org>
net_get_random_once(intrduced in the next patch) uses static_keys in
a way that they get enabled on boot-up instead of replaced with an
ideal_nop. So check for default_nop on initial enabling.
Other architectures don't check for this.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/jump_label.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/jump_label.c b/arch/x86/kernel/jump_label.c
index ee11b7d..26d5a55 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/jump_label.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/jump_label.c
@@ -42,15 +42,27 @@ static void __jump_label_transform(struct jump_entry *entry,
int init)
{
union jump_code_union code;
+ const unsigned char default_nop[] = { STATIC_KEY_INIT_NOP };
const unsigned char *ideal_nop = ideal_nops[NOP_ATOMIC5];
if (type == JUMP_LABEL_ENABLE) {
- /*
- * We are enabling this jump label. If it is not a nop
- * then something must have gone wrong.
- */
- if (unlikely(memcmp((void *)entry->code, ideal_nop, 5) != 0))
- bug_at((void *)entry->code, __LINE__);
+ if (init) {
+ /*
+ * Jump label is enabled for the first time.
+ * So we expect a default_nop...
+ */
+ if (unlikely(memcmp((void *)entry->code, default_nop, 5)
+ != 0))
+ bug_at((void *)entry->code, __LINE__);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * ...otherwise expect an ideal_nop. Otherwise
+ * something went horribly wrong.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(memcmp((void *)entry->code, ideal_nop, 5)
+ != 0))
+ bug_at((void *)entry->code, __LINE__);
+ }
code.jump = 0xe9;
code.offset = entry->target -
@@ -63,7 +75,6 @@ static void __jump_label_transform(struct jump_entry *entry,
* are converting the default nop to the ideal nop.
*/
if (init) {
- const unsigned char default_nop[] = { STATIC_KEY_INIT_NOP };
if (unlikely(memcmp((void *)entry->code, default_nop, 5) != 0))
bug_at((void *)entry->code, __LINE__);
} else {
--
1.8.3.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH net-next v3 5/9] net: introduce new macro net_get_random_once
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa @ 2013-10-17 5:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev
Cc: linux-kernel, Ingo Molnar, Steven Rostedt, Jason Baron,
Peter Zijlstra, Eric Dumazet, David S. Miller
In-Reply-To: <1381987923-1524-1-git-send-email-hannes@stressinduktion.org>
net_get_random_once is a new macro which handles the initialization
of secret keys. It is possible to call it in the fast path. Only the
initialization depends on the spinlock and is rather slow. Otherwise
it should get used just before the key is used to delay the entropy
extration as late as possible to get better randomness. It returns true
if the key got initialized.
The usage of static_keys for net_get_random_once is a bit uncommon so
it needs some further explanation why this actually works:
=== In the simple non-HAVE_JUMP_LABEL case we actually have ===
no constrains to use static_key_(true|false) on keys initialized with
STATIC_KEY_INIT_(FALSE|TRUE). So this path just expands in favor of
the likely case that the initialization is already done. The key is
initialized like this:
___done_key = { .enabled = ATOMIC_INIT(0) }
The check
if (!static_key_true(&___done_key)) \
expands into (pseudo code)
if (!likely(___done_key > 0))
, so we take the fast path as soon as ___done_key is increased from the
helper function.
=== If HAVE_JUMP_LABELs are available this depends ===
on patching of jumps into the prepared NOPs, which is done in
jump_label_init at boot-up time (from start_kernel). It is forbidden
and dangerous to use net_get_random_once in functions which are called
before that!
At compilation time NOPs are generated at the call sites of
net_get_random_once. E.g. net/ipv6/inet6_hashtable.c:inet6_ehashfn (we
need to call net_get_random_once two times in inet6_ehashfn, so two NOPs):
71: 0f 1f 44 00 00 nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
76: 0f 1f 44 00 00 nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
Both will be patched to the actual jumps to the end of the function to
call __net_get_random_once at boot time as explained above.
arch_static_branch is optimized and inlined for false as return value and
actually also returns false in case the NOP is placed in the instruction
stream. So in the fast case we get a "return false". But because we
initialize ___done_key with (enabled != (entries & 1)) this call-site
will get patched up at boot thus returning true. The final check looks
like this:
if (!static_key_true(&___done_key)) \
___ret = __net_get_random_once(buf, \
expands to
if (!!static_key_false(&___done_key)) \
___ret = __net_get_random_once(buf, \
So we get true at boot time and as soon as static_key_slow_inc is called
on the key it will invert the logic and return false for the fast path.
static_key_slow_inc will change the branch because it got initialized
with .enabled == 0. After static_key_slow_inc is called on the key the
branch is replaced with a nop again.
=== Misc: ===
The helper defers the increment into a workqueue so we don't
have problems calling this code from atomic sections. A seperate boolean
(___done) guards the case where we enter net_get_random_once again before
the increment happend.
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
---
I tested this patchset with !CC_HAVE_ASM_GOTO and with CC_HAVE_ASM_GOTO
on x86_64.
I quickly reviewed that all architectures which implement HAVE_JUMP_LABEL
also patch all branch sites on boot-up. But this needs further review
as this is a security sensitive patch series.
Thank you!
include/linux/net.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
net/core/utils.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 73 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/net.h b/include/linux/net.h
index ca9ec85..a489705 100644
--- a/include/linux/net.h
+++ b/include/linux/net.h
@@ -239,6 +239,31 @@ do { \
#define net_random() prandom_u32()
#define net_srandom(seed) prandom_seed((__force u32)(seed))
+bool __net_get_random_once(void *buf, int nbytes, bool *done,
+ struct static_key *done_key);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_JUMP_LABEL
+#define ___NET_RANDOM_STATIC_KEY_INIT ((struct static_key) \
+ { .enabled = ATOMIC_INIT(0), .entries = (void *)1 })
+#else /* !HAVE_JUMP_LABEL */
+#define ___NET_RANDOM_STATIC_KEY_INIT STATIC_KEY_INIT_FALSE
+#endif /* HAVE_JUMP_LABEL */
+
+/* BE CAREFUL: this function is not interrupt safe */
+#define net_get_random_once(buf, nbytes) \
+ ({ \
+ bool ___ret = false; \
+ static bool ___done = false; \
+ static struct static_key ___done_key = \
+ ___NET_RANDOM_STATIC_KEY_INIT; \
+ if (!static_key_true(&___done_key)) \
+ ___ret = __net_get_random_once(buf, \
+ nbytes, \
+ &___done, \
+ &___done_key); \
+ ___ret; \
+ })
+
int kernel_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct kvec *vec,
size_t num, size_t len);
int kernel_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct kvec *vec,
diff --git a/net/core/utils.c b/net/core/utils.c
index aa88e23..bf09371 100644
--- a/net/core/utils.c
+++ b/net/core/utils.c
@@ -338,3 +338,51 @@ void inet_proto_csum_replace16(__sum16 *sum, struct sk_buff *skb,
csum_unfold(*sum)));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_proto_csum_replace16);
+
+struct __net_random_once_work {
+ struct work_struct work;
+ struct static_key *key;
+};
+
+static void __net_random_once_deferred(struct work_struct *w)
+{
+ struct __net_random_once_work *work =
+ container_of(w, struct __net_random_once_work, work);
+ if (!static_key_enabled(work->key))
+ static_key_slow_inc(work->key);
+ kfree(work);
+}
+
+static void __net_random_once_disable_jump(struct static_key *key)
+{
+ struct __net_random_once_work *w;
+
+ w = kmalloc(sizeof(*w), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!w)
+ return;
+
+ INIT_WORK(&w->work, __net_random_once_deferred);
+ w->key = key;
+ schedule_work(&w->work);
+}
+
+bool __net_get_random_once(void *buf, int nbytes, bool *done,
+ struct static_key *done_key)
+{
+ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock);
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&lock);
+ if (*done) {
+ spin_unlock_bh(&lock);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes);
+ *done = true;
+ spin_unlock_bh(&lock);
+
+ __net_random_once_disable_jump(done_key);
+
+ return true;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__net_get_random_once);
--
1.8.3.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH net-next v3 6/9] inet: split syncookie keys for ipv4 and ipv6 and initialize with net_get_random_once
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa @ 2013-10-17 5:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev; +Cc: linux-kernel, Florian Westphal, Eric Dumazet, David S. Miller
In-Reply-To: <1381987923-1524-1-git-send-email-hannes@stressinduktion.org>
This patch splits the secret key for syncookies for ipv4 and ipv6 and
initializes them with net_get_random_once. This change was the reason I
did this series. I think the initialization of the syncookie_secret is
way to early.
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
---
include/net/tcp.h | 1 -
net/ipv4/syncookies.c | 15 +++++----------
net/ipv6/syncookies.c | 12 +++++++++---
3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h
index 1db3a01..0fa8fdc 100644
--- a/include/net/tcp.h
+++ b/include/net/tcp.h
@@ -475,7 +475,6 @@ int tcp_send_rcvq(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size);
void inet_sk_rx_dst_set(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb);
/* From syncookies.c */
-extern __u32 syncookie_secret[2][16-4+SHA_DIGEST_WORDS];
int __cookie_v4_check(const struct iphdr *iph, const struct tcphdr *th,
u32 cookie);
struct sock *cookie_v4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
diff --git a/net/ipv4/syncookies.c b/net/ipv4/syncookies.c
index 3b64c59..b95331e 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/syncookies.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/syncookies.c
@@ -25,15 +25,7 @@
extern int sysctl_tcp_syncookies;
-__u32 syncookie_secret[2][16-4+SHA_DIGEST_WORDS];
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(syncookie_secret);
-
-static __init int init_syncookies(void)
-{
- get_random_bytes(syncookie_secret, sizeof(syncookie_secret));
- return 0;
-}
-__initcall(init_syncookies);
+static u32 syncookie_secret[2][16-4+SHA_DIGEST_WORDS];
#define COOKIEBITS 24 /* Upper bits store count */
#define COOKIEMASK (((__u32)1 << COOKIEBITS) - 1)
@@ -44,8 +36,11 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [16 + 5 + SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS],
static u32 cookie_hash(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 sport, __be16 dport,
u32 count, int c)
{
- __u32 *tmp = __get_cpu_var(ipv4_cookie_scratch);
+ __u32 *tmp;
+
+ net_get_random_once(syncookie_secret, sizeof(syncookie_secret));
+ tmp = __get_cpu_var(ipv4_cookie_scratch);
memcpy(tmp + 4, syncookie_secret[c], sizeof(syncookie_secret[c]));
tmp[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
tmp[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
diff --git a/net/ipv6/syncookies.c b/net/ipv6/syncookies.c
index d04d3f1..535a3ad 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/syncookies.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/syncookies.c
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
#define COOKIEBITS 24 /* Upper bits store count */
#define COOKIEMASK (((__u32)1 << COOKIEBITS) - 1)
+static u32 syncookie6_secret[2][16-4+SHA_DIGEST_WORDS];
+
/* RFC 2460, Section 8.3:
* [ipv6 tcp] MSS must be computed as the maximum packet size minus 60 [..]
*
@@ -61,14 +63,18 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [16 + 5 + SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS],
static u32 cookie_hash(const struct in6_addr *saddr, const struct in6_addr *daddr,
__be16 sport, __be16 dport, u32 count, int c)
{
- __u32 *tmp = __get_cpu_var(ipv6_cookie_scratch);
+ __u32 *tmp;
+
+ net_get_random_once(syncookie6_secret, sizeof(syncookie6_secret));
+
+ tmp = __get_cpu_var(ipv6_cookie_scratch);
/*
* we have 320 bits of information to hash, copy in the remaining
- * 192 bits required for sha_transform, from the syncookie_secret
+ * 192 bits required for sha_transform, from the syncookie6_secret
* and overwrite the digest with the secret
*/
- memcpy(tmp + 10, syncookie_secret[c], 44);
+ memcpy(tmp + 10, syncookie6_secret[c], 44);
memcpy(tmp, saddr, 16);
memcpy(tmp + 4, daddr, 16);
tmp[8] = ((__force u32)sport << 16) + (__force u32)dport;
--
1.8.3.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH net-next v3 7/9] inet: convert inet_ehash_secret and ipv6_hash_secret to net_get_random_once
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa @ 2013-10-17 5:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev; +Cc: linux-kernel, Eric Dumazet, David S. Miller
In-Reply-To: <1381987923-1524-1-git-send-email-hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Initialize the ehash and ipv6_hash_secrets with net_get_random_once.
Each compilation unit gets its own secret now:
ipv4/inet_hashtables.o
ipv4/udp.o
ipv6/inet6_hashtables.o
ipv6/udp.o
rds/connection.o
The functions still get inlined into the hashing functions. In the fast
path we have at most two (needed in ipv6) if (unlikely(...)).
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
---
include/net/inet_sock.h | 4 ----
net/ipv4/af_inet.c | 27 ---------------------------
net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c | 4 ++++
net/ipv4/udp.c | 6 +++++-
net/ipv6/af_inet6.c | 5 -----
net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
net/ipv6/udp.c | 17 ++++++++++++++---
net/rds/connection.c | 12 +++++++++---
8 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/inet_sock.h b/include/net/inet_sock.h
index 7a6c7f8..1833c3f 100644
--- a/include/net/inet_sock.h
+++ b/include/net/inet_sock.h
@@ -204,10 +204,6 @@ static inline void inet_sk_copy_descendant(struct sock *sk_to,
int inet_sk_rebuild_header(struct sock *sk);
-extern u32 inet_ehash_secret;
-extern u32 ipv6_hash_secret;
-void build_ehash_secret(void);
-
static inline unsigned int __inet_ehashfn(const __be32 laddr,
const __u16 lport,
const __be32 faddr,
diff --git a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
index 35913fb..b6bdd82 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
@@ -245,29 +245,6 @@ out:
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_listen);
-u32 inet_ehash_secret __read_mostly;
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_ehash_secret);
-
-u32 ipv6_hash_secret __read_mostly;
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(ipv6_hash_secret);
-
-/*
- * inet_ehash_secret must be set exactly once, and to a non nul value
- * ipv6_hash_secret must be set exactly once.
- */
-void build_ehash_secret(void)
-{
- u32 rnd;
-
- do {
- get_random_bytes(&rnd, sizeof(rnd));
- } while (rnd == 0);
-
- if (cmpxchg(&inet_ehash_secret, 0, rnd) == 0)
- get_random_bytes(&ipv6_hash_secret, sizeof(ipv6_hash_secret));
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(build_ehash_secret);
-
/*
* Create an inet socket.
*/
@@ -284,10 +261,6 @@ static int inet_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
int try_loading_module = 0;
int err;
- if (unlikely(!inet_ehash_secret))
- if (sock->type != SOCK_RAW && sock->type != SOCK_DGRAM)
- build_ehash_secret();
-
sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
/* Look for the requested type/protocol pair. */
diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
index 18aa668..8b9cf27 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
@@ -28,6 +28,10 @@ static unsigned int inet_ehashfn(struct net *net, const __be32 laddr,
const __u16 lport, const __be32 faddr,
const __be16 fport)
{
+ static u32 inet_ehash_secret __read_mostly;
+
+ net_get_random_once(&inet_ehash_secret, sizeof(inet_ehash_secret));
+
return __inet_ehashfn(laddr, lport, faddr, fport,
inet_ehash_secret + net_hash_mix(net));
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp.c b/net/ipv4/udp.c
index b4437c7..89909dd 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/udp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/udp.c
@@ -411,8 +411,12 @@ static unsigned int udp_ehashfn(struct net *net, const __be32 laddr,
const __u16 lport, const __be32 faddr,
const __be16 fport)
{
+ static u32 udp_ehash_secret __read_mostly;
+
+ net_get_random_once(&udp_ehash_secret, sizeof(udp_ehash_secret));
+
return __inet_ehashfn(laddr, lport, faddr, fport,
- inet_ehash_secret + net_hash_mix(net));
+ udp_ehash_secret + net_hash_mix(net));
}
diff --git a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
index a2cb07c..20af1fb 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
@@ -110,11 +110,6 @@ static int inet6_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
int try_loading_module = 0;
int err;
- if (sock->type != SOCK_RAW &&
- sock->type != SOCK_DGRAM &&
- !inet_ehash_secret)
- build_ehash_secret();
-
/* Look for the requested type/protocol pair. */
lookup_protocol:
err = -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
diff --git a/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c b/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c
index fa7dd38..262e13c 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c
@@ -29,10 +29,19 @@ static unsigned int inet6_ehashfn(struct net *net,
const struct in6_addr *faddr,
const __be16 fport)
{
- const u32 lhash = (__force u32)laddr->s6_addr32[3];
- const u32 fhash = __ipv6_addr_jhash(faddr, ipv6_hash_secret);
+ static u32 inet6_ehash_secret __read_mostly;
+ static u32 ipv6_hash_secret __read_mostly;
+
+ u32 lhash, fhash;
+
+ net_get_random_once(&inet6_ehash_secret, sizeof(inet6_ehash_secret));
+ net_get_random_once(&ipv6_hash_secret, sizeof(ipv6_hash_secret));
+
+ lhash = (__force u32)laddr->s6_addr32[3];
+ fhash = __ipv6_addr_jhash(faddr, ipv6_hash_secret);
+
return __inet6_ehashfn(lhash, lport, fhash, fport,
- inet_ehash_secret + net_hash_mix(net));
+ inet6_ehash_secret + net_hash_mix(net));
}
static int inet6_sk_ehashfn(const struct sock *sk)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/udp.c b/net/ipv6/udp.c
index 324bd36..44fc4e3 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/udp.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/udp.c
@@ -59,10 +59,21 @@ static unsigned int udp6_ehashfn(struct net *net,
const struct in6_addr *faddr,
const __be16 fport)
{
- const u32 lhash = (__force u32)laddr->s6_addr32[3];
- const u32 fhash = __ipv6_addr_jhash(faddr, ipv6_hash_secret);
+ static u32 udp6_ehash_secret __read_mostly;
+ static u32 udp_ipv6_hash_secret __read_mostly;
+
+ u32 lhash, fhash;
+
+ net_get_random_once(&udp6_ehash_secret,
+ sizeof(udp6_ehash_secret));
+ net_get_random_once(&udp_ipv6_hash_secret,
+ sizeof(udp_ipv6_hash_secret));
+
+ lhash = (__force u32)laddr->s6_addr32[3];
+ fhash = __ipv6_addr_jhash(faddr, udp_ipv6_hash_secret);
+
return __inet6_ehashfn(lhash, lport, fhash, fport,
- inet_ehash_secret + net_hash_mix(net));
+ udp_ipv6_hash_secret + net_hash_mix(net));
}
int ipv6_rcv_saddr_equal(const struct sock *sk, const struct sock *sk2)
diff --git a/net/rds/connection.c b/net/rds/connection.c
index 45e2366..378c3a6 100644
--- a/net/rds/connection.c
+++ b/net/rds/connection.c
@@ -51,10 +51,16 @@ static struct kmem_cache *rds_conn_slab;
static struct hlist_head *rds_conn_bucket(__be32 laddr, __be32 faddr)
{
+ static u32 rds_hash_secret __read_mostly;
+
+ unsigned long hash;
+
+ net_get_random_once(&rds_hash_secret, sizeof(rds_hash_secret));
+
/* Pass NULL, don't need struct net for hash */
- unsigned long hash = __inet_ehashfn(be32_to_cpu(laddr), 0,
- be32_to_cpu(faddr), 0,
- inet_ehash_secret);
+ hash = __inet_ehashfn(be32_to_cpu(laddr), 0,
+ be32_to_cpu(faddr), 0,
+ rds_hash_secret);
return &rds_conn_hash[hash & RDS_CONNECTION_HASH_MASK];
}
--
1.8.3.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH net-next v3 8/9] tcp: switch tcp_fastopen key generation to net_get_random_once
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa @ 2013-10-17 5:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev; +Cc: linux-kernel, Yuchung Cheng, Eric Dumazet, David S. Miller
In-Reply-To: <1381987923-1524-1-git-send-email-hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Changed key initialization of tcp_fastopen cookies to net_get_random_once.
If the user sets a custom key net_get_random_once must be called at
least once to ensure we don't overwrite the user provided key when the
first cookie is generated later on.
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
---
include/net/tcp.h | 2 +-
net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c | 5 +++++
net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++-----------
3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h
index 0fa8fdc..027b663 100644
--- a/include/net/tcp.h
+++ b/include/net/tcp.h
@@ -1322,7 +1322,7 @@ extern struct tcp_fastopen_context __rcu *tcp_fastopen_ctx;
int tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher(void *key, unsigned int len);
void tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(__be32 src, __be32 dst,
struct tcp_fastopen_cookie *foc);
-
+void tcp_fastopen_init_key_once(bool publish);
#define TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH 16
/* Fastopen key context */
diff --git a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
index c08f096..4b161d5 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
@@ -274,6 +274,11 @@ static int proc_tcp_fastopen_key(struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
ret = -EINVAL;
goto bad_key;
}
+ /* Generate a dummy secret but don't publish it. This
+ * is needed so we don't regenerate a new key on the
+ * first invocation of tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen
+ */
+ tcp_fastopen_init_key_once(false);
tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher(user_key, TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH);
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c
index ab7bd35..766032b 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c
@@ -14,6 +14,20 @@ struct tcp_fastopen_context __rcu *tcp_fastopen_ctx;
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(tcp_fastopen_ctx_lock);
+void tcp_fastopen_init_key_once(bool publish)
+{
+ static u8 key[TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH];
+
+ /* tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher publishes the new context
+ * atomically, so we allow this race happening here.
+ *
+ * All call sites of tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen also check
+ * for a valid cookie, so this is an acceptable risk.
+ */
+ if (net_get_random_once(key, sizeof(key)) && publish)
+ tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher(key, sizeof(key));
+}
+
static void tcp_fastopen_ctx_free(struct rcu_head *head)
{
struct tcp_fastopen_context *ctx =
@@ -70,6 +84,8 @@ void tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(__be32 src, __be32 dst,
__be32 path[4] = { src, dst, 0, 0 };
struct tcp_fastopen_context *ctx;
+ tcp_fastopen_init_key_once(true);
+
rcu_read_lock();
ctx = rcu_dereference(tcp_fastopen_ctx);
if (ctx) {
@@ -78,14 +94,3 @@ void tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(__be32 src, __be32 dst,
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
-
-static int __init tcp_fastopen_init(void)
-{
- __u8 key[TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH];
-
- get_random_bytes(key, sizeof(key));
- tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher(key, sizeof(key));
- return 0;
-}
-
-late_initcall(tcp_fastopen_init);
--
1.8.3.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH net-next v3 9/9] net: switch net_secret key generation to net_get_random_once
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa @ 2013-10-17 5:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev; +Cc: linux-kernel, Eric Dumazet, David S. Miller
In-Reply-To: <1381987923-1524-1-git-send-email-hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
---
net/core/secure_seq.c | 14 ++------------
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/core/secure_seq.c b/net/core/secure_seq.c
index 3f1ec15..b02fd16 100644
--- a/net/core/secure_seq.c
+++ b/net/core/secure_seq.c
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
#include <linux/hrtimer.h>
#include <linux/ktime.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/net.h>
#include <net/secure_seq.h>
@@ -16,18 +17,7 @@ static u32 net_secret[NET_SECRET_SIZE] ____cacheline_aligned;
static void net_secret_init(void)
{
- u32 tmp;
- int i;
-
- if (likely(net_secret[0]))
- return;
-
- for (i = NET_SECRET_SIZE; i > 0;) {
- do {
- get_random_bytes(&tmp, sizeof(tmp));
- } while (!tmp);
- cmpxchg(&net_secret[--i], 0, tmp);
- }
+ net_get_random_once(net_secret, sizeof(net_secret));
}
#ifdef CONFIG_INET
--
1.8.3.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* RE: [PATCH net v2] be2net: Warn users of possible broken functionality on BE2 cards with very old FW versions with latest driver
From: Somnath Kotur @ 2013-10-17 5:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ivan Vecera; +Cc: David Miller, netdev@vger.kernel.org
In-Reply-To: <525EA9E7.409@redhat.com>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ivan Vecera [mailto:ivecera@redhat.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, October 16, 2013 8:30 PM
> To: Somnath Kotur
> Cc: David Miller; netdev@vger.kernel.org
> Subject: Re: [PATCH net v2] be2net: Warn users of possible broken
> functionality on BE2 cards with very old FW versions with latest driver
>
> On 10/07/2013 06:31 PM, David Miller wrote:
> > From: Somnath Kotur <somnath.kotur@emulex.com>
> > Date: Thu, 3 Oct 2013 15:34:29 +0530
> >
> >> + if (BE2_chip(adapter) && memcmp(adapter->fw_ver, "4.", 2) < 0) {
> >> + dev_err(dev, "Firmware version is too old.IRQs may not
> work\n");
> >
> > So many grammatical mistakes in one line.
> >
> > First sentence got a period, second one did not.
> >
> > Missing space between period and second sentence.
> > --
> > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe netdev" in
> > the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo
> info
> > at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
> >
> Som, any plan to send v3?
>
> Ivan
HI Ivan,
Yes , the problem was I was trying to stick within the 80 chars line limit , the missing space above would have pushed it over
needlessly warranting an extra line to accommodate a character.
Will rework the sentence using Joe Perches's suggestions as well as address Ben Hutching's concerns.
Stay tuned.
Thanks
Som
^ permalink raw reply
* RE: [PATCH 0/2] be2net: patch set
From: Sathya Perla @ 2013-10-17 6:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sathya Perla, netdev@vger.kernel.org
In-Reply-To: <1381837869-9543-1-git-send-email-sathya.perla@emulex.com>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org [mailto:netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org] On Behalf
> Of Sathya Perla
>
> Pls apply the following fixes to the net tree. Thanks.
>
> Vasundhara Volam (2):
> be2net: pass if_id for v1 and V2 versions of TX_CREATE cmd
> be2net: drop non-tso frames longer than mtu
>
Dave, I'll re-send this patch-set without the "drop non-tso frames" patch.
Based on Eric's comments, it seems better to place the mtu checks in pktgen and
before ndo_start_xmit() invocation so that all drivers/devices may benefit from the check.
thanks,
-Sathya
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH] be2net: pass if_id for v1 and V2 versions of TX_CREATE cmd
From: Sathya Perla @ 2013-10-17 6:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev
From: Vasundhara Volam <vasundhara.volam@emulex.com>
It is a required field for all TX_CREATE cmd versions > 0.
This fixes a driver initialization failure, caused by recent SH-R Firmwares
(versions > 10.0.639.0) failing the TX_CREATE cmd when if_id field is
not passed.
Signed-off-by: Sathya Perla <sathya.perla@emulex.com>
---
Dave, pls consider queuing this patch for -stable tree as it fixes
a driver load failure. Thanks.
drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_cmds.c | 3 ++-
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_cmds.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_cmds.c
index bd0e0c0..c08fd32 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_cmds.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_cmds.c
@@ -1198,7 +1198,6 @@ int be_cmd_txq_create(struct be_adapter *adapter, struct be_tx_obj *txo)
if (lancer_chip(adapter)) {
req->hdr.version = 1;
- req->if_id = cpu_to_le16(adapter->if_handle);
} else if (BEx_chip(adapter)) {
if (adapter->function_caps & BE_FUNCTION_CAPS_SUPER_NIC)
req->hdr.version = 2;
@@ -1206,6 +1205,8 @@ int be_cmd_txq_create(struct be_adapter *adapter, struct be_tx_obj *txo)
req->hdr.version = 2;
}
+ if (req->hdr.version > 0)
+ req->if_id = cpu_to_le16(adapter->if_handle);
req->num_pages = PAGES_4K_SPANNED(q_mem->va, q_mem->size);
req->ulp_num = BE_ULP1_NUM;
req->type = BE_ETH_TX_RING_TYPE_STANDARD;
--
1.7.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH 5/5] net: rfkill: gpio: add ACPI support
From: Mika Westerberg @ 2013-10-17 7:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Rafael J. Wysocki
Cc: Heikki Krogerus, John W. Linville, Johannes Berg, Rhyland Klein,
linux-acpi, linux-wireless, netdev
In-Reply-To: <2878506.7lf24R85t6@vostro.rjw.lan>
On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 10:55:01PM +0200, Rafael J. Wysocki wrote:
> On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 01:53:43 PM Heikki Krogerus wrote:
> > Including ACPI ID for Broadcom GPS receiver BCM4752.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com>
> > ---
> > net/rfkill/rfkill-gpio.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> > 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/net/rfkill/rfkill-gpio.c b/net/rfkill/rfkill-gpio.c
> > index 2dd78c6..5620d3c 100644
> > --- a/net/rfkill/rfkill-gpio.c
> > +++ b/net/rfkill/rfkill-gpio.c
> > @@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
> > #include <linux/platform_device.h>
> > #include <linux/clk.h>
> > #include <linux/slab.h>
> > +#include <linux/acpi.h>
> > +#include <linux/acpi_gpio.h>
> >
> > #include <linux/rfkill-gpio.h>
> >
> > @@ -70,6 +72,23 @@ static const struct rfkill_ops rfkill_gpio_ops = {
> > .set_block = rfkill_gpio_set_power,
> > };
> >
> > +static int rfkill_gpio_acpi_probe(struct device *dev,
> > + struct rfkill_gpio_data *rfkill)
> > +{
> > + const struct acpi_device_id *id;
> > +
> > + id = acpi_match_device(dev->driver->acpi_match_table, dev);
> > + if (!id)
> > + return -ENODEV;
> > +
> > + rfkill->name = dev_name(dev);
> > + rfkill->type = (unsigned)id->driver_data;
> > + rfkill->reset_gpio = acpi_get_gpio_by_index(dev, 0, NULL);
> > + rfkill->shutdown_gpio = acpi_get_gpio_by_index(dev, 1, NULL);
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > static int rfkill_gpio_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
> > {
> > struct rfkill_gpio_platform_data *pdata = pdev->dev.platform_data;
> > @@ -82,7 +101,11 @@ static int rfkill_gpio_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
> > if (!rfkill)
> > return -ENOMEM;
> >
> > - if (pdata) {
> > + if (ACPI_HANDLE(&pdev->dev)) {
> > + ret = rfkill_gpio_acpi_probe(&pdev->dev, rfkill);
> > + if (ret)
> > + return ret;
> > + } else if (pdata) {
> > clk_name = pdata->power_clk_name;
> > rfkill->name = pdata->name;
> > rfkill->type = pdata->type;
> > @@ -170,12 +193,18 @@ static int rfkill_gpio_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
> > return 0;
> > }
> >
> > +static const struct acpi_device_id rfkill_acpi_match[] = {
> > + { "BCM4752", RFKILL_TYPE_GPS },
> > + { },
> > +};
> > +
> > static struct platform_driver rfkill_gpio_driver = {
> > .probe = rfkill_gpio_probe,
> > .remove = rfkill_gpio_remove,
> > .driver = {
> > .name = "rfkill_gpio",
> > .owner = THIS_MODULE,
> > + .acpi_match_table = ACPI_PTR(rfkill_acpi_match),
> > },
> > };
>
> Looks good to me.
>
> Has Mika seen this?
Yes, saw it now and looks good to me as well.
Reviewed-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
for the whole series, for what it's worth.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 2/3] ipvs: avoid rcu_barrier during netns cleanup
From: Pablo Neira Ayuso @ 2013-10-17 8:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Simon Horman
Cc: Julian Anastasov, lvs-devel, netdev, netfilter-devel,
Wensong Zhang
In-Reply-To: <20131017004939.GB21728@verge.net.au>
On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 09:49:39AM +0900, Simon Horman wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 10:52:14PM +0300, Julian Anastasov wrote:
> >
> > Hello,
> >
> > On Wed, 16 Oct 2013, Pablo Neira Ayuso wrote:
> >
> > > I can enqueue this fix to nf if you like. No need to resend, I can
> > > manually apply.
> > >
> > > Let me know.
> >
> > It is not critical. I waited weeks the net tree to be
> > copied into net-next because it collides with the recent
> > "ipvs: make the service replacement more robust" change in
> > net tree :) But if a rcu_barrier in the netns cleanup looks
> > scary enough you can push it to nf. IMHO, it just adds
> > unneeded delay there.
>
> If it is not critical I would prefer for it to travel through
> nf-next. Though I do not feel strongly about this.
Will enqueue for nf-next.
I'd appreciate if you can recover the tradition of attaching a short
evaluation in the cover letter as I do when I send pull requests to
David. Thanks!
^ permalink raw reply
* View the attached file
From: Microsoft Promotion @ 2013-10-17 8:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
In-Reply-To: <1381940933.56384.YahooMailNeo@web5705.biz.mail.ne1.yahoo.com>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 22 bytes --]
View the attached file
[-- Attachment #2: MICROSOFT AWARD PROMOTION.doc --]
[-- Type: application/msword, Size: 109568 bytes --]
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH net] xen-netback: add the scenario which now beyond the range time_after_eq().
From: Jan Beulich @ 2013-10-17 8:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jason Luan
Cc: david.vrabel, ian.campbell, wei.liu2, xen-devel, annie.li, netdev
In-Reply-To: <1381944167-24918-1-git-send-email-jianhai.luan@oracle.com>
>>> On 16.10.13 at 19:22, Jason Luan <jianhai.luan@oracle.com> wrote:
> time_after_eq() only works if the delta is < MAX_ULONG/2.
>
> If netfront sends at a very low rate, the time between subsequent calls
> to tx_credit_exceeded() may exceed MAX_ULONG/2 and the test for
> timer_after_eq() will be incorrect. Credit will not be replenished and
> the guest may become unable to send (e.g., if prior to the long gap, all
> credit was exhausted).
>
> We should add the scenario which now beyond next_credit+MAX_UNLONG/2. Because
> the fact now must be not before than expire, time_before(now, expire) == true
> will verify the scenario.
> time_after_eq(now, next_credit) || time_before (now, expire)
> ==
> !time_in_range_open(now, expire, next_credit)
So first of all this must be with a 32-bit netback. And the not
coverable gap between activity is well over 240 days long. _If_
this really needs dealing with, then why is extending this from
240+ to 480+ days sufficient? I.e. why don't you simply
change to 64-bit jiffy values, and use time_after_eq64()?
Jan
> Signed-off-by: Jason Luan <jianhai.luan@oracle.com>
> ---
> drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c | 7 +++++--
> 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
> b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
> index f3e591c..31eedaf 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
> @@ -1194,8 +1194,11 @@ static bool tx_credit_exceeded(struct xenvif *vif,
> unsigned size)
> if (timer_pending(&vif->credit_timeout))
> return true;
>
> - /* Passed the point where we can replenish credit? */
> - if (time_after_eq(now, next_credit)) {
> + /* Credit should be replenished when now does not fall into the
> + * range from expires to next_credit, and time_in_range_open()
> + * is used to verify whether this case happens.
> + */
> + if (!time_in_range_open(now, vif->credit_timeout.expires, next_credit)) {
> vif->credit_timeout.expires = now;
> tx_add_credit(vif);
> }
> --
> 1.7.6.5
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Xen-devel mailing list
> Xen-devel@lists.xen.org
> http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH net-next] netfilter: xt_socket: use sock_gen_put()
From: Pablo Neira Ayuso @ 2013-10-17 8:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Eric Dumazet; +Cc: David Miller, netdev, netfilter-devel
In-Reply-To: <1381507405.4971.108.camel@edumazet-glaptop.roam.corp.google.com>
On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 09:03:25AM -0700, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
>
> TCP listener refactoring, part 7 :
>
> Use sock_gen_put() instead of xt_socket_put_sk() for future
> SYN_RECV support.
Applied, thanks Eric.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 2/3] ipvs: avoid rcu_barrier during netns cleanup
From: Simon Horman @ 2013-10-17 8:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Pablo Neira Ayuso
Cc: Julian Anastasov, lvs-devel, netdev, netfilter-devel,
Wensong Zhang
In-Reply-To: <20131017081142.GA5324@localhost>
On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 10:11:42AM +0200, Pablo Neira Ayuso wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 09:49:39AM +0900, Simon Horman wrote:
> > On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 10:52:14PM +0300, Julian Anastasov wrote:
> > >
> > > Hello,
> > >
> > > On Wed, 16 Oct 2013, Pablo Neira Ayuso wrote:
> > >
> > > > I can enqueue this fix to nf if you like. No need to resend, I can
> > > > manually apply.
> > > >
> > > > Let me know.
> > >
> > > It is not critical. I waited weeks the net tree to be
> > > copied into net-next because it collides with the recent
> > > "ipvs: make the service replacement more robust" change in
> > > net tree :) But if a rcu_barrier in the netns cleanup looks
> > > scary enough you can push it to nf. IMHO, it just adds
> > > unneeded delay there.
> >
> > If it is not critical I would prefer for it to travel through
> > nf-next. Though I do not feel strongly about this.
>
> Will enqueue for nf-next.
>
> I'd appreciate if you can recover the tradition of attaching a short
> evaluation in the cover letter as I do when I send pull requests to
> David. Thanks!
Sure, will do.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] x86: Run checksumming in parallel accross multiple alu's
From: Ingo Molnar @ 2013-10-17 8:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Neil Horman
Cc: Eric Dumazet, linux-kernel, sebastien.dugue, Thomas Gleixner,
Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin, x86, netdev
In-Reply-To: <20131017003421.GA31470@hmsreliant.think-freely.org>
* Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 03:18:47PM -0700, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> > On Mon, 2013-10-14 at 14:19 -0700, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> > > On Mon, 2013-10-14 at 16:28 -0400, Neil Horman wrote:
> > >
> > > > So, early testing results today. I wrote a test module that, allocated a 4k
> > > > buffer, initalized it with random data, and called csum_partial on it 100000
> > > > times, recording the time at the start and end of that loop. Results on a 2.4
> > > > GHz Intel Xeon processor:
> > > >
> > > > Without patch: Average execute time for csum_partial was 808 ns
> > > > With patch: Average execute time for csum_partial was 438 ns
> > >
> > > Impressive, but could you try again with data out of cache ?
> >
> > So I tried your patch on a GRE tunnel and got following results on a
> > single TCP flow. (short result : no visible difference)
> >
> >
>
> So I went to reproduce these results, but was unable to (due to the fact that I
> only have a pretty jittery network to do testing accross at the moment with
> these devices). So instead I figured that I would go back to just doing
> measurements with the module that I cobbled together (operating under the
> assumption that it would give me accurate, relatively jitter free results (I've
> attached the module code for reference below). My results show slightly
> different behavior:
>
> Base results runs:
> 89417240
> 85170397
> 85208407
> 89422794
> 91645494
> 103655144
> 86063791
> 75647774
> 83502921
> 85847372
> AVG = 875 ns
>
> Prefetch only runs:
> 70962849
> 77555099
> 81898170
> 68249290
> 72636538
> 83039294
> 78561494
> 83393369
> 85317556
> 79570951
> AVG = 781 ns
>
> Parallel addition only runs:
> 42024233
> 44313064
> 48304416
> 64762297
> 42994259
> 41811628
> 55654282
> 64892958
> 55125582
> 42456403
> AVG = 510 ns
>
>
> Both prefetch and parallel addition:
> 41329930
> 40689195
> 61106622
> 46332422
> 49398117
> 52525171
> 49517101
> 61311153
> 43691814
> 49043084
> AVG = 494 ns
>
>
> For reference, each of the above large numbers is the number of
> nanoseconds taken to compute the checksum of a 4kb buffer 100000 times.
> To get my average results, I ran the test in a loop 10 times, averaged
> them, and divided by 100000.
>
> Based on these, prefetching is obviously a a good improvement, but not
> as good as parallel execution, and the winner by far is doing both.
But in the actual usecase mentioned the packet data was likely cache-cold,
it just arrived in the NIC and an IRQ got sent. Your testcase uses a
super-hot 4K buffer that fits into the L1 cache. So it's apples to
oranges.
To correctly simulate the workload you'd have to:
- allocate a buffer larger than your L2 cache.
- to measure the effects of the prefetches you'd also have to randomize
the individual buffer positions. See how 'perf bench numa' implements a
random walk via --data_rand_walk, in tools/perf/bench/numa.c.
Otherwise the CPU might learn your simplistic stream direction and the
L2 cache might hw-prefetch your data, interfering with any explicit
prefetches the code does. In many real-life usecases packet buffers are
scattered.
Also, it would be nice to see standard deviation noise numbers when two
averages are close to each other, to be able to tell whether differences
are statistically significant or not.
For example 'perf stat --repeat' will output stddev for you:
comet:~/tip> perf stat --repeat 20 --null bash -c 'usleep $((RANDOM*10))'
Performance counter stats for 'bash -c usleep $((RANDOM*10))' (20 runs):
0.189084480 seconds time elapsed ( +- 11.95% )
The last '+-' percentage is the noise of the measurement.
Also note that you can inspect many cache behavior details of your
algorithm via perf stat - the -ddd option will give you a laundry list:
aldebaran:~> perf stat --repeat 20 -ddd perf bench sched messaging
...
Total time: 0.095 [sec]
Performance counter stats for 'perf bench sched messaging' (20 runs):
1519.128721 task-clock (msec) # 12.305 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.34% )
22,882 context-switches # 0.015 M/sec ( +- 2.84% )
3,927 cpu-migrations # 0.003 M/sec ( +- 2.74% )
16,616 page-faults # 0.011 M/sec ( +- 0.17% )
2,327,978,366 cycles # 1.532 GHz ( +- 1.61% ) [36.43%]
1,715,561,189 stalled-cycles-frontend # 73.69% frontend cycles idle ( +- 1.76% ) [38.05%]
715,715,454 stalled-cycles-backend # 30.74% backend cycles idle ( +- 2.25% ) [39.85%]
1,253,106,346 instructions # 0.54 insns per cycle
# 1.37 stalled cycles per insn ( +- 1.71% ) [49.68%]
241,181,126 branches # 158.763 M/sec ( +- 1.43% ) [47.83%]
4,232,053 branch-misses # 1.75% of all branches ( +- 1.23% ) [48.63%]
431,907,354 L1-dcache-loads # 284.313 M/sec ( +- 1.00% ) [48.37%]
20,550,528 L1-dcache-load-misses # 4.76% of all L1-dcache hits ( +- 0.82% ) [47.61%]
7,435,847 LLC-loads # 4.895 M/sec ( +- 0.94% ) [36.11%]
2,419,201 LLC-load-misses # 32.53% of all LL-cache hits ( +- 2.93% ) [ 7.33%]
448,638,547 L1-icache-loads # 295.326 M/sec ( +- 2.43% ) [21.75%]
22,066,490 L1-icache-load-misses # 4.92% of all L1-icache hits ( +- 2.54% ) [30.66%]
475,557,948 dTLB-loads # 313.047 M/sec ( +- 1.96% ) [37.96%]
6,741,523 dTLB-load-misses # 1.42% of all dTLB cache hits ( +- 2.38% ) [37.05%]
1,268,628,660 iTLB-loads # 835.103 M/sec ( +- 1.75% ) [36.45%]
74,192 iTLB-load-misses # 0.01% of all iTLB cache hits ( +- 2.88% ) [36.19%]
4,466,526 L1-dcache-prefetches # 2.940 M/sec ( +- 1.61% ) [36.17%]
2,396,311 L1-dcache-prefetch-misses # 1.577 M/sec ( +- 1.55% ) [35.71%]
0.123459566 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.58% )
There's also a number of prefetch counters that might be useful:
aldebaran:~> perf list | grep prefetch
L1-dcache-prefetches [Hardware cache event]
L1-dcache-prefetch-misses [Hardware cache event]
LLC-prefetches [Hardware cache event]
LLC-prefetch-misses [Hardware cache event]
node-prefetches [Hardware cache event]
node-prefetch-misses [Hardware cache event]
Thanks,
Ingo
^ permalink raw reply
* RE: [Xen-devel] [PATCH net-next v4 0/5] xen-netback: IPv6 offload support
From: Paul Durrant @ 2013-10-17 8:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ian Campbell; +Cc: xen-devel@lists.xen.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org
In-Reply-To: <1381942838.30409.26.camel@kazak.uk.xensource.com>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ian Campbell
> Sent: 16 October 2013 18:01
> To: Paul Durrant
> Cc: xen-devel@lists.xen.org; netdev@vger.kernel.org
> Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH net-next v4 0/5] xen-netback: IPv6 offload
> support
>
> On Wed, 2013-10-16 at 17:53 +0100, Paul Durrant wrote:
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Ian Campbell
> > > Sent: 16 October 2013 17:20
> > > To: Paul Durrant
> > > Cc: xen-devel@lists.xen.org; netdev@vger.kernel.org
> > > Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH net-next v4 0/5] xen-netback: IPv6
> offload
> > > support
> > >
> > > On Fri, 2013-10-11 at 16:06 +0100, Paul Durrant wrote:
> > > > This patch series adds support for checksum and large packet offloads
> into
> > > > xen-netback.
> > > > Testing has mainly been done using the Microsoft network hardware
> > > > certification suite running in Server 2008R2 VMs with Citrix PV
> frontends.
> > >
> > > Are there any Linux netfront patches in existence/the pipeline to take
> > > advantage of this?
> > >
> >
> > I was waiting for the backend patches to be accepted first ;-)
>
> I think it would be useful to get et least an RFC so others can try it
> etc.
>
Well, everyone can build and use the Windows frontend :-) (https://github.com/xenserver/win-xenvif/tree/upstream)
I'll try to hack up something in xen-netfront soon.
Paul
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH net] xen-netback: add the scenario which now beyond the range time_after_eq().
From: jianhai luan @ 2013-10-17 9:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jan Beulich
Cc: david.vrabel, ian.campbell, wei.liu2, xen-devel, annie.li, netdev
In-Reply-To: <525FBB4F02000078000FBB30@nat28.tlf.novell.com>
On 2013-10-17 16:26, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 16.10.13 at 19:22, Jason Luan <jianhai.luan@oracle.com> wrote:
>> time_after_eq() only works if the delta is < MAX_ULONG/2.
>>
>> If netfront sends at a very low rate, the time between subsequent calls
>> to tx_credit_exceeded() may exceed MAX_ULONG/2 and the test for
>> timer_after_eq() will be incorrect. Credit will not be replenished and
>> the guest may become unable to send (e.g., if prior to the long gap, all
>> credit was exhausted).
>>
>> We should add the scenario which now beyond next_credit+MAX_UNLONG/2. Because
>> the fact now must be not before than expire, time_before(now, expire) == true
>> will verify the scenario.
>> time_after_eq(now, next_credit) || time_before (now, expire)
>> ==
>> !time_in_range_open(now, expire, next_credit)
> So first of all this must be with a 32-bit netback. And the not
> coverable gap between activity is well over 240 days long. _If_
> this really needs dealing with, then why is extending this from
> 240+ to 480+ days sufficient? I.e. why don't you simply
> change to 64-bit jiffy values, and use time_after_eq64()?
Yes, the issue only can be reproduced in 32-bit Dom0 (Beyond
MAX_ULONG/2 in 64-bit will need long long time)
I think the gap should be think all environment even now extending 480+.
if now fall in the gap, one timer will be pending and replenish will be
in time. Please run the attachment test program.
If use time_after_eq64(), expire ,next_credit and other member will must
be u64.
>
> Jan
>
>> Signed-off-by: Jason Luan <jianhai.luan@oracle.com>
>> ---
>> drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c | 7 +++++--
>> 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
>> b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
>> index f3e591c..31eedaf 100644
>> --- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
>> +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
>> @@ -1194,8 +1194,11 @@ static bool tx_credit_exceeded(struct xenvif *vif,
>> unsigned size)
>> if (timer_pending(&vif->credit_timeout))
>> return true;
>>
>> - /* Passed the point where we can replenish credit? */
>> - if (time_after_eq(now, next_credit)) {
>> + /* Credit should be replenished when now does not fall into the
>> + * range from expires to next_credit, and time_in_range_open()
>> + * is used to verify whether this case happens.
>> + */
>> + if (!time_in_range_open(now, vif->credit_timeout.expires, next_credit)) {
>> vif->credit_timeout.expires = now;
>> tx_add_credit(vif);
>> }
>> --
>> 1.7.6.5
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Xen-devel mailing list
>> Xen-devel@lists.xen.org
>> http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
>
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH net] xen-netback: add the scenario which now beyond the range time_after_eq().
From: jianhai luan @ 2013-10-17 9:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jan Beulich
Cc: david.vrabel, ian.campbell, wei.liu2, xen-devel, annie.li, netdev
In-Reply-To: <525FA79F.8060601@oracle.com>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2985 bytes --]
On 2013-10-17 17:02, jianhai luan wrote:
>
> On 2013-10-17 16:26, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> On 16.10.13 at 19:22, Jason Luan <jianhai.luan@oracle.com> wrote:
>>> time_after_eq() only works if the delta is < MAX_ULONG/2.
>>>
>>> If netfront sends at a very low rate, the time between subsequent calls
>>> to tx_credit_exceeded() may exceed MAX_ULONG/2 and the test for
>>> timer_after_eq() will be incorrect. Credit will not be replenished and
>>> the guest may become unable to send (e.g., if prior to the long gap,
>>> all
>>> credit was exhausted).
>>>
>>> We should add the scenario which now beyond
>>> next_credit+MAX_UNLONG/2. Because
>>> the fact now must be not before than expire, time_before(now,
>>> expire) == true
>>> will verify the scenario.
>>> time_after_eq(now, next_credit) || time_before (now, expire)
>>> ==
>>> !time_in_range_open(now, expire, next_credit)
>> So first of all this must be with a 32-bit netback. And the not
>> coverable gap between activity is well over 240 days long. _If_
>> this really needs dealing with, then why is extending this from
>> 240+ to 480+ days sufficient? I.e. why don't you simply
>> change to 64-bit jiffy values, and use time_after_eq64()?
>
> Yes, the issue only can be reproduced in 32-bit Dom0 (Beyond
> MAX_ULONG/2 in 64-bit will need long long time)
>
> I think the gap should be think all environment even now extending
> 480+. if now fall in the gap, one timer will be pending and replenish
> will be in time. Please run the attachment test program.
>
Sorry for miss the attachment in previous letter. Please check the
attachment.
> If use time_after_eq64(), expire ,next_credit and other member will
> must be u64.
>>
>> Jan
>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Jason Luan <jianhai.luan@oracle.com>
>>> ---
>>> drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c | 7 +++++--
>>> 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
>>> b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
>>> index f3e591c..31eedaf 100644
>>> --- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
>>> +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
>>> @@ -1194,8 +1194,11 @@ static bool tx_credit_exceeded(struct xenvif
>>> *vif,
>>> unsigned size)
>>> if (timer_pending(&vif->credit_timeout))
>>> return true;
>>> - /* Passed the point where we can replenish credit? */
>>> - if (time_after_eq(now, next_credit)) {
>>> + /* Credit should be replenished when now does not fall into the
>>> + * range from expires to next_credit, and time_in_range_open()
>>> + * is used to verify whether this case happens.
>>> + */
>>> + if (!time_in_range_open(now, vif->credit_timeout.expires,
>>> next_credit)) {
>>> vif->credit_timeout.expires = now;
>>> tx_add_credit(vif);
>>> }
>>> --
>>> 1.7.6.5
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Xen-devel mailing list
>>> Xen-devel@lists.xen.org
>>> http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
>>
>>
>
[-- Attachment #2: main.c --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 961 bytes --]
#include <stdio.h>
#define typecheck(type,x) \
({ type __dummy; \
typeof(x) __dummy2; \
(void)(&__dummy == &__dummy2); \
1; \
})
#define time_after(a, b) \
(typecheck(unsigned char, a) && \
typecheck(unsigned char, b) && \
((char)((b) - (a)) < 0))
#define time_before(a,b) time_after(b,a)
#define time_after_eq(a,b) \
(typecheck(unsigned char, a) && \
typecheck(unsigned char, b) && \
((char)((a) -(b)) >= 0))
#define time_before_eq(a, b) time_after_eq(b,a)
void do_nothing()
{
return;
}
int main()
{
unsigned char expire, now, next;
unsigned char delta = 10;
int i, j;
for(i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
expire = i;
next = expire + delta;
printf("\n\n\n[%u ... %u]\n", expire, next);
now = expire;
for(j=0; j < 1024; j++, now++) {
if(j%256 == 0) printf("\n");
if (time_after_eq(now, next) ||
time_before(now, expire)) {
do_nothing();
}
else {
printf(" now=%d\n", (char)now);
}
}
}
return 0;
}
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH net] xen-netback: add the scenario which now beyond the range time_after_eq().
From: David Vrabel @ 2013-10-17 9:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jianhai luan
Cc: Jan Beulich, ian.campbell, wei.liu2, xen-devel, annie.li, netdev
In-Reply-To: <525FA79F.8060601@oracle.com>
On 17/10/13 10:02, jianhai luan wrote:
>
> On 2013-10-17 16:26, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> On 16.10.13 at 19:22, Jason Luan <jianhai.luan@oracle.com> wrote:
>>> time_after_eq() only works if the delta is < MAX_ULONG/2.
>>>
>>> If netfront sends at a very low rate, the time between subsequent calls
>>> to tx_credit_exceeded() may exceed MAX_ULONG/2 and the test for
>>> timer_after_eq() will be incorrect. Credit will not be replenished and
>>> the guest may become unable to send (e.g., if prior to the long gap, all
>>> credit was exhausted).
>>>
>>> We should add the scenario which now beyond next_credit+MAX_UNLONG/2.
>>> Because
>>> the fact now must be not before than expire, time_before(now, expire)
>>> == true
>>> will verify the scenario.
>>> time_after_eq(now, next_credit) || time_before (now, expire)
>>> ==
>>> !time_in_range_open(now, expire, next_credit)
>> So first of all this must be with a 32-bit netback. And the not
>> coverable gap between activity is well over 240 days long. _If_
>> this really needs dealing with, then why is extending this from
>> 240+ to 480+ days sufficient? I.e. why don't you simply
>> change to 64-bit jiffy values, and use time_after_eq64()?
>
> Yes, the issue only can be reproduced in 32-bit Dom0 (Beyond
> MAX_ULONG/2 in 64-bit will need long long time)
>
> I think the gap should be think all environment even now extending 480+.
> if now fall in the gap, one timer will be pending and replenish will be
> in time. Please run the attachment test program.
>
> If use time_after_eq64(), expire ,next_credit and other member will must
> be u64.
Yes, you'll need to store next_credit as a u64 in vif instead of
calculating it in tx_credit_exceeded from expires (which is only an
unsigned long).
David
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH net] xen-netback: add the scenario which now beyond the range time_after_eq().
From: Jan Beulich @ 2013-10-17 9:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jianhai luan
Cc: david.vrabel, ian.campbell, wei.liu2, xen-devel, annie.li, netdev
In-Reply-To: <525FA79F.8060601@oracle.com>
>>> On 17.10.13 at 11:02, jianhai luan <jianhai.luan@oracle.com> wrote:
> On 2013-10-17 16:26, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> On 16.10.13 at 19:22, Jason Luan <jianhai.luan@oracle.com> wrote:
>>> time_after_eq() only works if the delta is < MAX_ULONG/2.
>>>
>>> If netfront sends at a very low rate, the time between subsequent calls
>>> to tx_credit_exceeded() may exceed MAX_ULONG/2 and the test for
>>> timer_after_eq() will be incorrect. Credit will not be replenished and
>>> the guest may become unable to send (e.g., if prior to the long gap, all
>>> credit was exhausted).
>>>
>>> We should add the scenario which now beyond next_credit+MAX_UNLONG/2.
> Because
>>> the fact now must be not before than expire, time_before(now, expire) ==
> true
>>> will verify the scenario.
>>> time_after_eq(now, next_credit) || time_before (now, expire)
>>> ==
>>> !time_in_range_open(now, expire, next_credit)
>> So first of all this must be with a 32-bit netback. And the not
>> coverable gap between activity is well over 240 days long. _If_
>> this really needs dealing with, then why is extending this from
>> 240+ to 480+ days sufficient? I.e. why don't you simply
>> change to 64-bit jiffy values, and use time_after_eq64()?
>
> Yes, the issue only can be reproduced in 32-bit Dom0 (Beyond
> MAX_ULONG/2 in 64-bit will need long long time)
>
> I think the gap should be think all environment even now extending 480+.
> if now fall in the gap, one timer will be pending and replenish will be
> in time. Please run the attachment test program.
Not sure what this is supposed to tell me. I recognize that there
are overflow conditions not handled properly, but (a) I have a
hard time thinking of a sensible guest that sits idle for over 240
days (host uptime usually isn't even coming close to that due to
maintenance requirements) and (b) if there is such a sensible
guest, then I can't see why dealing with one being idle for over
480 days should be required too.
> If use time_after_eq64(), expire ,next_credit and other member will must
> be u64.
Exactly - that's what I was telling you to do.
Jan
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH net-next] {selinux, af_key} Rework pfkey_sadb2xfrm_user_sec_ctx
From: Steffen Klassert @ 2013-10-17 9:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Fan Du; +Cc: Paul Moore, davem, netdev
In-Reply-To: <525F3EBD.80406@windriver.com>
On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 09:34:53AM +0800, Fan Du wrote:
>
>
> On 2013年10月16日 23:15, Paul Moore wrote:
> >
> >The fact that you are now changing sadb_x_sec_ctx->sadb_x_sec_len whenever
> >pfkey_sadb2xfrm_user_sec_ctx() is called raises an eyebrow. Can you elaborate
> >on why this is not a problem?
> >
> Thanks for your attention, Paul.
>
> sadb_x_sec_ctx is extra headers passed down from user space, the usage of
> of this data structure falls down to one of pfkey_funcs function only for
> one time, more specifically speaking, it's only used by SELINUX for security
> checking for each operation. In other words, sadb_x_sec_ctx involves with a
> one shot business here. So the original codes seems do a lots of extra job
> which could easily be avoid using casting operation.
>
Since the selinux people have to live with that change in the fist place,
I'd like to see an ack of one of the selinux maintainers before I take
in into ipsec-next, Paul?
^ permalink raw reply
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