* Re: [PATCH 1/3] NFC: trf7970a: add device tree option for 27MHz clock
From: Rob Herring @ 2016-12-22 18:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Geoff Lansberry
Cc: linux-wireless, Lauro Ramos Venancio, Aloisio Almeida Jr,
Samuel Ortiz, Mark Rutland, netdev,
devicetree-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, Mark Greer,
Justin Bronder
In-Reply-To: <CAO7Z3WKmEbJCN_=srxTVKXvtz84vHGi41RS+9T7fmkmhRB6nEw-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
On Mon, Dec 19, 2016 at 5:23 PM, Geoff Lansberry <geoff-R+k406RtEhcAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> I can make that change, however, I worry that it may be a bit
> misleading, since there are only two supported clock frequencies, but
> a number like that to me implies that it could be set to any number
> you want. I'm new at this, and so I'll go ahead and change it as you
> request, but I'd like to hear your thoughts on my concern.
Then the binding doc just needs to state what are the 2 valid frequencies.
Rob
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^ permalink raw reply
* Re: BPF hash algo (Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v7 3/6] random: use SipHash in place of MD5)
From: Jason A. Donenfeld @ 2016-12-22 18:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Hannes Frederic Sowa
Cc: Andy Lutomirski, Daniel Borkmann, Alexei Starovoitov,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, Theodore Ts'o, Netdev,
LKML, Linux Crypto Mailing List, David Laight, Eric Dumazet,
Linus Torvalds, Eric Biggers, Tom Herbert, Andi Kleen,
David S. Miller, Jean-Philippe Aumasson
In-Reply-To: <1482425969.2673.5.camel@stressinduktion.org>
On Thu, Dec 22, 2016 at 5:59 PM, Hannes Frederic Sowa
<hannes@stressinduktion.org> wrote:
> We don't prevent ebpf programs being loaded based on the digest but
> just to uniquely identify loaded programs from user space and match up
> with their source.
Okay, so in that case, a weak hashing function like SHA1 could result
in a real vulnerability. Therefore, this SHA1 stuff needs to be
reverted immediately, pending a different implementation. If this has
ever shipped in a kernel version, it could even deserve a CVE. No
SHA1!
> The hashing is not a proper sha1 neither, unfortunately. I think that
> is why it will have a custom implementation in iproute2?
Jeepers creepers. So for some ungodly reason, LKML has invented yet
another homebrewed crypto primitive. This story really gets more
horrifying every day. No bueno.
So yea, let's revert and re-commit (repeal and replace? just
kidding...). Out with SHA-1, in with Blake2 or SHA2.
Jason
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: Re: [PATCH v7 3/6] random: use SipHash in place of MD5
From: Jason A. Donenfeld @ 2016-12-22 18:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Hannes Frederic Sowa
Cc: Theodore Ts'o, kernel-hardening, Andy Lutomirski, Netdev,
LKML, Linux Crypto Mailing List, David Laight, Eric Dumazet,
Linus Torvalds, Eric Biggers, Tom Herbert, Andi Kleen,
David S. Miller, Jean-Philippe Aumasson
In-Reply-To: <32db19ab-0c19-628c-3475-2ccb8050563a@stressinduktion.org>
On Thu, Dec 22, 2016 at 7:08 PM, Hannes Frederic Sowa
<hannes@stressinduktion.org> wrote:
> I wasn't concerned about performance but more about DoS resilience. I
> wonder how safe half md4 actually is in terms of allowing users to
> generate long hash chains in the filesystem (in terms of length
> extension attacks against half_md4).
AFAIK, this is a real vulnerability that needs to be addressed.
Judging by Ted's inquiry about my siphash testing suite, I assume he's
probably tinkering around with it as we speak. :)
Meanwhile I've separated things into several trees:
1. chacha20 rng, already submitted:
https://git.zx2c4.com/linux-dev/log/?h=random-next
2. md5 cleanup, not yet submitted:
https://git.zx2c4.com/linux-dev/log/?h=md5-cleanup
3. md4 cleanup, already submitted:
https://git.zx2c4.com/linux-dev/log/?h=ext4-next-md4-cleanup
4. siphash and networking, not yet submitted as a x/4 series:
https://git.zx2c4.com/linux-dev/log/?h=net-next-siphash
I'll submit (4) in a couple of days, waiting for any comments on the
existing patch-set.
Jason
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v7 3/6] random: use SipHash in place of MD5
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa @ 2016-12-22 18:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Theodore Ts'o, Jason A. Donenfeld, kernel-hardening,
Andy Lutomirski, Netdev, LKML, Linux Crypto Mailing List,
David Laight, Eric Dumazet, Linus Torvalds, Eric Biggers,
Tom Herbert, Andi Kleen, David S. Miller, Jean-Philippe Aumasson
In-Reply-To: <20161222155447.u3ayvw4gmorhswjv@thunk.org>
On 22.12.2016 16:54, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 22, 2016 at 02:10:33PM +0100, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
>> On Thu, Dec 22, 2016 at 1:47 PM, Hannes Frederic Sowa
>> <hannes@stressinduktion.org> wrote:
>>> following up on what appears to be a random subject: ;)
>>>
>>> IIRC, ext4 code by default still uses half_md4 for hashing of filenames
>>> in the htree. siphash seems to fit this use case pretty good.
>>
>> I saw this too. I'll try to address it in v8 of this series.
>
> This is a separate issue, and this series is getting a bit too
> complex. So I'd suggest pushing this off to a separate change.
>
> Changing the htree hash algorithm is an on-disk format change, and so
> we couldn't roll it out until e2fsprogs gets updated and rolled out
> pretty broadley. In fact George sent me patches to add siphash as a
> hash algorithm for htree a while back (for both the kernel and
> e2fsprogs), but I never got around to testing and applying them,
> mainly because while it's technically faster, I had other higher
> priority issues to work on --- and see previous comments regarding
> pixel peeping. Improving the hash algorithm by tens or even hundreds
> of nanoseconds isn't really going to matter since we only do a htree
> lookup on a file creation or cold cache lookup, and the SSD or HDD I/O
> times will dominate. And from the power perspective, saving
> microwatts of CPU power isn't going to matter if you're going to be
> spinning up the storage device....
I wasn't concerned about performance but more about DoS resilience. I
wonder how safe half md4 actually is in terms of allowing users to
generate long hash chains in the filesystem (in terms of length
extension attacks against half_md4).
In ext4, is it actually possible that a "disrupter" learns about the
hashing secret in the way how the inodes are returned during getdents?
Thanks,
Hannes
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH net-next] ixgbevf: fix 'Etherleak' in ixgbevf
From: Alexander Duyck @ 2016-12-22 17:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kefeng Wang
Cc: Weilong Chen, Jeff Kirsher, intel-wired-lan, Netdev,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
In-Reply-To: <74e1e76d-40f6-db8e-74ac-90b0474d4e11@huawei.com>
Yes that is much more helpful. So looking at it things are being
padded but the last 4 bytes always have this extra data in them. I've
been trying to recreate the issue on an 82599 with an SR-IOV VF and I
haven't been having much luck reproducing the problem.
In your test environment is the 82599 connected directly to the
Windows machine or are there any
switches/routers/gateways/tunnels/vlans in between? I've tried
several iterations but with the 82599 connected directly to another
NIC I have I am not able to get it to produce the garbage padding you
are seeing. It makes me wonder if there might be something that is
manipulating the packets in between the two systems. For example if
there was a VLAN being associated with the VF that is later stripped
and then the packet handed raw to the test system it might explain
what is introducing the extra padding and reason for pulling in the
CRC, and your patch would mask the issue since it would push the
minimum frame size with a VLAN to 68 instead of 64.
- Alex
On Wed, Dec 21, 2016 at 6:00 PM, Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> wrote:
>
>
> On 2016/12/21 10:20, Alexander Duyck wrote:
>> I find it curious that only the last 4 bytes have data in them. I'm
>> wondering if the NIC/driver in the Windows/Nessus system is
>> interpreting the 4 byte CRC on the end of the frame as padding instead
>> of stripping it.
>>
>> Is there any chance you could capture the entire frame instead of just
>> the padding? Maybe you could run something like wireshark without
>> enabling promiscuous mode on the VF and capture the frames it is
>> trying to send and receive. What I want to verify is what the actual
>> amount of padding is that is needed to get to 60 bytes and where the
>> CRC should start.
>>
>> - Alex
>
> Here is the verbose output, is this useful?
> Or we will try according to your advice, thanks,
>
> D:\Program Files\Tenable\Nessus>nasl.exe -aX -t 192.169.0.151 etherleak.nasl
> --------------------------
> ---[ ICMP ]---
> 0x00: 45 00 00 1D 20 81 00 00 40 01 D7 F3 C0 A9 00 97 E... ...@.......
> 0x10: C0 A9 00 82 00 00 87 FD 00 01 00 01 78 00 00 00 ............x...
> 0x20: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 98 E4 75 DF ............u.
> --------------------------
> ---[ ICMP ]---
> 0x00: 45 00 00 1D 20 85 00 00 40 01 D7 EF C0 A9 00 97 E... ...@.......
> 0x10: C0 A9 00 82 00 00 87 FD 00 01 00 01 78 00 00 00 ............x...
> 0x20: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 FB DA F8 13 ..............
> ---[ ether1 ]---
> 0x00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 98 E4 75 ...............u
> 0x10: DF .
> ---[ ether2 ]---
> 0x00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 FB DA F8 ................
> 0x10: 13 .
>
> Padding observed in one frame :
>
> 0x00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 98 E4 75 ...............u
> 0x10: DF .
>
> Padding observed in another frame :
>
> 0x00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 FB DA F8 ................
> 0x10: 13
>
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH net] net, sched: fix soft lockup in tc_classify
From: John Fastabend @ 2016-12-22 17:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Miller, daniel
Cc: xiyou.wangcong, shahark, gerlitz.or, roid, jiri, netdev
In-Reply-To: <20161222.115326.376675148706578174.davem@davemloft.net>
On 16-12-22 08:53 AM, David Miller wrote:
> From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
> Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2016 22:07:48 +0100
>
>> Ok, you mean for net. In that case I prefer the smaller sized fix to
>> be honest. It also covers everything from the point where we fetch
>> the chain via cops->tcf_chain() to the end of the function, which is
>> where most of the complexity resides, and only the two mentioned
>> commits do the relock, so as a fix I think it's fine as-is. As
>> mentioned, if there's need to refactor tc_ctl_tfilter() net-next
>> would be better, imho.
>
> Please, can you two work towards an agreement as to what fix should
> go in at this time?
>
> Thanks.
>
Thanks for fixing this!
I have a slight preference to push this patch into net as its been
tested already by Shahar and is not particularly invasive. Then for
net-next do a larger cleanup to get rid of some of the complexity per
Cong's suggestion.
.John
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: BPF hash algo (Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v7 3/6] random: use SipHash in place of MD5)
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa @ 2016-12-22 17:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andy Lutomirski
Cc: Daniel Borkmann, Alexei Starovoitov, Jason A. Donenfeld,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, Theodore Ts'o, Netdev,
LKML, Linux Crypto Mailing List, David Laight, Eric Dumazet,
Linus Torvalds, Eric Biggers, Tom Herbert, Andi Kleen,
David S. Miller, Jean-Philippe Aumasson
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrW_T1v4qKPJDs5dXwAnAit3M52AWMH-K+GJLb1WoLMuRQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, 2016-12-22 at 09:25 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 22, 2016 at 8:59 AM, Hannes Frederic Sowa
> <hannes@stressinduktion.org> wrote:
> > On Thu, 2016-12-22 at 08:07 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > >
> > > You mean:
> > >
> > > commit 7bd509e311f408f7a5132fcdde2069af65fa05ae
> > > Author: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
> > > Date: Sun Dec 4 23:19:41 2016 +0100
> > >
> > > bpf: add prog_digest and expose it via fdinfo/netlink
> > >
> > >
> > > Yes, please! This actually matters for security -- imagine a
> > > malicious program brute-forcing a collision so that it gets loaded
> > > wrong. And this is IMO a use case for SHA-256 or SHA-512/256
> > > (preferably the latter). Speed basically doesn't matter here and
> > > Blake2 is both less stable (didn't they slightly change it recently?)
> > > and much less well studied.
> >
> > We don't prevent ebpf programs being loaded based on the digest but
> > just to uniquely identify loaded programs from user space and match up
> > with their source.
>
> The commit log talks about using the hash to see if the program has
> already been compiled and JITted. If that's done, then a collision
> will directly cause the kernel to malfunction.
Yeah, it still shouldn't crash the kernel but it could cause
malfunctions because assumptions are not met from user space thus it
could act in a strange way:
My personal biggest concern is that users of this API will at some
point in time assume this digist is unique (as a key itself for a
hashtables f.e.), while it is actually not (and not enforced so by the
kernel). If you can get an unpriv ebpf program inserted to the kernel
with the same weak hash, a controller daemon could pick it up and bind
it to another ebpf hook, probably outside of the unpriv realm the user
was in before. Only the sorting matters, which might be unstable and is
not guaranteed by anything in most hash table based data structures.
The API seems flawed to me.
> > > My inclination would have been to seed them with something that isn't
> > > exposed to userspace for the precise reason that it would prevent user
> > > code from making assumptions about what's in the hash. But if there's
> > > a use case for why user code needs to be able to calculate the hash on
> > > its own, then that's fine. But perhaps the actual fdinfo string
> > > should be "sha256:abcd1234..." to give some flexibility down the road.
To add to this, I am very much in favor of that. Right now it doesn't
have a name because it is a custom algorithm. ;)
> > >
> > > Also:
> > >
> > > + result = (__force __be32 *)fp->digest;
> > > + for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_WORDS; i++)
> > > + result[i] = cpu_to_be32(fp->digest[i]);
> > >
> > > Everyone, please, please, please don't open-code crypto primitives.
> > > Is this and the code above it even correct? It might be but on a very
> > > brief glance it looks wrong to me. If you're doing this to avoid
> > > depending on crypto, then fix crypto so you can pull in the algorithm
> > > without pulling in the whole crypto core.
> >
> > The hashing is not a proper sha1 neither, unfortunately. I think that
> > is why it will have a custom implementation in iproute2?
>
> Putting on crypto hat:
>
> NAK NAK NAK NAK NAK. "The Linux kernel invented a new primitive in
> 2016 when people know better and is going to handle it by porting that
> new primitive to userspace" is not a particularly good argument.
>
> Okay, crypto hack back off.
>
> >
> > I wondered if bpf program loading should have used the module loading
> > infrastructure from the beginning...
>
> That would be way too complicated and would be nasty for the unprivileged cases.
I was more or less just thinking about using the syscalls and user
space representation not the generic infrastructure, as it is anyway
too much concerned with real kernel modules (would probably also solve
your cgroup-ebpf thread, as it can be passed by unique name or name and
hash ;) ). Anyway...
> > > At the very least, there should be a separate function that calculates
> > > the hash of a buffer and that function should explicitly run itself
> > > against test vectors of various lengths to make sure that it's
> > > calculating what it claims to be calculating. And it doesn't look
> > > like the userspace code has landed, so, if this thing isn't
> > > calculating SHA1 correctly, it's plausible that no one has noticed.
> >
> > I hope this was known from the beginning, this is not sha1 unfortunately.
> >
> > But ebpf elf programs also need preprocessing to get rid of some
> > embedded load-depending data, so maybe it was considered to be just
> > enough?
>
> I suspect it was actually an accident.
Maybe, I don't know.
Bye,
Hannes
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: BPF hash algo (Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v7 3/6] random: use SipHash in place of MD5)
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2016-12-22 17:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Hannes Frederic Sowa
Cc: Daniel Borkmann, Alexei Starovoitov, Jason A. Donenfeld,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, Theodore Ts'o, Netdev,
LKML, Linux Crypto Mailing List, David Laight, Eric Dumazet,
Linus Torvalds, Eric Biggers, Tom Herbert, Andi Kleen,
David S. Miller, Jean-Philippe Aumasson
In-Reply-To: <1482425969.2673.5.camel@stressinduktion.org>
On Thu, Dec 22, 2016 at 8:59 AM, Hannes Frederic Sowa
<hannes@stressinduktion.org> wrote:
> On Thu, 2016-12-22 at 08:07 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> On Thu, Dec 22, 2016 at 7:51 AM, Hannes Frederic Sowa
>> <hannes@stressinduktion.org> wrote:
>> > On Thu, 2016-12-22 at 16:41 +0100, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
>> > > Hi Hannes,
>> > >
>> > > On Thu, Dec 22, 2016 at 4:33 PM, Hannes Frederic Sowa
>> > > <hannes@stressinduktion.org> wrote:
>> > > > IPv6 you cannot touch anymore. The hashing algorithm is part of uAPI.
>> > > > You don't want to give people new IPv6 addresses with the same stable
>> > > > secret (across reboots) after a kernel upgrade. Maybe they lose
>> > > > connectivity then and it is extra work?
>> > >
>> > > Ahh, too bad. So it goes.
>> >
>> > If no other users survive we can put it into the ipv6 module.
>> >
>> > > > The bpf hash stuff can be changed during this merge window, as it is
>> > > > not yet in a released kernel. Albeit I would probably have preferred
>> > > > something like sha256 here, which can be easily replicated by user
>> > > > space tools (minus the problem of patching out references to not
>> > > > hashable data, which must be zeroed).
>> > >
>> > > Oh, interesting, so time is of the essence then. Do you want to handle
>> > > changing the new eBPF code to something not-SHA1 before it's too late,
>> > > as part of a ne
>>
>> w patchset that can fast track itself to David? And
>> > > then I can preserve my large series for the next merge window.
>> >
>> > This algorithm should be a non-seeded algorithm, because the hashes
>> > should be stable and verifiable by user space tooling. Thus this would
>> > need a hashing algorithm that is hardened against pre-image
>> > attacks/collision resistance, which siphash is not. I would prefer some
>> > higher order SHA algorithm for that actually.
>> >
>>
>> You mean:
>>
>> commit 7bd509e311f408f7a5132fcdde2069af65fa05ae
>> Author: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
>> Date: Sun Dec 4 23:19:41 2016 +0100
>>
>> bpf: add prog_digest and expose it via fdinfo/netlink
>>
>>
>> Yes, please! This actually matters for security -- imagine a
>> malicious program brute-forcing a collision so that it gets loaded
>> wrong. And this is IMO a use case for SHA-256 or SHA-512/256
>> (preferably the latter). Speed basically doesn't matter here and
>> Blake2 is both less stable (didn't they slightly change it recently?)
>> and much less well studied.
>
> We don't prevent ebpf programs being loaded based on the digest but
> just to uniquely identify loaded programs from user space and match up
> with their source.
The commit log talks about using the hash to see if the program has
already been compiled and JITted. If that's done, then a collision
will directly cause the kernel to malfunction.
>> My inclination would have been to seed them with something that isn't
>> exposed to userspace for the precise reason that it would prevent user
>> code from making assumptions about what's in the hash. But if there's
>> a use case for why user code needs to be able to calculate the hash on
>> its own, then that's fine. But perhaps the actual fdinfo string
>> should be "sha256:abcd1234..." to give some flexibility down the road.
>>
>> Also:
>>
>> + result = (__force __be32 *)fp->digest;
>> + for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_WORDS; i++)
>> + result[i] = cpu_to_be32(fp->digest[i]);
>>
>> Everyone, please, please, please don't open-code crypto primitives.
>> Is this and the code above it even correct? It might be but on a very
>> brief glance it looks wrong to me. If you're doing this to avoid
>> depending on crypto, then fix crypto so you can pull in the algorithm
>> without pulling in the whole crypto core.
>
> The hashing is not a proper sha1 neither, unfortunately. I think that
> is why it will have a custom implementation in iproute2?
Putting on crypto hat:
NAK NAK NAK NAK NAK. "The Linux kernel invented a new primitive in
2016 when people know better and is going to handle it by porting that
new primitive to userspace" is not a particularly good argument.
Okay, crypto hack back off.
>
> I wondered if bpf program loading should have used the module loading
> infrastructure from the beginning...
That would be way too complicated and would be nasty for the unprivileged cases.
>
>> At the very least, there should be a separate function that calculates
>> the hash of a buffer and that function should explicitly run itself
>> against test vectors of various lengths to make sure that it's
>> calculating what it claims to be calculating. And it doesn't look
>> like the userspace code has landed, so, if this thing isn't
>> calculating SHA1 correctly, it's plausible that no one has noticed.
>
> I hope this was known from the beginning, this is not sha1 unfortunately.
>
> But ebpf elf programs also need preprocessing to get rid of some
> embedded load-depending data, so maybe it was considered to be just
> enough?
I suspect it was actually an accident.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2] stmmac: CSR clock configuration fix
From: Joao Pinto @ 2016-12-22 17:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Phil Reid, Joao Pinto, peppe.cavallaro, davem, seraphin.bonnaffe
Cc: hock.leong.kweh, niklas.cassel, pavel, linux-kernel, netdev
In-Reply-To: <816bb34f-bb4c-648a-179e-7e72cab975b0@electromag.com.au>
Às 4:57 PM de 12/22/2016, Phil Reid escreveu:
> On 22/12/2016 23:47, Joao Pinto wrote:
>>
>> Hello Phil,
>>
>> Às 3:42 PM de 12/22/2016, Phil Reid escreveu:
>>> G'day Joao,
>>>
>>> On 22/12/2016 20:38, Joao Pinto wrote:
>>>> When testing stmmac with my QoS reference design I checked a problem in the
>>>> CSR clock configuration that was impossibilitating the phy discovery, since
>>>> every read operation returned 0x0000ffff. This patch fixes the issue.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Joao Pinto <jpinto@synopsys.com>
>>>> ---
>>>> changes v1->v2 (David Miller)
>>>> - DWMAC100 and DWMAC1000 csr clocks masks should also be fixed for the patch
>>>> to make sense
>>>>
>>>> drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac1000_core.c | 2 +-
>>>> drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac100_core.c | 2 +-
>>>> drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_mdio.c | 8 ++++----
>>>> 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac1000_core.c
>>>> b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac1000_core.c
>>>> index b21d03f..94223c8 100644
>>>> --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac1000_core.c
>>>> +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac1000_core.c
>>>> @@ -539,7 +539,7 @@ struct mac_device_info *dwmac1000_setup(void __iomem
>>>> *ioaddr, int mcbins,
>>>> mac->mii.reg_shift = 6;
>>>> mac->mii.reg_mask = 0x000007C0;
>>>> mac->mii.clk_csr_shift = 2;
>>>> - mac->mii.clk_csr_mask = 0xF;
>>>> + mac->mii.clk_csr_mask = GENMASK(4, 2);
>>>
>>> Should this not be GENMASK(5,2)
>>
>> According to Universal MAC databook (valid for MAC100 and MAC1000), we have:
>>
>> Bits: 4:2
>> 000 60-100 MHz clk_csr_i/42
>> 001 100-150 MHz clk_csr_i/62
>> 010 20-35 MHz clk_csr_i/16
>> 011 35-60 MHz clk_csr_i/26
>> 100 150-250 MHz clk_csr_i/102
>> 101 250-300 MHz clk_csr_i/124
>> 110, 111 Reserved
>>
>> So only bits 2, 3 and 4 should be masked.
>>
>> Thanks.
>>
> But this is a change in behaviour from what was there isn't.
> Previous mask was 4 bits. now it's 3.
>
> And for example the altera socfgpa implementation in the cyclone V has valid values
> for values 0x8-0xf, using bit 5:2.
According to the databook, bit 5 is reserved and RO. When reserved, it is
possible to customize. Is that the case? If there is hardware using the 5th bit
we can put it GENMASK(5, 2) with no problem.
>
>
>
>
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: BPF hash algo (Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v7 3/6] random: use SipHash in place of MD5)
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa @ 2016-12-22 16:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andy Lutomirski, Daniel Borkmann, Alexei Starovoitov
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Theodore Ts'o, Netdev, LKML, Linux Crypto Mailing List,
David Laight, Eric Dumazet, Linus Torvalds, Eric Biggers,
Tom Herbert, Andi Kleen, David S. Miller, Jean-Philippe Aumasson
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrUATPeaCJTQZN2h=ct6HH-xLt4V8T0PfPHNFGFN2HWtTA@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, 2016-12-22 at 08:07 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 22, 2016 at 7:51 AM, Hannes Frederic Sowa
> <hannes@stressinduktion.org> wrote:
> > On Thu, 2016-12-22 at 16:41 +0100, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> > > Hi Hannes,
> > >
> > > On Thu, Dec 22, 2016 at 4:33 PM, Hannes Frederic Sowa
> > > <hannes@stressinduktion.org> wrote:
> > > > IPv6 you cannot touch anymore. The hashing algorithm is part of uAPI.
> > > > You don't want to give people new IPv6 addresses with the same stable
> > > > secret (across reboots) after a kernel upgrade. Maybe they lose
> > > > connectivity then and it is extra work?
> > >
> > > Ahh, too bad. So it goes.
> >
> > If no other users survive we can put it into the ipv6 module.
> >
> > > > The bpf hash stuff can be changed during this merge window, as it is
> > > > not yet in a released kernel. Albeit I would probably have preferred
> > > > something like sha256 here, which can be easily replicated by user
> > > > space tools (minus the problem of patching out references to not
> > > > hashable data, which must be zeroed).
> > >
> > > Oh, interesting, so time is of the essence then. Do you want to handle
> > > changing the new eBPF code to something not-SHA1 before it's too late,
> > > as part of a ne
>
> w patchset that can fast track itself to David? And
> > > then I can preserve my large series for the next merge window.
> >
> > This algorithm should be a non-seeded algorithm, because the hashes
> > should be stable and verifiable by user space tooling. Thus this would
> > need a hashing algorithm that is hardened against pre-image
> > attacks/collision resistance, which siphash is not. I would prefer some
> > higher order SHA algorithm for that actually.
> >
>
> You mean:
>
> commit 7bd509e311f408f7a5132fcdde2069af65fa05ae
> Author: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
> Date: Sun Dec 4 23:19:41 2016 +0100
>
> bpf: add prog_digest and expose it via fdinfo/netlink
>
>
> Yes, please! This actually matters for security -- imagine a
> malicious program brute-forcing a collision so that it gets loaded
> wrong. And this is IMO a use case for SHA-256 or SHA-512/256
> (preferably the latter). Speed basically doesn't matter here and
> Blake2 is both less stable (didn't they slightly change it recently?)
> and much less well studied.
We don't prevent ebpf programs being loaded based on the digest but
just to uniquely identify loaded programs from user space and match up
with their source.
There have been talks about signing bpf programs, thus this would
probably need another digest algorithm additionally to that one,
wasting probably instructions. Probably going somewhere in direction of
PKCS#7 might be the thing to do (which leads to the problem to make
PKCS#7 attackable by ordinary unpriv users, hmpf).
> My inclination would have been to seed them with something that isn't
> exposed to userspace for the precise reason that it would prevent user
> code from making assumptions about what's in the hash. But if there's
> a use case for why user code needs to be able to calculate the hash on
> its own, then that's fine. But perhaps the actual fdinfo string
> should be "sha256:abcd1234..." to give some flexibility down the road.
>
> Also:
>
> + result = (__force __be32 *)fp->digest;
> + for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_WORDS; i++)
> + result[i] = cpu_to_be32(fp->digest[i]);
>
> Everyone, please, please, please don't open-code crypto primitives.
> Is this and the code above it even correct? It might be but on a very
> brief glance it looks wrong to me. If you're doing this to avoid
> depending on crypto, then fix crypto so you can pull in the algorithm
> without pulling in the whole crypto core.
The hashing is not a proper sha1 neither, unfortunately. I think that
is why it will have a custom implementation in iproute2?
I wondered if bpf program loading should have used the module loading
infrastructure from the beginning...
> At the very least, there should be a separate function that calculates
> the hash of a buffer and that function should explicitly run itself
> against test vectors of various lengths to make sure that it's
> calculating what it claims to be calculating. And it doesn't look
> like the userspace code has landed, so, if this thing isn't
> calculating SHA1 correctly, it's plausible that no one has noticed.
I hope this was known from the beginning, this is not sha1 unfortunately.
But ebpf elf programs also need preprocessing to get rid of some
embedded load-depending data, so maybe it was considered to be just
enough?
Bye,
Hannes
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2] stmmac: CSR clock configuration fix
From: Phil Reid @ 2016-12-22 16:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Joao Pinto, peppe.cavallaro, davem, seraphin.bonnaffe
Cc: hock.leong.kweh, niklas.cassel, pavel, linux-kernel, netdev
In-Reply-To: <efb22734-df9a-fde0-7cff-d1658105e2ec@synopsys.com>
On 22/12/2016 23:47, Joao Pinto wrote:
>
> Hello Phil,
>
> Às 3:42 PM de 12/22/2016, Phil Reid escreveu:
>> G'day Joao,
>>
>> On 22/12/2016 20:38, Joao Pinto wrote:
>>> When testing stmmac with my QoS reference design I checked a problem in the
>>> CSR clock configuration that was impossibilitating the phy discovery, since
>>> every read operation returned 0x0000ffff. This patch fixes the issue.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Joao Pinto <jpinto@synopsys.com>
>>> ---
>>> changes v1->v2 (David Miller)
>>> - DWMAC100 and DWMAC1000 csr clocks masks should also be fixed for the patch
>>> to make sense
>>>
>>> drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac1000_core.c | 2 +-
>>> drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac100_core.c | 2 +-
>>> drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_mdio.c | 8 ++++----
>>> 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac1000_core.c
>>> b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac1000_core.c
>>> index b21d03f..94223c8 100644
>>> --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac1000_core.c
>>> +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac1000_core.c
>>> @@ -539,7 +539,7 @@ struct mac_device_info *dwmac1000_setup(void __iomem
>>> *ioaddr, int mcbins,
>>> mac->mii.reg_shift = 6;
>>> mac->mii.reg_mask = 0x000007C0;
>>> mac->mii.clk_csr_shift = 2;
>>> - mac->mii.clk_csr_mask = 0xF;
>>> + mac->mii.clk_csr_mask = GENMASK(4, 2);
>>
>> Should this not be GENMASK(5,2)
>
> According to Universal MAC databook (valid for MAC100 and MAC1000), we have:
>
> Bits: 4:2
> 000 60-100 MHz clk_csr_i/42
> 001 100-150 MHz clk_csr_i/62
> 010 20-35 MHz clk_csr_i/16
> 011 35-60 MHz clk_csr_i/26
> 100 150-250 MHz clk_csr_i/102
> 101 250-300 MHz clk_csr_i/124
> 110, 111 Reserved
>
> So only bits 2, 3 and 4 should be masked.
>
> Thanks.
>
But this is a change in behaviour from what was there isn't.
Previous mask was 4 bits. now it's 3.
And for example the altera socfgpa implementation in the cyclone V has valid values
for values 0x8-0xf, using bit 5:2.
--
Regards
Phil Reid
^ permalink raw reply
* VERY IMPORTANT
From: info @ 2016-12-22 5:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
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contact me via email:( gertjan.vlieghe@yandex.com ) with your full
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----------------------------------
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*******************************************************************************
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******************************************************************************
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: BPF hash algo (Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v7 3/6] random: use SipHash in place of MD5)
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2016-12-22 16:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jason A. Donenfeld
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa, Daniel Borkmann, Alexei Starovoitov,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, Theodore Ts'o, Netdev,
LKML, Linux Crypto Mailing List, David Laight, Eric Dumazet,
Linus Torvalds, Eric Biggers, Tom Herbert, Andi Kleen,
David S. Miller, Jean-Philippe Aumasson
In-Reply-To: <CAHmME9pvPXiBu5TUYJL7gED7b=iXKrkXu45fXstnBFe77Esv5Q@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, Dec 22, 2016 at 8:28 AM, Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> I don't know what your design requirements are for this. It looks like
> you're generating some kind of crypto digest of a program, and you
> need to avoid collisions. If you'd like to go with a PRF (keyed hash
> function) that uses some kernel secret key, then I'd strongly suggest
> using Keyed-Blake2. Alternatively, if you need for userspace to be
> able to calculate the same hash, and don't want to use some kernel
> secret, then I'd still suggest using Blake2, which will be fast and
> secure.
>
> If you can wait until January, I'll work on a commit adding the
> primitive to the tree. I've already written it and I just need to get
> things cleaned up.
>
>> Blake2 is both less stable (didn't they slightly change it recently?)
>
> No, Blake2 is very stable. It's also extremely secure and has been
> extensively studied. Not to mention it's faster than SHA2. And if you
> want to use it as a PRF, it's obvious better suited and faster to use
> Blake2's keyed PRF mode than HMAC-SHA2.
>
> If you don't care about performance, and you don't want to use a PRF,
> then just use SHA2-256. If you're particularly concerned about certain
> types of attacks, you could go with SHA2-512 truncated to 256 bytes,
> but somehow I doubt you need this.
I don't think this cares about performance. (Well, it cares about
performance, but the verifier will likely dominiate the cost by such a
large margin that the hash algo doesn't matter.) And staying
FIPS-compliant-ish is worth a little bit, so I'd advocate for
something in the SHA2 family.
> If userspace hasn't landed, can we get away with changing this code
> after 4.10? Or should we just fix it before 4.10? Or should we revert
> it before 4.10? Development-policy-things like this I have zero clue
> about, so I heed to your guidance.
I think it should be fixed or reverted before 4.10.
--Andy
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH net] net, sched: fix soft lockup in tc_classify
From: David Miller @ 2016-12-22 16:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: daniel
Cc: xiyou.wangcong, shahark, gerlitz.or, roid, jiri, john.fastabend,
netdev
In-Reply-To: <585AEF24.4070800@iogearbox.net>
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2016 22:07:48 +0100
> Ok, you mean for net. In that case I prefer the smaller sized fix to
> be honest. It also covers everything from the point where we fetch
> the chain via cops->tcf_chain() to the end of the function, which is
> where most of the complexity resides, and only the two mentioned
> commits do the relock, so as a fix I think it's fine as-is. As
> mentioned, if there's need to refactor tc_ctl_tfilter() net-next
> would be better, imho.
Please, can you two work towards an agreement as to what fix should
go in at this time?
Thanks.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH net] net, sched: fix soft lockup in tc_classify
From: Shahar Klein @ 2016-12-22 13:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Borkmann, davem
Cc: shahark, xiyou.wangcong, gerlitz.or, roid, jiri, john.fastabend,
netdev
In-Reply-To: <1954223e8b7aa90ff835357e8a3ef7537be33e43.1482337600.git.daniel@iogearbox.net>
On 12/21/2016 7:04 PM, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
> Shahar reported a soft lockup in tc_classify(), where we run into an
> endless loop when walking the classifier chain due to tp->next == tp
> which is a state we should never run into. The issue only seems to
> trigger under load in the tc control path.
>
> What happens is that in tc_ctl_tfilter(), thread A allocates a new
> tp, initializes it, sets tp_created to 1, and calls into tp->ops->change()
> with it. In that classifier callback we had to unlock/lock the rtnl
> mutex and returned with -EAGAIN. One reason why we need to drop there
> is, for example, that we need to request an action module to be loaded.
>
> This happens via tcf_exts_validate() -> tcf_action_init/_1() meaning
> after we loaded and found the requested action, we need to redo the
> whole request so we don't race against others. While we had to unlock
> rtnl in that time, thread B's request was processed next on that CPU.
> Thread B added a new tp instance successfully to the classifier chain.
> When thread A returned grabbing the rtnl mutex again, propagating -EAGAIN
> and destroying its tp instance which never got linked, we goto replay
> and redo A's request.
>
> This time when walking the classifier chain in tc_ctl_tfilter() for
> checking for existing tp instances we had a priority match and found
> the tp instance that was created and linked by thread B. Now calling
> again into tp->ops->change() with that tp was successful and returned
> without error.
>
> tp_created was never cleared in the second round, thus kernel thinks
> that we need to link it into the classifier chain (once again). tp and
> *back point to the same object due to the match we had earlier on. Thus
> for thread B's already public tp, we reset tp->next to tp itself and
> link it into the chain, which eventually causes the mentioned endless
> loop in tc_classify() once a packet hits the data path.
>
> Fix is to clear tp_created at the beginning of each request, also when
> we replay it. On the paths that can cause -EAGAIN we already destroy
> the original tp instance we had and on replay we really need to start
> from scratch. It seems that this issue was first introduced in commit
> 12186be7d2e1 ("net_cls: fix unconfigured struct tcf_proto keeps chaining
> and avoid kernel panic when we use cls_cgroup").
>
> Fixes: 12186be7d2e1 ("net_cls: fix unconfigured struct tcf_proto keeps chaining and avoid kernel panic when we use cls_cgroup")
> Reported-by: Shahar Klein <shahark@mellanox.com>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
> Cc: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
> ---
> Shahar, you mentioned you wanted to run again later without the debug
> printk's. Once you do that and come to the same result again, please
> feel free to reply with a Tested-by or such. Thanks everyone!
>
> net/sched/cls_api.c | 4 +++-
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/sched/cls_api.c b/net/sched/cls_api.c
> index 3fbba79..1ecdf80 100644
> --- a/net/sched/cls_api.c
> +++ b/net/sched/cls_api.c
> @@ -148,13 +148,15 @@ static int tc_ctl_tfilter(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *n)
> unsigned long cl;
> unsigned long fh;
> int err;
> - int tp_created = 0;
> + int tp_created;
>
> if ((n->nlmsg_type != RTM_GETTFILTER) &&
> !netlink_ns_capable(skb, net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> return -EPERM;
>
> replay:
> + tp_created = 0;
> +
> err = nlmsg_parse(n, sizeof(*t), tca, TCA_MAX, NULL);
> if (err < 0)
> return err;
>
I've tested this specific patch (without cong's patch and without the
many prints) many times and in many test permutations today and it
didn't lock
Thanks again Daniel!
Shahar
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v7 3/6] random: use SipHash in place of MD5
From: Jason A. Donenfeld @ 2016-12-22 16:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kernel-hardening, Theodore Ts'o, Jason A. Donenfeld,
Hannes Frederic Sowa, Andy Lutomirski, Netdev, LKML,
Linux Crypto Mailing List, David Laight, Eric Dumazet,
Linus Torvalds, Eric Biggers, Tom Herbert, Andi Kleen,
David S. Miller, Jean-Philippe Aumasson
In-Reply-To: <20161222163041.xb2ysx4uswpaqfev@thunk.org>
On Thu, Dec 22, 2016 at 5:30 PM, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> wrote:
> I'd do this first, as one set. Adding a new file to crypto is
> unlikely to cause merge conflicts.
Ack.
>
>> 2. convert char/random to use siphash. to: ted ts'o's random-next
>
> I'm confused, I thought you had agreed to the batched chacha20
> approach?
Sorry, I meant to write this. Long day, little sleep. Yes, of course.
Batched entropy.
>> 3. move lib/md5.c to static function in crypto/md5.c, remove entry
>> inside of linux/cryptohash.h. to: ??'s ??-next
>
> This is cleanup, so it doesn't matter that much when it happens. md5
> changes to crypto is also unlikely to cause conflicts, so we could do
> this at the same time as (2), if Herbert (the crypto maintainer) agrees.
Alright, sure.
>
>> 4. move lib/halfmd4.c to static function in fs/ext/hash.c, remove
>> entry inside of linux/cryptohash.c. to: td ts'o's ext-next
>
> This is definitely separate.
Okay, I'll submit it to you separately.
> One more thing. Can you add some test cases to lib/siphash.h?
> Triggered off of a CONFIG_SIPHASH_REGRESSION_TEST config flag, with
> some test inputs and known outputs? I'm going to need to add a
> version of siphash to e2fsprogs, and I want to make sure the userspace
> version is implementing the same algorithm as the kernel siphash.
I've already written these. They're behind TEST_HASH. They currently
test every single line of code of all implementations of siphash. I
spent a long time on these. The test vectors themselves were taken
from the SipHash creators' reference publication. Check out
lib/test_siphash.c in my tree.
Jason
On Thu, Dec 22, 2016 at 5:30 PM, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 22, 2016 at 05:16:47PM +0100, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
>> Could you offer a bit of advice on how to manage dependencies between
>> patchsets during merge windows? I'm a bit new to the process.
>>
>> Specifically, we how have 4 parts:
>> 1. add siphash, and use it for some networking code. to: david miller's net-next
>
> I'd do this first, as one set. Adding a new file to crypto is
> unlikely to cause merge conflicts.
>
>> 2. convert char/random to use siphash. to: ted ts'o's random-next
>
> I'm confused, I thought you had agreed to the batched chacha20
> approach?
>
>> 3. move lib/md5.c to static function in crypto/md5.c, remove entry
>> inside of linux/cryptohash.h. to: ??'s ??-next
>
> This is cleanup, so it doesn't matter that much when it happens. md5
> changes to crypto is also unlikely to cause conflicts, so we could do
> this at the same time as (2), if Herbert (the crypto maintainer) agrees.
>
>> 4. move lib/halfmd4.c to static function in fs/ext/hash.c, remove
>> entry inside of linux/cryptohash.c. to: td ts'o's ext-next
>
> This is definitely separate.
>
> One more thing. Can you add some test cases to lib/siphash.h?
> Triggered off of a CONFIG_SIPHASH_REGRESSION_TEST config flag, with
> some test inputs and known outputs? I'm going to need to add a
> version of siphash to e2fsprogs, and I want to make sure the userspace
> version is implementing the same algorithm as the kernel siphash.
>
> - Ted
--
Jason A. Donenfeld
Deep Space Explorer
fr: +33 6 51 90 82 66
us: +1 513 476 1200
www.jasondonenfeld.com
www.zx2c4.com
zx2c4.com/keys/AB9942E6D4A4CFC3412620A749FC7012A5DE03AE.asc
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v7 3/6] random: use SipHash in place of MD5
From: Theodore Ts'o @ 2016-12-22 16:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kernel-hardening
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld, Hannes Frederic Sowa, Andy Lutomirski, Netdev,
LKML, Linux Crypto Mailing List, David Laight, Eric Dumazet,
Linus Torvalds, Eric Biggers, Tom Herbert, Andi Kleen,
David S. Miller, Jean-Philippe Aumasson
In-Reply-To: <CAHmME9r3zCE6zLsL9Jrp3a2D3mpH6oYEnz3BBerAGZXyJpr2mQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, Dec 22, 2016 at 05:16:47PM +0100, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> Could you offer a bit of advice on how to manage dependencies between
> patchsets during merge windows? I'm a bit new to the process.
>
> Specifically, we how have 4 parts:
> 1. add siphash, and use it for some networking code. to: david miller's net-next
I'd do this first, as one set. Adding a new file to crypto is
unlikely to cause merge conflicts.
> 2. convert char/random to use siphash. to: ted ts'o's random-next
I'm confused, I thought you had agreed to the batched chacha20
approach?
> 3. move lib/md5.c to static function in crypto/md5.c, remove entry
> inside of linux/cryptohash.h. to: ??'s ??-next
This is cleanup, so it doesn't matter that much when it happens. md5
changes to crypto is also unlikely to cause conflicts, so we could do
this at the same time as (2), if Herbert (the crypto maintainer) agrees.
> 4. move lib/halfmd4.c to static function in fs/ext/hash.c, remove
> entry inside of linux/cryptohash.c. to: td ts'o's ext-next
This is definitely separate.
One more thing. Can you add some test cases to lib/siphash.h?
Triggered off of a CONFIG_SIPHASH_REGRESSION_TEST config flag, with
some test inputs and known outputs? I'm going to need to add a
version of siphash to e2fsprogs, and I want to make sure the userspace
version is implementing the same algorithm as the kernel siphash.
- Ted
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: BPF hash algo (Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v7 3/6] random: use SipHash in place of MD5)
From: Jason A. Donenfeld @ 2016-12-22 16:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andy Lutomirski
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa, Daniel Borkmann, Alexei Starovoitov,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, Theodore Ts'o, Netdev,
LKML, Linux Crypto Mailing List, David Laight, Eric Dumazet,
Linus Torvalds, Eric Biggers, Tom Herbert, Andi Kleen,
David S. Miller, Jean-Philippe Aumasson
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrUATPeaCJTQZN2h=ct6HH-xLt4V8T0PfPHNFGFN2HWtTA@mail.gmail.com>
Hi all,
I don't know what your design requirements are for this. It looks like
you're generating some kind of crypto digest of a program, and you
need to avoid collisions. If you'd like to go with a PRF (keyed hash
function) that uses some kernel secret key, then I'd strongly suggest
using Keyed-Blake2. Alternatively, if you need for userspace to be
able to calculate the same hash, and don't want to use some kernel
secret, then I'd still suggest using Blake2, which will be fast and
secure.
If you can wait until January, I'll work on a commit adding the
primitive to the tree. I've already written it and I just need to get
things cleaned up.
> Blake2 is both less stable (didn't they slightly change it recently?)
No, Blake2 is very stable. It's also extremely secure and has been
extensively studied. Not to mention it's faster than SHA2. And if you
want to use it as a PRF, it's obvious better suited and faster to use
Blake2's keyed PRF mode than HMAC-SHA2.
If you don't care about performance, and you don't want to use a PRF,
then just use SHA2-256. If you're particularly concerned about certain
types of attacks, you could go with SHA2-512 truncated to 256 bytes,
but somehow I doubt you need this.
Anyway, the take away is: stop using SHA1. It's time has come.
> Everyone, please, please, please don't open-code crypto primitives.
> Is this and the code above it even correct? It might be but on a very
I shuttered looking at this too. How did this possibly make it past
review? The attitude toward crypto here is generally *terrifying*.
Unless you're a professional cryptographer, the only correct attitude
to have is a careful and conservative one.
> At the very least, there should be a separate function that calculates
> the hash of a buffer and that function should explicitly run itself
> against test vectors of various lengths to make sure that it's
> calculating what it claims to be calculating. And it doesn't look
> like the userspace code has landed, so, if this thing isn't
> calculating SHA1 correctly, it's plausible that no one has noticed.
If userspace hasn't landed, can we get away with changing this code
after 4.10? Or should we just fix it before 4.10? Or should we revert
it before 4.10? Development-policy-things like this I have zero clue
about, so I heed to your guidance.
Jason
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH iproute2 v3 4/4] ifstat: Add "sw only" extended statistics to ifstat
From: Nogah Frankel @ 2016-12-22 16:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev
Cc: stephen, roopa, roszenrami, ogerlitz, jiri, eladr, yotamg, idosch,
Nogah Frankel
In-Reply-To: <1482423795-6531-1-git-send-email-nogahf@mellanox.com>
Add support for extended statistics of SW only type, for counting only the
packets that went via the cpu. (useful for systems with forward
offloading). It reads it from filter type IFLA_STATS_LINK_OFFLOAD_XSTATS
and sub type IFLA_OFFLOAD_XSTATS_CPU_HIT.
It is under the name 'software'
(or any shorten of it as 'soft' or simply 's')
For example:
ifstat -x s
Signed-off-by: Nogah Frankel <nogahf@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
---
misc/ifstat.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/misc/ifstat.c b/misc/ifstat.c
index 8325ac7..79c0dba 100644
--- a/misc/ifstat.c
+++ b/misc/ifstat.c
@@ -730,7 +730,8 @@ static void xstat_usage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr,
"Usage: ifstat supported xstats:\n"
-" 64bits default stats, with 64 bits support\n");
+" 64bits default stats, with 64 bits support\n"
+" software SW stats. Counts only packets that went via the CPU\n");
}
struct extended_stats_options_t {
@@ -745,6 +746,7 @@ struct extended_stats_options_t {
*/
static const struct extended_stats_options_t extended_stats_options[] = {
{"64bits", IFLA_STATS_LINK_64, NO_SUB_TYPE},
+ {"software", IFLA_STATS_LINK_OFFLOAD_XSTATS, IFLA_OFFLOAD_XSTATS_CPU_HIT},
};
static bool get_filter_type(char *name)
--
2.4.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH iproute2 v3 3/4] ifstat: Add 64 bits based stats to extended statistics
From: Nogah Frankel @ 2016-12-22 16:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev
Cc: stephen, roopa, roszenrami, ogerlitz, jiri, eladr, yotamg, idosch,
Nogah Frankel
In-Reply-To: <1482423795-6531-1-git-send-email-nogahf@mellanox.com>
The default stats for ifstat are 32 bits based.
The kernel supports 64 bits based stats. (They are returned in struct
rtnl_link_stats64 which is an exact copy of struct rtnl_link_stats, in
which the "normal" stats are returned, but with fields of u64 instead of
u32). This patch adds them as an extended stats.
It is read with filter type IFLA_STATS_LINK_64 and no sub type.
It is under the name 64bits
(or any shorten of it as "64")
For example:
ifstat -x 64bit
Signed-off-by: Nogah Frankel <nogahf@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
---
misc/ifstat.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/misc/ifstat.c b/misc/ifstat.c
index ce666b3..8325ac7 100644
--- a/misc/ifstat.c
+++ b/misc/ifstat.c
@@ -729,7 +729,8 @@ static int verify_forging(int fd)
static void xstat_usage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr,
-"Usage: ifstat supported xstats:\n");
+"Usage: ifstat supported xstats:\n"
+" 64bits default stats, with 64 bits support\n");
}
struct extended_stats_options_t {
@@ -743,6 +744,7 @@ struct extended_stats_options_t {
* Name length must be under 64 chars.
*/
static const struct extended_stats_options_t extended_stats_options[] = {
+ {"64bits", IFLA_STATS_LINK_64, NO_SUB_TYPE},
};
static bool get_filter_type(char *name)
--
2.4.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH iproute2 v3 1/4] ifstat: Includes reorder
From: Nogah Frankel @ 2016-12-22 16:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev
Cc: stephen, roopa, roszenrami, ogerlitz, jiri, eladr, yotamg, idosch,
Nogah Frankel
In-Reply-To: <1482423795-6531-1-git-send-email-nogahf@mellanox.com>
Reorder the includes order in misc/ifstat.c to match convention.
Signed-off-by: Nogah Frankel <nogahf@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
---
misc/ifstat.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/misc/ifstat.c b/misc/ifstat.c
index 92d67b0..5bcbcc8 100644
--- a/misc/ifstat.c
+++ b/misc/ifstat.c
@@ -28,12 +28,12 @@
#include <math.h>
#include <getopt.h>
-#include <libnetlink.h>
-#include <json_writer.h>
#include <linux/if.h>
#include <linux/if_link.h>
-#include <SNAPSHOT.h>
+#include "libnetlink.h"
+#include "json_writer.h"
+#include "SNAPSHOT.h"
int dump_zeros;
int reset_history;
--
2.4.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH iproute2 v3 2/4] ifstat: Add extended statistics to ifstat
From: Nogah Frankel @ 2016-12-22 16:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev
Cc: stephen, roopa, roszenrami, ogerlitz, jiri, eladr, yotamg, idosch,
Nogah Frankel
In-Reply-To: <1482423795-6531-1-git-send-email-nogahf@mellanox.com>
Extended stats are part of the RTM_GETSTATS method. This patch adds them
to ifstat.
While extended stats can come in many forms, we support only the
rtnl_link_stats64 struct for them (which is the 64 bits version of struct
rtnl_link_stats).
We support stats in the main nesting level, or one lower.
The extension can be called by its name or any shorten of it. If there is
more than one matched, the first one will be picked.
To get the extended stats the flag -x <stats type> is used.
Signed-off-by: Nogah Frankel <nogahf@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
---
misc/ifstat.c | 161 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 146 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/misc/ifstat.c b/misc/ifstat.c
index 5bcbcc8..ce666b3 100644
--- a/misc/ifstat.c
+++ b/misc/ifstat.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
#include "libnetlink.h"
#include "json_writer.h"
#include "SNAPSHOT.h"
+#include "utils.h"
int dump_zeros;
int reset_history;
@@ -48,17 +49,21 @@ int pretty;
double W;
char **patterns;
int npatterns;
+bool is_extended;
+int filter_type;
+int sub_type;
char info_source[128];
int source_mismatch;
#define MAXS (sizeof(struct rtnl_link_stats)/sizeof(__u32))
+#define NO_SUB_TYPE 0xffff
struct ifstat_ent {
struct ifstat_ent *next;
char *name;
int ifindex;
- unsigned long long val[MAXS];
+ __u64 val[MAXS];
double rate[MAXS];
__u32 ival[MAXS];
};
@@ -106,6 +111,48 @@ static int match(const char *id)
return 0;
}
+static int get_nlmsg_extended(const struct sockaddr_nl *who,
+ struct nlmsghdr *m, void *arg)
+{
+ struct if_stats_msg *ifsm = NLMSG_DATA(m);
+ struct rtattr *tb[IFLA_STATS_MAX+1];
+ int len = m->nlmsg_len;
+ struct ifstat_ent *n;
+
+ if (m->nlmsg_type != RTM_NEWSTATS)
+ return 0;
+
+ len -= NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(*ifsm));
+ if (len < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ parse_rtattr(tb, IFLA_STATS_MAX, IFLA_STATS_RTA(ifsm), len);
+ if (tb[filter_type] == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ n = malloc(sizeof(*n));
+ if (!n)
+ abort();
+
+ n->ifindex = ifsm->ifindex;
+ n->name = strdup(ll_index_to_name(ifsm->ifindex));
+
+ if (sub_type == NO_SUB_TYPE) {
+ memcpy(&n->val, RTA_DATA(tb[filter_type]), sizeof(n->val));
+ } else {
+ struct rtattr *attr;
+
+ attr = parse_rtattr_one_nested(sub_type, tb[filter_type]);
+ if (attr == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ memcpy(&n->val, RTA_DATA(attr), sizeof(n->val));
+ }
+ memset(&n->rate, 0, sizeof(n->rate));
+ n->next = kern_db;
+ kern_db = n;
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int get_nlmsg(const struct sockaddr_nl *who,
struct nlmsghdr *m, void *arg)
{
@@ -147,18 +194,34 @@ static void load_info(void)
{
struct ifstat_ent *db, *n;
struct rtnl_handle rth;
+ __u32 filter_mask;
if (rtnl_open(&rth, 0) < 0)
exit(1);
- if (rtnl_wilddump_request(&rth, AF_INET, RTM_GETLINK) < 0) {
- perror("Cannot send dump request");
- exit(1);
- }
+ if (is_extended) {
+ ll_init_map(&rth);
+ filter_mask = IFLA_STATS_FILTER_BIT(filter_type);
+ if (rtnl_wilddump_stats_req_filter(&rth, AF_UNSPEC, RTM_GETSTATS,
+ filter_mask) < 0) {
+ perror("Cannot send dump request");
+ exit(1);
+ }
- if (rtnl_dump_filter(&rth, get_nlmsg, NULL) < 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Dump terminated\n");
- exit(1);
+ if (rtnl_dump_filter(&rth, get_nlmsg_extended, NULL) < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Dump terminated\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (rtnl_wilddump_request(&rth, AF_INET, RTM_GETLINK) < 0) {
+ perror("Cannot send dump request");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ if (rtnl_dump_filter(&rth, get_nlmsg, NULL) < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Dump terminated\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
}
rtnl_close(&rth);
@@ -553,10 +616,17 @@ static void update_db(int interval)
}
for (i = 0; i < MAXS; i++) {
double sample;
- unsigned long incr = h1->ival[i] - n->ival[i];
+ __u64 incr;
+
+ if (is_extended) {
+ incr = h1->val[i] - n->val[i];
+ n->val[i] = h1->val[i];
+ } else {
+ incr = (__u32) (h1->ival[i] - n->ival[i]);
+ n->val[i] += incr;
+ n->ival[i] = h1->ival[i];
+ }
- n->val[i] += incr;
- n->ival[i] = h1->ival[i];
sample = (double)(incr*1000)/interval;
if (interval >= scan_interval) {
n->rate[i] += W*(sample-n->rate[i]);
@@ -656,6 +726,48 @@ static int verify_forging(int fd)
return -1;
}
+static void xstat_usage(void)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr,
+"Usage: ifstat supported xstats:\n");
+}
+
+struct extended_stats_options_t {
+ char *name;
+ int id;
+ int sub_type;
+};
+
+/* Note: if one xstat name is subset of another, it should be before it in this
+ * list.
+ * Name length must be under 64 chars.
+ */
+static const struct extended_stats_options_t extended_stats_options[] = {
+};
+
+static bool get_filter_type(char *name)
+{
+ int name_len;
+ int i;
+
+ name_len = strlen(name);
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(extended_stats_options); i++) {
+ const struct extended_stats_options_t *xstat;
+
+ xstat = &extended_stats_options[i];
+ if (strncmp(name, xstat->name, name_len) == 0) {
+ filter_type = xstat->id;
+ sub_type = xstat->sub_type;
+ strcpy(name, xstat->name);
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ fprintf(stderr, "invalid ifstat extension %s\n", name);
+ xstat_usage();
+ return false;
+}
+
static void usage(void) __attribute__((noreturn));
static void usage(void)
@@ -673,7 +785,8 @@ static void usage(void)
" -s, --noupdate don't update history\n"
" -t, --interval=SECS report average over the last SECS\n"
" -V, --version output version information\n"
-" -z, --zeros show entries with zero activity\n");
+" -z, --zeros show entries with zero activity\n"
+" -x, --extended=TYPE show extended stats of TYPE\n");
exit(-1);
}
@@ -691,18 +804,22 @@ static const struct option longopts[] = {
{ "interval", 1, 0, 't' },
{ "version", 0, 0, 'V' },
{ "zeros", 0, 0, 'z' },
+ { "extended", 1, 0, 'x'},
{ 0 }
};
+
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
char hist_name[128];
struct sockaddr_un sun;
FILE *hist_fp = NULL;
+ char stats_type[64];
int ch;
int fd;
- while ((ch = getopt_long(argc, argv, "hjpvVzrnasd:t:e",
+ is_extended = false;
+ while ((ch = getopt_long(argc, argv, "hjpvVzrnasd:t:ex:",
longopts, NULL)) != EOF) {
switch (ch) {
case 'z':
@@ -743,6 +860,11 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
exit(-1);
}
break;
+ case 'x':
+ is_extended = true;
+ memset(stats_type, 0, 64);
+ strncpy(stats_type, optarg, 63);
+ break;
case 'v':
case 'V':
printf("ifstat utility, iproute2-ss%s\n", SNAPSHOT);
@@ -757,6 +879,10 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
argc -= optind;
argv += optind;
+ if (is_extended)
+ if (!get_filter_type(stats_type))
+ exit(-1);
+
sun.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
sun.sun_path[0] = 0;
sprintf(sun.sun_path+1, "ifstat%d", getuid());
@@ -795,8 +921,13 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
snprintf(hist_name, sizeof(hist_name),
"%s", getenv("IFSTAT_HISTORY"));
else
- snprintf(hist_name, sizeof(hist_name),
- "%s/.ifstat.u%d", P_tmpdir, getuid());
+ if (!is_extended)
+ snprintf(hist_name, sizeof(hist_name),
+ "%s/.ifstat.u%d", P_tmpdir, getuid());
+ else
+ snprintf(hist_name, sizeof(hist_name),
+ "%s/.%s_ifstat.u%d", P_tmpdir, stats_type,
+ getuid());
if (reset_history)
unlink(hist_name);
--
2.4.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH iproute2 v3 0/4] update ifstat for new stats
From: Nogah Frankel @ 2016-12-22 16:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev
Cc: stephen, roopa, roszenrami, ogerlitz, jiri, eladr, yotamg, idosch,
Nogah Frankel
Previously stats were gotten by RTM_GETLINK which returns 32 bits based
statistics. It supports only one type of stats.
Lately, a new method to get stats was added - RTM_GETSTATS. It supports
ability to choose stats type. The basic stats were changed from 32 bits
based to 64 bits based.
This patchset adds ifstat the ability to get extended stats by this
method. Its adds two types of extended stats:
64bits - the same as the "normal" stats but get the stats from the cpu
in 64 bits based struct.
SW - for packets that hit cpu.
---
v2->v3:
- patch 1/4:
- add a new patch to reorder includes in misc/ifstat.c
- patch 2/4: (previously 1/3)
- fix typos.
- change error print to use fprintf.
v1->v2:
- change from using RTM_GETSTATS always to using it only for extended
stats.
- Add 64bits extended stats type.
Nogah Frankel (4):
ifstat: Includes reorder
ifstat: Add extended statistics to ifstat
ifstat: Add 64 bits based stats to extended statistics
ifstat: Add "sw only" extended statistics to ifstat
misc/ifstat.c | 171 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 153 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
--
2.4.3
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH net] net/mlx4_en: Fix user prio field in XDP forward
From: David Miller @ 2016-12-22 16:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: tariqt; +Cc: netdev, eranbe, saeedm, kafai
In-Reply-To: <1482409978-17590-1-git-send-email-tariqt@mellanox.com>
From: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Dec 2016 14:32:58 +0200
> The user prio field is wrong (and overflows) in the XDP forward
> flow.
> This is a result of a bad value for num_tx_rings_p_up, which should
> account all XDP TX rings, as they operate for the same user prio.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com>
> Reported-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Applied.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2] stmmac: CSR clock configuration fix
From: David Miller @ 2016-12-22 16:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Joao.Pinto
Cc: peppe.cavallaro, seraphin.bonnaffe, hock.leong.kweh,
niklas.cassel, pavel, linux-kernel, netdev
In-Reply-To: <7b395fd7dfd0c808243a744393473cbbf89b268a.1482410161.git.jpinto@synopsys.com>
From: Joao Pinto <Joao.Pinto@synopsys.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Dec 2016 12:38:00 +0000
> When testing stmmac with my QoS reference design I checked a problem in the
> CSR clock configuration that was impossibilitating the phy discovery, since
> every read operation returned 0x0000ffff. This patch fixes the issue.
>
> Signed-off-by: Joao Pinto <jpinto@synopsys.com>
Applied.
^ permalink raw reply
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