* [PATCH v2] scsi: bfa: Increase requested firmware version to 3.2.5.1
From: Benjamin Poirier @ 2016-12-24 4:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Martin K. Petersen
Cc: Tim Ehlers, Rasesh Mody, Anil Gurumurthy, Sudarsana Kalluru,
James E.J. Bottomley, linux-scsi, netdev, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <BLUPR0701MB15724638DA0BB8FB5CB9B3CF9F940@BLUPR0701MB1572.namprd07.prod.outlook.com>
bna & bfa firmware version 3.2.5.1 was submitted to linux-firmware on
Feb 17 19:10:20 2015 -0500 in 0ab54ff1dc ("linux-firmware: Add QLogic BR
Series Adapter Firmware").
bna was updated to use the newer firmware on Feb 19 16:02:32 2015 -0500 in
3f307c3d70 ("bna: Update the Driver and Firmware Version")
bfa was not updated. I presume this was an oversight but it broke support
for bfa+bna cards such as the following
04:00.0 Fibre Channel [0c04]: Brocade Communications Systems, Inc.
1010/1020/1007/1741 10Gbps CNA [1657:0014] (rev 01)
04:00.1 Fibre Channel [0c04]: Brocade Communications Systems, Inc.
1010/1020/1007/1741 10Gbps CNA [1657:0014] (rev 01)
04:00.2 Ethernet controller [0200]: Brocade Communications Systems,
Inc. 1010/1020/1007/1741 10Gbps CNA [1657:0014] (rev 01)
04:00.3 Ethernet controller [0200]: Brocade Communications Systems,
Inc. 1010/1020/1007/1741 10Gbps CNA [1657:0014] (rev 01)
Currently, if the bfa module is loaded first, bna fails to probe the
respective devices with
[ 215.026787] bna: QLogic BR-series 10G Ethernet driver - version: 3.2.25.1
[ 215.043707] bna 0000:04:00.2: bar0 mapped to ffffc90001fc0000, len 262144
[ 215.060656] bna 0000:04:00.2: initialization failed err=1
[ 215.073893] bna 0000:04:00.3: bar0 mapped to ffffc90002040000, len 262144
[ 215.090644] bna 0000:04:00.3: initialization failed err=1
Whereas if bna is loaded first, bfa fails with
[ 249.592109] QLogic BR-series BFA FC/FCOE SCSI driver - version: 3.2.25.0
[ 249.610738] bfa 0000:04:00.0: Running firmware version is incompatible with the driver version
[ 249.833513] bfa 0000:04:00.0: bfa init failed
[ 249.833919] scsi host6: QLogic BR-series FC/FCOE Adapter, hwpath: 0000:04:00.0 driver: 3.2.25.0
[ 249.841446] bfa 0000:04:00.1: Running firmware version is incompatible with the driver version
[ 250.045449] bfa 0000:04:00.1: bfa init failed
[ 250.045962] scsi host7: QLogic BR-series FC/FCOE Adapter, hwpath: 0000:04:00.1 driver: 3.2.25.0
Increase bfa's requested firmware version. Also increase the driver
version.
I only tested that all of the devices probe without error.
Reported-by: Tim Ehlers <tehlers@gwdg.de>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@suse.com>
Acked-by: Rasesh Mody <rasesh.mody@cavium.com>
---
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfad.c | 6 +++---
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfad_drv.h | 2 +-
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Changes v1-v2:
Also increase the driver version
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfad.c b/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfad.c
index 9d253cb..e70410b 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfad.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfad.c
@@ -64,9 +64,9 @@ int max_rport_logins = BFA_FCS_MAX_RPORT_LOGINS;
u32 bfi_image_cb_size, bfi_image_ct_size, bfi_image_ct2_size;
u32 *bfi_image_cb, *bfi_image_ct, *bfi_image_ct2;
-#define BFAD_FW_FILE_CB "cbfw-3.2.3.0.bin"
-#define BFAD_FW_FILE_CT "ctfw-3.2.3.0.bin"
-#define BFAD_FW_FILE_CT2 "ct2fw-3.2.3.0.bin"
+#define BFAD_FW_FILE_CB "cbfw-3.2.5.1.bin"
+#define BFAD_FW_FILE_CT "ctfw-3.2.5.1.bin"
+#define BFAD_FW_FILE_CT2 "ct2fw-3.2.5.1.bin"
static u32 *bfad_load_fwimg(struct pci_dev *pdev);
static void bfad_free_fwimg(void);
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfad_drv.h b/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfad_drv.h
index f9e8620..cfcfff4 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfad_drv.h
+++ b/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfad_drv.h
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@
#ifdef BFA_DRIVER_VERSION
#define BFAD_DRIVER_VERSION BFA_DRIVER_VERSION
#else
-#define BFAD_DRIVER_VERSION "3.2.25.0"
+#define BFAD_DRIVER_VERSION "3.2.25.1"
#endif
#define BFAD_PROTO_NAME FCPI_NAME
--
2.10.2
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH net] net: korina: Fix NAPI versus resources freeing
From: Florian Fainelli @ 2016-12-24 3:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev; +Cc: davem, alex, phil, Florian Fainelli
Commit beb0babfb77e ("korina: disable napi on close and restart")
introduced calls to napi_disable() that were missing before,
unfortunately this leaves a small window during which NAPI has a chance
to run, yet we just freed resources since korina_free_ring() has been
called:
Fix this by disabling NAPI first then freeing resource, and make sure
that we also cancel the restart taks before doing the resource freeing.
Fixes: beb0babfb77e ("korina: disable napi on close and restart")
Reported-by: Alexandros C. Couloumbis <alex@ozo.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/korina.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/korina.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/korina.c
index cbeea915f026..8037426ec50f 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/korina.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/korina.c
@@ -900,10 +900,10 @@ static void korina_restart_task(struct work_struct *work)
DMA_STAT_DONE | DMA_STAT_HALT | DMA_STAT_ERR,
&lp->rx_dma_regs->dmasm);
- korina_free_ring(dev);
-
napi_disable(&lp->napi);
+ korina_free_ring(dev);
+
if (korina_init(dev) < 0) {
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: cannot restart device\n", dev->name);
return;
@@ -1064,12 +1064,12 @@ static int korina_close(struct net_device *dev)
tmp = tmp | DMA_STAT_DONE | DMA_STAT_HALT | DMA_STAT_ERR;
writel(tmp, &lp->rx_dma_regs->dmasm);
- korina_free_ring(dev);
-
napi_disable(&lp->napi);
cancel_work_sync(&lp->restart_task);
+ korina_free_ring(dev);
+
free_irq(lp->rx_irq, dev);
free_irq(lp->tx_irq, dev);
free_irq(lp->ovr_irq, dev);
--
2.9.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [RFC PATCH 4.10 1/6] crypto/sha256: Refactor the API so it can be used without shash
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2016-12-24 2:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andy Lutomirski
Cc: Daniel Borkmann, Netdev, LKML, Linux Crypto Mailing List,
Jason A. Donenfeld, Hannes Frederic Sowa, Alexei Starovoitov,
Eric Dumazet, Eric Biggers, Tom Herbert, David S. Miller,
Ard Biesheuvel, Herbert Xu
In-Reply-To: <942b91f25a63b22ec4946378a1fffe78d655cf18.1482545792.git.luto@kernel.org>
On Fri, Dec 23, 2016 at 6:22 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> wrote:
> There are some pieecs of kernel code that want to compute SHA256
> directly without going through the crypto core. Adjust the exported
> API to decouple it from the crypto core.
>
> I suspect this will very slightly speed up the SHA256 shash operations
> as well by reducing the amount of indirection involved.
>
I should also mention: there's a nice potential cleanup that's
possible on top of this. Currently, most of the accelerated SHA256
implementations just swap out the block function. Another approach to
enabling this would be to restructure sha256_update along the lines
of:
sha256_block_fn_t fn = arch_sha256_block_fn(len);
sha256_base_do_update(sctx, data, len, arch_sha256_block_fn(len));
The idea being that arch code can decide whether to use an accelerated
block function based on context (x86, for example, can't always use
xmm regs) and length (on x86, using the accelerated versions for short
digests is very slow due to the state save/restore that happens) and
then the core code can just use it.
This would allow a lot of the boilerplate that this patch was forced
to modify to be deleted outright.
--Andy
^ permalink raw reply
* [RFC PATCH 4.10 6/6] net: Rename TCA*BPF_DIGEST to ..._SHA256
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2016-12-24 2:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Borkmann, Netdev, LKML, Linux Crypto Mailing List
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld, Hannes Frederic Sowa, Alexei Starovoitov,
Eric Dumazet, Eric Biggers, Tom Herbert, David S. Miller,
Andy Lutomirski, Alexei Starovoitov
In-Reply-To: <cover.1482545792.git.luto@kernel.org>
This makes it easier to add another digest algorithm down the road if
needed. It also serves to force any programs that might have been
written against a kernel that had the old field name to notice the
change and make any necessary changes.
This shouldn't violate any stable API policies, as no released kernel
has ever had TCA*BPF_DIGEST.
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
---
include/uapi/linux/pkt_cls.h | 2 +-
include/uapi/linux/tc_act/tc_bpf.h | 2 +-
net/sched/act_bpf.c | 2 +-
net/sched/cls_bpf.c | 2 +-
4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/pkt_cls.h b/include/uapi/linux/pkt_cls.h
index cb4bcdc58543..ac6b300c1550 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/pkt_cls.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/pkt_cls.h
@@ -397,7 +397,7 @@ enum {
TCA_BPF_NAME,
TCA_BPF_FLAGS,
TCA_BPF_FLAGS_GEN,
- TCA_BPF_DIGEST,
+ TCA_BPF_SHA256,
__TCA_BPF_MAX,
};
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/tc_act/tc_bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/tc_act/tc_bpf.h
index a6b88a6f7f71..eae18a7430eb 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/tc_act/tc_bpf.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/tc_act/tc_bpf.h
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ enum {
TCA_ACT_BPF_FD,
TCA_ACT_BPF_NAME,
TCA_ACT_BPF_PAD,
- TCA_ACT_BPF_DIGEST,
+ TCA_ACT_BPF_SHA256,
__TCA_ACT_BPF_MAX,
};
#define TCA_ACT_BPF_MAX (__TCA_ACT_BPF_MAX - 1)
diff --git a/net/sched/act_bpf.c b/net/sched/act_bpf.c
index 1c60317f0121..3868a66d0b24 100644
--- a/net/sched/act_bpf.c
+++ b/net/sched/act_bpf.c
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ static int tcf_bpf_dump_ebpf_info(const struct tcf_bpf *prog,
nla_put_string(skb, TCA_ACT_BPF_NAME, prog->bpf_name))
return -EMSGSIZE;
- nla = nla_reserve(skb, TCA_ACT_BPF_DIGEST,
+ nla = nla_reserve(skb, TCA_ACT_BPF_SHA256,
sizeof(prog->filter->digest));
if (nla == NULL)
return -EMSGSIZE;
diff --git a/net/sched/cls_bpf.c b/net/sched/cls_bpf.c
index adc776048d1a..6fc110321621 100644
--- a/net/sched/cls_bpf.c
+++ b/net/sched/cls_bpf.c
@@ -555,7 +555,7 @@ static int cls_bpf_dump_ebpf_info(const struct cls_bpf_prog *prog,
nla_put_string(skb, TCA_BPF_NAME, prog->bpf_name))
return -EMSGSIZE;
- nla = nla_reserve(skb, TCA_BPF_DIGEST, sizeof(prog->filter->digest));
+ nla = nla_reserve(skb, TCA_BPF_SHA256, sizeof(prog->filter->digest));
if (nla == NULL)
return -EMSGSIZE;
--
2.9.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* [RFC PATCH 4.10 5/6] bpf: Rename fdinfo's prog_digest to prog_sha256
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2016-12-24 2:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Borkmann, Netdev, LKML, Linux Crypto Mailing List
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld, Hannes Frederic Sowa, Alexei Starovoitov,
Eric Dumazet, Eric Biggers, Tom Herbert, David S. Miller,
Andy Lutomirski, Alexei Starovoitov
In-Reply-To: <cover.1482545792.git.luto@kernel.org>
This makes it easier to add another digest algorithm down the road
if needed. It also serves to force any programs that might have
been written against a kernel that had 'prog_digest' to be updated.
This shouldn't violate any stable API policies, as no released
kernel has ever had 'prog_digest'.
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
---
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index e89acea22ecf..956370b80296 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -694,7 +694,7 @@ static void bpf_prog_show_fdinfo(struct seq_file *m, struct file *filp)
seq_printf(m,
"prog_type:\t%u\n"
"prog_jited:\t%u\n"
- "prog_digest:\t%s\n"
+ "prog_sha256:\t%s\n"
"memlock:\t%llu\n",
prog->type,
prog->jited,
--
2.9.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* [RFC PATCH 4.10 4/6] bpf: Avoid copying the entire BPF program when hashing it
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2016-12-24 2:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Borkmann, Netdev, LKML, Linux Crypto Mailing List
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld, Hannes Frederic Sowa, Alexei Starovoitov,
Eric Dumazet, Eric Biggers, Tom Herbert, David S. Miller,
Andy Lutomirski, Alexei Starovoitov
In-Reply-To: <cover.1482545792.git.luto@kernel.org>
The sha256 helpers can consume a message incrementally, so there's no need
to allocate a buffer to store the whole blob to be hashed.
This may be a slight slowdown for very long messages because gcc can't
inline the sha256_update() calls. For reasonably-sized programs,
however, this should be a considerable speedup as vmalloc() is quite
slow.
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
---
kernel/bpf/core.c | 34 ++++++++++++++--------------------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
index 911993863799..1c2931f505af 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
@@ -149,43 +149,37 @@ void __bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *fp)
int bpf_prog_calc_digest(struct bpf_prog *fp)
{
struct sha256_state sha;
- u32 i, psize;
- struct bpf_insn *dst;
+ u32 i;
bool was_ld_map;
- u8 *raw;
-
- psize = bpf_prog_insn_size(fp);
- raw = vmalloc(psize);
- if (!raw)
- return -ENOMEM;
sha256_init(&sha);
/* We need to take out the map fd for the digest calculation
* since they are unstable from user space side.
*/
- dst = (void *)raw;
for (i = 0, was_ld_map = false; i < fp->len; i++) {
- dst[i] = fp->insnsi[i];
+ struct bpf_insn insn = fp->insnsi[i];
+
if (!was_ld_map &&
- dst[i].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW) &&
- dst[i].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD) {
+ insn.code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW) &&
+ insn.src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD) {
was_ld_map = true;
- dst[i].imm = 0;
+ insn.imm = 0;
} else if (was_ld_map &&
- dst[i].code == 0 &&
- dst[i].dst_reg == 0 &&
- dst[i].src_reg == 0 &&
- dst[i].off == 0) {
+ insn.code == 0 &&
+ insn.dst_reg == 0 &&
+ insn.src_reg == 0 &&
+ insn.off == 0) {
was_ld_map = false;
- dst[i].imm = 0;
+ insn.imm = 0;
} else {
was_ld_map = false;
}
+
+ sha256_update(&sha, (const u8 *)&insn, sizeof(insn));
}
- sha256_finup(&sha, raw, psize, fp->digest);
- vfree(raw);
+ sha256_final(&sha, fp->digest);
return 0;
}
--
2.9.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* [RFC PATCH 4.10 3/6] bpf: Use SHA256 instead of SHA1 for bpf digests
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2016-12-24 2:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Borkmann, Netdev, LKML, Linux Crypto Mailing List
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld, Hannes Frederic Sowa, Alexei Starovoitov,
Eric Dumazet, Eric Biggers, Tom Herbert, David S. Miller,
Andy Lutomirski, Alexei Starovoitov
In-Reply-To: <cover.1482545792.git.luto@kernel.org>
BPF digests are intended to be used to avoid reloading programs that
are already loaded. For use cases (CRIU?) where untrusted programs
are involved, intentional hash collisions could cause the wrong BPF
program to execute. Additionally, if BPF digests are ever used
in-kernel to skip verification, a hash collision could give privilege
escalation directly.
SHA1 is no longer considered adequately collision-resistant (see, for
example, all the major browsers dropping support for SHA1
certificates). Use SHA256 instead.
I moved the digest field to keep all of the bpf program metadata in
the same cache line.
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
---
include/linux/filter.h | 11 +++--------
init/Kconfig | 1 +
kernel/bpf/core.c | 41 +++++++----------------------------------
3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h
index 702314253797..23df2574e30c 100644
--- a/include/linux/filter.h
+++ b/include/linux/filter.h
@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
-#include <linux/cryptohash.h>
+
+#include <crypto/sha.h>
#include <net/sch_generic.h>
@@ -408,11 +409,11 @@ struct bpf_prog {
kmemcheck_bitfield_end(meta);
enum bpf_prog_type type; /* Type of BPF program */
u32 len; /* Number of filter blocks */
- u32 digest[SHA_DIGEST_WORDS]; /* Program digest */
struct bpf_prog_aux *aux; /* Auxiliary fields */
struct sock_fprog_kern *orig_prog; /* Original BPF program */
unsigned int (*bpf_func)(const void *ctx,
const struct bpf_insn *insn);
+ u8 digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; /* Program digest */
/* Instructions for interpreter */
union {
struct sock_filter insns[0];
@@ -519,12 +520,6 @@ static inline u32 bpf_prog_insn_size(const struct bpf_prog *prog)
return prog->len * sizeof(struct bpf_insn);
}
-static inline u32 bpf_prog_digest_scratch_size(const struct bpf_prog *prog)
-{
- return round_up(bpf_prog_insn_size(prog) +
- sizeof(__be64) + 1, SHA_MESSAGE_BYTES);
-}
-
static inline unsigned int bpf_prog_size(unsigned int proglen)
{
return max(sizeof(struct bpf_prog),
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 223b734abccd..5a4e2d99cc38 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1634,6 +1634,7 @@ config BPF_SYSCALL
bool "Enable bpf() system call"
select ANON_INODES
select BPF
+ select CRYPTO_SHA256_LIB
default n
help
Enable the bpf() system call that allows to manipulate eBPF
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
index 1eb4f1303756..911993863799 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
@@ -148,22 +148,18 @@ void __bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *fp)
int bpf_prog_calc_digest(struct bpf_prog *fp)
{
- const u32 bits_offset = SHA_MESSAGE_BYTES - sizeof(__be64);
- u32 raw_size = bpf_prog_digest_scratch_size(fp);
- u32 ws[SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS];
- u32 i, bsize, psize, blocks;
+ struct sha256_state sha;
+ u32 i, psize;
struct bpf_insn *dst;
bool was_ld_map;
- u8 *raw, *todo;
- __be32 *result;
- __be64 *bits;
+ u8 *raw;
- raw = vmalloc(raw_size);
+ psize = bpf_prog_insn_size(fp);
+ raw = vmalloc(psize);
if (!raw)
return -ENOMEM;
- sha_init(fp->digest);
- memset(ws, 0, sizeof(ws));
+ sha256_init(&sha);
/* We need to take out the map fd for the digest calculation
* since they are unstable from user space side.
@@ -188,30 +184,7 @@ int bpf_prog_calc_digest(struct bpf_prog *fp)
}
}
- psize = bpf_prog_insn_size(fp);
- memset(&raw[psize], 0, raw_size - psize);
- raw[psize++] = 0x80;
-
- bsize = round_up(psize, SHA_MESSAGE_BYTES);
- blocks = bsize / SHA_MESSAGE_BYTES;
- todo = raw;
- if (bsize - psize >= sizeof(__be64)) {
- bits = (__be64 *)(todo + bsize - sizeof(__be64));
- } else {
- bits = (__be64 *)(todo + bsize + bits_offset);
- blocks++;
- }
- *bits = cpu_to_be64((psize - 1) << 3);
-
- while (blocks--) {
- sha_transform(fp->digest, todo, ws);
- todo += SHA_MESSAGE_BYTES;
- }
-
- result = (__force __be32 *)fp->digest;
- for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_WORDS; i++)
- result[i] = cpu_to_be32(fp->digest[i]);
-
+ sha256_finup(&sha, raw, psize, fp->digest);
vfree(raw);
return 0;
}
--
2.9.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* [RFC PATCH 4.10 2/6] crypto/sha256: Make the sha256 library functions selectable
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2016-12-24 2:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Borkmann, Netdev, LKML, Linux Crypto Mailing List
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld, Hannes Frederic Sowa, Alexei Starovoitov,
Eric Dumazet, Eric Biggers, Tom Herbert, David S. Miller,
Andy Lutomirski
In-Reply-To: <cover.1482545792.git.luto@kernel.org>
This will let other kernel code call into sha256_init(), etc. without
pulling in the core crypto code.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
---
crypto/Kconfig | 8 ++++++++
crypto/Makefile | 2 +-
crypto/sha256_generic.c | 4 ++++
include/crypto/sha.h | 4 ++++
4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/crypto/Kconfig b/crypto/Kconfig
index 160f08e721cc..85a2b3440c2b 100644
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -10,6 +10,13 @@ config XOR_BLOCKS
source "crypto/async_tx/Kconfig"
#
+# Cryptographic algorithms that are usable without the Crypto API.
+# None of these should have visible config options.
+#
+config CRYPTO_SHA256_LIB
+ bool
+
+#
# Cryptographic API Configuration
#
menuconfig CRYPTO
@@ -763,6 +770,7 @@ config CRYPTO_SHA512_MB
config CRYPTO_SHA256
tristate "SHA224 and SHA256 digest algorithm"
+ select CRYPTO_SHA256_LIB
select CRYPTO_HASH
help
SHA256 secure hash standard (DFIPS 180-2).
diff --git a/crypto/Makefile b/crypto/Makefile
index b8f0e3eb0791..d147d4c911f5 100644
--- a/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/Makefile
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_RMD160) += rmd160.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_RMD256) += rmd256.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_RMD320) += rmd320.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1) += sha1_generic.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256) += sha256_generic.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256_LIB) += sha256_generic.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512) += sha512_generic.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA3) += sha3_generic.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_WP512) += wp512.o
diff --git a/crypto/sha256_generic.c b/crypto/sha256_generic.c
index f2747893402c..9df71ac66dc4 100644
--- a/crypto/sha256_generic.c
+++ b/crypto/sha256_generic.c
@@ -261,6 +261,8 @@ void sha256_final(struct sha256_state *sctx, u8 *out)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(sha256_final);
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH
+
static int crypto_sha256_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len)
{
@@ -328,6 +330,8 @@ static void __exit sha256_generic_mod_fini(void)
module_init(sha256_generic_mod_init);
module_exit(sha256_generic_mod_fini);
+#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH */
+
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("SHA-224 and SHA-256 Secure Hash Algorithm");
diff --git a/include/crypto/sha.h b/include/crypto/sha.h
index 2b6978471605..381ba7fa5e3f 100644
--- a/include/crypto/sha.h
+++ b/include/crypto/sha.h
@@ -96,6 +96,8 @@ extern int crypto_sha1_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
extern int crypto_sha1_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len, u8 *hash);
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256_LIB
+
static inline void sha256_init(struct sha256_state *sctx)
{
sctx->state[0] = SHA256_H0;
@@ -121,6 +123,8 @@ static inline void sha256_finup(struct sha256_state *sctx, const u8 *data,
sha256_final(sctx, hash);
}
+#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256_LIB */
+
extern int crypto_sha512_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len);
--
2.9.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* [RFC PATCH 4.10 1/6] crypto/sha256: Refactor the API so it can be used without shash
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2016-12-24 2:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Borkmann, Netdev, LKML, Linux Crypto Mailing List
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld, Hannes Frederic Sowa, Alexei Starovoitov,
Eric Dumazet, Eric Biggers, Tom Herbert, David S. Miller,
Andy Lutomirski, Ard Biesheuvel, Herbert Xu
In-Reply-To: <cover.1482545792.git.luto@kernel.org>
There are some pieecs of kernel code that want to compute SHA256
directly without going through the crypto core. Adjust the exported
API to decouple it from the crypto core.
I suspect this will very slightly speed up the SHA256 shash operations
as well by reducing the amount of indirection involved.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
---
arch/arm/crypto/sha2-ce-glue.c | 10 ++++---
arch/arm/crypto/sha256_glue.c | 23 ++++++++++-----
arch/arm/crypto/sha256_neon_glue.c | 34 +++++++++++----------
arch/arm64/crypto/sha2-ce-glue.c | 13 ++++----
arch/arm64/crypto/sha256-glue.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++----------------
arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ssse3_glue.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++------------
arch/x86/purgatory/purgatory.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/purgatory/sha256.c | 25 ++--------------
arch/x86/purgatory/sha256.h | 22 --------------
crypto/sha256_generic.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------
include/crypto/sha.h | 29 ++++++++++++++----
include/crypto/sha256_base.h | 40 ++++++++-----------------
12 files changed, 184 insertions(+), 169 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 arch/x86/purgatory/sha256.h
diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/sha2-ce-glue.c b/arch/arm/crypto/sha2-ce-glue.c
index 0755b2d657f3..8832c2f85591 100644
--- a/arch/arm/crypto/sha2-ce-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm/crypto/sha2-ce-glue.c
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ static int sha2_ce_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
return crypto_sha256_arm_update(desc, data, len);
kernel_neon_begin();
- sha256_base_do_update(desc, data, len,
+ sha256_base_do_update(sctx, data, len,
(sha256_block_fn *)sha2_ce_transform);
kernel_neon_end();
@@ -48,17 +48,19 @@ static int sha2_ce_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
static int sha2_ce_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len, u8 *out)
{
+ struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
if (!may_use_simd())
return crypto_sha256_arm_finup(desc, data, len, out);
kernel_neon_begin();
if (len)
- sha256_base_do_update(desc, data, len,
+ sha256_base_do_update(sctx, data, len,
(sha256_block_fn *)sha2_ce_transform);
- sha256_base_do_finalize(desc, (sha256_block_fn *)sha2_ce_transform);
+ sha256_base_do_finalize(sctx, (sha256_block_fn *)sha2_ce_transform);
kernel_neon_end();
- return sha256_base_finish(desc, out);
+ return crypto_sha2_final(desc, out);
}
static int sha2_ce_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/sha256_glue.c b/arch/arm/crypto/sha256_glue.c
index a84e869ef900..405a29a9a9d3 100644
--- a/arch/arm/crypto/sha256_glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm/crypto/sha256_glue.c
@@ -36,27 +36,34 @@ asmlinkage void sha256_block_data_order(u32 *digest, const void *data,
int crypto_sha256_arm_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len)
{
+ struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
/* make sure casting to sha256_block_fn() is safe */
BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct sha256_state, state) != 0);
- return sha256_base_do_update(desc, data, len,
+ sha256_base_do_update(sctx, data, len,
(sha256_block_fn *)sha256_block_data_order);
+ return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_sha256_arm_update);
-static int sha256_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
+static int sha256_arm_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
{
- sha256_base_do_finalize(desc,
+ struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+ sha256_base_do_finalize(sctx,
(sha256_block_fn *)sha256_block_data_order);
- return sha256_base_finish(desc, out);
+ return crypto_sha2_final(desc, out);
}
int crypto_sha256_arm_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len, u8 *out)
{
- sha256_base_do_update(desc, data, len,
+ struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+ sha256_base_do_update(sctx, data, len,
(sha256_block_fn *)sha256_block_data_order);
- return sha256_final(desc, out);
+ return crypto_sha2_final(desc, out);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_sha256_arm_finup);
@@ -64,7 +71,7 @@ static struct shash_alg algs[] = { {
.digestsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
.init = sha256_base_init,
.update = crypto_sha256_arm_update,
- .final = sha256_final,
+ .final = sha256_arm_final,
.finup = crypto_sha256_arm_finup,
.descsize = sizeof(struct sha256_state),
.base = {
@@ -79,7 +86,7 @@ static struct shash_alg algs[] = { {
.digestsize = SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE,
.init = sha224_base_init,
.update = crypto_sha256_arm_update,
- .final = sha256_final,
+ .final = sha256_arm_final,
.finup = crypto_sha256_arm_finup,
.descsize = sizeof(struct sha256_state),
.base = {
diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/sha256_neon_glue.c b/arch/arm/crypto/sha256_neon_glue.c
index 39ccd658817e..40c85d1d4c1e 100644
--- a/arch/arm/crypto/sha256_neon_glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm/crypto/sha256_neon_glue.c
@@ -29,8 +29,8 @@
asmlinkage void sha256_block_data_order_neon(u32 *digest, const void *data,
unsigned int num_blks);
-static int sha256_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
- unsigned int len)
+static int sha256_neon_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
+ unsigned int len)
{
struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
@@ -39,41 +39,43 @@ static int sha256_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
return crypto_sha256_arm_update(desc, data, len);
kernel_neon_begin();
- sha256_base_do_update(desc, data, len,
+ sha256_base_do_update(sctx, data, len,
(sha256_block_fn *)sha256_block_data_order_neon);
kernel_neon_end();
return 0;
}
-static int sha256_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
- unsigned int len, u8 *out)
+static int sha256_neon_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
+ unsigned int len, u8 *out)
{
+ struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
if (!may_use_simd())
return crypto_sha256_arm_finup(desc, data, len, out);
kernel_neon_begin();
if (len)
- sha256_base_do_update(desc, data, len,
+ sha256_base_do_update(sctx, data, len,
(sha256_block_fn *)sha256_block_data_order_neon);
- sha256_base_do_finalize(desc,
+ sha256_base_do_finalize(sctx,
(sha256_block_fn *)sha256_block_data_order_neon);
kernel_neon_end();
- return sha256_base_finish(desc, out);
+ return crypto_sha2_final(desc, out);
}
-static int sha256_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
+static int sha256_neon_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
{
- return sha256_finup(desc, NULL, 0, out);
+ return sha256_neon_finup(desc, NULL, 0, out);
}
struct shash_alg sha256_neon_algs[] = { {
.digestsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
.init = sha256_base_init,
- .update = sha256_update,
- .final = sha256_final,
- .finup = sha256_finup,
+ .update = sha256_neon_update,
+ .final = sha256_neon_final,
+ .finup = sha256_neon_finup,
.descsize = sizeof(struct sha256_state),
.base = {
.cra_name = "sha256",
@@ -86,9 +88,9 @@ struct shash_alg sha256_neon_algs[] = { {
}, {
.digestsize = SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE,
.init = sha224_base_init,
- .update = sha256_update,
- .final = sha256_final,
- .finup = sha256_finup,
+ .update = sha256_neon_update,
+ .final = sha256_neon_final,
+ .finup = sha256_neon_finup,
.descsize = sizeof(struct sha256_state),
.base = {
.cra_name = "sha224",
diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/sha2-ce-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/sha2-ce-glue.c
index 7cd587564a41..e38dd301abce 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/sha2-ce-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/sha2-ce-glue.c
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ static int sha256_ce_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
sctx->finalize = 0;
kernel_neon_begin_partial(28);
- sha256_base_do_update(desc, data, len,
+ sha256_base_do_update(&sctx->sst, data, len,
(sha256_block_fn *)sha2_ce_transform);
kernel_neon_end();
@@ -64,13 +64,13 @@ static int sha256_ce_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
sctx->finalize = finalize;
kernel_neon_begin_partial(28);
- sha256_base_do_update(desc, data, len,
+ sha256_base_do_update(&sctx->sst, data, len,
(sha256_block_fn *)sha2_ce_transform);
if (!finalize)
- sha256_base_do_finalize(desc,
+ sha256_base_do_finalize(&sctx->sst,
(sha256_block_fn *)sha2_ce_transform);
kernel_neon_end();
- return sha256_base_finish(desc, out);
+ return crypto_sha2_final(desc, out);
}
static int sha256_ce_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
@@ -79,9 +79,10 @@ static int sha256_ce_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
sctx->finalize = 0;
kernel_neon_begin_partial(28);
- sha256_base_do_finalize(desc, (sha256_block_fn *)sha2_ce_transform);
+ sha256_base_do_finalize(&sctx->sst,
+ (sha256_block_fn *)sha2_ce_transform);
kernel_neon_end();
- return sha256_base_finish(desc, out);
+ return crypto_sha2_final(desc, out);
}
static struct shash_alg algs[] = { {
diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/sha256-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/sha256-glue.c
index a2226f841960..132a1ef89a71 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/sha256-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/sha256-glue.c
@@ -33,36 +33,39 @@ asmlinkage void sha256_block_data_order(u32 *digest, const void *data,
asmlinkage void sha256_block_neon(u32 *digest, const void *data,
unsigned int num_blks);
-static int sha256_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
- unsigned int len)
+static int sha256_update_arm64(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
+ unsigned int len)
{
- return sha256_base_do_update(desc, data, len,
- (sha256_block_fn *)sha256_block_data_order);
+ sha256_base_do_update(shash_desc_ctx(desc), data, len,
+ (sha256_block_fn *)sha256_block_data_order);
+ return 0;
}
-static int sha256_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
- unsigned int len, u8 *out)
+static int sha256_finup_arm64(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
+ unsigned int len, u8 *out)
{
+ struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
if (len)
- sha256_base_do_update(desc, data, len,
+ sha256_base_do_update(sctx, data, len,
(sha256_block_fn *)sha256_block_data_order);
- sha256_base_do_finalize(desc,
+ sha256_base_do_finalize(sctx,
(sha256_block_fn *)sha256_block_data_order);
- return sha256_base_finish(desc, out);
+ return crypto_sha2_final(desc, out);
}
-static int sha256_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
+static int sha256_final_arm64(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
{
- return sha256_finup(desc, NULL, 0, out);
+ return sha256_finup_arm64(desc, NULL, 0, out);
}
static struct shash_alg algs[] = { {
.digestsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
.init = sha256_base_init,
- .update = sha256_update,
- .final = sha256_final,
- .finup = sha256_finup,
+ .update = sha256_update_arm64,
+ .final = sha256_final_arm64,
+ .finup = sha256_finup_arm64,
.descsize = sizeof(struct sha256_state),
.base.cra_name = "sha256",
.base.cra_driver_name = "sha256-arm64",
@@ -73,9 +76,9 @@ static struct shash_alg algs[] = { {
}, {
.digestsize = SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE,
.init = sha224_base_init,
- .update = sha256_update,
- .final = sha256_final,
- .finup = sha256_finup,
+ .update = sha256_update_arm64,
+ .final = sha256_final_arm64,
+ .finup = sha256_finup_arm64,
.descsize = sizeof(struct sha256_state),
.base.cra_name = "sha224",
.base.cra_driver_name = "sha224-arm64",
@@ -88,18 +91,22 @@ static struct shash_alg algs[] = { {
static int sha256_update_neon(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len)
{
+ struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
/*
* Stacking and unstacking a substantial slice of the NEON register
* file may significantly affect performance for small updates when
* executing in interrupt context, so fall back to the scalar code
* in that case.
*/
- if (!may_use_simd())
- return sha256_base_do_update(desc, data, len,
+ if (!may_use_simd()) {
+ sha256_base_do_update(sctx, data, len,
(sha256_block_fn *)sha256_block_data_order);
+ return 0;
+ }
kernel_neon_begin();
- sha256_base_do_update(desc, data, len,
+ sha256_base_do_update(sctx, data, len,
(sha256_block_fn *)sha256_block_neon);
kernel_neon_end();
@@ -109,22 +116,24 @@ static int sha256_update_neon(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
static int sha256_finup_neon(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len, u8 *out)
{
+ struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
if (!may_use_simd()) {
if (len)
- sha256_base_do_update(desc, data, len,
+ sha256_base_do_update(sctx, data, len,
(sha256_block_fn *)sha256_block_data_order);
- sha256_base_do_finalize(desc,
+ sha256_base_do_finalize(sctx,
(sha256_block_fn *)sha256_block_data_order);
} else {
kernel_neon_begin();
if (len)
- sha256_base_do_update(desc, data, len,
+ sha256_base_do_update(sctx, data, len,
(sha256_block_fn *)sha256_block_neon);
- sha256_base_do_finalize(desc,
+ sha256_base_do_finalize(sctx,
(sha256_block_fn *)sha256_block_neon);
kernel_neon_end();
}
- return sha256_base_finish(desc, out);
+ return crypto_sha2_final(desc, out);
}
static int sha256_final_neon(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ssse3_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ssse3_glue.c
index 9e79baf03a4b..e722fbaf0558 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ssse3_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ssse3_glue.c
@@ -44,52 +44,60 @@ asmlinkage void sha256_transform_ssse3(u32 *digest, const char *data,
u64 rounds);
typedef void (sha256_transform_fn)(u32 *digest, const char *data, u64 rounds);
-static int sha256_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
- unsigned int len, sha256_transform_fn *sha256_xform)
+static int sha256_fpu_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
+ unsigned int len,
+ sha256_transform_fn *sha256_xform)
{
struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
if (!irq_fpu_usable() ||
- (sctx->count % SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE) + len < SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE)
- return crypto_sha256_update(desc, data, len);
+ (sctx->count % SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE) + len < SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ sha256_update(sctx, data, len);
+ return 0;
+ }
/* make sure casting to sha256_block_fn() is safe */
BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct sha256_state, state) != 0);
kernel_fpu_begin();
- sha256_base_do_update(desc, data, len,
+ sha256_base_do_update(sctx, data, len,
(sha256_block_fn *)sha256_xform);
kernel_fpu_end();
return 0;
}
-static int sha256_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
+static int sha256_fpu_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len, u8 *out, sha256_transform_fn *sha256_xform)
{
- if (!irq_fpu_usable())
- return crypto_sha256_finup(desc, data, len, out);
+ struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+ if (!irq_fpu_usable()) {
+ sha256_finup(sctx, data, len, out);
+ return 0;
+ }
kernel_fpu_begin();
if (len)
- sha256_base_do_update(desc, data, len,
+ sha256_base_do_update(sctx, data, len,
(sha256_block_fn *)sha256_xform);
- sha256_base_do_finalize(desc, (sha256_block_fn *)sha256_xform);
+ sha256_base_do_finalize(sctx, (sha256_block_fn *)sha256_xform);
kernel_fpu_end();
- return sha256_base_finish(desc, out);
+ crypto_sha2_final(desc, out);
+ return 0;
}
static int sha256_ssse3_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len)
{
- return sha256_update(desc, data, len, sha256_transform_ssse3);
+ return sha256_fpu_update(desc, data, len, sha256_transform_ssse3);
}
static int sha256_ssse3_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len, u8 *out)
{
- return sha256_finup(desc, data, len, out, sha256_transform_ssse3);
+ return sha256_fpu_finup(desc, data, len, out, sha256_transform_ssse3);
}
/* Add padding and return the message digest. */
@@ -152,13 +160,13 @@ asmlinkage void sha256_transform_avx(u32 *digest, const char *data,
static int sha256_avx_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len)
{
- return sha256_update(desc, data, len, sha256_transform_avx);
+ return sha256_fpu_update(desc, data, len, sha256_transform_avx);
}
static int sha256_avx_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len, u8 *out)
{
- return sha256_finup(desc, data, len, out, sha256_transform_avx);
+ return sha256_fpu_finup(desc, data, len, out, sha256_transform_avx);
}
static int sha256_avx_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
@@ -236,13 +244,13 @@ asmlinkage void sha256_transform_rorx(u32 *digest, const char *data,
static int sha256_avx2_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len)
{
- return sha256_update(desc, data, len, sha256_transform_rorx);
+ return sha256_fpu_update(desc, data, len, sha256_transform_rorx);
}
static int sha256_avx2_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len, u8 *out)
{
- return sha256_finup(desc, data, len, out, sha256_transform_rorx);
+ return sha256_fpu_finup(desc, data, len, out, sha256_transform_rorx);
}
static int sha256_avx2_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
@@ -318,13 +326,13 @@ asmlinkage void sha256_ni_transform(u32 *digest, const char *data,
static int sha256_ni_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len)
{
- return sha256_update(desc, data, len, sha256_ni_transform);
+ return sha256_fpu_update(desc, data, len, sha256_ni_transform);
}
static int sha256_ni_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len, u8 *out)
{
- return sha256_finup(desc, data, len, out, sha256_ni_transform);
+ return sha256_fpu_finup(desc, data, len, out, sha256_ni_transform);
}
static int sha256_ni_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
diff --git a/arch/x86/purgatory/purgatory.c b/arch/x86/purgatory/purgatory.c
index 25e068ba3382..ed6e80b844cf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/purgatory/purgatory.c
+++ b/arch/x86/purgatory/purgatory.c
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
* Version 2. See the file COPYING for more details.
*/
-#include "sha256.h"
+#include <crypto/sha.h>
#include "../boot/string.h"
struct sha_region {
diff --git a/arch/x86/purgatory/sha256.c b/arch/x86/purgatory/sha256.c
index 548ca675a14a..724925d5da61 100644
--- a/arch/x86/purgatory/sha256.c
+++ b/arch/x86/purgatory/sha256.c
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
#include <linux/bitops.h>
#include <asm/byteorder.h>
-#include "sha256.h"
+#include <crypto/sha.h>
#include "../boot/string.h"
static inline u32 Ch(u32 x, u32 y, u32 z)
@@ -208,22 +208,7 @@ static void sha256_transform(u32 *state, const u8 *input)
memset(W, 0, 64 * sizeof(u32));
}
-int sha256_init(struct sha256_state *sctx)
-{
- sctx->state[0] = SHA256_H0;
- sctx->state[1] = SHA256_H1;
- sctx->state[2] = SHA256_H2;
- sctx->state[3] = SHA256_H3;
- sctx->state[4] = SHA256_H4;
- sctx->state[5] = SHA256_H5;
- sctx->state[6] = SHA256_H6;
- sctx->state[7] = SHA256_H7;
- sctx->count = 0;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-int sha256_update(struct sha256_state *sctx, const u8 *data, unsigned int len)
+void sha256_update(struct sha256_state *sctx, const u8 *data, unsigned int len)
{
unsigned int partial, done;
const u8 *src;
@@ -249,11 +234,9 @@ int sha256_update(struct sha256_state *sctx, const u8 *data, unsigned int len)
partial = 0;
}
memcpy(sctx->buf + partial, src, len - done);
-
- return 0;
}
-int sha256_final(struct sha256_state *sctx, u8 *out)
+void sha256_final(struct sha256_state *sctx, u8 *out)
{
__be32 *dst = (__be32 *)out;
__be64 bits;
@@ -278,6 +261,4 @@ int sha256_final(struct sha256_state *sctx, u8 *out)
/* Zeroize sensitive information. */
memset(sctx, 0, sizeof(*sctx));
-
- return 0;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/purgatory/sha256.h b/arch/x86/purgatory/sha256.h
deleted file mode 100644
index bd15a4127735..000000000000
--- a/arch/x86/purgatory/sha256.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat Inc.
- *
- * Author: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
- *
- * This source code is licensed under the GNU General Public License,
- * Version 2. See the file COPYING for more details.
- */
-
-#ifndef SHA256_H
-#define SHA256_H
-
-
-#include <linux/types.h>
-#include <crypto/sha.h>
-
-extern int sha256_init(struct sha256_state *sctx);
-extern int sha256_update(struct sha256_state *sctx, const u8 *input,
- unsigned int length);
-extern int sha256_final(struct sha256_state *sctx, u8 *hash);
-
-#endif /* SHA256_H */
diff --git a/crypto/sha256_generic.c b/crypto/sha256_generic.c
index 8f9c47e1a96e..f2747893402c 100644
--- a/crypto/sha256_generic.c
+++ b/crypto/sha256_generic.c
@@ -231,6 +231,13 @@ static void sha256_transform(u32 *state, const u8 *input)
memzero_explicit(W, 64 * sizeof(u32));
}
+int sha256_base_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+ sha256_init(shash_desc_ctx(desc));
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(sha256_base_init);
+
static void sha256_generic_block_fn(struct sha256_state *sst, u8 const *src,
int blocks)
{
@@ -240,32 +247,49 @@ static void sha256_generic_block_fn(struct sha256_state *sst, u8 const *src,
}
}
-int crypto_sha256_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
+void sha256_update(struct sha256_state *sctx, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len)
{
- return sha256_base_do_update(desc, data, len, sha256_generic_block_fn);
+ sha256_base_do_update(sctx, data, len, sha256_generic_block_fn);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(sha256_update);
+
+void sha256_final(struct sha256_state *sctx, u8 *out)
+{
+ sha256_base_do_finalize(sctx, sha256_generic_block_fn);
+ sha256_base_finish(sctx, out);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_sha256_update);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(sha256_final);
-static int sha256_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
+static int crypto_sha256_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
+ unsigned int len)
{
- sha256_base_do_finalize(desc, sha256_generic_block_fn);
- return sha256_base_finish(desc, out);
+ sha256_update(shash_desc_ctx(desc), data, len);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int crypto_sha2_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
+{
+ struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+ sha256_base_do_finalize(sctx, sha256_generic_block_fn);
+ sha2_base_finish(sctx, crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm), out);
+ return 0;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_sha2_final);
-int crypto_sha256_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
- unsigned int len, u8 *hash)
+static int crypto_sha256_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
+ unsigned int len, u8 *hash)
{
- sha256_base_do_update(desc, data, len, sha256_generic_block_fn);
- return sha256_final(desc, hash);
+ sha256_finup(shash_desc_ctx(desc), data, len, hash);
+ return 0;
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_sha256_finup);
static struct shash_alg sha256_algs[2] = { {
.digestsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
.init = sha256_base_init,
.update = crypto_sha256_update,
- .final = sha256_final,
+ .final = crypto_sha2_final,
.finup = crypto_sha256_finup,
.descsize = sizeof(struct sha256_state),
.base = {
@@ -279,7 +303,7 @@ static struct shash_alg sha256_algs[2] = { {
.digestsize = SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE,
.init = sha224_base_init,
.update = crypto_sha256_update,
- .final = sha256_final,
+ .final = crypto_sha2_final,
.finup = crypto_sha256_finup,
.descsize = sizeof(struct sha256_state),
.base = {
diff --git a/include/crypto/sha.h b/include/crypto/sha.h
index c94d3eb1cefd..2b6978471605 100644
--- a/include/crypto/sha.h
+++ b/include/crypto/sha.h
@@ -96,11 +96,30 @@ extern int crypto_sha1_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
extern int crypto_sha1_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len, u8 *hash);
-extern int crypto_sha256_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
- unsigned int len);
-
-extern int crypto_sha256_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
- unsigned int len, u8 *hash);
+static inline void sha256_init(struct sha256_state *sctx)
+{
+ sctx->state[0] = SHA256_H0;
+ sctx->state[1] = SHA256_H1;
+ sctx->state[2] = SHA256_H2;
+ sctx->state[3] = SHA256_H3;
+ sctx->state[4] = SHA256_H4;
+ sctx->state[5] = SHA256_H5;
+ sctx->state[6] = SHA256_H6;
+ sctx->state[7] = SHA256_H7;
+ sctx->count = 0;
+}
+
+extern void sha256_update(struct sha256_state *sctx, const u8 *data,
+ unsigned int len);
+
+extern void sha256_final(struct sha256_state *sctx, u8 *out);
+
+static inline void sha256_finup(struct sha256_state *sctx, const u8 *data,
+ unsigned int len, u8 *hash)
+{
+ sha256_update(sctx, data, len);
+ sha256_final(sctx, hash);
+}
extern int crypto_sha512_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len);
diff --git a/include/crypto/sha256_base.h b/include/crypto/sha256_base.h
index d1f2195bb7de..f65d9a516b36 100644
--- a/include/crypto/sha256_base.h
+++ b/include/crypto/sha256_base.h
@@ -35,29 +35,13 @@ static inline int sha224_base_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
return 0;
}
-static inline int sha256_base_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
-{
- struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
-
- sctx->state[0] = SHA256_H0;
- sctx->state[1] = SHA256_H1;
- sctx->state[2] = SHA256_H2;
- sctx->state[3] = SHA256_H3;
- sctx->state[4] = SHA256_H4;
- sctx->state[5] = SHA256_H5;
- sctx->state[6] = SHA256_H6;
- sctx->state[7] = SHA256_H7;
- sctx->count = 0;
-
- return 0;
-}
+extern int sha256_base_init(struct shash_desc *desc);
-static inline int sha256_base_do_update(struct shash_desc *desc,
+static inline void sha256_base_do_update(struct sha256_state *sctx,
const u8 *data,
unsigned int len,
sha256_block_fn *block_fn)
{
- struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
unsigned int partial = sctx->count % SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE;
sctx->count += len;
@@ -86,15 +70,12 @@ static inline int sha256_base_do_update(struct shash_desc *desc,
}
if (len)
memcpy(sctx->buf + partial, data, len);
-
- return 0;
}
-static inline int sha256_base_do_finalize(struct shash_desc *desc,
+static inline void sha256_base_do_finalize(struct sha256_state *sctx,
sha256_block_fn *block_fn)
{
const int bit_offset = SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE - sizeof(__be64);
- struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
__be64 *bits = (__be64 *)(sctx->buf + bit_offset);
unsigned int partial = sctx->count % SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE;
@@ -109,14 +90,11 @@ static inline int sha256_base_do_finalize(struct shash_desc *desc,
memset(sctx->buf + partial, 0x0, bit_offset - partial);
*bits = cpu_to_be64(sctx->count << 3);
block_fn(sctx, sctx->buf, 1);
-
- return 0;
}
-static inline int sha256_base_finish(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
+static inline void sha2_base_finish(struct sha256_state *sctx,
+ unsigned int digest_size, u8 *out)
{
- unsigned int digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);
- struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
__be32 *digest = (__be32 *)out;
int i;
@@ -124,5 +102,11 @@ static inline int sha256_base_finish(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
put_unaligned_be32(sctx->state[i], digest++);
*sctx = (struct sha256_state){};
- return 0;
}
+
+static inline void sha256_base_finish(struct sha256_state *sctx, u8 *out)
+{
+ sha2_base_finish(sctx, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, out);
+}
+
+extern int crypto_sha2_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out);
--
2.9.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* [RFC PATCH 4.10 0/6] Switch BPF's digest to SHA256
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2016-12-24 2:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Borkmann, Netdev, LKML, Linux Crypto Mailing List
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld, Hannes Frederic Sowa, Alexei Starovoitov,
Eric Dumazet, Eric Biggers, Tom Herbert, David S. Miller,
Andy Lutomirski
Since there are plenty of uses for the new-in-4.10 BPF digest feature
that would be problematic if malicious users could produce collisions,
the BPF digest should be collision-resistant. SHA-1 is no longer
considered collision-resistant, so switch it to SHA-256.
The actual switchover is trivial. Most of this series consists of
cleanups to the SHA256 code to make it usable as a standalone library
(since BPF should not depend on crypto).
The cleaned up library is much more user-friendly than the SHA-1 code,
so this also significantly tidies up the BPF digest code.
This is intended for 4.10. If this series misses 4.10 and nothing
takes its place, then we'll have an unpleasant ABI stability
situation.
Andy Lutomirski (6):
crypto/sha256: Refactor the API so it can be used without shash
crypto/sha256: Make the sha256 library functions selectable
bpf: Use SHA256 instead of SHA1 for bpf digests
bpf: Avoid copying the entire BPF program when hashing it
bpf: Rename fdinfo's prog_digest to prog_sha256
net: Rename TCA*BPF_DIGEST to ..._SHA256
arch/arm/crypto/sha2-ce-glue.c | 10 +++---
arch/arm/crypto/sha256_glue.c | 23 +++++++++-----
arch/arm/crypto/sha256_neon_glue.c | 34 ++++++++++----------
arch/arm64/crypto/sha2-ce-glue.c | 13 ++++----
arch/arm64/crypto/sha256-glue.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++---------------
arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ssse3_glue.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++-----------
arch/x86/purgatory/purgatory.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/purgatory/sha256.c | 25 ++-------------
arch/x86/purgatory/sha256.h | 22 -------------
crypto/Kconfig | 8 +++++
crypto/Makefile | 2 +-
crypto/sha256_generic.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------
include/crypto/sha.h | 33 ++++++++++++++++---
include/crypto/sha256_base.h | 40 +++++++----------------
include/linux/filter.h | 11 ++-----
include/uapi/linux/pkt_cls.h | 2 +-
include/uapi/linux/tc_act/tc_bpf.h | 2 +-
init/Kconfig | 1 +
kernel/bpf/core.c | 63 +++++++++----------------------------
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 2 +-
net/sched/act_bpf.c | 2 +-
net/sched/cls_bpf.c | 2 +-
22 files changed, 225 insertions(+), 231 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 arch/x86/purgatory/sha256.h
--
2.9.3
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: George's crazy full state idea (Re: HalfSipHash Acceptable Usage)
From: George Spelvin @ 2016-12-24 1:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: daniel, hannes, linux
Cc: ak, davem, David.Laight, ebiggers3, eric.dumazet, Jason,
kernel-hardening, linux-crypto, linux-kernel, luto, netdev, tom,
tytso, vegard.nossum
In-Reply-To: <254f8cd7-d045-172d-8692-6052d9da287e@stressinduktion.org>
Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote:
> On 24.12.2016 00:39, George Spelvin wrote:
>> We just finished discussing why 8 bytes isn't enough. If you only
>> feed back 8 bytes, an attacker who can do 2^64 computation can find it
>> (by guessing and computing forward to verify the guess) and recover the
>> previous state. You need to feed back at least as much output as your
>> security targete. For /dev/urandom's ChaCha20, that's 256 bits.
> I followed the discussion but it appeared to me that this has the
> additional constraint of time until the next reseeding event happenes,
> which is 300s (under the assumption that calls to get_random_int happen
> regularly, which I expect right now). After that the existing reseeding
> mechansim will ensure enough backtracking protection. The number of
> bytes can easily be increased here, given that reseeding was shown to be
> quite fast already and we produce enough output. But I am not sure if
> this is a bit overengineered in the end?
I'm not following your description of how the time-based and call-based
mechanisms interact, but for any mix-back, you should either do enough
or none at all. (Also called "catastrophic reseeding".)
For example, two mix-backs of 64 bits gives you 65 bit security, not 128.
(Because each mixback can be guessed and verified separately.)
> Also agreed. Given your solution below to prandom_u32, I do think it
> might also work without the seqlock now.
It's not technically a seqlock; in particular the reader doesn't
spin. But the write side, and general logic is so similar it's
a good mental model.
Basically, assume a 64-byte buffer. The reader has gone through
32 bytes of it, and has 32 left, and when he reads another 8 bytes,
has to distinguish three cases:
1) No update; we read the old bytes and there are now 32 - 24 bytes left.
2) Update completed while we weren't looking. There are now new
bytes in the buffer, and we took 8 leaving 64 - 8 = 56.
3) Update in progress at the time of the read. We don't know if we
are seeing old bytes or new bytes, so we have to assume the worst
and not proceeed unless 32 >= 8, but assume at the end there are
64 - 8 = 56 new bytes left.
> I wouldn't have added a disable irqs, but given that I really like your
> proposal, I would take it in my todo branch and submit it when net-next
> window opens.
If you want that, I have a pile of patches to prandom I really
should push upstream. Shall I refresh them and send them to you?
commit 4cf1b3d9f4fbccc29ffc2fe4ca4ff52ea77253f1
Author: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Date: Mon Aug 31 00:05:00 2015 -0400
net: Use prandom_u32_max()
It's slightly more efficient than "prandom_u32() % range"
The net/802 code was already efficient, but prandom_u32_max() is simpler.
In net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c, batadv_iv_ogm_fwd_send_time() got changed
from picking a random number of milliseconds and converting to jiffies to
picking a random number of jiffies, since the number of milliseconds (and
thus the conversion to jiffies) is a compile-time constant. The equivalent
code in batadv_iv_ogm_emit_send_time was not changed, because the number
of milliseconds is variable.
In net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c, ip6_flowlabel had htonl(prandom_u32()),
which is silly. Just cast to __be32 without permuting the bits.
net/sched/sch_netem.c got adjusted to only need one call to prandom_u32
instead of 2. (Assuming skb_headlen can't exceed 512 MiB, which is
hopefully safe for some time yet.)
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
commit 9c8fb80e1fd2be42c35cab1af27187d600fd85e3
Author: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Date: Sat May 24 15:20:47 2014 -0400
mm/swapfile.c: Use prandom_u32_max()
It's slightly more efficient than "prandom_u32() % range"
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
commit 2743eb01e5c5958fd88ae78d19c5fea772d4b117
Author: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Date: Sat May 24 15:19:53 2014 -0400
lib: Use prandom_u32_max()
It's slightly more efficient than "prandom_u32() % range"
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
commit 6a5e91bf395060a3351bfe5efc40ac20ffba2c1b
Author: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Date: Sat May 24 15:18:50 2014 -0400
fs/xfs: Use prandom_u32_max()
It's slightly more efficient than "prandom_u32() % range".
Also changed the last argument of xfs_error_test() from "unsigned long"
to "unsigned", since the code never did support values > 2^32, and
the largest value ever passed is 100.
The code could be improved even further by passing in 2^32/rf rather
than rf, but I'll leave that to some XFS developers.
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
commit 6f6d485d9179ca6ec4e30caa06ade0e0c6931810
Author: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Date: Sat May 24 15:00:17 2014 -0400
fs/ubifs: Use prandom_u32_max()
It's slightly more efficient than "prandom_u32() % range".
In fs/ubifs/debug.c, the chance() function got rewritten entirely
to take advantage of the fact its arguments are always constant.
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
commit 0b6bf2c874bbbcfa74f6be0413c772b3ac134d12
Author: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Date: Sat May 24 14:52:17 2014 -0400
fs/extX: Use prandom_u32_max()
It's slightly more efficient than "prandom_u32() % range".
In ext4/ialloc.c:436, there's one more chance to do that, but
the modulo is required to keep the deterministic option consistent,
so I left it alone.
Switching to "parent_group = ((u64)grp * ngroups) >> 32;" would be more
efficient, but would change user-visible behavior.
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
commit e79e0e8b491bc976c0b4e1b2070eccdf55b34f43
Author: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Date: Sat May 24 14:47:15 2014 -0400
fs/ceph: Use prandom_u32_max()
It's slightly more efficient than "prandom_u32() % range"
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
commit fc628326d8cf4abe364ea01259bc392c0bbaf5a0
Author: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Date: Sat May 24 14:46:29 2014 -0400
drivers/scsi/fcoe/fcoe_ctlr.c: Use prandom_u32_max()
It's slightly more efficient than "prandom_u32() % range"
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
commit 4810d67dd2edf08e7801ef47550d46b7397fe2dc
Author: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Date: Sat May 24 14:45:55 2014 -0400
drivers/ntb/ntb_hw.c: Use prandom_u32_max()
It's slightly more efficient than "prandom_u32() % range"
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
commit f4a806abbc0785e8f0363e02fac613246eed9e34
Author: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Date: Sat May 24 14:45:27 2014 -0400
drivers/net: Use prandom_u32_max()
It's slightly more efficient than "prandom_u32() % range"
In some cases (like ethernet/broadcom/cnic.c and drivers/net/hamradio),
the range is a compile-time constant power of 2, so the code doesn't
get any better, but I'm trying to do a full sweep.
In drivers/net/wireless/brcm80211/brcmfmac/p2p.c, a timeout is selected from
100, 200 or 300 ms. It would be easy enough to make the granularity finer,
but I assume the existing code is that way for a reason.
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
commit 603e0c311fac09d633ff6c0fd9242108f1c52ead
Author: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Date: Sat May 24 13:55:09 2014 -0400
drivers/mtd: Use prandom_u32_max()
It's slightly more efficient than "prandom_u32() % range".
And rewrote the 1-in-N code in drivers/mtd/ubi/debug.h to avoid
even more arithmetic.
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
commit e0657cc865e8e02768906935b8e8bf63af58aa46
Author: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Date: Sat May 24 13:52:13 2014 -0400
drivers/mmc/core: Use prandom_u32_max()
It's slightly more efficient than "prandom_u32() % range"
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
commit 017ee6841ec8d416093fc1f18bdd3df0dfc6aacc
Author: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Date: Sat May 24 13:51:33 2014 -0400
drivers/lguest/page_tables.c: Use prandom_u32_max()
This doesn't actually change the code because the array size is
a power of 2 (it's a 4-element array). But I'm on a roll.
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
commit 87556165f46eb42c756bcb94e062c3fbd272a4bf
Author: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Date: Sat May 24 13:49:41 2014 -0400
drivers/infiniband: Use prandom_u32_max()
It's slightly more efficient than "prandom_u32() % range"
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
commit 1eafe1d429f442218810e8c604d4e7c466414cf3
Author: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Date: Sun Aug 30 23:42:41 2015 -0400
block/blk-mq-tag.c: Use prandom_u32_max()
It's slightly more efficient than "prandom_u32() % range"
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
commit f03ee59a63098d244d5b8932fc68c9fc3e2bb222
Author: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Date: Sat May 24 13:46:52 2014 -0400
arch/x86: Use prandom_u32_max()
It's slightly more efficient than "prandom_u32() % range"
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
commit feafd3a3fb09924ea633d677a7ab8a25a817f39d
Author: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Date: Sat May 24 13:44:49 2014 -0400
lib/random32.c: Remove redundant U suffixes on integers
Get rid of a few of the extraneous U suffixes on ordinary integers.
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
commit f14328d248e59c862478633479528c9cb8554d7a
Author: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Date: Sat May 24 12:40:19 2014 -0400
lib/random32.c: Randomize timeout to the millisecond, not the second.
If you're going to bother randomizing it, do it right.
And use prandom_u32_max(), which is designed for the job, rather
than "% 40".
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
commit 143342006adfff718afedf58f639b72337d7c816
Author: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Date: Sat May 24 12:51:26 2014 -0400
lib/random32.c: Make prandom_u32_max efficient for powers of 2
The multiply-and-shift is efficient in the general case, but slower
than a simple bitwise AND if the range is a power of 2. Make the function
handle this case so callers don't have to worry about micro-optimizing it.
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
commit 99864db5cb023e6b09d71cde4997a5f6cafb5cca
Author: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Date: Sat May 24 12:02:17 2014 -0400
lib/random32.c: Use <asm/unaligned.h> instead of hand-rolling it
The functions exist for a reason; the manual byte-at-a-time code
is unnecessarily slow (and bloated).
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
commit 4ecd45f6eadd4d171782dc6b451ed1040e47d419
Author: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Date: Sat May 24 11:55:59 2014 -0400
lib/random32.c: Debloat non-speed-critical code
Unrolling code in rarely-used code paths is just silly. There are
two places that static calls to prandom_u32_state() can be removed:
1) prandom_warmup() calls prandom_u32_state 10 times.
2) prandom_state_selftest() can avoid one call and simplify the
loop logic by repeating an assignment to a local variable
(which probably adds zero code anyway).
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
commit 8765cff45da1d96e4310d50dd49231790c49b612
Author: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Date: Sat May 24 11:52:34 2014 -0400
lib/random32.c: Mark self-test data as __initconst
So it can be thrown away along with the code that uses it.
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] drivers: net: ethernet: 3com: fix return value
From: David Dillow @ 2016-12-24 1:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Thomas Preisner; +Cc: netdev, linux-kernel, linux-kernel, milan.stephan+linux
In-Reply-To: <1482534015-7828-1-git-send-email-thomas.preisner+linux@fau.de>
On Sat, 2016-12-24 at 00:00 +0100, Thomas Preisner wrote:
> diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/3com/typhoon.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/3com/typhoon.c
> index a0cacbe..9a3ab58 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/3com/typhoon.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/3com/typhoon.c
> @@ -2404,6 +2404,7 @@ typhoon_init_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent)
>
> if(!is_valid_ether_addr(dev->dev_addr)) {
> err_msg = "Could not obtain valid ethernet address, aborting";
> + err = -EIO;
> goto error_out_reset;
The change above is fine, but the other two should use the return value
from the failing function call.
> @@ -2413,6 +2414,7 @@ typhoon_init_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent)
> INIT_COMMAND_WITH_RESPONSE(&xp_cmd, TYPHOON_CMD_READ_VERSIONS);
> if(typhoon_issue_command(tp, 1, &xp_cmd, 3, xp_resp) < 0) {
> err_msg = "Could not get Sleep Image version";
> + err = -EIO;
> goto error_out_reset;
> }
>
> @@ -2455,6 +2457,7 @@ typhoon_init_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent)
>
> if(register_netdev(dev) < 0) {
> err_msg = "unable to register netdev";
> + err = -EIO;
> goto error_out_reset;
> }
>
^ permalink raw reply
* RE: [PATCH] scsi: bfa: Increase requested firmware version to 3.2.5.1
From: Mody, Rasesh @ 2016-12-24 0:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Benjamin Poirier, Martin K. Petersen
Cc: Tim Ehlers, Rasesh Mody, Anil Gurumurthy, Sudarsana Kalluru,
James E.J. Bottomley, linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
In-Reply-To: <20161223220128.1226-1-bpoirier@suse.com>
> From: Benjamin Poirier [mailto:benjamin.poirier@gmail.com] On Behalf Of
> Benjamin Poirier
> Sent: Friday, December 23, 2016 2:01 PM
>
> bna & bfa firmware version 3.2.5.1 was submitted to linux-firmware on Tue
> Feb 17 19:10:20 2015 -0500 in 0ab54ff1dc ("linux-firmware: Add QLogic BR
> Series Adapter Firmware").
>
> bna was updated to use the newer firmware on Thu, 19 Feb 2015 16:02:32
> -0500 in 3f307c3d70 ("bna: Update the Driver and Firmware Version")
>
> bfa was not updated. I presume this was an oversight but it broke support
> for bfa+bna cards such as the following
> 04:00.0 Fibre Channel [0c04]: Brocade Communications Systems, Inc.
> 1010/1020/1007/1741 10Gbps CNA [1657:0014] (rev 01)
> 04:00.1 Fibre Channel [0c04]: Brocade Communications Systems, Inc.
> 1010/1020/1007/1741 10Gbps CNA [1657:0014] (rev 01)
> 04:00.2 Ethernet controller [0200]: Brocade Communications
> Systems,
> Inc. 1010/1020/1007/1741 10Gbps CNA [1657:0014] (rev 01)
> 04:00.3 Ethernet controller [0200]: Brocade Communications
> Systems,
> Inc. 1010/1020/1007/1741 10Gbps CNA [1657:0014] (rev 01)
>
> Currently, if the bfa module is loaded first, bna fails to probe the respective
> devices with [ 215.026787] bna: QLogic BR-series 10G Ethernet driver -
> version: 3.2.25.1 [ 215.043707] bna 0000:04:00.2: bar0 mapped to
> ffffc90001fc0000, len 262144 [ 215.060656] bna 0000:04:00.2: initialization
> failed err=1 [ 215.073893] bna 0000:04:00.3: bar0 mapped to
> ffffc90002040000, len 262144 [ 215.090644] bna 0000:04:00.3: initialization
> failed err=1
>
> Whereas if bna is loaded first, bfa fails with [ 249.592109] QLogic BR-series
> BFA FC/FCOE SCSI driver - version: 3.2.25.0 [ 249.610738] bfa 0000:04:00.0:
> Running firmware version is incompatible with the driver version [
> 249.833513] bfa 0000:04:00.0: bfa init failed [ 249.833919] scsi host6: QLogic
> BR-series FC/FCOE Adapter, hwpath: 0000:04:00.0 driver: 3.2.25.0 [
> 249.841446] bfa 0000:04:00.1: Running firmware version is incompatible with
> the driver version [ 250.045449] bfa 0000:04:00.1: bfa init failed [ 250.045962]
> scsi host7: QLogic BR-series FC/FCOE Adapter, hwpath: 0000:04:00.1 driver:
> 3.2.25.0
>
> Increase bfa's requested firmware version.
> I only tested that all of the devices probe without error.
>
> Cc: Rasesh Mody <rasesh.mody@qlogic.com>
> Reported-by: Tim Ehlers <tehlers@gwdg.de>
> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@suse.com>
Acked-by: Rasesh Mody <rasesh.mody@cavium.com>
Thanks! We also need to bump up the BFA driver version to 3.2.25.1.
> ---
> drivers/scsi/bfa/bfad.c | 6 +++---
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfad.c b/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfad.c index
> 9d253cb..e70410b 100644
> --- a/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfad.c
> +++ b/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfad.c
> @@ -64,9 +64,9 @@ int max_rport_logins =
> BFA_FCS_MAX_RPORT_LOGINS;
> u32 bfi_image_cb_size, bfi_image_ct_size, bfi_image_ct2_size;
> u32 *bfi_image_cb, *bfi_image_ct, *bfi_image_ct2;
>
> -#define BFAD_FW_FILE_CB "cbfw-3.2.3.0.bin"
> -#define BFAD_FW_FILE_CT "ctfw-3.2.3.0.bin"
> -#define BFAD_FW_FILE_CT2 "ct2fw-3.2.3.0.bin"
> +#define BFAD_FW_FILE_CB "cbfw-3.2.5.1.bin"
> +#define BFAD_FW_FILE_CT "ctfw-3.2.5.1.bin"
> +#define BFAD_FW_FILE_CT2 "ct2fw-3.2.5.1.bin"
>
> static u32 *bfad_load_fwimg(struct pci_dev *pdev); static void
> bfad_free_fwimg(void);
> --
> 2.10.2
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: George's crazy full state idea (Re: HalfSipHash Acceptable Usage)
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa @ 2016-12-24 0:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: George Spelvin, daniel
Cc: ak, davem, David.Laight, ebiggers3, eric.dumazet, Jason,
kernel-hardening, linux-crypto, linux-kernel, luto, netdev, tom,
tytso, vegard.nossum
In-Reply-To: <20161223233904.11739.qmail@ns.sciencehorizons.net>
Hi,
On 24.12.2016 00:39, George Spelvin wrote:
> Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote:
>> In general this looks good, but bitbuffer needs to be protected from
>> concurrent access, thus needing at least some atomic instruction and
>> disabling of interrupts for the locking if done outside of
>> get_random_long. Thus I liked your previous approach more where you
>> simply embed this in the already necessary get_random_long and aliased
>> get_random_long as get_random_bits(BITS_PER_LONG) accordingly, IMHO.
>
> It's meant to be part of the same approach, and I didn't include locking
> because that's a requirement for *any* solution, and isn't specific
> to the part I was trying to illustrate.
>
> (As for re-using the name "get_random_long", that was just so
> I didn't have to explain it. Call it "get_random_long_internal"
> if you like.)
>
> Possible locking implementations include:
> 1) Use the same locking as applies to get_random_long_internal(), or
> 2) Make bitbuffer a per-CPU variable (note that we currently have 128
> bits of per-CPU state in get_random_int_hash[]), and this is all a
> fast-path to bypass heavier locking in get_random_long_internal().
I understood that this is definitely a solvable problem.
>>> But, I just realized I've been overlooking something glaringly obvious...
>>> there's no reason you can't compute multple blocks in advance.
>>
>> In the current code on the cost of per cpu allocations thus memory.
>
> Yes, but on 4-core machines it's still not much, and 4096-core
> behemoths have RAM to burn.
>
>> In the extract_crng case, couldn't we simply use 8 bytes of the 64 byte
>> return block to feed it directly back into the state chacha? So we pass
>> on 56 bytes into the pcpu buffer, and consume 8 bytes for the next
>> state. This would make the window max shorter than the anti
>> backtracking protection right now from 300s to 14 get_random_int calls.
>> Not sure if this is worth it.
>
> We just finished discussing why 8 bytes isn't enough. If you only
> feed back 8 bytes, an attacker who can do 2^64 computation can find it
> (by guessing and computing forward to verify the guess) and recover the
> previous state. You need to feed back at least as much output as your
> security targete. For /dev/urandom's ChaCha20, that's 256 bits.
I followed the discussion but it appeared to me that this has the
additional constraint of time until the next reseeding event happenes,
which is 300s (under the assumption that calls to get_random_int happen
regularly, which I expect right now). After that the existing reseeding
mechansim will ensure enough backtracking protection. The number of
bytes can easily be increased here, given that reseeding was shown to be
quite fast already and we produce enough output. But I am not sure if
this is a bit overengineered in the end?
>>> For example, suppose we gave each CPU a small pool to minimize locking.
>>> When one runs out and calls the global refill, it could refill *all*
>>> of the CPU pools. (You don't even need locking; there may be a race to
>>> determine *which* random numbers the reader sees, but they're equally
>>> good either way.)
>
>> Yes, but still disabled interrupts, otherwise the same state could be
>> used twice on the same CPU. Uff, I think we have this problem in
>> prandom_u32.
>
> There are some locking gotchas, but it is doable lock-free.
>
> Basically, it's a seqlock. The writer increments it once (to an odd
> number) before starting to overwrite the buffer, and a second time (to
> an even number) after. "Before" and "after" mean smp_wmb().
>
> The reader can use this to figure out how much of the data in the buffer
> is safely fresh. The full sequence of checks is a bit intricate,
> but straightforward.
>
> I didn't discuss the locking because I'm confident it's solvable,
> not because I wasn't aware it has to be solved.
Also agreed. Given your solution below to prandom_u32, I do think it
might also work without the seqlock now.
> As for prandom_u32(), what's the problem? Are you worried that
> get_cpu_var disables preemption but not interrupts, and so an
> ISR might return the same value as process-level code?
Yes, exactly those were my thoughts.
> First of all, that's not a problem because prandom_u32() doesn't
> have security guarantees. Occasionally returning a dupicate number
> is okay.
>
> Second, if you do care, that could be trivially fixed by throwing
> a barrier() in the middle of the code. (Patch appended; S-o-B
> if anyone wants it.)
I wouldn't have added a disable irqs, but given that I really like your
proposal, I would take it in my todo branch and submit it when net-next
window opens.
> diff --git a/lib/random32.c b/lib/random32.c
> index c750216d..6bee4a36 100644
> --- a/lib/random32.c
> +++ b/lib/random32.c
> [...]
Thanks,
Hannes
^ permalink raw reply
* Your Urgent Response Is Highly Anticipated{}
From: Mr. Khan Moosa @ 2016-12-23 23:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
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for more details.
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^ permalink raw reply
* Re: George's crazy full state idea (Re: HalfSipHash Acceptable Usage)
From: George Spelvin @ 2016-12-23 23:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: daniel, hannes, linux
Cc: ak, davem, David.Laight, ebiggers3, eric.dumazet, Jason,
kernel-hardening, linux-crypto, linux-kernel, luto, netdev, tom,
tytso, vegard.nossum
In-Reply-To: <1482526135.2554.5.camel@stressinduktion.org>
Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote:
> In general this looks good, but bitbuffer needs to be protected from
> concurrent access, thus needing at least some atomic instruction and
> disabling of interrupts for the locking if done outside of
> get_random_long. Thus I liked your previous approach more where you
> simply embed this in the already necessary get_random_long and aliased
> get_random_long as get_random_bits(BITS_PER_LONG) accordingly, IMHO.
It's meant to be part of the same approach, and I didn't include locking
because that's a requirement for *any* solution, and isn't specific
to the part I was trying to illustrate.
(As for re-using the name "get_random_long", that was just so
I didn't have to explain it. Call it "get_random_long_internal"
if you like.)
Possible locking implementations include:
1) Use the same locking as applies to get_random_long_internal(), or
2) Make bitbuffer a per-CPU variable (note that we currently have 128
bits of per-CPU state in get_random_int_hash[]), and this is all a
fast-path to bypass heavier locking in get_random_long_internal().
>> But, I just realized I've been overlooking something glaringly obvious...
>> there's no reason you can't compute multple blocks in advance.
>
> In the current code on the cost of per cpu allocations thus memory.
Yes, but on 4-core machines it's still not much, and 4096-core
behemoths have RAM to burn.
> In the extract_crng case, couldn't we simply use 8 bytes of the 64 byte
> return block to feed it directly back into the state chacha? So we pass
> on 56 bytes into the pcpu buffer, and consume 8 bytes for the next
> state. This would make the window max shorter than the anti
> backtracking protection right now from 300s to 14 get_random_int calls.
> Not sure if this is worth it.
We just finished discussing why 8 bytes isn't enough. If you only
feed back 8 bytes, an attacker who can do 2^64 computation can find it
(by guessing and computing forward to verify the guess) and recover the
previous state. You need to feed back at least as much output as your
security targete. For /dev/urandom's ChaCha20, that's 256 bits.
>> For example, suppose we gave each CPU a small pool to minimize locking.
>> When one runs out and calls the global refill, it could refill *all*
>> of the CPU pools. (You don't even need locking; there may be a race to
>> determine *which* random numbers the reader sees, but they're equally
>> good either way.)
> Yes, but still disabled interrupts, otherwise the same state could be
> used twice on the same CPU. Uff, I think we have this problem in
> prandom_u32.
There are some locking gotchas, but it is doable lock-free.
Basically, it's a seqlock. The writer increments it once (to an odd
number) before starting to overwrite the buffer, and a second time (to
an even number) after. "Before" and "after" mean smp_wmb().
The reader can use this to figure out how much of the data in the buffer
is safely fresh. The full sequence of checks is a bit intricate,
but straightforward.
I didn't discuss the locking because I'm confident it's solvable,
not because I wasn't aware it has to be solved.
As for prandom_u32(), what's the problem? Are you worried that
get_cpu_var disables preemption but not interrupts, and so an
ISR might return the same value as process-level code?
First of all, that's not a problem because prandom_u32() doesn't
have security guarantees. Occasionally returning a dupicate number
is okay.
Second, if you do care, that could be trivially fixed by throwing
a barrier() in the middle of the code. (Patch appended; S-o-B
if anyone wants it.)
diff --git a/lib/random32.c b/lib/random32.c
index c750216d..6bee4a36 100644
--- a/lib/random32.c
+++ b/lib/random32.c
@@ -55,16 +55,29 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct rnd_state, net_rand_state);
*
* This is used for pseudo-randomness with no outside seeding.
* For more random results, use prandom_u32().
+ *
+ * The barrier() is to allow prandom_u32() to be called from interupt
+ * context without locking. An interrupt will run to completion,
+ * updating all four state variables. The barrier() ensures that
+ * the interrupted code will compute a different result. Either it
+ * will have written s1 and s2 (so the interrupt will start with
+ * the updated values), or it will use the values of s3 and s4
+ * updated by the interrupt.
+ *
+ * (The same logic applies recursively to nested interrupts, trap
+ * handlers, and NMIs.)
*/
u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state)
{
+ register u32 x;
#define TAUSWORTHE(s, a, b, c, d) ((s & c) << d) ^ (((s << a) ^ s) >> b)
- state->s1 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s1, 6, 13, 4294967294U, 18U);
- state->s2 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s2, 2, 27, 4294967288U, 2U);
- state->s3 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s3, 13, 21, 4294967280U, 7U);
- state->s4 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s4, 3, 12, 4294967168U, 13U);
+ x = state->s1 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s1, 6, 13, ~1u, 18);
+ x += state->s2 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s2, 2, 27, ~7u, 2);
+ barrier();
+ x ^= state->s3 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s3, 13, 21, ~15u, 7);
+ x += state->s4 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s4, 3, 12, ~127u, 13);
- return (state->s1 ^ state->s2 ^ state->s3 ^ state->s4);
+ return x;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_u32_state);
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH] drivers: net: ethernet: 3com: fix return value
From: Thomas Preisner @ 2016-12-23 23:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev, linux-kernel
Cc: linux-kernel, milan.stephan+linux, thomas.preisner+linux, dave
In a few cases the err-variable is not set to a negative error code if a
function call fails and thus 0 is returned instead.
It may be better to set err to the proper negative error code before
returning.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=188841
Reported-by: Pan Bian <bianpan2016@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Preisner <thomas.preisner+linux@fau.de>
Signed-off-by: Milan Stephan <milan.stephan+linux@fau.de>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/3com/typhoon.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/3com/typhoon.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/3com/typhoon.c
index a0cacbe..9a3ab58 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/3com/typhoon.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/3com/typhoon.c
@@ -2404,6 +2404,7 @@ typhoon_init_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent)
if(!is_valid_ether_addr(dev->dev_addr)) {
err_msg = "Could not obtain valid ethernet address, aborting";
+ err = -EIO;
goto error_out_reset;
}
@@ -2413,6 +2414,7 @@ typhoon_init_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent)
INIT_COMMAND_WITH_RESPONSE(&xp_cmd, TYPHOON_CMD_READ_VERSIONS);
if(typhoon_issue_command(tp, 1, &xp_cmd, 3, xp_resp) < 0) {
err_msg = "Could not get Sleep Image version";
+ err = -EIO;
goto error_out_reset;
}
@@ -2455,6 +2457,7 @@ typhoon_init_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent)
if(register_netdev(dev) < 0) {
err_msg = "unable to register netdev";
+ err = -EIO;
goto error_out_reset;
}
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH] scsi: bfa: Increase requested firmware version to 3.2.5.1
From: Benjamin Poirier @ 2016-12-23 22:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Martin K. Petersen
Cc: Tim Ehlers, Rasesh Mody, Anil Gurumurthy, Sudarsana Kalluru,
James E.J. Bottomley, linux-scsi, netdev, linux-kernel
bna & bfa firmware version 3.2.5.1 was submitted to linux-firmware on Tue
Feb 17 19:10:20 2015 -0500 in 0ab54ff1dc ("linux-firmware: Add QLogic BR
Series Adapter Firmware").
bna was updated to use the newer firmware on Thu, 19 Feb 2015 16:02:32
-0500 in 3f307c3d70 ("bna: Update the Driver and Firmware Version")
bfa was not updated. I presume this was an oversight but it broke support
for bfa+bna cards such as the following
04:00.0 Fibre Channel [0c04]: Brocade Communications Systems, Inc.
1010/1020/1007/1741 10Gbps CNA [1657:0014] (rev 01)
04:00.1 Fibre Channel [0c04]: Brocade Communications Systems, Inc.
1010/1020/1007/1741 10Gbps CNA [1657:0014] (rev 01)
04:00.2 Ethernet controller [0200]: Brocade Communications Systems,
Inc. 1010/1020/1007/1741 10Gbps CNA [1657:0014] (rev 01)
04:00.3 Ethernet controller [0200]: Brocade Communications Systems,
Inc. 1010/1020/1007/1741 10Gbps CNA [1657:0014] (rev 01)
Currently, if the bfa module is loaded first, bna fails to probe the
respective devices with
[ 215.026787] bna: QLogic BR-series 10G Ethernet driver - version: 3.2.25.1
[ 215.043707] bna 0000:04:00.2: bar0 mapped to ffffc90001fc0000, len 262144
[ 215.060656] bna 0000:04:00.2: initialization failed err=1
[ 215.073893] bna 0000:04:00.3: bar0 mapped to ffffc90002040000, len 262144
[ 215.090644] bna 0000:04:00.3: initialization failed err=1
Whereas if bna is loaded first, bfa fails with
[ 249.592109] QLogic BR-series BFA FC/FCOE SCSI driver - version: 3.2.25.0
[ 249.610738] bfa 0000:04:00.0: Running firmware version is incompatible with the driver version
[ 249.833513] bfa 0000:04:00.0: bfa init failed
[ 249.833919] scsi host6: QLogic BR-series FC/FCOE Adapter, hwpath: 0000:04:00.0 driver: 3.2.25.0
[ 249.841446] bfa 0000:04:00.1: Running firmware version is incompatible with the driver version
[ 250.045449] bfa 0000:04:00.1: bfa init failed
[ 250.045962] scsi host7: QLogic BR-series FC/FCOE Adapter, hwpath: 0000:04:00.1 driver: 3.2.25.0
Increase bfa's requested firmware version.
I only tested that all of the devices probe without error.
Cc: Rasesh Mody <rasesh.mody@qlogic.com>
Reported-by: Tim Ehlers <tehlers@gwdg.de>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@suse.com>
---
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfad.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfad.c b/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfad.c
index 9d253cb..e70410b 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfad.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfad.c
@@ -64,9 +64,9 @@ int max_rport_logins = BFA_FCS_MAX_RPORT_LOGINS;
u32 bfi_image_cb_size, bfi_image_ct_size, bfi_image_ct2_size;
u32 *bfi_image_cb, *bfi_image_ct, *bfi_image_ct2;
-#define BFAD_FW_FILE_CB "cbfw-3.2.3.0.bin"
-#define BFAD_FW_FILE_CT "ctfw-3.2.3.0.bin"
-#define BFAD_FW_FILE_CT2 "ct2fw-3.2.3.0.bin"
+#define BFAD_FW_FILE_CB "cbfw-3.2.5.1.bin"
+#define BFAD_FW_FILE_CT "ctfw-3.2.5.1.bin"
+#define BFAD_FW_FILE_CT2 "ct2fw-3.2.5.1.bin"
static u32 *bfad_load_fwimg(struct pci_dev *pdev);
static void bfad_free_fwimg(void);
--
2.10.2
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [RFC PATCH] virtio_net: XDP support for adjust_head
From: John Fastabend @ 2016-12-23 21:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jasowang, jakub.kicinski, mst
Cc: john.r.fastabend, netdev, alexei.starovoitov, daniel,
virtualization
In-Reply-To: <20161223184301.26974.68383.stgit@john-Precision-Tower-5810>
On 16-12-23 10:43 AM, John Fastabend wrote:
> Add support for XDP adjust head by allocating a 256B header region
> that XDP programs can grow into. This is only enabled when a XDP
> program is loaded.
>
> In order to ensure that we do not have to unwind queue headroom push
> queue setup below bpf_prog_add. It reads better to do a prog ref
> unwind vs another queue setup call.
>
> TBD merge with Jason Wang's fixes, do a bit more testing, note
> big_packet support is removed by Jason as well.
>
> Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.r.fastabend@intel.com>
> ---
> drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
> 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
>
ah dang, I sent this from the wrong tree so it was missing a fix sorry
for the noise. I'll send an update on top of net shortly.
.John
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: BPF hash algo (Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v7 3/6] random: use SipHash in place of MD5)
From: Jason A. Donenfeld @ 2016-12-23 21:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Hannes Frederic Sowa
Cc: Andy Lutomirski, Daniel Borkmann, Alexei Starovoitov,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, Theodore Ts'o, Netdev,
LKML, Linux Crypto Mailing List, David Laight, Eric Dumazet,
Linus Torvalds, Eric Biggers, Tom Herbert, Andi Kleen,
David S. Miller, Jean-Philippe Aumasson
In-Reply-To: <ec43894a-7b54-ff30-9874-bb4a25314e09@stressinduktion.org>
On Fri, Dec 23, 2016 at 7:19 PM, Hannes Frederic Sowa
<hannes@stressinduktion.org> wrote:
> Factoring out sha3
Per the other thread, you probably don't actually want SHA3, because
it's slow in software. You want SHA2. If you want something faster and
better, then Blake2 is most certainly the way to go. I'll be
submitting some patches in a month or so adding Blake2 for future use
in the tree.
Jason
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: George's crazy full state idea (Re: HalfSipHash Acceptable Usage)
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa @ 2016-12-23 20:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: George Spelvin
Cc: ak, davem, David.Laight, ebiggers3, eric.dumazet, Jason,
kernel-hardening, linux-crypto, linux-kernel, luto, netdev, tom,
tytso, vegard.nossum
In-Reply-To: <20161223182626.6290.qmail@ns.sciencehorizons.net>
Hi,
On Fri, 2016-12-23 at 13:26 -0500, George Spelvin wrote:
> (Cc: list trimmed slightly as the topic is wandering a bit.)
>
> Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote:
> > On Thu, 2016-12-22 at 19:07 -0500, George Spelvin wrote:
> > > Adding might_lock() annotations will improve coverage a lot.
> >
> > Might be hard to find the correct lock we take later down the code
> > path, but if that is possible, certainly.
>
> The point of might_lock() is that you don't have to. You find the
> worst case (most global) lock that the code *might* take if all the
> buffer-empty conditions are true, and tell lockdep "assume this lock is
> taken all the time".
Yes, of course. Probably indicating input_pool's and primary_crng's
locks are good to indicate here, but on NUMA other locks might be
taken.
> > > Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote:
> > > > Yes, that does look nice indeed. Accounting for bits instead of bytes
> > > > shouldn't be a huge problem either. Maybe it gets a bit more verbose in
> > > > case you can't satisfy a request with one batched entropy block and have
> > > > to consume randomness from two.
>
> For example, here's a simple bit-buffer implementation that wraps around
> a get_random_long. The bitbuffer is of the form "00001xxxx", where the
> x bits are valid, and the position of the msbit indicates how many bits
> are valid.
>
> extern unsigned long get_random_long();
> static unsigned long bitbuffer = 1; /* Holds 0..BITS_PER_LONG-1 bits */
> unsigned long get_random_bits(unsigned char bits)
> {
> /* We handle bits == BITS_PER_LONG,and not bits == 0 */
> unsigned long mask = -1ul >> (BITS_PER_LONG - bits);
> unsigned long val;
>
> if (bitbuffer > mask) {
> /* Request can be satisfied out of the bit buffer */
> val = bitbuffer;
> bitbuffer >>= bits;
> } else {
> /*
> * Not enough bits, but enough room in bitbuffer for the
> * leftovers. avail < bits, so avail + 64 <= bits + 63.
> */
> val = get_random_long();
> bitbuffer = bitbuffer << (BITS_PER_LONG - bits)
> | val >> 1 >> (bits-1);
> }
> return val & mask;
> }
In general this looks good, but bitbuffer needs to be protected from
concurrent access, thus needing at least some atomic instruction and
disabling of interrupts for the locking if done outside of
get_random_long. Thus I liked your previous approach more where you
simply embed this in the already necessary get_random_long and aliased
get_random_long as get_random_bits(BITS_PER_LONG) accordingly, IMHO.
> > When we hit the chacha20 without doing a reseed we only mutate the
> > state of chacha, but being an invertible function in its own, a
> > proposal would be to mix parts of the chacha20 output back into the
> > state, which, as a result, would cause slowdown because we couldn't
> > propagate the complete output of the cipher back to the caller (looking
> > at the function _extract_crng).
>
> Basically, yes. Half of the output goes to rekeying itself.
Okay, thanks and understood. :)
> But, I just realized I've been overlooking something glaringly obvious...
> there's no reason you can't compute multple blocks in advance.
In the current code on the cost of per cpu allocations thus memory.
> The standard assumption in antibacktracking is that you'll *notice* the
> state capture and stop trusting the random numbers afterward; you just
> want the output *before* to be secure. In other words, cops busting
> down the door can't find the session key used in the message you just sent.
Yep, analogous to forward secrecy and future secrecy (self healing) is
provided by catastrophic reseeding from /dev/random.
In the extract_crng case, couldn't we simply use 8 bytes of the 64 byte
return block to feed it directly back into the state chacha? So we pass
on 56 bytes into the pcpu buffer, and consume 8 bytes for the next
state. This would make the window max shorter than the anti
backtracking protection right now from 300s to 14 get_random_int calls.
Not sure if this is worth it.
> So you can compute and store random numbers ahead of need.
>
> This can amortize the antibacktracking as much as you'd like.
>
> For example, suppose we gave each CPU a small pool to minimize locking.
> When one runs out and calls the global refill, it could refill *all*
> of the CPU pools. (You don't even need locking; there may be a race to
> determine *which* random numbers the reader sees, but they're equally
> good either way.)
Yes, but still disabled interrupts, otherwise the same state could be
used twice on the same CPU. Uff, I think we have this problem in
prandom_u32.
> > Or are you referring that the anti-backtrack protection should happen
> > in every call from get_random_int?
>
> If you ask for anti-backtracking without qualification, that's the
> goal, since you don't know how long will elapse until the next call.
>
> It's like fsync(). There are lots of more limited forms of "keep my
> data safe in case of a crash", but the most basic one is "if we lost
> power the very instant the call returned, the data would be safe."
Yes, it absolutely makes sense.
Thanks a lot,
Hannes
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] brcmfmac: fix spelling mistakes on "Ivalid"
From: Arend Van Spriel @ 2016-12-23 19:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Colin King, Franky Lin, Hante Meuleman, Kalle Valo,
Pieter-Paul Giesberts, Rafał Miłecki, linux-wireless,
brcm80211-dev-list.pdl, netdev
Cc: linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <20161223004322.7300-1-colin.king@canonical.com>
On 23-12-2016 1:43, Colin King wrote:
> From: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
>
> Trivial fixes to spelling mistake "Ivalid" to "Invalid" in
> brcmf_err error messages.
Acked-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
> Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
> ---
> drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c | 4 ++--
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c
> index 7ffc4ab..15eaf72 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c
> @@ -3971,7 +3971,7 @@ brcmf_configure_wpaie(struct brcmf_if *ifp,
> pval |= AES_ENABLED;
> break;
> default:
> - brcmf_err("Ivalid unicast security info\n");
> + brcmf_err("Invalid unicast security info\n");
> }
> offset++;
> }
> @@ -4015,7 +4015,7 @@ brcmf_configure_wpaie(struct brcmf_if *ifp,
> wpa_auth |= WPA2_AUTH_1X_SHA256;
> break;
> default:
> - brcmf_err("Ivalid key mgmt info\n");
> + brcmf_err("Invalid key mgmt info\n");
> }
> offset++;
> }
>
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH RFC 0/5] Add QLogic FastLinQ FCoE (qedf) driver
From: Dupuis, Chad @ 2016-12-23 19:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: martin.petersen
Cc: linux-scsi, fcoe-devel, netdev, yuval.mintz,
QLogic-Storage-Upstream
From: "Dupuis, Chad" <chad.dupuis@cavium.com>
This series introduces the hardware offload FCoE initiator driver for the
41000 Series Converged Network Adapters (579xx chip) by QLogic. The overall
driver design includes a common module ('qed') and protocol specific
dependent modules ('qedf' for FCoE).
This driver uses the kernel components of libfc and libfcoe as is and does not
Make use of the open-fcoe user space components. Therefore, no changes will need to be
Made to any open-fcoe components.
The 'qed' common module, under drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/, is
enhanced with functionality required for FCoE support.
Arun Easi (1):
qed: Add support for hardware offloaded FCoE.
Dupuis, Chad (4):
qedf: Add QLogic FastLinQ offload FCoE driver framework.
qedf: Add offloaded I/O request functions.
qedf: Add offload ELS request handling.
qedf: Add FIP request handling.qdevelop_dec13_qedf
MAINTAINERS | 6 +
drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/Kconfig | 3 +
drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed.h | 11 +
drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_cxt.c | 98 +-
drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_cxt.h | 3 +
drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_dcbx.c | 11 +
drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_dcbx.h | 1 +
drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_dev.c | 205 +-
drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_dev_api.h | 42 +
drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_fcoe.c | 990 ++++++
drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_fcoe.h | 52 +
drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_hsi.h | 781 ++++-
drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_hw.c | 3 +
drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_ll2.c | 25 +
drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_ll2.h | 2 +-
drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_main.c | 7 +
drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_mcp.c | 3 +
drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_mcp.h | 1 +
drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_reg_addr.h | 8 +
drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_sp.h | 4 +
drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_sp_commands.c | 3 +
drivers/scsi/Kconfig | 1 +
drivers/scsi/qedf/Kconfig | 11 +
drivers/scsi/qedf/Makefile | 5 +
drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf.h | 555 ++++
drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_attr.c | 165 +
drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_dbg.c | 192 ++
drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_dbg.h | 153 +
drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_debugfs.c | 472 +++
drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_els.c | 984 ++++++
drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_fip.c | 267 ++
drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_hsi.h | 427 +++
drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_io.c | 2303 ++++++++++++++
drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_main.c | 3519 +++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_version.h | 15 +
include/linux/qed/common_hsi.h | 10 +-
include/linux/qed/fcoe_common.h | 715 +++++
include/linux/qed/qed_fcoe_if.h | 145 +
include/linux/qed/qed_if.h | 39 +
40 files changed, 12227 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_fcoe.c
create mode 100644 drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_fcoe.h
create mode 100644 drivers/scsi/qedf/Kconfig
create mode 100644 drivers/scsi/qedf/Makefile
create mode 100644 drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf.h
create mode 100644 drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_attr.c
create mode 100644 drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_dbg.c
create mode 100644 drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_dbg.h
create mode 100644 drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_debugfs.c
create mode 100644 drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_els.c
create mode 100644 drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_fip.c
create mode 100644 drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_hsi.h
create mode 100644 drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_io.c
create mode 100644 drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_main.c
create mode 100644 drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_version.h
create mode 100644 include/linux/qed/fcoe_common.h
create mode 100644 include/linux/qed/qed_fcoe_if.h
--
1.8.5.6
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH net 1/9] virtio-net: remove the warning before XDP linearizing
From: Daniel Borkmann @ 2016-12-23 19:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jason Wang, mst, virtualization, netdev, linux-kernel; +Cc: john.r.fastabend
In-Reply-To: <1482503852-12438-2-git-send-email-jasowang@redhat.com>
Hi Jason,
On 12/23/2016 03:37 PM, Jason Wang wrote:
> Since we use EWMA to estimate the size of rx buffer. When rx buffer
> size is underestimated, it's usual to have a packet with more than one
> buffers. Consider this is not a bug, remove the warning and correct
> the comment before XDP linearizing.
>
> Cc: John Fastabend <john.r.fastabend@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
> ---
> drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 8 +-------
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c
> index 08327e0..1067253 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c
> @@ -552,14 +552,8 @@ static struct sk_buff *receive_mergeable(struct net_device *dev,
> struct page *xdp_page;
> u32 act;
>
> - /* No known backend devices should send packets with
> - * more than a single buffer when XDP conditions are
> - * met. However it is not strictly illegal so the case
> - * is handled as an exception and a warning is thrown.
> - */
> + /* This happens when rx buffer size is underestimated */
> if (unlikely(num_buf > 1)) {
> - bpf_warn_invalid_xdp_buffer();
Could you also remove the bpf_warn_invalid_xdp_buffer(), which got added
just for this?
Thanks.
> /* linearize data for XDP */
> xdp_page = xdp_linearize_page(rq, num_buf,
> page, offset, &len);
>
^ permalink raw reply
* [GIT] Networking
From: David Miller @ 2016-12-23 19:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: torvalds; +Cc: akpm, netdev, linux-kernel
1) We have to be careful to not try and place a checksum after the end
of a rawv6 packet, fix from Dave Jones with help from Hannes Frederic
Sowa.
2) Missing memory barriers in tcp_tasklet_func() lead to crashes, from
Eric Dumazet.
3) Several bug fixes for the new XDP support in virtio_net, from Jason
Wang.
4) Increase headroom in RX skbs in be2net driver to accomodate
encapsulations such as geneve. From Kalesh A P.
5) Fix SKB frag unmapping on TX in mvpp2, from Thomas Petazzoni.
6) Pre-pulling UDP headers created a regression in RECVORIGDSTADDR
socket option support, from Willem de Bruijn.
7) UID based routing added a potential OOPS in ip_do_redirect() when we
see an SKB without a socket attached. We just need it for the network
namespace which we can get from skb->dev instead. Fix from Lorenzo
Colitti.
Please pull, thanks a lot!
The following changes since commit ba6d973f78eb62ffebb32f6ef3334fc9a3b33d22:
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net (2016-12-20 15:48:34 -0800)
are available in the git repository at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net.git
for you to fetch changes up to 1636098c46ac52c7fec384fe629144e8e03487b1:
sctp: fix recovering from 0 win with small data chunks (2016-12-23 14:01:35 -0500)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Arend Van Spriel (2):
brcmfmac: fix memory leak in brcmf_cfg80211_attach()
brcmfmac: fix uninitialized field in scheduled scan ssid configuration
Ben Greear (1):
ath10k: free host-mem with DMA_BIRECTIONAL flag
Colin Ian King (1):
net: fddi: skfp: use %p format specifier for addresses rather than %x
Dave Jones (1):
ipv6: handle -EFAULT from skb_copy_bits
David S. Miller (4):
Merge tag 'wireless-drivers-for-davem-2016-12-22' of git://git.kernel.org/.../kvalo/wireless-drivers
Merge branch 'cls_flower-act_tunnel_key-fixes'
Merge branch 'mlxsw-router-fixes'
Merge branch 'virtio-net-xdp-fixes'
Eric Dumazet (1):
tcp: add a missing barrier in tcp_tasklet_func()
Heiko Stübner (1):
net: ethernet: stmmac: dwmac-rk: make clk enablement first in powerup
Ido Schimmel (3):
neigh: Send netevent after marking neigh as dead
mlxsw: spectrum_router: Don't reflect dead neighs
mlxsw: spectrum_router: Correctly remove nexthop groups
Jason Wang (9):
virtio-net: remove the warning before XDP linearizing
virtio-net: correctly xmit linearized page on XDP_TX
virtio-net: fix page miscount during XDP linearizing
virtio-net: correctly handle XDP_PASS for linearized packets
virtio-net: unbreak csumed packets for XDP_PASS
virtio-net: make rx buf size estimation works for XDP
virtio-net: forbid XDP when VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_UFO is support
virtio-net: remove big packet XDP codes
virtio-net: XDP support for small buffers
Kalesh A P (1):
be2net: Increase skb headroom size to 256 bytes
Larry Finger (1):
rtlwifi: Fix kernel oops introduced with commit e49656147359
Lorenzo Colitti (1):
net: ipv4: Don't crash if passing a null sk to ip_do_redirect.
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner (2):
sctp: do not loose window information if in rwnd_over
sctp: fix recovering from 0 win with small data chunks
Or Gerlitz (2):
net/sched: act_tunnel_key: Fix setting UDP dst port in metadata under IPv6
net/sched: cls_flower: Mandate mask when matching on flags
Thomas Petazzoni (1):
net: mvpp2: fix dma unmapping of TX buffers for fragments
Tobias Klausmann (1):
ath9k: do not return early to fix rcu unlocking
Willem de Bruijn (1):
inet: fix IP(V6)_RECVORIGDSTADDR for udp sockets
jpinto (1):
stmmac: CSR clock configuration fix
drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be.h | 2 +-
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mvpp2.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_router.c | 13 +++++++---
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-rk.c | 8 +++---
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac1000_core.c | 2 +-
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac100_core.c | 2 +-
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_mdio.c | 8 +++---
drivers/net/fddi/skfp/hwmtm.c | 12 ++++-----
drivers/net/fddi/skfp/pmf.c | 2 +-
drivers/net/fddi/skfp/smt.c | 2 +-
drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 172 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------------------------------
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/wmi.c | 2 +-
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/xmit.c | 2 +-
drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c | 7 ++++--
drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/pno.c | 1 +
drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/core.c | 3 ++-
net/core/neighbour.c | 1 +
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 2 +-
net/ipv4/route.c | 3 ++-
net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 1 +
net/ipv6/datagram.c | 2 +-
net/ipv6/raw.c | 6 ++++-
net/sched/act_tunnel_key.c | 4 +--
net/sched/cls_flower.c | 23 +++++++++--------
net/sctp/associola.c | 4 +--
25 files changed, 197 insertions(+), 146 deletions(-)
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