* Re: Ethtool question
From: Ben Greear @ 2017-10-16 18:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Roopa Prabhu; +Cc: David Miller, John W. Linville, netdev@vger.kernel.org
In-Reply-To: <CAJieiUhsxPRPBBV1WJR6NRfzDKt-8c=QYRHhwoW33KchSb-gXg@mail.gmail.com>
On 10/12/2017 03:00 PM, Roopa Prabhu wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 12, 2017 at 2:45 PM, Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com> wrote:
>> On 10/11/2017 01:49 PM, David Miller wrote:
>>>
>>> From: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
>>> Date: Wed, 11 Oct 2017 16:44:07 -0400
>>>
>>>> On Wed, Oct 11, 2017 at 09:51:56AM -0700, Ben Greear wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> I noticed today that setting some ethtool settings to the same value
>>>>> returns an error code. I would think this should silently return
>>>>> success instead? Makes it easier to call it from scripts this way:
>>>>>
>>>>> [root@lf0313-6477 lanforge]# ethtool -L eth3 combined 1
>>>>> combined unmodified, ignoring
>>>>> no channel parameters changed, aborting
>>>>> current values: tx 0 rx 0 other 1 combined 1
>>>>> [root@lf0313-6477 lanforge]# echo $?
>>>>> 1
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I just had this discussion a couple of months ago with someone. My
>>>> initial feeling was like you, a no-op is not a failure. But someone
>>>> convinced me otherwise...I will now endeavour to remember who that
>>>> was and how they convinced me...
>>>>
>>>> Anyone else have input here?
>>>
>>>
>>> I guess this usually happens when drivers don't support changing the
>>> settings at all. So they just make their ethtool operation for the
>>> 'set' always return an error.
>>>
>>> We could have a generic ethtool helper that does "get" and then if the
>>> "set" request is identical just return zero.
>>>
>>> But from another perspective, the error returned from the "set" in this
>>> situation also indicates to the user that the driver does not support
>>> the "set" operation which has value and meaning in and of itself. And
>>> we'd lose that with the given suggestion.
>>
>>
>> In my case, the driver (igb) does support the set, my program just made the
>> same
>> ethtool call several times and it fails after the initial change (that
>> actually
>> changes something), as best as I can figure.
>
>
> This error is returned by ethtool user-space. It does a get, check and
> then set if user has requested changes.
>
So, should we fix ethtool to return 0 in this case instead of an error code?
I think so. If the driver itself returns an error, then probably return the
error code and/or fix the driver as seems appropriate.
Thanks,
Ben
--
Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com>
Candela Technologies Inc http://www.candelatech.com
^ permalink raw reply
* RE: [PATCH net-next v3 0/5] net: dsa: remove .set_addr
From: Rodney Cummings @ 2017-10-16 18:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrew Lunn
Cc: Vivien Didelot, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kernel@savoirfairelinux.com,
David S. Miller, Florian Fainelli, David Laight
In-Reply-To: <20171016165724.GE13339@lunn.ch>
I stand corrected. Thanks for clearing that up Andrew.
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Andrew Lunn [mailto:andrew@lunn.ch]
> Sent: Monday, October 16, 2017 11:57 AM
> To: Rodney Cummings <rodney.cummings@ni.com>
> Cc: Vivien Didelot <vivien.didelot@savoirfairelinux.com>;
> netdev@vger.kernel.org; linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org;
> kernel@savoirfairelinux.com; David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>;
> Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>; David Laight
> <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
> Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next v3 0/5] net: dsa: remove .set_addr
>
> > How do you guarantee that this MAC address is used for PAUSE, and only
> for PAUSE?
>
> That is the only thing the data sheet says this MAC address is used
> for.
>
> Andrew
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH net v2] bpf: disallow arithmetic operations on context pointer
From: Jakub Kicinski @ 2017-10-16 18:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev; +Cc: oss-drivers, alexei.starovoitov, daniel, ecree, Jakub Kicinski
Commit f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
removed the crafty selection of which pointer types are
allowed to be modified. This is OK for most pointer types
since adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() will catch operations on
immutable pointers. One exception is PTR_TO_CTX which is
now allowed to be offseted freely.
The intent of aforementioned commit was to allow context
access via modified registers. The offset passed to
->is_valid_access() verifier callback has been adjusted
by the value of the variable offset.
What is missing, however, is taking the variable offset
into account when the context register is used. Or in terms
of the code adding the offset to the value passed to the
->convert_ctx_access() callback. This leads to the following
eBPF user code:
r1 += 68
r0 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 8)
exit
being translated to this in kernel space:
0: (07) r1 += 68
1: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r1 +180)
2: (95) exit
Offset 8 is corresponding to 180 in the kernel, but offset
76 is valid too. Verifier will "accept" access to offset
68+8=76 but then "convert" access to offset 8 as 180.
Effective access to offset 248 is beyond the kernel context.
(This is a __sk_buff example on a debug-heavy kernel -
packet mark is 8 -> 180, 76 would be data.)
Dereferencing the modified context pointer is not as easy
as dereferencing other types, because we have to translate
the access to reading a field in kernel structures which is
usually at a different offset and often of a different size.
To allow modifying the pointer we would have to make sure
that given eBPF instruction will always access the same
field or the fields accessed are "compatible" in terms of
offset and size...
Disallow dereferencing modified context pointers and add
to selftests the test case described here.
Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
---
Dave, a merge note - in net-next this will need env to be passed
to verbose().
v2:
- spell dereference correctly.
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 8 ++++++--
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 8b8d6ba39e23..20f3889c006e 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -1116,7 +1116,12 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn
/* ctx accesses must be at a fixed offset, so that we can
* determine what type of data were returned.
*/
- if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
+ if (reg->off) {
+ verbose("dereference of modified ctx ptr R%d off=%d+%d, ctx+const is allowed, ctx+const+const is not\n",
+ regno, reg->off, off - reg->off);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+ if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) {
char tn_buf[48];
tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
@@ -1124,7 +1129,6 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn
tn_buf, off, size);
return -EACCES;
}
- off += reg->var_off.value;
err = check_ctx_access(env, insn_idx, off, size, t, ®_type);
if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) {
/* ctx access returns either a scalar, or a
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
index 26f3250bdcd2..3c7d3a45a3c5 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
@@ -6645,6 +6645,20 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
.errstr = "BPF_END uses reserved fields",
.result = REJECT,
},
+ {
+ "arithmetic ops make PTR_TO_CTX unusable",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1,
+ offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data) -
+ offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark)),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1,
+ offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark)),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .errstr = "dereference of modified ctx ptr R1 off=68+8, ctx+const is allowed, ctx+const+const is not",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
+ },
};
static int probe_filter_length(const struct bpf_insn *fp)
--
2.14.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 1/3] bpf: Don't check for current being NULL
From: Richard Weinberger @ 2017-10-16 18:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev; +Cc: linux-kernel, daniel, ast, Richard Weinberger
current is never NULL.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
---
kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 12 ------------
1 file changed, 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
index 3d24e238221e..e8845adcd15e 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
@@ -120,9 +120,6 @@ BPF_CALL_0(bpf_get_current_pid_tgid)
{
struct task_struct *task = current;
- if (unlikely(!task))
- return -EINVAL;
-
return (u64) task->tgid << 32 | task->pid;
}
@@ -138,9 +135,6 @@ BPF_CALL_0(bpf_get_current_uid_gid)
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
- if (unlikely(!task))
- return -EINVAL;
-
current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
return (u64) from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid) << 32 |
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid);
@@ -156,9 +150,6 @@ BPF_CALL_2(bpf_get_current_comm, char *, buf, u32, size)
{
struct task_struct *task = current;
- if (unlikely(!task))
- goto err_clear;
-
strncpy(buf, task->comm, size);
/* Verifier guarantees that size > 0. For task->comm exceeding
@@ -167,9 +158,6 @@ BPF_CALL_2(bpf_get_current_comm, char *, buf, u32, size)
*/
buf[size - 1] = 0;
return 0;
-err_clear:
- memset(buf, 0, size);
- return -EINVAL;
}
const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_get_current_comm_proto = {
--
2.13.6
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 2/3] bpf: Remove dead variable
From: Richard Weinberger @ 2017-10-16 18:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev; +Cc: linux-kernel, daniel, ast, Richard Weinberger
In-Reply-To: <20171016181856.12497-1-richard@nod.at>
task is never used in bpf_get_current_uid_gid(), kill it.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
---
kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 1 -
1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
index e8845adcd15e..511c9d522cfc 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
@@ -131,7 +131,6 @@ const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_get_current_pid_tgid_proto = {
BPF_CALL_0(bpf_get_current_uid_gid)
{
- struct task_struct *task = current;
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
--
2.13.6
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 3/3] bpf: Make sure that ->comm does not change under us.
From: Richard Weinberger @ 2017-10-16 18:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev; +Cc: linux-kernel, daniel, ast, Richard Weinberger
In-Reply-To: <20171016181856.12497-1-richard@nod.at>
Sadly we cannot use get_task_comm() since bpf_get_current_comm()
allows truncation.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
---
kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
index 511c9d522cfc..4b042b24524d 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/uidgid.h>
#include <linux/filter.h>
+#include <linux/sched/task.h>
/* If kernel subsystem is allowing eBPF programs to call this function,
* inside its own verifier_ops->get_func_proto() callback it should return
@@ -149,7 +150,9 @@ BPF_CALL_2(bpf_get_current_comm, char *, buf, u32, size)
{
struct task_struct *task = current;
+ task_lock(task);
strncpy(buf, task->comm, size);
+ task_unlock(task);
/* Verifier guarantees that size > 0. For task->comm exceeding
* size, guarantee that buf is %NUL-terminated. Unconditionally
--
2.13.6
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH v2 06/15] PCI: endpoint: make config_item_type const
From: Bjorn Helgaas @ 2017-10-16 18:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Bhumika Goyal
Cc: julia.lawall, rjw, lenb, alexander.shishkin, jic23, knaack.h,
lars, pmeerw, dledford, sean.hefty, hal.rosenstock, hch, sagi,
kishon, bhelgaas, nab, balbi, gregkh, laurent.pinchart, jlbec,
ccaulfie, teigland, mfasheh, linux-acpi, linux-kernel, linux-iio,
linux-rdma, netdev, linux-nvme, linux-pci, linux-scsi,
target-devel, linux-usb, cluster-devel
In-Reply-To: <1508167134-6243-7-git-send-email-bhumirks@gmail.com>
On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 05:18:45PM +0200, Bhumika Goyal wrote:
> Make config_item_type structures const as they are either passed to a
> function having the argument as const or stored in the const "ci_type"
> field of a config_item structure.
>
> Done using Coccinelle.
>
> Signed-off-by: Bhumika Goyal <bhumirks@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Please apply this along with the rest of the series, since it depends
on an earlier patch in the series.
> ---
> * Changes in v2- Combine all the followup patches and the constification
> patches into a series.
>
> drivers/pci/endpoint/pci-ep-cfs.c | 12 ++++++------
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/pci/endpoint/pci-ep-cfs.c b/drivers/pci/endpoint/pci-ep-cfs.c
> index 424fdd6..4f74386 100644
> --- a/drivers/pci/endpoint/pci-ep-cfs.c
> +++ b/drivers/pci/endpoint/pci-ep-cfs.c
> @@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ static void pci_epc_epf_unlink(struct config_item *epc_item,
> .drop_link = pci_epc_epf_unlink,
> };
>
> -static struct config_item_type pci_epc_type = {
> +static const struct config_item_type pci_epc_type = {
> .ct_item_ops = &pci_epc_item_ops,
> .ct_attrs = pci_epc_attrs,
> .ct_owner = THIS_MODULE,
> @@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ static void pci_epf_release(struct config_item *item)
> .release = pci_epf_release,
> };
>
> -static struct config_item_type pci_epf_type = {
> +static const struct config_item_type pci_epf_type = {
> .ct_item_ops = &pci_epf_ops,
> .ct_attrs = pci_epf_attrs,
> .ct_owner = THIS_MODULE,
> @@ -400,7 +400,7 @@ static void pci_epf_drop(struct config_group *group, struct config_item *item)
> .drop_item = &pci_epf_drop,
> };
>
> -static struct config_item_type pci_epf_group_type = {
> +static const struct config_item_type pci_epf_group_type = {
> .ct_group_ops = &pci_epf_group_ops,
> .ct_owner = THIS_MODULE,
> };
> @@ -428,15 +428,15 @@ void pci_ep_cfs_remove_epf_group(struct config_group *group)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(pci_ep_cfs_remove_epf_group);
>
> -static struct config_item_type pci_functions_type = {
> +static const struct config_item_type pci_functions_type = {
> .ct_owner = THIS_MODULE,
> };
>
> -static struct config_item_type pci_controllers_type = {
> +static const struct config_item_type pci_controllers_type = {
> .ct_owner = THIS_MODULE,
> };
>
> -static struct config_item_type pci_ep_type = {
> +static const struct config_item_type pci_ep_type = {
> .ct_owner = THIS_MODULE,
> };
>
> --
> 1.9.1
>
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH v3 0/6] adapt DPAA drivers for DSA
From: Madalin Bucur @ 2017-10-16 18:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev, davem; +Cc: f.fainelli, andrew, vivien.didelot, junote, linux-kernel
Junote Cai reported that he was not able to get a DSA setup involving the
DPAA/FMAN driver to work and narrowed it down to of_find_net_device_by_node()
call in DSA setup. The initial attempt to fix this by adding of_node to the
platform device results in a second, failed, probing of the FMan MAC driver
against the new platform device created for the DPAA Ethernet driver.
Solve these issues by removing the of_node pointer from the platform device
and changing the net_dev dev to the of_device dev to ensure the DSA init
will be able to find the DPAA net_dev using of_find_net_device_by_node().
Several changes were required to enable this solution: refactoring the
adjust_link (also resulted in lesser, cleaner code) and renaming the fman
kernel modules to keep the legacy udev rules happy.
Changes in v2:
- fix issue on error path in "dpaa_eth: change device used" patch
- cleanup the dpaa_eth_probe() error paths
Changes in v3:
- remove obsolete comment in moved code
- add explanation for module rename
Madalin Bucur (6):
fsl/fman: remove of_node
dpaa_eth: move of_phy_connect() to the eth driver
dpaa_eth: change device used
dpaa_eth: cleanup dpaa_eth_probe() error paths
fsl/fman: add dpaa in module names
dpaa_eth: remove obsolete comment
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa/dpaa_eth.c | 139 +++++++++++++------------
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman/Makefile | 12 +--
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman/mac.c | 135 +++++++-----------------
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman/mac.h | 6 +-
4 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 177 deletions(-)
--
2.1.0
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH v3 1/6] fsl/fman: remove of_node
From: Madalin Bucur @ 2017-10-16 18:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev, davem; +Cc: f.fainelli, andrew, vivien.didelot, junote, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <1508178970-28945-1-git-send-email-madalin.bucur@nxp.com>
The FMan MAC driver allocates a platform device for the Ethernet
driver to probe on. Setting pdev->dev.of_node with the MAC node
triggers the MAC driver probing of the new platform device. While
this fails quickly and does not affect the functionality of the
drivers, it is incorrect and must be removed. This was added to
address a report that DSA code using of_find_net_device_by_node()
is unable to use the DPAA interfaces. Error message seen before
this fix:
fsl_mac dpaa-ethernet.0: __devm_request_mem_region(mac) failed
fsl_mac: probe of dpaa-ethernet.0 failed with error -16
Signed-off-by: Madalin Bucur <madalin.bucur@nxp.com>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman/mac.c | 1 -
1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman/mac.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman/mac.c
index 387eb4a..9a265f8 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman/mac.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman/mac.c
@@ -623,7 +623,6 @@ static struct platform_device *dpaa_eth_add_device(int fman_id,
goto no_mem;
}
- pdev->dev.of_node = node;
pdev->dev.parent = priv->dev;
set_dma_ops(&pdev->dev, get_dma_ops(priv->dev));
--
2.1.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v3 2/6] dpaa_eth: move of_phy_connect() to the eth driver
From: Madalin Bucur @ 2017-10-16 18:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev, davem; +Cc: f.fainelli, andrew, vivien.didelot, junote, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <1508178970-28945-1-git-send-email-madalin.bucur@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Madalin Bucur <madalin.bucur@nxp.com>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa/dpaa_eth.c | 48 +++++++++++--
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman/mac.c | 97 ++++++--------------------
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman/mac.h | 5 +-
3 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 84 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa/dpaa_eth.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa/dpaa_eth.c
index 4225806..7cf61d6 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa/dpaa_eth.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa/dpaa_eth.c
@@ -2435,6 +2435,48 @@ static void dpaa_eth_napi_disable(struct dpaa_priv *priv)
}
}
+static void dpaa_adjust_link(struct net_device *net_dev)
+{
+ struct mac_device *mac_dev;
+ struct dpaa_priv *priv;
+
+ priv = netdev_priv(net_dev);
+ mac_dev = priv->mac_dev;
+ mac_dev->adjust_link(mac_dev);
+}
+
+static int dpaa_phy_init(struct net_device *net_dev)
+{
+ struct mac_device *mac_dev;
+ struct phy_device *phy_dev;
+ struct dpaa_priv *priv;
+
+ priv = netdev_priv(net_dev);
+ mac_dev = priv->mac_dev;
+
+ phy_dev = of_phy_connect(net_dev, mac_dev->phy_node,
+ &dpaa_adjust_link, 0,
+ mac_dev->phy_if);
+ if (!phy_dev) {
+ netif_err(priv, ifup, net_dev, "init_phy() failed\n");
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+
+ /* Remove any features not supported by the controller */
+ phy_dev->supported &= mac_dev->if_support;
+
+ /* Enable the symmetric and asymmetric PAUSE frame advertisements,
+ * as most of the PHY drivers do not enable them by default.
+ */
+ phy_dev->supported |= (SUPPORTED_Pause | SUPPORTED_Asym_Pause);
+ phy_dev->advertising = phy_dev->supported;
+
+ mac_dev->phy_dev = phy_dev;
+ net_dev->phydev = phy_dev;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int dpaa_open(struct net_device *net_dev)
{
struct mac_device *mac_dev;
@@ -2445,12 +2487,8 @@ static int dpaa_open(struct net_device *net_dev)
mac_dev = priv->mac_dev;
dpaa_eth_napi_enable(priv);
- net_dev->phydev = mac_dev->init_phy(net_dev, priv->mac_dev);
- if (!net_dev->phydev) {
- netif_err(priv, ifup, net_dev, "init_phy() failed\n");
- err = -ENODEV;
+ if (dpaa_phy_init(net_dev))
goto phy_init_failed;
- }
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mac_dev->port); i++) {
err = fman_port_enable(mac_dev->port[i]);
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman/mac.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman/mac.c
index 9a265f8..a0a3107 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman/mac.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman/mac.c
@@ -57,9 +57,7 @@ struct mac_priv_s {
struct device *dev;
void __iomem *vaddr;
u8 cell_index;
- phy_interface_t phy_if;
struct fman *fman;
- struct device_node *phy_node;
struct device_node *internal_phy_node;
/* List of multicast addresses */
struct list_head mc_addr_list;
@@ -106,7 +104,7 @@ static void set_fman_mac_params(struct mac_device *mac_dev,
resource_size(mac_dev->res));
memcpy(¶ms->addr, mac_dev->addr, sizeof(mac_dev->addr));
params->max_speed = priv->max_speed;
- params->phy_if = priv->phy_if;
+ params->phy_if = mac_dev->phy_if;
params->basex_if = false;
params->mac_id = priv->cell_index;
params->fm = (void *)priv->fman;
@@ -419,15 +417,12 @@ void fman_get_pause_cfg(struct mac_device *mac_dev, bool *rx_pause,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fman_get_pause_cfg);
-static void adjust_link_void(struct net_device *net_dev)
+static void adjust_link_void(struct mac_device *mac_dev)
{
}
-static void adjust_link_dtsec(struct net_device *net_dev)
+static void adjust_link_dtsec(struct mac_device *mac_dev)
{
- struct device *dev = net_dev->dev.parent;
- struct dpaa_eth_data *eth_data = dev->platform_data;
- struct mac_device *mac_dev = eth_data->mac_dev;
struct phy_device *phy_dev = mac_dev->phy_dev;
struct fman_mac *fman_mac;
bool rx_pause, tx_pause;
@@ -444,14 +439,12 @@ static void adjust_link_dtsec(struct net_device *net_dev)
fman_get_pause_cfg(mac_dev, &rx_pause, &tx_pause);
err = fman_set_mac_active_pause(mac_dev, rx_pause, tx_pause);
if (err < 0)
- netdev_err(net_dev, "fman_set_mac_active_pause() = %d\n", err);
+ dev_err(mac_dev->priv->dev, "fman_set_mac_active_pause() = %d\n",
+ err);
}
-static void adjust_link_memac(struct net_device *net_dev)
+static void adjust_link_memac(struct mac_device *mac_dev)
{
- struct device *dev = net_dev->dev.parent;
- struct dpaa_eth_data *eth_data = dev->platform_data;
- struct mac_device *mac_dev = eth_data->mac_dev;
struct phy_device *phy_dev = mac_dev->phy_dev;
struct fman_mac *fman_mac;
bool rx_pause, tx_pause;
@@ -463,60 +456,12 @@ static void adjust_link_memac(struct net_device *net_dev)
fman_get_pause_cfg(mac_dev, &rx_pause, &tx_pause);
err = fman_set_mac_active_pause(mac_dev, rx_pause, tx_pause);
if (err < 0)
- netdev_err(net_dev, "fman_set_mac_active_pause() = %d\n", err);
-}
-
-/* Initializes driver's PHY state, and attaches to the PHY.
- * Returns 0 on success.
- */
-static struct phy_device *init_phy(struct net_device *net_dev,
- struct mac_device *mac_dev,
- void (*adj_lnk)(struct net_device *))
-{
- struct phy_device *phy_dev;
- struct mac_priv_s *priv = mac_dev->priv;
-
- phy_dev = of_phy_connect(net_dev, priv->phy_node, adj_lnk, 0,
- priv->phy_if);
- if (!phy_dev) {
- netdev_err(net_dev, "Could not connect to PHY\n");
- return NULL;
- }
-
- /* Remove any features not supported by the controller */
- phy_dev->supported &= mac_dev->if_support;
- /* Enable the symmetric and asymmetric PAUSE frame advertisements,
- * as most of the PHY drivers do not enable them by default.
- */
- phy_dev->supported |= (SUPPORTED_Pause | SUPPORTED_Asym_Pause);
- phy_dev->advertising = phy_dev->supported;
-
- mac_dev->phy_dev = phy_dev;
-
- return phy_dev;
-}
-
-static struct phy_device *dtsec_init_phy(struct net_device *net_dev,
- struct mac_device *mac_dev)
-{
- return init_phy(net_dev, mac_dev, &adjust_link_dtsec);
-}
-
-static struct phy_device *tgec_init_phy(struct net_device *net_dev,
- struct mac_device *mac_dev)
-{
- return init_phy(net_dev, mac_dev, adjust_link_void);
-}
-
-static struct phy_device *memac_init_phy(struct net_device *net_dev,
- struct mac_device *mac_dev)
-{
- return init_phy(net_dev, mac_dev, &adjust_link_memac);
+ dev_err(mac_dev->priv->dev, "fman_set_mac_active_pause() = %d\n",
+ err);
}
static void setup_dtsec(struct mac_device *mac_dev)
{
- mac_dev->init_phy = dtsec_init_phy;
mac_dev->init = dtsec_initialization;
mac_dev->set_promisc = dtsec_set_promiscuous;
mac_dev->change_addr = dtsec_modify_mac_address;
@@ -528,14 +473,13 @@ static void setup_dtsec(struct mac_device *mac_dev)
mac_dev->set_multi = set_multi;
mac_dev->start = start;
mac_dev->stop = stop;
-
+ mac_dev->adjust_link = adjust_link_dtsec;
mac_dev->priv->enable = dtsec_enable;
mac_dev->priv->disable = dtsec_disable;
}
static void setup_tgec(struct mac_device *mac_dev)
{
- mac_dev->init_phy = tgec_init_phy;
mac_dev->init = tgec_initialization;
mac_dev->set_promisc = tgec_set_promiscuous;
mac_dev->change_addr = tgec_modify_mac_address;
@@ -547,14 +491,13 @@ static void setup_tgec(struct mac_device *mac_dev)
mac_dev->set_multi = set_multi;
mac_dev->start = start;
mac_dev->stop = stop;
-
+ mac_dev->adjust_link = adjust_link_void;
mac_dev->priv->enable = tgec_enable;
mac_dev->priv->disable = tgec_disable;
}
static void setup_memac(struct mac_device *mac_dev)
{
- mac_dev->init_phy = memac_init_phy;
mac_dev->init = memac_initialization;
mac_dev->set_promisc = memac_set_promiscuous;
mac_dev->change_addr = memac_modify_mac_address;
@@ -566,7 +509,7 @@ static void setup_memac(struct mac_device *mac_dev)
mac_dev->set_multi = set_multi;
mac_dev->start = start;
mac_dev->stop = stop;
-
+ mac_dev->adjust_link = adjust_link_memac;
mac_dev->priv->enable = memac_enable;
mac_dev->priv->disable = memac_disable;
}
@@ -850,13 +793,13 @@ static int mac_probe(struct platform_device *_of_dev)
mac_node);
phy_if = PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_SGMII;
}
- priv->phy_if = phy_if;
+ mac_dev->phy_if = phy_if;
- priv->speed = phy2speed[priv->phy_if];
+ priv->speed = phy2speed[mac_dev->phy_if];
priv->max_speed = priv->speed;
mac_dev->if_support = DTSEC_SUPPORTED;
/* We don't support half-duplex in SGMII mode */
- if (priv->phy_if == PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_SGMII)
+ if (mac_dev->phy_if == PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_SGMII)
mac_dev->if_support &= ~(SUPPORTED_10baseT_Half |
SUPPORTED_100baseT_Half);
@@ -865,12 +808,12 @@ static int mac_probe(struct platform_device *_of_dev)
mac_dev->if_support |= SUPPORTED_1000baseT_Full;
/* The 10G interface only supports one mode */
- if (priv->phy_if == PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_XGMII)
+ if (mac_dev->phy_if == PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_XGMII)
mac_dev->if_support = SUPPORTED_10000baseT_Full;
/* Get the rest of the PHY information */
- priv->phy_node = of_parse_phandle(mac_node, "phy-handle", 0);
- if (!priv->phy_node && of_phy_is_fixed_link(mac_node)) {
+ mac_dev->phy_node = of_parse_phandle(mac_node, "phy-handle", 0);
+ if (!mac_dev->phy_node && of_phy_is_fixed_link(mac_node)) {
struct phy_device *phy;
err = of_phy_register_fixed_link(mac_node);
@@ -884,8 +827,8 @@ static int mac_probe(struct platform_device *_of_dev)
goto _return_dev_set_drvdata;
}
- priv->phy_node = of_node_get(mac_node);
- phy = of_phy_find_device(priv->phy_node);
+ mac_dev->phy_node = of_node_get(mac_node);
+ phy = of_phy_find_device(mac_dev->phy_node);
if (!phy) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto _return_dev_set_drvdata;
@@ -903,7 +846,7 @@ static int mac_probe(struct platform_device *_of_dev)
err = mac_dev->init(mac_dev);
if (err < 0) {
dev_err(dev, "mac_dev->init() = %d\n", err);
- of_node_put(priv->phy_node);
+ of_node_put(mac_dev->phy_node);
goto _return_dev_set_drvdata;
}
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman/mac.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman/mac.h
index d7313f0..1ca85a1 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman/mac.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman/mac.h
@@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ struct mac_device {
struct fman_port *port[2];
u32 if_support;
struct phy_device *phy_dev;
+ phy_interface_t phy_if;
+ struct device_node *phy_node;
bool autoneg_pause;
bool rx_pause_req;
@@ -58,11 +60,10 @@ struct mac_device {
bool tx_pause_active;
bool promisc;
- struct phy_device *(*init_phy)(struct net_device *net_dev,
- struct mac_device *mac_dev);
int (*init)(struct mac_device *mac_dev);
int (*start)(struct mac_device *mac_dev);
int (*stop)(struct mac_device *mac_dev);
+ void (*adjust_link)(struct mac_device *mac_dev);
int (*set_promisc)(struct fman_mac *mac_dev, bool enable);
int (*change_addr)(struct fman_mac *mac_dev, enet_addr_t *enet_addr);
int (*set_multi)(struct net_device *net_dev,
--
2.1.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v3 3/6] dpaa_eth: change device used
From: Madalin Bucur @ 2017-10-16 18:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev, davem; +Cc: f.fainelli, andrew, vivien.didelot, junote, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <1508178970-28945-1-git-send-email-madalin.bucur@nxp.com>
Change device used for DMA mapping to the MAC device that is an
of_device, with proper DMA ops. Using this device for the netdevice
should also address the issue with DSA scenarios that need the
netdevice to be backed by an of_device.
Signed-off-by: Madalin Bucur <madalin.bucur@nxp.com>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa/dpaa_eth.c | 42 ++++++++------------------
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman/mac.c | 37 +++++++++--------------
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman/mac.h | 1 -
3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa/dpaa_eth.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa/dpaa_eth.c
index 7cf61d6..823aa65 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa/dpaa_eth.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa/dpaa_eth.c
@@ -385,34 +385,19 @@ static int dpaa_setup_tc(struct net_device *net_dev, enum tc_setup_type type,
static struct mac_device *dpaa_mac_dev_get(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
- struct platform_device *of_dev;
struct dpaa_eth_data *eth_data;
- struct device *dpaa_dev, *dev;
- struct device_node *mac_node;
+ struct device *dpaa_dev;
struct mac_device *mac_dev;
dpaa_dev = &pdev->dev;
eth_data = dpaa_dev->platform_data;
- if (!eth_data)
+ if (!eth_data) {
+ dev_err(dpaa_dev, "eth_data missing\n");
return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
-
- mac_node = eth_data->mac_node;
-
- of_dev = of_find_device_by_node(mac_node);
- if (!of_dev) {
- dev_err(dpaa_dev, "of_find_device_by_node(%pOF) failed\n",
- mac_node);
- of_node_put(mac_node);
- return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
- of_node_put(mac_node);
-
- dev = &of_dev->dev;
-
- mac_dev = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+ mac_dev = eth_data->mac_dev;
if (!mac_dev) {
- dev_err(dpaa_dev, "dev_get_drvdata(%s) failed\n",
- dev_name(dev));
+ dev_err(dpaa_dev, "mac_dev missing\n");
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
@@ -2696,7 +2681,13 @@ static int dpaa_eth_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
int err = 0, i, channel;
struct device *dev;
- dev = &pdev->dev;
+ /* device used for DMA mapping */
+ dev = pdev->dev.parent;
+ err = dma_coerce_mask_and_coherent(dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(40));
+ if (err) {
+ dev_err(dev, "dma_coerce_mask_and_coherent() failed\n");
+ return err;
+ }
/* Allocate this early, so we can store relevant information in
* the private area
@@ -2738,14 +2729,6 @@ static int dpaa_eth_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
priv->buf_layout[RX].priv_data_size = DPAA_RX_PRIV_DATA_SIZE; /* Rx */
priv->buf_layout[TX].priv_data_size = DPAA_TX_PRIV_DATA_SIZE; /* Tx */
- /* device used for DMA mapping */
- set_dma_ops(dev, get_dma_ops(&pdev->dev));
- err = dma_coerce_mask_and_coherent(dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(40));
- if (err) {
- dev_err(dev, "dma_coerce_mask_and_coherent() failed\n");
- goto dev_mask_failed;
- }
-
/* bp init */
for (i = 0; i < DPAA_BPS_NUM; i++) {
int err;
@@ -2879,7 +2862,6 @@ static int dpaa_eth_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
dpaa_bps_free(priv);
bp_create_failed:
fq_probe_failed:
-dev_mask_failed:
mac_probe_failed:
dev_set_drvdata(dev, NULL);
free_netdev(net_dev);
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman/mac.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman/mac.c
index a0a3107..1d6da1e 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman/mac.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman/mac.c
@@ -542,8 +542,7 @@ static const u16 phy2speed[] = {
};
static struct platform_device *dpaa_eth_add_device(int fman_id,
- struct mac_device *mac_dev,
- struct device_node *node)
+ struct mac_device *mac_dev)
{
struct platform_device *pdev;
struct dpaa_eth_data data;
@@ -556,10 +555,8 @@ static struct platform_device *dpaa_eth_add_device(int fman_id,
data.mac_dev = mac_dev;
data.mac_hw_id = priv->cell_index;
data.fman_hw_id = fman_id;
- data.mac_node = node;
mutex_lock(ð_lock);
-
pdev = platform_device_alloc("dpaa-ethernet", dpaa_eth_dev_cnt);
if (!pdev) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
@@ -648,9 +645,6 @@ static int mac_probe(struct platform_device *_of_dev)
goto _return;
}
- /* Register mac_dev */
- dev_set_drvdata(dev, mac_dev);
-
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&priv->mc_addr_list);
/* Get the FM node */
@@ -659,7 +653,7 @@ static int mac_probe(struct platform_device *_of_dev)
dev_err(dev, "of_get_parent(%pOF) failed\n",
mac_node);
err = -EINVAL;
- goto _return_dev_set_drvdata;
+ goto _return_of_get_parent;
}
of_dev = of_find_device_by_node(dev_node);
@@ -693,7 +687,7 @@ static int mac_probe(struct platform_device *_of_dev)
if (err < 0) {
dev_err(dev, "of_address_to_resource(%pOF) = %d\n",
mac_node, err);
- goto _return_dev_set_drvdata;
+ goto _return_of_get_parent;
}
mac_dev->res = __devm_request_region(dev,
@@ -703,7 +697,7 @@ static int mac_probe(struct platform_device *_of_dev)
if (!mac_dev->res) {
dev_err(dev, "__devm_request_mem_region(mac) failed\n");
err = -EBUSY;
- goto _return_dev_set_drvdata;
+ goto _return_of_get_parent;
}
priv->vaddr = devm_ioremap(dev, mac_dev->res->start,
@@ -711,7 +705,7 @@ static int mac_probe(struct platform_device *_of_dev)
if (!priv->vaddr) {
dev_err(dev, "devm_ioremap() failed\n");
err = -EIO;
- goto _return_dev_set_drvdata;
+ goto _return_of_get_parent;
}
if (!of_device_is_available(mac_node)) {
@@ -728,7 +722,7 @@ static int mac_probe(struct platform_device *_of_dev)
if (err) {
dev_err(dev, "failed to read cell-index for %pOF\n", mac_node);
err = -EINVAL;
- goto _return_dev_set_drvdata;
+ goto _return_of_get_parent;
}
priv->cell_index = (u8)val;
@@ -737,7 +731,7 @@ static int mac_probe(struct platform_device *_of_dev)
if (!mac_addr) {
dev_err(dev, "of_get_mac_address(%pOF) failed\n", mac_node);
err = -EINVAL;
- goto _return_dev_set_drvdata;
+ goto _return_of_get_parent;
}
memcpy(mac_dev->addr, mac_addr, sizeof(mac_dev->addr));
@@ -747,14 +741,14 @@ static int mac_probe(struct platform_device *_of_dev)
dev_err(dev, "of_count_phandle_with_args(%pOF, fsl,fman-ports) failed\n",
mac_node);
err = nph;
- goto _return_dev_set_drvdata;
+ goto _return_of_get_parent;
}
if (nph != ARRAY_SIZE(mac_dev->port)) {
dev_err(dev, "Not supported number of fman-ports handles of mac node %pOF from device tree\n",
mac_node);
err = -EINVAL;
- goto _return_dev_set_drvdata;
+ goto _return_of_get_parent;
}
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mac_dev->port); i++) {
@@ -818,20 +812,20 @@ static int mac_probe(struct platform_device *_of_dev)
err = of_phy_register_fixed_link(mac_node);
if (err)
- goto _return_dev_set_drvdata;
+ goto _return_of_get_parent;
priv->fixed_link = kzalloc(sizeof(*priv->fixed_link),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!priv->fixed_link) {
err = -ENOMEM;
- goto _return_dev_set_drvdata;
+ goto _return_of_get_parent;
}
mac_dev->phy_node = of_node_get(mac_node);
phy = of_phy_find_device(mac_dev->phy_node);
if (!phy) {
err = -EINVAL;
- goto _return_dev_set_drvdata;
+ goto _return_of_get_parent;
}
priv->fixed_link->link = phy->link;
@@ -847,7 +841,7 @@ static int mac_probe(struct platform_device *_of_dev)
if (err < 0) {
dev_err(dev, "mac_dev->init() = %d\n", err);
of_node_put(mac_dev->phy_node);
- goto _return_dev_set_drvdata;
+ goto _return_of_get_parent;
}
/* pause frame autonegotiation enabled */
@@ -868,7 +862,7 @@ static int mac_probe(struct platform_device *_of_dev)
mac_dev->addr[0], mac_dev->addr[1], mac_dev->addr[2],
mac_dev->addr[3], mac_dev->addr[4], mac_dev->addr[5]);
- priv->eth_dev = dpaa_eth_add_device(fman_id, mac_dev, mac_node);
+ priv->eth_dev = dpaa_eth_add_device(fman_id, mac_dev);
if (IS_ERR(priv->eth_dev)) {
dev_err(dev, "failed to add Ethernet platform device for MAC %d\n",
priv->cell_index);
@@ -879,9 +873,8 @@ static int mac_probe(struct platform_device *_of_dev)
_return_of_node_put:
of_node_put(dev_node);
-_return_dev_set_drvdata:
+_return_of_get_parent:
kfree(priv->fixed_link);
- dev_set_drvdata(dev, NULL);
_return:
return err;
}
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman/mac.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman/mac.h
index 1ca85a1..eefb335 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman/mac.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman/mac.h
@@ -83,7 +83,6 @@ struct mac_device {
};
struct dpaa_eth_data {
- struct device_node *mac_node;
struct mac_device *mac_dev;
int mac_hw_id;
int fman_hw_id;
--
2.1.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v3 4/6] dpaa_eth: cleanup dpaa_eth_probe() error paths
From: Madalin Bucur @ 2017-10-16 18:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev, davem; +Cc: f.fainelli, andrew, vivien.didelot, junote, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <1508178970-28945-1-git-send-email-madalin.bucur@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Madalin Bucur <madalin.bucur@nxp.com>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa/dpaa_eth.c | 53 ++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa/dpaa_eth.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa/dpaa_eth.c
index 823aa65..c6b97a1 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa/dpaa_eth.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa/dpaa_eth.c
@@ -2695,7 +2695,7 @@ static int dpaa_eth_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
net_dev = alloc_etherdev_mq(sizeof(*priv), DPAA_ETH_TXQ_NUM);
if (!net_dev) {
dev_err(dev, "alloc_etherdev_mq() failed\n");
- goto alloc_etherdev_mq_failed;
+ return -ENOMEM;
}
/* Do this here, so we can be verbose early */
@@ -2711,7 +2711,7 @@ static int dpaa_eth_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
if (IS_ERR(mac_dev)) {
dev_err(dev, "dpaa_mac_dev_get() failed\n");
err = PTR_ERR(mac_dev);
- goto mac_probe_failed;
+ goto free_netdev;
}
/* If fsl_fm_max_frm is set to a higher value than the all-common 1500,
@@ -2735,7 +2735,7 @@ static int dpaa_eth_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
dpaa_bps[i] = dpaa_bp_alloc(dev);
if (IS_ERR(dpaa_bps[i]))
- return PTR_ERR(dpaa_bps[i]);
+ goto free_dpaa_bps;
/* the raw size of the buffers used for reception */
dpaa_bps[i]->raw_size = bpool_buffer_raw_size(i, DPAA_BPS_NUM);
/* avoid runtime computations by keeping the usable size here */
@@ -2743,11 +2743,8 @@ static int dpaa_eth_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
dpaa_bps[i]->dev = dev;
err = dpaa_bp_alloc_pool(dpaa_bps[i]);
- if (err < 0) {
- dpaa_bps_free(priv);
- priv->dpaa_bps[i] = NULL;
- goto bp_create_failed;
- }
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto free_dpaa_bps;
priv->dpaa_bps[i] = dpaa_bps[i];
}
@@ -2758,7 +2755,7 @@ static int dpaa_eth_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
err = dpaa_alloc_all_fqs(dev, &priv->dpaa_fq_list, &port_fqs);
if (err < 0) {
dev_err(dev, "dpaa_alloc_all_fqs() failed\n");
- goto fq_probe_failed;
+ goto free_dpaa_bps;
}
priv->mac_dev = mac_dev;
@@ -2767,7 +2764,7 @@ static int dpaa_eth_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
if (channel < 0) {
dev_err(dev, "dpaa_get_channel() failed\n");
err = channel;
- goto get_channel_failed;
+ goto free_dpaa_bps;
}
priv->channel = (u16)channel;
@@ -2787,20 +2784,20 @@ static int dpaa_eth_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
err = dpaa_eth_cgr_init(priv);
if (err < 0) {
dev_err(dev, "Error initializing CGR\n");
- goto tx_cgr_init_failed;
+ goto free_dpaa_bps;
}
err = dpaa_ingress_cgr_init(priv);
if (err < 0) {
dev_err(dev, "Error initializing ingress CGR\n");
- goto rx_cgr_init_failed;
+ goto delete_egress_cgr;
}
/* Add the FQs to the interface, and make them active */
list_for_each_entry_safe(dpaa_fq, tmp, &priv->dpaa_fq_list, list) {
err = dpaa_fq_init(dpaa_fq, false);
if (err < 0)
- goto fq_alloc_failed;
+ goto free_dpaa_fqs;
}
priv->tx_headroom = dpaa_get_headroom(&priv->buf_layout[TX]);
@@ -2810,7 +2807,7 @@ static int dpaa_eth_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
err = dpaa_eth_init_ports(mac_dev, dpaa_bps, DPAA_BPS_NUM, &port_fqs,
&priv->buf_layout[0], dev);
if (err)
- goto init_ports_failed;
+ goto free_dpaa_fqs;
/* Rx traffic distribution based on keygen hashing defaults to on */
priv->keygen_in_use = true;
@@ -2819,7 +2816,7 @@ static int dpaa_eth_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
if (!priv->percpu_priv) {
dev_err(dev, "devm_alloc_percpu() failed\n");
err = -ENOMEM;
- goto alloc_percpu_failed;
+ goto free_dpaa_fqs;
}
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
percpu_priv = per_cpu_ptr(priv->percpu_priv, i);
@@ -2832,11 +2829,11 @@ static int dpaa_eth_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
/* Initialize NAPI */
err = dpaa_napi_add(net_dev);
if (err < 0)
- goto napi_add_failed;
+ goto delete_dpaa_napi;
err = dpaa_netdev_init(net_dev, &dpaa_ops, tx_timeout);
if (err < 0)
- goto netdev_init_failed;
+ goto delete_dpaa_napi;
dpaa_eth_sysfs_init(&net_dev->dev);
@@ -2845,31 +2842,21 @@ static int dpaa_eth_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
return 0;
-netdev_init_failed:
-napi_add_failed:
+delete_dpaa_napi:
dpaa_napi_del(net_dev);
-alloc_percpu_failed:
-init_ports_failed:
+free_dpaa_fqs:
dpaa_fq_free(dev, &priv->dpaa_fq_list);
-fq_alloc_failed:
qman_delete_cgr_safe(&priv->ingress_cgr);
qman_release_cgrid(priv->ingress_cgr.cgrid);
-rx_cgr_init_failed:
+delete_egress_cgr:
qman_delete_cgr_safe(&priv->cgr_data.cgr);
qman_release_cgrid(priv->cgr_data.cgr.cgrid);
-tx_cgr_init_failed:
-get_channel_failed:
+free_dpaa_bps:
dpaa_bps_free(priv);
-bp_create_failed:
-fq_probe_failed:
-mac_probe_failed:
+free_netdev:
dev_set_drvdata(dev, NULL);
free_netdev(net_dev);
-alloc_etherdev_mq_failed:
- for (i = 0; i < DPAA_BPS_NUM && dpaa_bps[i]; i++) {
- if (atomic_read(&dpaa_bps[i]->refs) == 0)
- devm_kfree(dev, dpaa_bps[i]);
- }
+
return err;
}
--
2.1.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v3 5/6] fsl/fman: add dpaa in module names
From: Madalin Bucur @ 2017-10-16 18:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev, davem; +Cc: f.fainelli, andrew, vivien.didelot, junote, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <1508178970-28945-1-git-send-email-madalin.bucur@nxp.com>
This change just renames the FMan driver modules, using a common prefix
for the DPAA FMan and DPAA Ethernet drivers. Besides making the names more
aligned, this allows writing udev rules that match on either driver name,
if needed, using the fsl_dpaa_* prefix. The change of netdev dev required
for the DSA probing makes the previous rules written using this prefix
fail, this change makes them work again, ensuring backwards compatibility
for their users.
Signed-off-by: Madalin Bucur <madalin.bucur@nxp.com>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman/Makefile | 12 ++++++------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman/Makefile b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman/Makefile
index 2c38119..4ae524a 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman/Makefile
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
subdir-ccflags-y += -I$(srctree)/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fman
-obj-$(CONFIG_FSL_FMAN) += fsl_fman.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_FSL_FMAN) += fsl_fman_port.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_FSL_FMAN) += fsl_mac.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_FSL_FMAN) += fsl_dpaa_fman.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_FSL_FMAN) += fsl_dpaa_fman_port.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_FSL_FMAN) += fsl_dpaa_mac.o
-fsl_fman-objs := fman_muram.o fman.o fman_sp.o fman_keygen.o
-fsl_fman_port-objs := fman_port.o
-fsl_mac-objs:= mac.o fman_dtsec.o fman_memac.o fman_tgec.o
+fsl_dpaa_fman-objs := fman_muram.o fman.o fman_sp.o fman_keygen.o
+fsl_dpaa_fman_port-objs := fman_port.o
+fsl_dpaa_mac-objs:= mac.o fman_dtsec.o fman_memac.o fman_tgec.o
--
2.1.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v3 6/6] dpaa_eth: remove obsolete comment
From: Madalin Bucur @ 2017-10-16 18:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev, davem; +Cc: f.fainelli, andrew, vivien.didelot, junote, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <1508178970-28945-1-git-send-email-madalin.bucur@nxp.com>
Comment is no longer valid for a long time now.
Signed-off-by: Madalin Bucur <madalin.bucur@nxp.com>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa/dpaa_eth.c | 4 ----
1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa/dpaa_eth.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa/dpaa_eth.c
index c6b97a1..a8d0be8 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa/dpaa_eth.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa/dpaa_eth.c
@@ -2449,10 +2449,6 @@ static int dpaa_phy_init(struct net_device *net_dev)
/* Remove any features not supported by the controller */
phy_dev->supported &= mac_dev->if_support;
-
- /* Enable the symmetric and asymmetric PAUSE frame advertisements,
- * as most of the PHY drivers do not enable them by default.
- */
phy_dev->supported |= (SUPPORTED_Pause | SUPPORTED_Asym_Pause);
phy_dev->advertising = phy_dev->supported;
--
2.1.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH v2 04/15] iio: make function argument and some structures const
From: Jonathan Cameron @ 2017-10-16 18:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Bhumika Goyal, julia.lawall, rjw, lenb, alexander.shishkin, jic23,
knaack.h, lars, pmeerw, dledford, sean.hefty, hal.rosenstock, hch,
sagi, kishon, bhelgaas, nab, balbi, gregkh, laurent.pinchart,
jlbec, ccaulfie, teigland, mfasheh, linux-acpi, linux-kernel,
linux-iio, linux-rdma, netdev, linux-nvme, linux-pci, linux-scsi,
target-devel, linux-usb
In-Reply-To: <1508167134-6243-5-git-send-email-bhumirks@gmail.com>
On 16 October 2017 16:18:43 BST, Bhumika Goyal <bhumirks@gmail.com> wrote:
>Make the argument of the functions iio_sw{d/t}_group_init_type_name
>const
>as they are only passed to the function config_group_init_type_name
>having
>the argument as const.
>
>Make the config_item_type structures const as they are either passed to
>the functions having the argument as const or they are
>stored in the const "ci_type" field of a config_item structure.
>
>Signed-off-by: Bhumika Goyal <bhumirks@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@Huawei.com>
>---
>* Changes in v2- Combine all the followup patches and the
>constification
>patches into a series.
>
> drivers/iio/dummy/iio_simple_dummy.c | 2 +-
> drivers/iio/industrialio-configfs.c | 2 +-
> drivers/iio/industrialio-sw-device.c | 6 +++---
> drivers/iio/industrialio-sw-trigger.c | 6 +++---
> drivers/iio/trigger/iio-trig-hrtimer.c | 2 +-
> drivers/iio/trigger/iio-trig-loop.c | 2 +-
> include/linux/iio/sw_device.h | 2 +-
> include/linux/iio/sw_trigger.h | 2 +-
> 8 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/drivers/iio/dummy/iio_simple_dummy.c
>b/drivers/iio/dummy/iio_simple_dummy.c
>index a45d01e..6205247 100644
>--- a/drivers/iio/dummy/iio_simple_dummy.c
>+++ b/drivers/iio/dummy/iio_simple_dummy.c
>@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
> #include <linux/iio/sw_device.h>
> #include "iio_simple_dummy.h"
>
>-static struct config_item_type iio_dummy_type = {
>+static const struct config_item_type iio_dummy_type = {
> .ct_owner = THIS_MODULE,
> };
>
>diff --git a/drivers/iio/industrialio-configfs.c
>b/drivers/iio/industrialio-configfs.c
>index 45ce2bc..5a0aae1 100644
>--- a/drivers/iio/industrialio-configfs.c
>+++ b/drivers/iio/industrialio-configfs.c
>@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
> #include <linux/iio/iio.h>
> #include <linux/iio/configfs.h>
>
>-static struct config_item_type iio_root_group_type = {
>+static const struct config_item_type iio_root_group_type = {
> .ct_owner = THIS_MODULE,
> };
>
>diff --git a/drivers/iio/industrialio-sw-device.c
>b/drivers/iio/industrialio-sw-device.c
>index 81b49cf..90df97c 100644
>--- a/drivers/iio/industrialio-sw-device.c
>+++ b/drivers/iio/industrialio-sw-device.c
>@@ -19,9 +19,9 @@
> #include <linux/configfs.h>
>
> static struct config_group *iio_devices_group;
>-static struct config_item_type iio_device_type_group_type;
>+static const struct config_item_type iio_device_type_group_type;
>
>-static struct config_item_type iio_devices_group_type = {
>+static const struct config_item_type iio_devices_group_type = {
> .ct_owner = THIS_MODULE,
> };
>
>@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ static void device_drop_group(struct config_group
>*group,
> .drop_item = &device_drop_group,
> };
>
>-static struct config_item_type iio_device_type_group_type = {
>+static const struct config_item_type iio_device_type_group_type = {
> .ct_group_ops = &device_ops,
> .ct_owner = THIS_MODULE,
> };
>diff --git a/drivers/iio/industrialio-sw-trigger.c
>b/drivers/iio/industrialio-sw-trigger.c
>index 8d24fb1..bc6b7fb 100644
>--- a/drivers/iio/industrialio-sw-trigger.c
>+++ b/drivers/iio/industrialio-sw-trigger.c
>@@ -19,9 +19,9 @@
> #include <linux/configfs.h>
>
> static struct config_group *iio_triggers_group;
>-static struct config_item_type iio_trigger_type_group_type;
>+static const struct config_item_type iio_trigger_type_group_type;
>
>-static struct config_item_type iio_triggers_group_type = {
>+static const struct config_item_type iio_triggers_group_type = {
> .ct_owner = THIS_MODULE,
> };
>
>@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ static void trigger_drop_group(struct config_group
>*group,
> .drop_item = &trigger_drop_group,
> };
>
>-static struct config_item_type iio_trigger_type_group_type = {
>+static const struct config_item_type iio_trigger_type_group_type = {
> .ct_group_ops = &trigger_ops,
> .ct_owner = THIS_MODULE,
> };
>diff --git a/drivers/iio/trigger/iio-trig-hrtimer.c
>b/drivers/iio/trigger/iio-trig-hrtimer.c
>index 3ee9216..7accd01 100644
>--- a/drivers/iio/trigger/iio-trig-hrtimer.c
>+++ b/drivers/iio/trigger/iio-trig-hrtimer.c
>@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ struct iio_hrtimer_info {
> ktime_t period;
> };
>
>-static struct config_item_type iio_hrtimer_type = {
>+static const struct config_item_type iio_hrtimer_type = {
> .ct_owner = THIS_MODULE,
> };
>
>diff --git a/drivers/iio/trigger/iio-trig-loop.c
>b/drivers/iio/trigger/iio-trig-loop.c
>index b4b02db..94a90e0 100644
>--- a/drivers/iio/trigger/iio-trig-loop.c
>+++ b/drivers/iio/trigger/iio-trig-loop.c
>@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ struct iio_loop_info {
> struct task_struct *task;
> };
>
>-static struct config_item_type iio_loop_type = {
>+static const struct config_item_type iio_loop_type = {
> .ct_owner = THIS_MODULE,
> };
>
>diff --git a/include/linux/iio/sw_device.h
>b/include/linux/iio/sw_device.h
>index fa79319..8642b91 100644
>--- a/include/linux/iio/sw_device.h
>+++ b/include/linux/iio/sw_device.h
>@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ struct iio_sw_device *to_iio_sw_device(struct
>config_item *item)
> static inline
> void iio_swd_group_init_type_name(struct iio_sw_device *d,
> const char *name,
>- struct config_item_type *type)
>+ const struct config_item_type *type)
> {
> #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CONFIGFS_FS)
> config_group_init_type_name(&d->group, name, type);
>diff --git a/include/linux/iio/sw_trigger.h
>b/include/linux/iio/sw_trigger.h
>index c97eab6..0c43738 100644
>--- a/include/linux/iio/sw_trigger.h
>+++ b/include/linux/iio/sw_trigger.h
>@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ struct iio_sw_trigger *to_iio_sw_trigger(struct
>config_item *item)
> static inline
> void iio_swt_group_init_type_name(struct iio_sw_trigger *t,
> const char *name,
>- struct config_item_type *type)
>+ const struct config_item_type *type)
> {
> #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CONFIGFS_FS)
> config_group_init_type_name(&t->group, name, type);
--
Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] bpf: devmap: Check attr->max_entries more carefully
From: Daniel Borkmann @ 2017-10-16 18:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Richard Weinberger, netdev
Cc: linux-kernel, ast, sp3485, tj, mark.rutland, john.fastabend
In-Reply-To: <20171015220020.8157-1-richard@nod.at>
[ +Tejun, Mark, John ]
On 10/16/2017 12:00 AM, Richard Weinberger wrote:
> max_entries is user controlled and used as input for __alloc_percpu().
> This function expects that the allocation size is a power of two and
> less than PCPU_MIN_UNIT_SIZE.
> Otherwise a WARN() is triggered.
>
> Fixes: 11393cc9b9be ("xdp: Add batching support to redirect map")
> Reported-by: Shankara Pailoor <sp3485@columbia.edu>
> Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Thanks for the patch, Richard. There was a prior discussion here [1] on
the same issue, I thought this would have been resolved by now, but looks
like it's still open and there was never a follow-up, at least I don't see
it in the percpu tree if I didn't miss anything.
I would suggest, we do the following below and pass __GFP_NOWARN from BPF
side to the per-cpu allocs. This is kind of a generic 'issue' and we shouldn't
add more code which bails out anyway just to work around the WARN(). Lets
handle it properly instead.
If Tejun is fine with the one below, I could cook and official patch and
cleanup the remaining call-sites from BPF which have similar pattern.
[1] https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9975851/
Thanks,
Daniel
mm/percpu.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/percpu.c b/mm/percpu.c
index 59d44d6..5d9414e 100644
--- a/mm/percpu.c
+++ b/mm/percpu.c
@@ -1357,7 +1357,8 @@ static void __percpu *pcpu_alloc(size_t size, size_t align, bool reserved,
if (unlikely(!size || size > PCPU_MIN_UNIT_SIZE || align > PAGE_SIZE ||
!is_power_of_2(align))) {
- WARN(true, "illegal size (%zu) or align (%zu) for percpu allocation\n",
+ WARN(!(gfp & __GFP_NOWARN),
+ "illegal size (%zu) or align (%zu) for percpu allocation\n",
size, align);
return NULL;
}
@@ -1478,7 +1479,7 @@ static void __percpu *pcpu_alloc(size_t size, size_t align, bool reserved,
fail:
trace_percpu_alloc_percpu_fail(reserved, is_atomic, size, align);
- if (!is_atomic && warn_limit) {
+ if (!is_atomic && warn_limit && !(gfp & __GFP_NOWARN)) {
pr_warn("allocation failed, size=%zu align=%zu atomic=%d, %s\n",
size, align, is_atomic, err);
dump_stack();
--
1.9.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH 2/3] bpf: Remove dead variable
From: Daniel Borkmann @ 2017-10-16 18:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Richard Weinberger, netdev; +Cc: linux-kernel, ast
In-Reply-To: <20171016181856.12497-2-richard@nod.at>
On 10/16/2017 08:18 PM, Richard Weinberger wrote:
> task is never used in bpf_get_current_uid_gid(), kill it.
>
> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
> ---
> kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 1 -
> 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
> index e8845adcd15e..511c9d522cfc 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
> @@ -131,7 +131,6 @@ const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_get_current_pid_tgid_proto = {
>
> BPF_CALL_0(bpf_get_current_uid_gid)
> {
> - struct task_struct *task = current;
> kuid_t uid;
> kgid_t gid;
>
>
Needs to be squashed into patch 1/3?
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 2/3] bpf: Remove dead variable
From: Richard Weinberger @ 2017-10-16 18:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Borkmann; +Cc: netdev, linux-kernel, ast
In-Reply-To: <59E5006C.4090303@iogearbox.net>
Am Montag, 16. Oktober 2017, 20:54:36 CEST schrieb Daniel Borkmann:
> On 10/16/2017 08:18 PM, Richard Weinberger wrote:
> > task is never used in bpf_get_current_uid_gid(), kill it.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
> > ---
> >
> > kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 1 -
> > 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
> > index e8845adcd15e..511c9d522cfc 100644
> > --- a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
> > +++ b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
> > @@ -131,7 +131,6 @@ const struct bpf_func_proto
> > bpf_get_current_pid_tgid_proto = {>
> > BPF_CALL_0(bpf_get_current_uid_gid)
> > {
> >
> > - struct task_struct *task = current;
> >
> > kuid_t uid;
> > kgid_t gid;
>
> Needs to be squashed into patch 1/3?
I can squash it into 1/3, I kept it that way because
even without 1/3 this variable is unused.
Thanks,
//richard
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH net-next v5 5/5] selinux: bpf: Add addtional check for bpf object file receive
From: Chenbo Feng @ 2017-10-16 19:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stephen Smalley, David Miller
Cc: Chenbo Feng, netdev, Jeffrey Vander Stoep, Alexei Starovoitov,
Lorenzo Colitti, Daniel Borkmann, James Morris, Paul Moore
In-Reply-To: <1508171646.2722.7.camel@tycho.nsa.gov>
On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 9:34 AM, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote:
> On Thu, 2017-10-12 at 13:55 -0700, Chenbo Feng wrote:
>> From: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
>>
>> Introduce a bpf object related check when sending and receiving files
>> through unix domain socket as well as binder. It checks if the
>> receiving
>> process have privilege to read/write the bpf map or use the bpf
>> program.
>> This check is necessary because the bpf maps and programs are using a
>> anonymous inode as their shared inode so the normal way of checking
>> the
>> files and sockets when passing between processes cannot work properly
>> on
>> eBPF object. This check only works when the BPF_SYSCALL is
>> configured.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
>> ---
>> include/linux/bpf.h | 3 +++
>> kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 4 ++--
>> security/selinux/hooks.c | 49
>> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> 3 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
>> index 225740688ab7..81d6c01b8825 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/bpf.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
>> @@ -285,6 +285,9 @@ int bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user(struct
>> bpf_prog_array __rcu *progs,
>> #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
>> DECLARE_PER_CPU(int, bpf_prog_active);
>>
>> +extern const struct file_operations bpf_map_fops;
>> +extern const struct file_operations bpf_prog_fops;
>> +
>> #define BPF_PROG_TYPE(_id, _ops) \
>> extern const struct bpf_verifier_ops _ops;
>> #define BPF_MAP_TYPE(_id, _ops) \
>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
>> index d3e152e282d8..8bdb98aa7f34 100644
>> --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
>> @@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ static ssize_t bpf_dummy_write(struct file *filp,
>> const char __user *buf,
>> return -EINVAL;
>> }
>>
>> -static const struct file_operations bpf_map_fops = {
>> +const struct file_operations bpf_map_fops = {
>> #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
>> .show_fdinfo = bpf_map_show_fdinfo,
>> #endif
>> @@ -967,7 +967,7 @@ static void bpf_prog_show_fdinfo(struct seq_file
>> *m, struct file *filp)
>> }
>> #endif
>>
>> -static const struct file_operations bpf_prog_fops = {
>> +const struct file_operations bpf_prog_fops = {
>> #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
>> .show_fdinfo = bpf_prog_show_fdinfo,
>> #endif
>> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> index 12cf7de8cbed..ef7e5c1de640 100644
>> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> @@ -1815,6 +1815,10 @@ static inline int file_path_has_perm(const
>> struct cred *cred,
>> return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
>> }
>>
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
>> +static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid);
>> +#endif
>> +
>> /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
>> access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
>> descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
>> @@ -1845,6 +1849,12 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred
>> *cred,
>> goto out;
>> }
>>
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
>> + rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, cred_sid(cred));
>> + if (rc)
>> + return rc;
>> +#endif
>> +
>> /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
>> rc = 0;
>> if (av)
>> @@ -2165,6 +2175,12 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct
>> task_struct *from,
>> return rc;
>> }
>>
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
>> + rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, sid);
>> + if (rc)
>> + return rc;
>> +#endif
>> +
>> if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
>> return 0;
>>
>> @@ -6288,6 +6304,39 @@ static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
>> return av;
>> }
>>
>> +/* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or
>> binder to see
>> + * if it is a bpf related object. And apply correspinding checks on
>> the bpf
>> + * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like
>> other files and
>> + * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as
>> their inode.
>> + * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have
>> privilege to
>> + * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this
>> additional check in
>> + * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files.
>> + */
>> +static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid)
>> +{
>> + struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
>> + struct bpf_prog *prog;
>> + struct bpf_map *map;
>> + int ret;
>> +
>> + if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) {
>> + map = file->private_data;
>> + bpfsec = map->security;
>> + ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid,
>> SECCLASS_BPF_MAP,
>> + bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file-
>> >f_mode), NULL);
>> + if (ret)
>> + return ret;
>> + } else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) {
>> + prog = file->private_data;
>> + bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
>> + ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid,
>> SECCLASS_BPF_PROG,
>> + BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
>> + if (ret)
>> + return ret;
>> + }
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>
> My apologies, I should have caught this earlier, but you didn't update
> the class/permission symbols used above when you re-spun patch 4/5 with
> a single bpf class with distinct permissions defined.
>
> Please, ensure that the entire series compiles and works before
> sending.
>
> Also, you likely should be cc'ing linux-security-module mailing list
> and selinux mailing list; I thought you were doing so on earlier
> versions
>
Sorry, forget to run format-patch again after I fix these errors. New
patch submitted and added back linux-security-module mailing list and
selinux mailing list to the recipient.
>> +
>> static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
>> {
>> u32 sid = current_sid();
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH net-next v6 0/5] bpf: security: New file mode and LSM hooks for eBPF object permission control
From: Chenbo Feng @ 2017-10-16 19:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev, SELinux, linux-security-module
Cc: Jeffrey Vander Stoep, Alexei Starovoitov, lorenzo,
Daniel Borkmann, Stephen Smalley, James Morris, Paul Moore,
Chenbo Feng
From: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Much like files and sockets, eBPF objects are accessed, controlled, and
shared via a file descriptor (FD). Unlike files and sockets, the
existing mechanism for eBPF object access control is very limited.
Currently there are two options for granting accessing to eBPF
operations: grant access to all processes, or only CAP_SYS_ADMIN
processes. The CAP_SYS_ADMIN-only mode is not ideal because most users
do not have this capability and granting a user CAP_SYS_ADMIN grants too
many other security-sensitive permissions. It also unnecessarily allows
all CAP_SYS_ADMIN processes access to eBPF functionality. Allowing all
processes to access to eBPF objects is also undesirable since it has
potential to allow unprivileged processes to consume kernel memory, and
opens up attack surface to the kernel.
Adding LSM hooks maintains the status quo for systems which do not use
an LSM, preserving compatibility with userspace, while allowing security
modules to choose how best to handle permissions on eBPF objects. Here
is a possible use case for the lsm hooks with selinux module:
The network-control daemon (netd) creates and loads an eBPF object for
network packet filtering and analysis. It passes the object FD to an
unprivileged network monitor app (netmonitor), which is not allowed to
create, modify or load eBPF objects, but is allowed to read the traffic
stats from the map.
Selinux could use these hooks to grant the following permissions:
allow netd self:bpf_map { create read write};
allow netmonitor netd:fd use;
allow netmonitor netd:bpf_map read;
In this patch series, A file mode is added to bpf map to store the
accessing mode. With this file mode flags, the map can be obtained read
only, write only or read and write. With the help of this file mode,
several security hooks can be added to the eBPF syscall implementations
to do permissions checks. These LSM hooks are mainly focused on checking
the process privileges before it obtains the fd for a specific bpf
object. No matter from a file location or from a eBPF id. Besides that,
a general check hook is also implemented at the start of bpf syscalls so
that each security module can have their own implementation on the reset
of bpf object related functionalities.
In order to store the ownership and security information about eBPF
maps, a security field pointer is added to the struct bpf_map. And the
last two patch set are implementation of selinux check on these hooks
introduced, plus an additional check when eBPF object is passed between
processes using unix socket as well as binder IPC.
Change since V1:
- Whitelist the new bpf flags in the map allocate check.
- Added bpf selftest for the new flags.
- Added two new security hooks for copying the security information from
the bpf object security struct to file security struct
- Simplified the checking action when bpf fd is passed between processes.
Change since V2:
- Fixed the line break problem for map flags check
- Fixed the typo in selinux check of file mode.
- Merge bpf_map and bpf_prog into one selinux class
- Added bpf_type and bpf_sid into file security struct to store the
security information when generate fd.
- Add the hook to bpf_map_new_fd and bpf_prog_new_fd.
Change since V3:
- Return the actual error from security check instead of -EPERM
- Move the hooks into anon_inode_getfd() to avoid get file again after
bpf object file is installed with fd.
- Removed the bpf_sid field inside file_scerity_struct to reduce the
cache size.
Change since V4:
- Rename bpf av prog_use to prog_run to distinguish from fd_use.
- Remove the bpf_type field inside file_scerity_struct and use bpf fops
to indentify bpf object instead.
Change since v5:
- Fixed the incorrect selinux class name for SECCLASS_BPF
Chenbo Feng (5):
bpf: Add file mode configuration into bpf maps
bpf: Add tests for eBPF file mode
security: bpf: Add LSM hooks for bpf object related syscall
selinux: bpf: Add selinux check for eBPF syscall operations
selinux: bpf: Add addtional check for bpf object file receive
include/linux/bpf.h | 15 ++-
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 54 +++++++++++
include/linux/security.h | 45 +++++++++
include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 6 ++
kernel/bpf/arraymap.c | 6 +-
kernel/bpf/devmap.c | 5 +-
kernel/bpf/hashtab.c | 5 +-
kernel/bpf/inode.c | 15 ++-
kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c | 3 +-
kernel/bpf/sockmap.c | 5 +-
kernel/bpf/stackmap.c | 5 +-
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 118 ++++++++++++++++++++---
security/security.c | 32 +++++++
security/selinux/hooks.c | 160 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 4 +
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_maps.c | 48 ++++++++++
17 files changed, 502 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
--
2.15.0.rc0.271.g36b669edcc-goog
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH net-next v6 2/5] bpf: Add tests for eBPF file mode
From: Chenbo Feng @ 2017-10-16 19:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev, SELinux, linux-security-module
Cc: Jeffrey Vander Stoep, Alexei Starovoitov, lorenzo,
Daniel Borkmann, Stephen Smalley, James Morris, Paul Moore,
Chenbo Feng
In-Reply-To: <20171016191135.8046-1-chenbofeng.kernel@gmail.com>
From: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Two related tests are added into bpf selftest to test read only map and
write only map. The tests verified the read only and write only flags
are working on hash maps.
Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_maps.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 48 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_maps.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_maps.c
index fe3a443a1102..896f23cfe918 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_maps.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_maps.c
@@ -1033,6 +1033,51 @@ static void test_map_parallel(void)
assert(bpf_map_get_next_key(fd, &key, &key) == -1 && errno == ENOENT);
}
+static void test_map_rdonly(void)
+{
+ int i, fd, key = 0, value = 0;
+
+ fd = bpf_create_map(BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH, sizeof(key), sizeof(value),
+ MAP_SIZE, map_flags | BPF_F_RDONLY);
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to create map for read only test '%s'!\n",
+ strerror(errno));
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ key = 1;
+ value = 1234;
+ /* Insert key=1 element. */
+ assert(bpf_map_update_elem(fd, &key, &value, BPF_ANY) == -1 &&
+ errno == EPERM);
+
+ /* Check that key=2 is not found. */
+ assert(bpf_map_lookup_elem(fd, &key, &value) == -1 && errno == ENOENT);
+ assert(bpf_map_get_next_key(fd, &key, &value) == -1 && errno == ENOENT);
+}
+
+static void test_map_wronly(void)
+{
+ int i, fd, key = 0, value = 0;
+
+ fd = bpf_create_map(BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH, sizeof(key), sizeof(value),
+ MAP_SIZE, map_flags | BPF_F_WRONLY);
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to create map for read only test '%s'!\n",
+ strerror(errno));
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ key = 1;
+ value = 1234;
+ /* Insert key=1 element. */
+ assert(bpf_map_update_elem(fd, &key, &value, BPF_ANY) == 0)
+
+ /* Check that key=2 is not found. */
+ assert(bpf_map_lookup_elem(fd, &key, &value) == -1 && errno == EPERM);
+ assert(bpf_map_get_next_key(fd, &key, &value) == -1 && errno == EPERM);
+}
+
static void run_all_tests(void)
{
test_hashmap(0, NULL);
@@ -1050,6 +1095,9 @@ static void run_all_tests(void)
test_map_large();
test_map_parallel();
test_map_stress();
+
+ test_map_rdonly();
+ test_map_wronly();
}
int main(void)
--
2.15.0.rc0.271.g36b669edcc-goog
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH net-next v6 3/5] security: bpf: Add LSM hooks for bpf object related syscall
From: Chenbo Feng @ 2017-10-16 19:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev, SELinux, linux-security-module
Cc: Jeffrey Vander Stoep, Alexei Starovoitov, lorenzo,
Daniel Borkmann, Stephen Smalley, James Morris, Paul Moore,
Chenbo Feng
In-Reply-To: <20171016191135.8046-1-chenbofeng.kernel@gmail.com>
From: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Introduce several LSM hooks for the syscalls that will allow the
userspace to access to eBPF object such as eBPF programs and eBPF maps.
The security check is aimed to enforce a per object security protection
for eBPF object so only processes with the right priviliges can
read/write to a specific map or use a specific eBPF program. Besides
that, a general security hook is added before the multiplexer of bpf
syscall to check the cmd and the attribute used for the command. The
actual security module can decide which command need to be checked and
how the cmd should be checked.
Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
---
include/linux/bpf.h | 6 ++++++
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/security.h | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
security/security.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 169 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
index efbde1639970..1479442d5293 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -57,6 +57,9 @@ struct bpf_map {
atomic_t usercnt;
struct bpf_map *inner_map_meta;
char name[BPF_OBJ_NAME_LEN];
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+ void *security;
+#endif
};
/* function argument constraints */
@@ -190,6 +193,9 @@ struct bpf_prog_aux {
struct user_struct *user;
u64 load_time; /* ns since boottime */
char name[BPF_OBJ_NAME_LEN];
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+ void *security;
+#endif
union {
struct work_struct work;
struct rcu_head rcu;
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index c9258124e417..7161d8e7ee79 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1351,6 +1351,40 @@
* @inode we wish to get the security context of.
* @ctx is a pointer in which to place the allocated security context.
* @ctxlen points to the place to put the length of @ctx.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for using the eBPF maps and programs functionalities through
+ * eBPF syscalls.
+ *
+ * @bpf:
+ * Do a initial check for all bpf syscalls after the attribute is copied
+ * into the kernel. The actual security module can implement their own
+ * rules to check the specific cmd they need.
+ *
+ * @bpf_map:
+ * Do a check when the kernel generate and return a file descriptor for
+ * eBPF maps.
+ *
+ * @map: bpf map that we want to access
+ * @mask: the access flags
+ *
+ * @bpf_prog:
+ * Do a check when the kernel generate and return a file descriptor for
+ * eBPF programs.
+ *
+ * @prog: bpf prog that userspace want to use.
+ *
+ * @bpf_map_alloc_security:
+ * Initialize the security field inside bpf map.
+ *
+ * @bpf_map_free_security:
+ * Clean up the security information stored inside bpf map.
+ *
+ * @bpf_prog_alloc_security:
+ * Initialize the security field inside bpf program.
+ *
+ * @bpf_prog_free_security:
+ * Clean up the security information stored inside bpf prog.
+ *
*/
union security_list_options {
int (*binder_set_context_mgr)(struct task_struct *mgr);
@@ -1682,6 +1716,17 @@ union security_list_options {
struct audit_context *actx);
void (*audit_rule_free)(void *lsmrule);
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+ int (*bpf)(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
+ unsigned int size);
+ int (*bpf_map)(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode);
+ int (*bpf_prog)(struct bpf_prog *prog);
+ int (*bpf_map_alloc_security)(struct bpf_map *map);
+ void (*bpf_map_free_security)(struct bpf_map *map);
+ int (*bpf_prog_alloc_security)(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux);
+ void (*bpf_prog_free_security)(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux);
+#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
};
struct security_hook_heads {
@@ -1901,6 +1946,15 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
struct list_head audit_rule_match;
struct list_head audit_rule_free;
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+ struct list_head bpf;
+ struct list_head bpf_map;
+ struct list_head bpf_prog;
+ struct list_head bpf_map_alloc_security;
+ struct list_head bpf_map_free_security;
+ struct list_head bpf_prog_alloc_security;
+ struct list_head bpf_prog_free_security;
+#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
} __randomize_layout;
/*
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index ce6265960d6c..18800b0911e5 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
struct linux_binprm;
struct cred;
@@ -1730,6 +1731,50 @@ static inline void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry)
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+extern int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size);
+extern int security_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode);
+extern int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog);
+extern int security_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map);
+extern void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map);
+extern int security_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux);
+extern void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux);
+#else
+static inline int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
+ unsigned int size)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
+{ }
+
+static inline int security_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
+{ }
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
+#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
static inline char *alloc_secdata(void)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index b02582ead9a4..d3e152e282d8 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -210,6 +210,7 @@ static void bpf_map_free_deferred(struct work_struct *work)
struct bpf_map *map = container_of(work, struct bpf_map, work);
bpf_map_uncharge_memlock(map);
+ security_bpf_map_free(map);
/* implementation dependent freeing */
map->ops->map_free(map);
}
@@ -323,6 +324,12 @@ static const struct file_operations bpf_map_fops = {
int bpf_map_new_fd(struct bpf_map *map, int flags)
{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = security_bpf_map(map, OPEN_FMODE(flags));
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
return anon_inode_getfd("bpf-map", &bpf_map_fops, map,
flags | O_CLOEXEC);
}
@@ -403,10 +410,14 @@ static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
atomic_set(&map->refcnt, 1);
atomic_set(&map->usercnt, 1);
- err = bpf_map_charge_memlock(map);
+ err = security_bpf_map_alloc(map);
if (err)
goto free_map_nouncharge;
+ err = bpf_map_charge_memlock(map);
+ if (err)
+ goto free_map_sec;
+
err = bpf_map_alloc_id(map);
if (err)
goto free_map;
@@ -428,6 +439,8 @@ static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
free_map:
bpf_map_uncharge_memlock(map);
+free_map_sec:
+ security_bpf_map_free(map);
free_map_nouncharge:
map->ops->map_free(map);
return err;
@@ -906,6 +919,7 @@ static void __bpf_prog_put_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
free_used_maps(aux);
bpf_prog_uncharge_memlock(aux->prog);
+ security_bpf_prog_free(aux);
bpf_prog_free(aux->prog);
}
@@ -964,6 +978,12 @@ static const struct file_operations bpf_prog_fops = {
int bpf_prog_new_fd(struct bpf_prog *prog)
{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = security_bpf_prog(prog);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
return anon_inode_getfd("bpf-prog", &bpf_prog_fops, prog,
O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC);
}
@@ -1103,10 +1123,14 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr)
if (!prog)
return -ENOMEM;
- err = bpf_prog_charge_memlock(prog);
+ err = security_bpf_prog_alloc(prog->aux);
if (err)
goto free_prog_nouncharge;
+ err = bpf_prog_charge_memlock(prog);
+ if (err)
+ goto free_prog_sec;
+
prog->len = attr->insn_cnt;
err = -EFAULT;
@@ -1164,6 +1188,8 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr)
free_used_maps(prog->aux);
free_prog:
bpf_prog_uncharge_memlock(prog);
+free_prog_sec:
+ security_bpf_prog_free(prog->aux);
free_prog_nouncharge:
bpf_prog_free(prog);
return err;
@@ -1630,6 +1656,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(bpf, int, cmd, union bpf_attr __user *, uattr, unsigned int, siz
if (copy_from_user(&attr, uattr, size) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
+ err = security_bpf(cmd, &attr, size);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+
switch (cmd) {
case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
err = map_create(&attr);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 4bf0f571b4ef..1cd8526cb0b7 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
* (at your option) any later version.
*/
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/dcache.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
@@ -1703,3 +1704,34 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
actx);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(bpf, 0, cmd, attr, size);
+}
+int security_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(bpf_map, 0, map, fmode);
+}
+int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(bpf_prog, 0, prog);
+}
+int security_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(bpf_map_alloc_security, 0, map);
+}
+int security_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(bpf_prog_alloc_security, 0, aux);
+}
+void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
+{
+ call_void_hook(bpf_map_free_security, map);
+}
+void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
+{
+ call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free_security, aux);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
--
2.15.0.rc0.271.g36b669edcc-goog
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH 2/3] bpf: Remove dead variable
From: Daniel Borkmann @ 2017-10-16 19:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Richard Weinberger; +Cc: netdev, linux-kernel, ast
In-Reply-To: <2297422.9nBBslcvMo@blindfold>
On 10/16/2017 08:59 PM, Richard Weinberger wrote:
> Am Montag, 16. Oktober 2017, 20:54:36 CEST schrieb Daniel Borkmann:
>> On 10/16/2017 08:18 PM, Richard Weinberger wrote:
>>> task is never used in bpf_get_current_uid_gid(), kill it.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
>>> ---
>>>
>>> kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 1 -
>>> 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
>>> index e8845adcd15e..511c9d522cfc 100644
>>> --- a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
>>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
>>> @@ -131,7 +131,6 @@ const struct bpf_func_proto
>>> bpf_get_current_pid_tgid_proto = {>
>>> BPF_CALL_0(bpf_get_current_uid_gid)
>>> {
>>>
>>> - struct task_struct *task = current;
>>>
>>> kuid_t uid;
>>> kgid_t gid;
>>
>> Needs to be squashed into patch 1/3?
>
> I can squash it into 1/3, I kept it that way because
> even without 1/3 this variable is unused.
Hmm, the helper looks like the below. In patch 1/3 you removed
the 'if (unlikely(!task))' test where the variable was used before,
so 2/3 without the 1/3 would result in a compile error.
BPF_CALL_0(bpf_get_current_uid_gid)
{
struct task_struct *task = current;
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
if (unlikely(!task))
return -EINVAL;
current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
return (u64) from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid) << 32 |
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid);
}
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH net-next v6 1/5] bpf: Add file mode configuration into bpf maps
From: Chenbo Feng @ 2017-10-16 19:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev, SELinux, linux-security-module
Cc: Jeffrey Vander Stoep, Alexei Starovoitov, lorenzo,
Daniel Borkmann, Stephen Smalley, James Morris, Paul Moore,
Chenbo Feng
In-Reply-To: <20171016191135.8046-1-chenbofeng.kernel@gmail.com>
From: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Introduce the map read/write flags to the eBPF syscalls that returns the
map fd. The flags is used to set up the file mode when construct a new
file descriptor for bpf maps. To not break the backward capability, the
f_flags is set to O_RDWR if the flag passed by syscall is 0. Otherwise
it should be O_RDONLY or O_WRONLY. When the userspace want to modify or
read the map content, it will check the file mode to see if it is
allowed to make the change.
Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
include/linux/bpf.h | 6 ++--
include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 6 ++++
kernel/bpf/arraymap.c | 6 +++-
kernel/bpf/devmap.c | 5 ++-
kernel/bpf/hashtab.c | 5 +--
kernel/bpf/inode.c | 15 ++++++---
kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c | 3 +-
kernel/bpf/sockmap.c | 5 ++-
kernel/bpf/stackmap.c | 5 ++-
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 80 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
10 files changed, 114 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
index 4373125de1f3..efbde1639970 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -308,11 +308,11 @@ void bpf_map_area_free(void *base);
extern int sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled;
-int bpf_map_new_fd(struct bpf_map *map);
+int bpf_map_new_fd(struct bpf_map *map, int flags);
int bpf_prog_new_fd(struct bpf_prog *prog);
int bpf_obj_pin_user(u32 ufd, const char __user *pathname);
-int bpf_obj_get_user(const char __user *pathname);
+int bpf_obj_get_user(const char __user *pathname, int flags);
int bpf_percpu_hash_copy(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value);
int bpf_percpu_array_copy(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value);
@@ -331,6 +331,8 @@ int bpf_fd_htab_map_update_elem(struct bpf_map *map, struct file *map_file,
void *key, void *value, u64 map_flags);
int bpf_fd_htab_map_lookup_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, u32 *value);
+int bpf_get_file_flag(int flags);
+
/* memcpy that is used with 8-byte aligned pointers, power-of-8 size and
* forced to use 'long' read/writes to try to atomically copy long counters.
* Best-effort only. No barriers here, since it _will_ race with concurrent
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
index 6db9e1d679cd..9cb50a228c39 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
@@ -217,6 +217,10 @@ enum bpf_attach_type {
#define BPF_OBJ_NAME_LEN 16U
+/* Flags for accessing BPF object */
+#define BPF_F_RDONLY (1U << 3)
+#define BPF_F_WRONLY (1U << 4)
+
union bpf_attr {
struct { /* anonymous struct used by BPF_MAP_CREATE command */
__u32 map_type; /* one of enum bpf_map_type */
@@ -259,6 +263,7 @@ union bpf_attr {
struct { /* anonymous struct used by BPF_OBJ_* commands */
__aligned_u64 pathname;
__u32 bpf_fd;
+ __u32 file_flags;
};
struct { /* anonymous struct used by BPF_PROG_ATTACH/DETACH commands */
@@ -286,6 +291,7 @@ union bpf_attr {
__u32 map_id;
};
__u32 next_id;
+ __u32 open_flags;
};
struct { /* anonymous struct used by BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_FD */
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
index 68d866628be0..988c04c91e10 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@
#include "map_in_map.h"
+#define ARRAY_CREATE_FLAG_MASK \
+ (BPF_F_NUMA_NODE | BPF_F_RDONLY | BPF_F_WRONLY)
+
static void bpf_array_free_percpu(struct bpf_array *array)
{
int i;
@@ -56,7 +59,8 @@ static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
/* check sanity of attributes */
if (attr->max_entries == 0 || attr->key_size != 4 ||
- attr->value_size == 0 || attr->map_flags & ~BPF_F_NUMA_NODE ||
+ attr->value_size == 0 ||
+ attr->map_flags & ~ARRAY_CREATE_FLAG_MASK ||
(percpu && numa_node != NUMA_NO_NODE))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/devmap.c b/kernel/bpf/devmap.c
index e093d9a2c4dd..e5d3de7cff2e 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/devmap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/devmap.c
@@ -50,6 +50,9 @@
#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include <linux/filter.h>
+#define DEV_CREATE_FLAG_MASK \
+ (BPF_F_NUMA_NODE | BPF_F_RDONLY | BPF_F_WRONLY)
+
struct bpf_dtab_netdev {
struct net_device *dev;
struct bpf_dtab *dtab;
@@ -80,7 +83,7 @@ static struct bpf_map *dev_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
/* check sanity of attributes */
if (attr->max_entries == 0 || attr->key_size != 4 ||
- attr->value_size != 4 || attr->map_flags & ~BPF_F_NUMA_NODE)
+ attr->value_size != 4 || attr->map_flags & ~DEV_CREATE_FLAG_MASK)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
dtab = kzalloc(sizeof(*dtab), GFP_USER);
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c b/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c
index 431126f31ea3..919955236e63 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c
@@ -18,8 +18,9 @@
#include "bpf_lru_list.h"
#include "map_in_map.h"
-#define HTAB_CREATE_FLAG_MASK \
- (BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC | BPF_F_NO_COMMON_LRU | BPF_F_NUMA_NODE)
+#define HTAB_CREATE_FLAG_MASK \
+ (BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC | BPF_F_NO_COMMON_LRU | BPF_F_NUMA_NODE | \
+ BPF_F_RDONLY | BPF_F_WRONLY)
struct bucket {
struct hlist_nulls_head head;
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/inode.c b/kernel/bpf/inode.c
index be1dde967208..01aaef1a77c5 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/inode.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/inode.c
@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ int bpf_obj_pin_user(u32 ufd, const char __user *pathname)
}
static void *bpf_obj_do_get(const struct filename *pathname,
- enum bpf_type *type)
+ enum bpf_type *type, int flags)
{
struct inode *inode;
struct path path;
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ static void *bpf_obj_do_get(const struct filename *pathname,
return ERR_PTR(ret);
inode = d_backing_inode(path.dentry);
- ret = inode_permission(inode, MAY_WRITE);
+ ret = inode_permission(inode, ACC_MODE(flags));
if (ret)
goto out;
@@ -326,18 +326,23 @@ static void *bpf_obj_do_get(const struct filename *pathname,
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
-int bpf_obj_get_user(const char __user *pathname)
+int bpf_obj_get_user(const char __user *pathname, int flags)
{
enum bpf_type type = BPF_TYPE_UNSPEC;
struct filename *pname;
int ret = -ENOENT;
+ int f_flags;
void *raw;
+ f_flags = bpf_get_file_flag(flags);
+ if (f_flags < 0)
+ return f_flags;
+
pname = getname(pathname);
if (IS_ERR(pname))
return PTR_ERR(pname);
- raw = bpf_obj_do_get(pname, &type);
+ raw = bpf_obj_do_get(pname, &type, f_flags);
if (IS_ERR(raw)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(raw);
goto out;
@@ -346,7 +351,7 @@ int bpf_obj_get_user(const char __user *pathname)
if (type == BPF_TYPE_PROG)
ret = bpf_prog_new_fd(raw);
else if (type == BPF_TYPE_MAP)
- ret = bpf_map_new_fd(raw);
+ ret = bpf_map_new_fd(raw, f_flags);
else
goto out;
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c b/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c
index 34d8a690ea05..885e45479680 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c
@@ -495,7 +495,8 @@ static int trie_delete_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *_key)
#define LPM_KEY_SIZE_MAX LPM_KEY_SIZE(LPM_DATA_SIZE_MAX)
#define LPM_KEY_SIZE_MIN LPM_KEY_SIZE(LPM_DATA_SIZE_MIN)
-#define LPM_CREATE_FLAG_MASK (BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC | BPF_F_NUMA_NODE)
+#define LPM_CREATE_FLAG_MASK (BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC | BPF_F_NUMA_NODE | \
+ BPF_F_RDONLY | BPF_F_WRONLY)
static struct bpf_map *trie_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
{
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/sockmap.c b/kernel/bpf/sockmap.c
index a298d6666698..86ec846f2d5e 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/sockmap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/sockmap.c
@@ -40,6 +40,9 @@
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <net/strparser.h>
+#define SOCK_CREATE_FLAG_MASK \
+ (BPF_F_NUMA_NODE | BPF_F_RDONLY | BPF_F_WRONLY)
+
struct bpf_stab {
struct bpf_map map;
struct sock **sock_map;
@@ -489,7 +492,7 @@ static struct bpf_map *sock_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
/* check sanity of attributes */
if (attr->max_entries == 0 || attr->key_size != 4 ||
- attr->value_size != 4 || attr->map_flags & ~BPF_F_NUMA_NODE)
+ attr->value_size != 4 || attr->map_flags & ~SOCK_CREATE_FLAG_MASK)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (attr->value_size > KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
index 135be433e9a0..a15bc636cc98 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@
#include <linux/perf_event.h>
#include "percpu_freelist.h"
+#define STACK_CREATE_FLAG_MASK \
+ (BPF_F_NUMA_NODE | BPF_F_RDONLY | BPF_F_WRONLY)
+
struct stack_map_bucket {
struct pcpu_freelist_node fnode;
u32 hash;
@@ -60,7 +63,7 @@ static struct bpf_map *stack_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
- if (attr->map_flags & ~BPF_F_NUMA_NODE)
+ if (attr->map_flags & ~STACK_CREATE_FLAG_MASK)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
/* check sanity of attributes */
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index d124e702e040..b02582ead9a4 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -294,17 +294,48 @@ static void bpf_map_show_fdinfo(struct seq_file *m, struct file *filp)
}
#endif
+static ssize_t bpf_dummy_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t siz,
+ loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ /* We need this handler such that alloc_file() enables
+ * f_mode with FMODE_CAN_READ.
+ */
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static ssize_t bpf_dummy_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t siz, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ /* We need this handler such that alloc_file() enables
+ * f_mode with FMODE_CAN_WRITE.
+ */
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
static const struct file_operations bpf_map_fops = {
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
.show_fdinfo = bpf_map_show_fdinfo,
#endif
.release = bpf_map_release,
+ .read = bpf_dummy_read,
+ .write = bpf_dummy_write,
};
-int bpf_map_new_fd(struct bpf_map *map)
+int bpf_map_new_fd(struct bpf_map *map, int flags)
{
return anon_inode_getfd("bpf-map", &bpf_map_fops, map,
- O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC);
+ flags | O_CLOEXEC);
+}
+
+int bpf_get_file_flag(int flags)
+{
+ if ((flags & BPF_F_RDONLY) && (flags & BPF_F_WRONLY))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (flags & BPF_F_RDONLY)
+ return O_RDONLY;
+ if (flags & BPF_F_WRONLY)
+ return O_WRONLY;
+ return O_RDWR;
}
/* helper macro to check that unused fields 'union bpf_attr' are zero */
@@ -344,12 +375,17 @@ static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
{
int numa_node = bpf_map_attr_numa_node(attr);
struct bpf_map *map;
+ int f_flags;
int err;
err = CHECK_ATTR(BPF_MAP_CREATE);
if (err)
return -EINVAL;
+ f_flags = bpf_get_file_flag(attr->map_flags);
+ if (f_flags < 0)
+ return f_flags;
+
if (numa_node != NUMA_NO_NODE &&
((unsigned int)numa_node >= nr_node_ids ||
!node_online(numa_node)))
@@ -375,7 +411,7 @@ static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
if (err)
goto free_map;
- err = bpf_map_new_fd(map);
+ err = bpf_map_new_fd(map, f_flags);
if (err < 0) {
/* failed to allocate fd.
* bpf_map_put() is needed because the above
@@ -490,6 +526,11 @@ static int map_lookup_elem(union bpf_attr *attr)
if (IS_ERR(map))
return PTR_ERR(map);
+ if (!(f.file->f_mode & FMODE_CAN_READ)) {
+ err = -EPERM;
+ goto err_put;
+ }
+
key = memdup_user(ukey, map->key_size);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
err = PTR_ERR(key);
@@ -570,6 +611,11 @@ static int map_update_elem(union bpf_attr *attr)
if (IS_ERR(map))
return PTR_ERR(map);
+ if (!(f.file->f_mode & FMODE_CAN_WRITE)) {
+ err = -EPERM;
+ goto err_put;
+ }
+
key = memdup_user(ukey, map->key_size);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
err = PTR_ERR(key);
@@ -653,6 +699,11 @@ static int map_delete_elem(union bpf_attr *attr)
if (IS_ERR(map))
return PTR_ERR(map);
+ if (!(f.file->f_mode & FMODE_CAN_WRITE)) {
+ err = -EPERM;
+ goto err_put;
+ }
+
key = memdup_user(ukey, map->key_size);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
err = PTR_ERR(key);
@@ -696,6 +747,11 @@ static int map_get_next_key(union bpf_attr *attr)
if (IS_ERR(map))
return PTR_ERR(map);
+ if (!(f.file->f_mode & FMODE_CAN_READ)) {
+ err = -EPERM;
+ goto err_put;
+ }
+
if (ukey) {
key = memdup_user(ukey, map->key_size);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
@@ -902,6 +958,8 @@ static const struct file_operations bpf_prog_fops = {
.show_fdinfo = bpf_prog_show_fdinfo,
#endif
.release = bpf_prog_release,
+ .read = bpf_dummy_read,
+ .write = bpf_dummy_write,
};
int bpf_prog_new_fd(struct bpf_prog *prog)
@@ -1111,11 +1169,11 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr)
return err;
}
-#define BPF_OBJ_LAST_FIELD bpf_fd
+#define BPF_OBJ_LAST_FIELD file_flags
static int bpf_obj_pin(const union bpf_attr *attr)
{
- if (CHECK_ATTR(BPF_OBJ))
+ if (CHECK_ATTR(BPF_OBJ) || attr->file_flags != 0)
return -EINVAL;
return bpf_obj_pin_user(attr->bpf_fd, u64_to_user_ptr(attr->pathname));
@@ -1126,7 +1184,8 @@ static int bpf_obj_get(const union bpf_attr *attr)
if (CHECK_ATTR(BPF_OBJ) || attr->bpf_fd != 0)
return -EINVAL;
- return bpf_obj_get_user(u64_to_user_ptr(attr->pathname));
+ return bpf_obj_get_user(u64_to_user_ptr(attr->pathname),
+ attr->file_flags);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF
@@ -1386,12 +1445,13 @@ static int bpf_prog_get_fd_by_id(const union bpf_attr *attr)
return fd;
}
-#define BPF_MAP_GET_FD_BY_ID_LAST_FIELD map_id
+#define BPF_MAP_GET_FD_BY_ID_LAST_FIELD open_flags
static int bpf_map_get_fd_by_id(const union bpf_attr *attr)
{
struct bpf_map *map;
u32 id = attr->map_id;
+ int f_flags;
int fd;
if (CHECK_ATTR(BPF_MAP_GET_FD_BY_ID))
@@ -1400,6 +1460,10 @@ static int bpf_map_get_fd_by_id(const union bpf_attr *attr)
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
+ f_flags = bpf_get_file_flag(attr->open_flags);
+ if (f_flags < 0)
+ return f_flags;
+
spin_lock_bh(&map_idr_lock);
map = idr_find(&map_idr, id);
if (map)
@@ -1411,7 +1475,7 @@ static int bpf_map_get_fd_by_id(const union bpf_attr *attr)
if (IS_ERR(map))
return PTR_ERR(map);
- fd = bpf_map_new_fd(map);
+ fd = bpf_map_new_fd(map, f_flags);
if (fd < 0)
bpf_map_put(map);
--
2.15.0.rc0.271.g36b669edcc-goog
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH net-next v6 4/5] selinux: bpf: Add selinux check for eBPF syscall operations
From: Chenbo Feng @ 2017-10-16 19:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev, SELinux, linux-security-module
Cc: Jeffrey Vander Stoep, Alexei Starovoitov, lorenzo,
Daniel Borkmann, Stephen Smalley, James Morris, Paul Moore,
Chenbo Feng
In-Reply-To: <20171016191135.8046-1-chenbofeng.kernel@gmail.com>
From: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Implement the actual checks introduced to eBPF related syscalls. This
implementation use the security field inside bpf object to store a sid that
identify the bpf object. And when processes try to access the object,
selinux will check if processes have the right privileges. The creation
of eBPF object are also checked at the general bpf check hook and new
cmd introduced to eBPF domain can also be checked there.
Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 111 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 4 ++
3 files changed, 117 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index f5d304736852..12cf7de8cbed 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/msg.h>
#include <linux/shm.h>
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include "avc.h"
#include "objsec.h"
@@ -6252,6 +6253,106 @@ static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec)
}
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
+ unsigned int size)
+{
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+ int ret;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
+ ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
+ NULL);
+ break;
+ case BPF_PROG_LOAD:
+ ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
+ NULL);
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
+{
+ u32 av = 0;
+
+ if (fmode & FMODE_READ)
+ av |= BPF__MAP_READ;
+ if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE)
+ av |= BPF__MAP_WRITE;
+ return av;
+}
+
+static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
+{
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+ struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
+
+ bpfsec = map->security;
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
+ bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+{
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+ struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
+
+ bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
+ BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
+{
+ struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
+
+ bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!bpfsec)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
+ map->security = bpfsec;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
+{
+ struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security;
+
+ map->security = NULL;
+ kfree(bpfsec);
+}
+
+static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
+{
+ struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
+
+ bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!bpfsec)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
+ aux->security = bpfsec;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
+{
+ struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security;
+
+ aux->security = NULL;
+ kfree(bpfsec);
+}
+#endif
+
static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
@@ -6471,6 +6572,16 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_map_alloc),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_prog_alloc),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
+#endif
};
static __init int selinux_init(void)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 35ffb29a69cb..0a7023b5f000 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -237,6 +237,8 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
{ "access", NULL } },
{ "infiniband_endport",
{ "manage_subnet", NULL } },
+ { "bpf",
+ {"map_create", "map_read", "map_write", "prog_load", "prog_run"} },
{ NULL }
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 1649cd18eb0b..3d54468ce334 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -150,6 +150,10 @@ struct pkey_security_struct {
u32 sid; /* SID of pkey */
};
+struct bpf_security_struct {
+ u32 sid; /*SID of bpf obj creater*/
+};
+
extern unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot;
#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
--
2.15.0.rc0.271.g36b669edcc-goog
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