* [PATCH net-next v3 0/2] net: thunderx: add support for PTP clock
From: Aleksey Makarov @ 2017-12-06 13:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev
Cc: linux-arm-kernel, linux-kernel, Goutham, Sunil,
Radoslaw Biernacki, Aleksey Makarov, Robert Richter, David Daney
This series adds support for IEEE 1588 Precision Time Protocol
to Cavium ethernet driver.
The first patch adds support for the Precision Time Protocol Clocks and
Timestamping coprocessor (PTP) found on Cavium processors.
It registers a new PTP clock in the PTP core and provides functions
to use the counter in BGX, TNS, GTI, and NIC blocks.
The second patch introduces support for the PTP protocol to the
Cavium ThunderX ethernet driver.
v3:
- rebase to net-next
v2: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171117134909.8954-1-aleksey.makarov@cavium.com
- use readq()/writeq() in place of cavium_ptp_reg_read()/cavium_ptp_reg_write(),
don't use readq_relaxed()/writeq_relaxed() (David Daney)
v1: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171107190704.15458-1-aleksey.makarov@cavium.com
Radoslaw Biernacki (1):
net: add support for Cavium PTP coprocessor
Sunil Goutham (1):
net: thunderx: add timestamping support
drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/Kconfig | 14 +
drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/common/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/common/cavium_ptp.c | 334 +++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/common/cavium_ptp.h | 78 +++++
drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nic.h | 15 +
drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nic_main.c | 58 +++-
drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nic_reg.h | 1 +
.../net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_ethtool.c | 29 +-
drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_main.c | 173 ++++++++++-
drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_queues.c | 26 ++
drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/thunder_bgx.c | 29 ++
drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/thunder_bgx.h | 4 +
13 files changed, 757 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/common/Makefile
create mode 100644 drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/common/cavium_ptp.c
create mode 100644 drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/common/cavium_ptp.h
--
2.15.1
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH net-next v2 1/2] bpf/tracing: allow user space to query prog array on the same tp
From: Peter Zijlstra @ 2017-12-06 13:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Yonghong Song; +Cc: rostedt, ast, daniel, kafai, netdev, kernel-team
In-Reply-To: <20171206115636.mquwhtnj3cbf2gse@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
On Wed, Dec 06, 2017 at 12:56:36PM +0100, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 05, 2017 at 10:31:28PM -0800, Yonghong Song wrote:
> > Commit e87c6bc3852b ("bpf: permit multiple bpf attachments
> > for a single perf event") added support to attach multiple
> > bpf programs to a single perf event.
> > Commit 2541517c32be ("tracing, perf: Implement BPF programs
> > attached to kprobes") utilized the existing perf ioctl
> > interface and added the command PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_BPF
> > to attach a bpf program to a tracepoint.
> >
> > This patch adds a new ioctl
> > command, given a perf event fd, to query the bpf program array
> > attached to the same perf tracepoint event.
> >
> > The new uapi ioctl command:
> > PERF_EVENT_IOC_QUERY_BPF
> >
> > The new uapi/linux/perf_event.h structure:
> > struct perf_event_query_bpf {
> > __u64 prog_ids;
> > __u32 prog_cnt;
> > };
> >
> > The usage:
> > struct perf_event_query_bpf query;
> > query.prog_ids = (__u64)usr_prog_ids_buf;
> > query.prog_cnt = usr_prog_ids_buf_len;
> > err = ioctl(pmu_efd, PERF_EVENT_IOC_QUERY_BPF, &query);
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
> > Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
>
> Can you please fix that example to make it clear that prog_ids is in
> fact a pointer to an array of size prog_cnt. Ideally also describing
> what the type of array is.
>
> In fact, would not something like:
>
> struct perf_event_query_bpf {
> __u32 len;
> __u32 __reserved;
I suppose we could use this field to store the number of entries
returned, retaining the len to indicate how large the structure is.
> __u64 ids[0];
> };
>
> be a much clearer interface?
>
> Also, you forgot to tell us why we need this interface at all.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH net-next 2/2 v6] net: ethernet: Add a driver for Gemini gigabit ethernet
From: Linus Walleij @ 2017-12-06 13:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Miller
Cc: netdev, Michal Miroslaw, Janos Laube, Paulius Zaleckas, Linux ARM,
Hans Ulli Kroll, Florian Fainelli, Tobias Waldvogel
In-Reply-To: <20171203.182149.1898604535140297695.davem@davemloft.net>
On Mon, Dec 4, 2017 at 12:21 AM, David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> wrote:
>> +static irqreturn_t gemini_port_irq_thread(int irq, void *data)
>> +{
>> + struct gemini_ethernet_port *port = data;
>> + struct gemini_ethernet *geth = port->geth;
>> + unsigned long irqmask = SWFQ_EMPTY_INT_BIT;
>> + unsigned long flags;
>
> Always order local variables in reverse-christmas-tree format,
> which is longest to shortest line.
It's hard to do in cases like this where I use the variable
when defining another variable:
struct gemini_ethernet_port *port = netdev_priv(netdev);
void __iomem *status_reg = port->gmac_base + GMAC_STATUS;
But I understand the aesthetic, so I fix it as well as I can.
If you want me to even rewrite the above using more lines of code
to keep the aestetic (moving assignment out of the variable
definitions), tell me and I can fix that too, whatever you like.
Yours,
Linus Walleij
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH] arch/x86: Initialize __max_smt_threads to 1
From: Prarit Bhargava @ 2017-12-06 12:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Prarit Bhargava, Jakub Kicinski, netdev, Clark Williams,
Andi Kleen, x86, Thomas Gleixner
A single socket, single core, single thread system has __max_smt_threads
set to 0 since smp_callin() is not called.
__max_smt_threads must be a minimum of 1.
Fixes: b1cbacc8663a ("x86/smpboot: Do not use smp_num_siblings in __max_logical_packages calculation)
Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kubakici@wp.pl>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "netdev@vger.kernel.org"
Cc: Clark Williams <williams@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://marc.info/?t=151246092100004&r=1&w=2
---
arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
index eaee15fb7d8b..882c61e1d7a2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__max_logical_packages);
static unsigned int logical_packages __read_mostly;
/* Maximum number of SMT threads on any online core */
-int __max_smt_threads __read_mostly;
+int __read_mostly __max_smt_threads = 1;
/* Flag to indicate if a complete sched domain rebuild is required */
bool x86_topology_update;
--
2.15.0.rc0.39.g2f0e14e64
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: KASAN: use-after-free Read in get_work_pool
From: Dmitry Vyukov @ 2017-12-06 12:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Cong Wang
Cc: Tejun Heo, syzbot, Lai Jiangshan, LKML, syzkaller-bugs,
David Miller, tom, Eric Dumazet, Eric Biggers, netdev
In-Reply-To: <CAM_iQpU0XFuj_Qc_Usug5=ymRWGU0nhQyPso6O=VbhPKAMa91Q@mail.gmail.com>
On Fri, Oct 27, 2017 at 11:18 PM, Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 26, 2017 at 11:00 PM, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> wrote:
>> On Thu, Oct 26, 2017 at 7:58 PM, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> wrote:
>>> Hello,
>>>
>>> On Thu, Oct 26, 2017 at 09:35:44AM -0700, syzbot wrote:
>>>> BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __read_once_size
>>>> include/linux/compiler.h:276 [inline]
>>>> BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in atomic64_read
>>>> arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:21 [inline]
>>>> BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in atomic_long_read
>>>> include/asm-generic/atomic-long.h:44 [inline]
>>>> BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in get_work_pool+0x1c2/0x1e0
>>>> kernel/workqueue.c:709
>>>> Read of size 8 at addr ffff8801cc58c378 by task syz-executor5/21326
>>>>
>>>> CPU: 1 PID: 21326 Comm: syz-executor5 Not tainted 4.13.0+ #43
>>>> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine,
>>>> BIOS Google 01/01/2011
>>>> Call Trace:
>>>> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16 [inline]
>>>> dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:52
>>>> print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:252
>>>> kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
>>>> kasan_report+0x24e/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
>>>> __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430
>>>> __read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:276 [inline]
>>>> atomic64_read arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:21 [inline]
>>>> atomic_long_read include/asm-generic/atomic-long.h:44 [inline]
>>>> get_work_pool+0x1c2/0x1e0 kernel/workqueue.c:709
>>>> __queue_work+0x235/0x1150 kernel/workqueue.c:1401
>>>> queue_work_on+0x16a/0x1c0 kernel/workqueue.c:1486
>>>> queue_work include/linux/workqueue.h:489 [inline]
>>>> strp_check_rcv+0x25/0x30 net/strparser/strparser.c:553
>>>> kcm_attach net/kcm/kcmsock.c:1439 [inline]
>>>> kcm_attach_ioctl net/kcm/kcmsock.c:1460 [inline]
>>>> kcm_ioctl+0x826/0x1610 net/kcm/kcmsock.c:1695
>>>> sock_do_ioctl+0x65/0xb0 net/socket.c:961
>>>> sock_ioctl+0x2c2/0x440 net/socket.c:1058
>>>> vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:45 [inline]
>>>> do_vfs_ioctl+0x1b1/0x1530 fs/ioctl.c:685
>>>> SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:700 [inline]
>>>> SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:691
>>>> entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
>>>
>>> Looks like kcm is trying to reuse a work item whose last workqueue has
>>> been destroyed without re-initing it. A work item needs to be
>>> reinit'd.
>>
>> +kcm maintainers
>
> Can you try the fix below? There is no C reproducer so I can't verify it.
Hi Cong,
syzbot can now test proposed patches, see
https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/syzbot.md#communication-with-syzbot
for details. Please give it a try.
> diff --git a/net/kcm/kcmsock.c b/net/kcm/kcmsock.c
> index af4e76ac88ff..7816f44c576a 100644
> --- a/net/kcm/kcmsock.c
> +++ b/net/kcm/kcmsock.c
> @@ -1433,11 +1433,12 @@ static int kcm_attach(struct socket *sock,
> struct socket *csock,
> KCM_STATS_INCR(mux->stats.psock_attach);
> mux->psocks_cnt++;
> psock_now_avail(psock);
> - spin_unlock_bh(&mux->lock);
>
> /* Schedule RX work in case there are already bytes queued */
> strp_check_rcv(&psock->strp);
>
> + spin_unlock_bh(&mux->lock);
> +
> return 0;
> }
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] ptr_ring: add barriers
From: Michael S. Tsirkin @ 2017-12-06 12:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: George Cherian
Cc: George Cherian, netdev, linux-kernel, virtualization, edumazet,
davem
In-Reply-To: <7d1ce1b5-edba-b017-3131-37405f1b0c24@caviumnetworks.com>
On Wed, Dec 06, 2017 at 02:51:41PM +0530, George Cherian wrote:
> Hi Michael,
>
>
> On 12/06/2017 12:59 AM, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > Users of ptr_ring expect that it's safe to give the
> > data structure a pointer and have it be available
> > to consumers, but that actually requires an smb_wmb
> > or a stronger barrier.
> This is not the exact situation we are seeing.
Could you test the patch pls?
> Let me try to explain the situation
>
> Affected on ARM64 platform.
> 1) tun_net_xmit calls skb_array_produce, which pushes the skb to the
> ptr_ring, this push is protected by a producer_lock.
>
> 2)Prior to this call the tun_net_xmit calls skb_orphan which calls the
> skb->destructor and sets skb->destructor and skb->sk as NULL.
>
> 2.a) These 2 writes are getting reordered
>
> 3) At the same time in the receive side (tun_ring_recv), which gets executed
> in another core calls skb_array_consume which pulls the skb from ptr ring,
> this pull is protected by a consumer lock.
>
> 4) eventually calling the skb->destructor (sock_wfree) with stale values.
>
> Also note that this issue is reproducible in a long run and doesn't happen
> immediately after the launch of multiple VM's (infact the particular test
> cases launches 56 VM's which does iperf back and forth)
>
> >
> > In absence of such barriers and on architectures that reorder writes,
> > consumer might read an un=initialized value from an skb pointer stored
> > in the skb array. This was observed causing crashes.
> >
> > To fix, add memory barriers. The barrier we use is a wmb, the
> > assumption being that producers do not need to read the value so we do
> > not need to order these reads.
> It is not the case that producer is reading the value, but the consumer
> reading stale value. So we need to have a strict rmb in place .
>
> >
> > Reported-by: George Cherian <george.cherian@cavium.com>
> > Suggested-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
> > ---
> >
> > George, could you pls report whether this patch fixes
> > the issue for you?
> >
> > This seems to be needed in stable as well.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > include/linux/ptr_ring.h | 9 +++++++++
> > 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/include/linux/ptr_ring.h b/include/linux/ptr_ring.h
> > index 37b4bb2..6866df4 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/ptr_ring.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/ptr_ring.h
> > @@ -101,12 +101,18 @@ static inline bool ptr_ring_full_bh(struct ptr_ring *r)
> > /* Note: callers invoking this in a loop must use a compiler barrier,
> > * for example cpu_relax(). Callers must hold producer_lock.
> > + * Callers are responsible for making sure pointer that is being queued
> > + * points to a valid data.
> > */
> > static inline int __ptr_ring_produce(struct ptr_ring *r, void *ptr)
> > {
> > if (unlikely(!r->size) || r->queue[r->producer])
> > return -ENOSPC;
> > + /* Make sure the pointer we are storing points to a valid data. */
> > + /* Pairs with smp_read_barrier_depends in __ptr_ring_consume. */
> > + smp_wmb();
> > +
> > r->queue[r->producer++] = ptr;
> > if (unlikely(r->producer >= r->size))
> > r->producer = 0;
> > @@ -275,6 +281,9 @@ static inline void *__ptr_ring_consume(struct ptr_ring *r)
> > if (ptr)
> > __ptr_ring_discard_one(r);
> > + /* Make sure anyone accessing data through the pointer is up to date. */
> > + /* Pairs with smp_wmb in __ptr_ring_produce. */
> > + smp_read_barrier_depends();
> > return ptr;
> > }
> >
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH V2] selinux: Add SCTP support
From: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner @ 2017-12-06 12:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Richard Haines
Cc: selinux, netdev, linux-sctp, linux-security-module, paul,
vyasevich, nhorman, sds, eparis
In-Reply-To: <20171206101736.3217-1-richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
On Wed, Dec 06, 2017 at 10:17:36AM +0000, Richard Haines wrote:
> The SELinux SCTP implementation is explained in:
> Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst
>
> Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
> ---
> V2 Changes
> Remove lock from selinux_sctp_assoc_request()
> Fix selinux_sctp_sk_clone() kbuild test robot catch [1]
>
> [1] https://marc.info/?l=selinux&m=151198281817779&w=2
>
Is this patchset going in via netdev tree or selinux one?
I see Dave is tracking the v1
(http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/841842/) so I'm thinking netdev but
for netdev it would require a repost of the entire patchset, even if
the first ones weren't changed.
Marcelo
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 4/7 v2] net: ethernet: i825xx: Fix platform_get_irq's error checking
From: Sergei Shtylyov @ 2017-12-06 12:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Miller, arvind.yadav.cs
Cc: wg, mkl, michal.simek, opendmb, f.fainelli, linux-kernel,
linux-arm-kernel, netdev
In-Reply-To: <20171205.104947.121188625730183933.davem@davemloft.net>
On 12/05/2017 06:49 PM, David Miller wrote:
>>> From: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@gmail.com>
>>> Date: Mon, 4 Dec 2017 23:18:20 +0530
>>>
>>>> @@ -120,9 +120,10 @@ static int sni_82596_probe(struct platform_device
>>>> *dev)
>>>> netdevice->dev_addr[5] = readb(eth_addr + 0x06);
>>>> iounmap(eth_addr);
>>>> - if (!netdevice->irq) {
>>>> + if (netdevice->irq <= 0) {
>>>> printk(KERN_ERR "%s: IRQ not found for i82596 at 0x%lx\n",
>>>> __FILE__, netdevice->base_addr);
>>>> + retval = netdevice->irq ? netdevice->irq : -ENODEV;
>>>> goto probe_failed;
>>>> }
>>> Ok, thinking about this some more...
>>>
>>> It is impossible to use platform_get_irq() without every single call
>>> site having this funny:
>>>
>>> ret = val ? val : -ENODEV;
>>>
>>> sequence.
>>>
>>> This is unnecessary duplication and it is also error prone, so I
>>> really think this logic belongs in platform_get_irq() itself. It can
>>> convert '0' to -ENODEV and that way we need no special logic in the
>>> callers at all.
>> platform_get_irq() will return 0 only for sparc, If sparc initialize
>> platform
>> data irq[PROMINTR_MAX] as zero. Otherwise platform_get_irq() will
>> never return
>> 0. It will return either IRQ number or error (as negative number). But
>> I am getting
>> review comment by reviewer/maintainer in other subsystem to add check
>> for
>> zero. So I have done same changes here. Please correct me if i am
>> wrong.
>
> If you make the change that I suggest, you instead can check for
I assume such change is needed only for the SPARC-specific section of
platform_get_irq()?
> '-ENODEV' to mean no IRQ.
No specific error check is needed, just irq < 0 check should be enough...
Also, looking at platform_get_irq(), -ENXIO should be returned in this case.
MBR, Sergei
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: Commit 05cf0d1bf4 ("net: stmmac: free an skb first when there are no longer any descriptors using it") breaks stmmac?
From: Niklas Cassel @ 2017-12-06 12:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jose Abreu; +Cc: Joao Pinto, linux-netdev, Giuseppe CAVALLARO, alexandre.torgue
In-Reply-To: <f638c527-75d7-1b98-ae7f-978f08652856@synopsys.com>
On Thu, Nov 30, 2017 at 04:50:38PM +0000, Jose Abreu wrote:
> Hi Niklas,
>
> Thanks for the detailed explanation!
>
> On 30-11-2017 03:51, Niklas Cassel wrote:
> >
> > Could you try to see if the following patch
> > solves your problem:
> > (still don't see why it should be needed,
> > considering stmmac_tx_clean() should set all non-NULL
> > entries to NULL)
> >
> > diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c
> > index 1763e48c84e2..1d30b20b3740 100644
> > --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c
> > +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c
> > @@ -2830,6 +2830,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t stmmac_tso_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
> >
> > tx_q->tx_skbuff_dma[first_entry].buf = des;
> > tx_q->tx_skbuff_dma[first_entry].len = skb_headlen(skb);
> > + tx_q->tx_skbuff[first_entry] = NULL;
> >
> > first->des0 = cpu_to_le32(des);
> >
> > @@ -3003,6 +3004,8 @@ static netdev_tx_t stmmac_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
> >
> > first = desc;
> >
> > + tx_q->tx_skbuff[first_entry] = NULL;
> > +
> > enh_desc = priv->plat->enh_desc;
> > /* To program the descriptors according to the size of the frame */
> > if (enh_desc)
>
> I confirm that applying 05cf0d1bf4 ("net: stmmac: free an skb
> first when there are no longer any descriptors using it") and
> this patch makes my setup work perfectly in multi-queue
> configuration. Can you send an official patch to -net?
>
> You can add my:
> Tested-by: Jose Abreu <joabreu@synopsys.com>
>
> Also, maybe we should try to understand why stmmac_tx_clean() is
> not setting the entry to NULL?
Hello Jose,
It is not easy to decode the databook, however,
after reading the databook several times more,
looking at:
3.3.2.2 Tx DMA Operation: OSP Mode
"The DMA writes the status, with a cleared Own bit, to the
corresponding TDES3, thus closing the descriptor."
So closing the descriptor means clearing the own bit.
Now looking at the mode we are interested in:
3.3.2.1 Tx DMA Operation: Default (Non-OSP) Mode
8. If an Ethernet packet is stored over data buffers in multiple descriptors,
the DMA closes the intermediate descriptor and fetches the next descriptor.
Steps 3 through 7 are repeated until the end-of-Ethernet-packet data is
transferred to the MTL.
So I think that my initial understanding was correct after all,
i.e., the commit 05cf0d1bf4 ("net: stmmac: free an skb first when
there are no longer any descriptors using it") is needed to make
sure that the DMA is not using skbs that might have been freed.
How certain are you that this is the offending commit?
Your crash is on v4.14-rc5, I can see an interesting
commit: 8d5f4b071749 ("stmmac: Don't access tx_q->dirty_tx before
netif_tx_lock"), which got included first in v4.14-rc6.
I've tried to understand if this could be a use-after-free,
but I don't see it.
An skb has a certain queue-mapping, so it shouldn't be in more
than one queue.
tx_q->tx_skbuff is allocated with kmalloc_array(), but is
initialized in init_dma_tx_desc_rings().
Other than that, it is only used in stmmac_tso_xmit()/stmmac_xmit()
and stmmac_tx_clean(). stmmac_tx_clean() will free and non-NULL skb,
and set tx_q->tx_skbuff[entry] to NULL.
I don't see why stmmac does:
for (i = 0; i < nfrags; i++) {
...
tx_q->tx_skbuff[tx_q->cur_tx] = NULL;
since it is initialized to NULL in init_dma_tx_desc_rings(),
and if it has been cleaned, it should be set to NULL again.
If we haven't cleaned for a long time, we will not be able
to queue more skbs, since stmmac_tso_xmit()/stmmac_xmit()
checks current "clean" entries, see stmmac_tx_avail().
I removed the tx_q->tx_skbuff[tx_q->cur_tx] = NULL
from both stmmac_tso_xmit()/stmmac_xmit() locally,
and I could not see any problems with ping (different sizes)
or with iperf3.
Could you try to reproduce the bug with CONFIG_KASAN enabled?
(And please don't cut anything from the oops message).
Regards,
Niklas
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH net-next v2 1/2] bpf/tracing: allow user space to query prog array on the same tp
From: Peter Zijlstra @ 2017-12-06 11:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Yonghong Song; +Cc: rostedt, ast, daniel, kafai, netdev, kernel-team
In-Reply-To: <20171206063129.3730876-2-yhs@fb.com>
On Tue, Dec 05, 2017 at 10:31:28PM -0800, Yonghong Song wrote:
> Commit e87c6bc3852b ("bpf: permit multiple bpf attachments
> for a single perf event") added support to attach multiple
> bpf programs to a single perf event.
> Commit 2541517c32be ("tracing, perf: Implement BPF programs
> attached to kprobes") utilized the existing perf ioctl
> interface and added the command PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_BPF
> to attach a bpf program to a tracepoint.
>
> This patch adds a new ioctl
> command, given a perf event fd, to query the bpf program array
> attached to the same perf tracepoint event.
>
> The new uapi ioctl command:
> PERF_EVENT_IOC_QUERY_BPF
>
> The new uapi/linux/perf_event.h structure:
> struct perf_event_query_bpf {
> __u64 prog_ids;
> __u32 prog_cnt;
> };
>
> The usage:
> struct perf_event_query_bpf query;
> query.prog_ids = (__u64)usr_prog_ids_buf;
> query.prog_cnt = usr_prog_ids_buf_len;
> err = ioctl(pmu_efd, PERF_EVENT_IOC_QUERY_BPF, &query);
>
> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Can you please fix that example to make it clear that prog_ids is in
fact a pointer to an array of size prog_cnt. Ideally also describing
what the type of array is.
In fact, would not something like:
struct perf_event_query_bpf {
__u32 len;
__u32 __reserved;
__u64 ids[0];
};
be a much clearer interface?
Also, you forgot to tell us why we need this interface at all.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH net-next] rds: debug: fix null check on static array
From: Sowmini Varadhan @ 2017-12-06 11:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Prashant Bhole
Cc: David S . Miller, netdev, Santosh Shilimkar, linux-rdma,
rds-devel
In-Reply-To: <20171206014704.3796-1-bhole_prashant_q7@lab.ntt.co.jp>
On (12/06/17 10:47), Prashant Bhole wrote:
>
> t_name cannot be NULL since it is an array field of a struct.
> Replacing null check on static array with string length check using
> strnlen()
t_name is always initialized for all rds transports today, and would
be all zeros unless someone stomped over that memory (in which case
there could be more serious issues than a busted debug string) but
it's good to be safe and check I suppose.
Acked-by: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com>
--Sowmini
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH net-next] ipvlan: Eliminate duplicated codes with existing function
From: gfree.wind @ 2017-12-06 11:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: davem, netdev; +Cc: Gao Feng
From: Gao Feng <gfree.wind@vip.163.com>
The recv flow of ipvlan l2 mode performs as same as l3 mode for
non-multicast packet, so use the existing func ipvlan_handle_mode_l3
instead of these duplicated statements in non-multicast case.
Signed-off-by: Gao Feng <gfree.wind@vip.163.com>
---
drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c | 13 ++-----------
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c b/drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c
index 11c1e79..20dd95e7 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c
@@ -663,8 +663,6 @@ static rx_handler_result_t ipvlan_handle_mode_l2(struct sk_buff **pskb,
struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb;
struct ethhdr *eth = eth_hdr(skb);
rx_handler_result_t ret = RX_HANDLER_PASS;
- void *lyr3h;
- int addr_type;
if (is_multicast_ether_addr(eth->h_dest)) {
if (ipvlan_external_frame(skb, port)) {
@@ -682,15 +680,8 @@ static rx_handler_result_t ipvlan_handle_mode_l2(struct sk_buff **pskb,
}
}
} else {
- struct ipvl_addr *addr;
-
- lyr3h = ipvlan_get_L3_hdr(port, skb, &addr_type);
- if (!lyr3h)
- return ret;
-
- addr = ipvlan_addr_lookup(port, lyr3h, addr_type, true);
- if (addr)
- ret = ipvlan_rcv_frame(addr, pskb, false);
+ /* Perform like l3 mode for non-multicast packet */
+ ret = ipvlan_handle_mode_l3(pskb, port);
}
return ret;
--
1.9.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* RE: [PATCH V11 3/5] printk: hash addresses printed with %p
From: David Laight @ 2017-12-06 10:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: 'David Miller', geert@linux-m68k.org
Cc: me@tobin.cc, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, Jason@zx2c4.com, tytso@mit.edu,
keescook@chromium.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, tycho@tycho.ws,
william.c.roberts@intel.com, tj@kernel.org,
Golden_Miller83@protonmail.ch, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
pmladek@suse.com, joe@perches.com, ijc@hellion.org.uk,
sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com, catalin.marinas@arm.com,
wilal.deacon@arm.com, "rostedt@good
In-Reply-To: <20171205.153120.151025775956658954.davem@davemloft.net>
From: David Miller
> Sent: 05 December 2017 20:31
...
> > Would it make sense to keep the 3 lowest bits of the address?
> >
> > Currently printed pointers no longer have any correlation with the actual
> > alignment in memory of the object, which is a typical cause of a class of bugs.
>
> Yeah, this is driving people nuts who wonder why pointers are aligned
> all weird now.
I can also image issues where you want to know whether 2 pointers point
into the same structure (like an skb).
Useful if you suspect that code is using a stale pointer because the
skb got reallocated by some internal function.
I'm not sure such pointers are printed by default though.
I know I have debugged things that required hexdumps of memory areas
referenced by traced pointers.
I won't have done that for anything written with the kernel printf because
getting any more info for a linux kernel oops is actually quite hard.
David
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RFC v2 6/6] flow_dissector: Parse batman-adv unicast headers
From: Sven Eckelmann @ 2017-12-06 10:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tom Herbert
Cc: Linux Kernel Network Developers, David S . Miller, Jiri Pirko,
Eric Dumazet, LKML, b.a.t.m.a.n
In-Reply-To: <CALx6S34QfkvbGqrSahQ17upSPDjNaHnf4wsxk90gXgR2dW_D8A@mail.gmail.com>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1699 bytes --]
On Dienstag, 5. Dezember 2017 09:19:45 CET Tom Herbert wrote:
[...]
> Switch statements with cases having many LOC is hard to read and
> __skb_flow_dissect is aleady quite convoluted to begin with.
>
> I suggest putting this in a static function similar to how MPLS and
> GRE are handled.
Thanks for the feedback.
I was not sure whether "inline" or an extra function would be preferred. I've
then decided to implement it like most of the other protocols. But since an
extra function is the preferred method for handling new protos, I will move it
to an extra function.
The change can already be found in
https://git.open-mesh.org/linux-merge.git/shortlog/refs/heads/ecsv/flowdissector
I also saw that you've introduced in
commit 823b96939578 ("flow_dissector: Add control/reporting of encapsulation")
a flag to stop dissecting when something encapsulated was detected. It is not
100% clear to me when the FLOW_DIS_ENCAPSULATION should be set and
FLOW_DISSECTOR_F_STOP_AT_ENCAP be checked. Only when there is IP/eth in IP
(like in the two examples from the commit message) or also when there is a
ethernet header, followed by batman-adv unicast header and again followed by
an ethernet header?
Right now, the flag FLOW_DISSECTOR_F_STOP_AT_ENCAP is only used by
fib_multipath_hash - so it doesn't really help me to understand it. But the
FLOW_DIS_ENCAPSULATION is checked by drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c
to set it in a special tunnel_type (anytunnel) mode for IPv4/IPv6 packets. So
my (wild) guess right now is that these flags should only be used/checked when
handling encapsulation inside IPv4/IPv6 packets. But maybe you can correct me
here.
Kind regards,
Sven
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[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 833 bytes --]
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH V2] selinux: Add SCTP support
From: Richard Haines @ 2017-12-06 10:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: selinux, netdev, linux-sctp, linux-security-module
Cc: paul, vyasevich, nhorman, sds, eparis, marcelo.leitner,
Richard Haines
The SELinux SCTP implementation is explained in:
Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst
Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
---
V2 Changes
Remove lock from selinux_sctp_assoc_request()
Fix selinux_sctp_sk_clone() kbuild test robot catch [1]
[1] https://marc.info/?l=selinux&m=151198281817779&w=2
Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst | 104 ++++++++++++
security/selinux/hooks.c | 270 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +-
security/selinux/include/netlabel.h | 20 ++-
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 4 +
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 144 +++++++++++++++--
6 files changed, 512 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst
diff --git a/Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst b/Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f6a9162
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+SCTP SELinux Support
+=====================
+
+Security Hooks
+===============
+
+The ``Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.rst`` document describes how the
+following sctp security hooks are utilised::
+
+ security_sctp_assoc_request()
+ security_sctp_bind_connect()
+ security_sctp_sk_clone()
+ security_inet_conn_established()
+
+
+Policy Statements
+==================
+The following class and permissions to support SCTP are available within the
+kernel::
+
+ class sctp_socket inherits socket { node_bind }
+
+whenever the following policy capability is enabled::
+
+ policycap extended_socket_class;
+
+SELinux SCTP support adds the ``name_connect`` permission for connecting
+to a specific port type and the ``association`` permission that is explained
+in the section below.
+
+If userspace tools have been updated, SCTP will support the ``portcon``
+statement as shown in the following example::
+
+ portcon sctp 1024-1036 system_u:object_r:sctp_ports_t:s0
+
+
+SCTP Bind, Connect and ASCONF Chunk Parameter Permission Checks
+================================================================
+The hook ``security_sctp_bind_connect()`` is called by SCTP to check
+permissions required for ipv4/ipv6 addresses based on the ``@optname`` as
+follows::
+
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------
+ | BIND Permission Checks |
+ | @optname | @address contains |
+ |----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
+ | SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses |
+ | SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address |
+ | SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address |
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------
+ | CONNECT Permission Checks |
+ | @optname | @address contains |
+ |----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
+ | SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses |
+ | SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses |
+ | SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address |
+ | SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address |
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+SCTP Peer Labeling
+===================
+An SCTP socket will only have one peer label assigned to it. This will be
+assigned during the establishment of the first association. Once the peer
+label has been assigned, any new associations will have the ``association``
+permission validated by checking the socket peer sid against the received
+packets peer sid to determine whether the association should be allowed or
+denied.
+
+NOTES:
+ 1) If peer labeling is not enabled, then the peer context will always be
+ ``SECINITSID_UNLABELED`` (``unlabeled_t`` in Reference Policy).
+
+ 2) As SCTP can support more than one transport address per endpoint
+ (multi-homing) on a single socket, it is possible to configure policy
+ and NetLabel to provide different peer labels for each of these. As the
+ socket peer label is determined by the first associations transport
+ address, it is recommended that all peer labels are consistent.
+
+ 3) **getpeercon**\(3) may be used by userspace to retrieve the sockets peer
+ context.
+
+ 4) While not SCTP specific, be aware when using NetLabel that if a label
+ is assigned to a specific interface, and that interface 'goes down',
+ then the NetLabel service will remove the entry. Therefore ensure that
+ the network startup scripts call **netlabelctl**\(8) to set the required
+ label (see **netlabel-config**\(8) helper script for details).
+
+ 5) The NetLabel SCTP peer labeling rules apply as discussed in the following
+ set of posts tagged "netlabel" at: http://www.paul-moore.com/blog/t.
+
+ 6) CIPSO is only supported for IPv4 addressing: ``socket(AF_INET, ...)``
+ CALIPSO is only supported for IPv6 addressing: ``socket(AF_INET6, ...)``
+
+ Note the following when testing CIPSO/CALIPSO:
+ a) CIPSO will send an ICMP packet if an SCTP packet cannot be
+ delivered because of an invalid label.
+ b) CALIPSO does not send an ICMP packet, just silently discards it.
+
+ 7) IPSEC is not supported as RFC 3554 - sctp/ipsec support has not been
+ implemented in userspace (**racoon**\(8) or **ipsec_pluto**\(8)),
+ although the kernel supports SCTP/IPSEC.
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 0110bb5..954bfcf 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -67,6 +67,8 @@
#include <linux/tcp.h>
#include <linux/udp.h>
#include <linux/dccp.h>
+#include <linux/sctp.h>
+#include <net/sctp/structs.h>
#include <linux/quota.h>
#include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
#include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
@@ -4136,6 +4138,23 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
break;
}
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
+ case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
+ struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
+
+ if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
+ break;
+
+ offset += ihlen;
+ sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
+ if (sh == NULL)
+ break;
+
+ ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
+ ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
+ break;
+ }
+#endif
default:
break;
}
@@ -4209,6 +4228,19 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
break;
}
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
+ case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
+ struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
+
+ sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
+ if (sh == NULL)
+ break;
+
+ ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
+ ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
+ break;
+ }
+#endif
/* includes fragments */
default:
break;
@@ -4398,6 +4430,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
sksec->sclass = sclass;
sksec->sid = sid;
+ /* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
+ if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
+ sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET;
+
err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
}
@@ -4418,11 +4454,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
if (err)
goto out;
- /*
- * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
- * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
- * check the first address now.
- */
+ /* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */
family = sk->sk_family;
if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
char *addrp;
@@ -4434,7 +4466,13 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
unsigned short snum;
u32 sid, node_perm;
- if (family == PF_INET) {
+ /*
+ * sctp_bindx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
+ * that validates multiple binding addresses. Because of this
+ * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
+ * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
+ */
+ if (address->sa_family == AF_INET) {
if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
@@ -4488,6 +4526,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
break;
+ case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
+ node_perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
+ break;
+
default:
node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
break;
@@ -4502,7 +4544,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
ad.u.net->family = family;
- if (family == PF_INET)
+ if (address->sa_family == AF_INET)
ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
else
ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
@@ -4516,7 +4558,11 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
return err;
}
-static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+/* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3)
+ * and sctp_sendmsg(3) as described in Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.txt
+ */
+static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
+ struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
@@ -4527,10 +4573,12 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
return err;
/*
- * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
+ * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission
+ * for the port.
*/
if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
- sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
+ sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET ||
+ sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) {
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
@@ -4538,7 +4586,12 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
unsigned short snum;
u32 sid, perm;
- if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
+ /* sctp_connectx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
+ * that validates multiple connect addresses. Because of this
+ * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
+ * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
+ */
+ if (address->sa_family == AF_INET) {
addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
return -EINVAL;
@@ -4552,10 +4605,19 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
if (err)
- goto out;
+ return err;
- perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
- TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
+ switch (sksec->sclass) {
+ case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
+ perm = TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
+ break;
+ case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
+ perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
+ break;
+ case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
+ perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
+ break;
+ }
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
ad.u.net = &net;
@@ -4563,13 +4625,24 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
if (err)
- goto out;
+ return err;
}
- err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
+ return 0;
+}
-out:
- return err;
+/* Supports connect(2), see comments in selinux_socket_connect_helper() */
+static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
+ struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+ int err;
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+ err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, address, addrlen);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
}
static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
@@ -4832,7 +4905,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *op
u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
- sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
+ sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
+ sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
@@ -4945,6 +5019,161 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
}
+/* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT chunk. This happens when an incoming
+ * connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association
+ * already present).
+ */
+static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+ struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+ u8 peerlbl_active;
+ u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ u32 conn_sid;
+ int err = 0;
+
+ if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass)
+ return 0;
+
+ peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
+
+ if (peerlbl_active) {
+ /* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if there are
+ * no peer labels, see security_net_peersid_resolve().
+ */
+ err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, ep->base.sk->sk_family,
+ &peer_sid);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
+ peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ }
+
+ if (sksec->sctp_assoc_state == SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET) {
+ sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_SET;
+
+ /* Here as first association on socket. As the peer SID
+ * was allowed by peer recv (and the netif/node checks),
+ * then it is approved by policy and used as the primary
+ * peer SID for getpeercon(3).
+ */
+ sksec->peer_sid = peer_sid;
+ } else if (sksec->peer_sid != peer_sid) {
+ /* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce
+ * consistency among the peer SIDs.
+ */
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+ ad.u.net = &net;
+ ad.u.net->sk = ep->base.sk;
+ err = avc_has_perm(sksec->peer_sid, peer_sid, sksec->sclass,
+ SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION, &ad);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ /* Compute the MLS component for the connection and store
+ * the information in ep. This will be used by SCTP TCP type
+ * sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new
+ * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone() will then
+ * plug this into the new socket.
+ */
+ err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peer_sid, &conn_sid);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ ep->secid = conn_sid;
+ ep->peer_secid = peer_sid;
+
+ /* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO options. */
+ return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(ep, skb);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or connecting
+ * based on their @optname.
+ */
+static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
+ struct sockaddr *address,
+ int addrlen)
+{
+ int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0;
+ void *addr_buf;
+ struct sockaddr *addr;
+ struct socket *sock;
+
+ if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */
+ sock = sk->sk_socket;
+ addr_buf = address;
+
+ while (walk_size < addrlen) {
+ addr = addr_buf;
+ switch (addr->sa_family) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
+ }
+
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ switch (optname) {
+ /* Bind checks */
+ case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
+ case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR:
+ case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD:
+ err = selinux_socket_bind(sock, addr, len);
+ break;
+ /* Connect checks */
+ case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX:
+ case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
+ case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
+ case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT:
+ err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, addr, len);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ err = selinux_netlbl_sctp_socket_connect(sk, addr);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ addr_buf += len;
+ walk_size += len;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3). */
+static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
+ struct sock *newsk)
+{
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+
+ /* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
+ * the non-sctp clone version.
+ */
+ if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass)
+ return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
+
+ newsksec->sid = ep->secid;
+ newsksec->peer_sid = ep->peer_secid;
+ newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
+ selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
+}
+
static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req)
{
@@ -6433,6 +6662,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 35ffb29..099065e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
{ COMMON_CAP2_PERMS, NULL } },
{ "sctp_socket",
{ COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
- "node_bind", NULL } },
+ "node_bind", "name_connect", "association", NULL } },
{ "icmp_socket",
{ COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
"node_bind", NULL } },
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
index 75686d5..73668db 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/request_sock.h>
+#include <net/sctp/structs.h>
#include "avc.h"
#include "objsec.h"
@@ -53,9 +54,11 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 family,
u32 sid);
-
+int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+ struct sk_buff *skb);
int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family);
void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family);
+void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family);
int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
struct sk_buff *skb,
@@ -65,6 +68,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
int level,
int optname);
int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr);
+int selinux_netlbl_sctp_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr);
#else
static inline void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void)
@@ -114,6 +118,11 @@ static inline int selinux_netlbl_conn_setsid(struct sock *sk,
return 0;
}
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+ struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
static inline int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req,
u16 family)
{
@@ -123,6 +132,10 @@ static inline void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
{
return;
}
+static inline void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, sock *newsk)
+{
+ return;
+}
static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk,
u16 family)
{
@@ -146,6 +159,11 @@ static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk,
{
return 0;
}
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_sctp_socket_connect(struct sock *sk,
+ struct sockaddr *addr)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 6ebc61e..e319d5d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -130,6 +130,10 @@ struct sk_security_struct {
u32 sid; /* SID of this object */
u32 peer_sid; /* SID of peer */
u16 sclass; /* sock security class */
+ enum { /* SCTP association state */
+ SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET = 0,
+ SCTP_ASSOC_SET,
+ } sctp_assoc_state;
};
struct tun_security_struct {
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index aaba667..ddb5d55 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -250,6 +250,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
if (sk != NULL) {
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB)
return 0;
secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, sid);
@@ -270,6 +271,61 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
return rc;
}
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request - Label an incoming sctp association.
+ * @ep: incoming association endpoint.
+ * @skb: the packet.
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * A new incoming connection is represented by @ep, ......
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+ struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
+ struct sockaddr *addr;
+ struct sockaddr_in addr4;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+ struct sockaddr_in6 addr6;
+#endif
+
+ if (ep->base.sk->sk_family != PF_INET &&
+ ep->base.sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)
+ return 0;
+
+ netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+ rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(ep->secid, &secattr);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ goto assoc_request_return;
+
+ /* Move skb hdr address info to a struct sockaddr and then call
+ * netlbl_conn_setattr().
+ */
+ if (ip_hdr(skb)->version == 4) {
+ addr4.sin_family = AF_INET;
+ addr4.sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
+ addr = (struct sockaddr *)&addr4;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+ } else {
+ addr6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
+ addr6.sin6_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
+ addr = (struct sockaddr *)&addr6;
+#endif
+ }
+
+ rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(ep->base.sk, addr, &secattr);
+ if (rc == 0)
+ sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
+
+assoc_request_return:
+ netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+ return rc;
+}
+
/**
* selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request - Label an incoming stream connection
* @req: incoming connection request socket
@@ -319,6 +375,22 @@ void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_UNSET;
}
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone - Copy state to the newly created sock
+ * @sk: current sock
+ * @newsk: the new sock
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3).
+ */
+void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
+{
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+
+ newsksec->nlbl_state = sksec->nlbl_state;
+}
+
/**
* selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create - Label a socket using NetLabel
* @sock: the socket to label
@@ -470,7 +542,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
}
/**
- * selinux_netlbl_socket_connect - Label a client-side socket on connect
+ * selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper - Help label a client-side socket on
+ * connect
* @sk: the socket to label
* @addr: the destination address
*
@@ -479,18 +552,13 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
* Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
*
*/
-int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr)
+static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
+ struct sockaddr *addr)
{
int rc;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
- if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB &&
- sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
- return 0;
-
- lock_sock(sk);
-
/* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family
* is set to AF_UNSPEC, if that is what is happening we want to reset
* the socket */
@@ -498,18 +566,72 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr)
netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQSKB;
rc = 0;
- goto socket_connect_return;
+ return rc;
}
secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(sk);
if (secattr == NULL) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto socket_connect_return;
+ return rc;
}
rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(sk, addr, secattr);
if (rc == 0)
sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_CONNLABELED;
-socket_connect_return:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_socket_connect - Label a client-side socket on connect
+ * @sk: the socket to label
+ * @addr: the destination address
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Attempt to label a connected socket with NetLabel using the given address.
+ * Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+ if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB &&
+ sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
+ return 0;
+
+ lock_sock(sk);
+ rc = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(sk, addr);
release_sock(sk);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sctp_socket_connect - Label an SCTP client-side socket on a
+ * connect
+ * @sk: the socket to label
+ * @addr: the destination address
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Attempt to label a connected socket with NetLabel using the given address
+ * when called by the SCTP protocol layer. The situations handled are:
+ * sctp_connectx(3), sctp_sendmsg(3), sendmsg(2), whenever a new IP address
+ * is added or when a new primary address is selected. Note that an SCTP
+ * connect(2) call happens before the SCTP protocol layer and is handled via
+ * selinux_netlbl_socket_connect()
+ * Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_sctp_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+ if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB &&
+ sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
+ return 0;
+
+ rc = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(sk, addr);
+
return rc;
}
--
2.14.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH v4 1/6] perf: prepare perf_event.h for new types perf_kprobe and perf_uprobe
From: Peter Zijlstra @ 2017-12-06 10:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Song Liu; +Cc: rostedt, mingo, davem, netdev, linux-kernel, daniel, kernel-team
In-Reply-To: <20171205012729.358860-4-songliubraving@fb.com>
On Mon, Dec 04, 2017 at 05:27:24PM -0800, Song Liu wrote:
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h b/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h
> index 362493a..0f39b31 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h
> @@ -291,6 +291,16 @@ enum perf_event_read_format {
> PERF_FORMAT_MAX = 1U << 4, /* non-ABI */
> };
>
> +/*
> + * Flags in config, used by dynamic PMU kprobe and uprobe
> + *
> + * PERF_PROBE_CONFIG_IS_RETPROBE if set, create kretprobe/uretprobe
> + * if not set, create kprobe/uprobe
> + */
> +enum perf_probe_config {
> + PERF_PROBE_CONFIG_IS_RETPROBE = 1U << 0, /* [k,u]retprobe */
> +};
This should not be in uapi; pmu's can describe their config format in
sysfs.
PMU_FORMAT_ATTR(retprobe, "config:0");
static struct attribute *kprobe_attr[] = {
&format_attr_retprobe,
NULL,
};
static struct attribute_group kprobe_format_group = {
.name = "format",
.attrs = kprobe_attrs,
};
static const struct attribute_group *kprobe_attr_groups[] = {
&kprobe_format_group,
NULL,
};
struct pmu perf_kprobe {
...
.attr_groups = kprobe_attr_groups,
};
Other than that, this series looks good to me. Thanks!
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH] ptr_ring: Add barriers to fix NULL-pointer exception
From: George Cherian @ 2017-12-06 9:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: mst, davem, jasowang, edumazet, netdev, virtualization,
George Cherian
While running a multiple VM testscase with each VM running iperf
traffic between others the following kernel NULL pointer exception
was seen.
Race appears when the tun driver instance of one VM calls skb_array_produce
(from tun_net_xmit) and the the destined VM's skb_array_consume
(from tun_ring_recv), which could run concurrently on another core. Due to
which the sock_wfree gets called again from the tun_ring_recv context.
The fix is to add write/read barrier calls to be sure that we get proper
values in the tun_ring_recv context.
Crash log
[35321.580227] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000060
[35321.596720] pgd = ffff809ee552f000
[35321.603723] [00000060] *pgd=0000009f514ac003, *pud=0000009f54f7c003, *pmd=0000000000000000
[35321.620588] Internal error: Oops: 96000006 1 SMP
[35321.630461] Modules linked in: xt_CHECKSUM iptable_mangle ipt_MASQUERADE nf_nat_masquerade_ipv4 iptable_nat nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_4
[35321.728501] CPU: 114 PID: 5560 Comm: qemu-system-aar Not tainted 4.11.8-4k-vhe-lse+ #3
[35321.744510] Hardware name: Cavium Inc. Unknown/Unknown, BIOS 1.0 07/24/2017
[35321.758602] task: ffff80bed7fca880 task.stack: ffff80beb5128000
[35321.770600] PC is at sock_wfree+0x24/0x80
[35321.778746] LR is at skb_release_head_state+0x68/0xf8
[35321.788979] pc : [<ffff000008a772fc>] lr : [<ffff000008a79238>] pstate: 40400149
[35321.803930] sp : ffff80beb512bc30
[35321.810648] x29: ffff80beb512bc30 x28: ffff80bed7fca880
[35321.821400] x27: 000000000000004e x26: 0000000000000000
[35321.832156] x25: 000000000000000c x24: 0000000000000000
[35321.842947] x23: ffff809ece3e4900 x22: ffff80beb512be00
[35321.853729] x21: ffff000009138000 x20: 0000000000000144
[35321.864507] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000014
[35321.875276] x17: 0000ffff9d9689a0 x16: ffff00000828b3f8
[35321.886048] x15: 0000504d7b000000 x14: e90ab50c48680a08
[35321.896824] x13: 0101000017773f52 x12: 1080d422c00e5db6
[35321.907595] x11: 68c322bd3930cf7a x10: a8c0d07aa8c0ad16
[35321.918352] x9 : 000000001da4ed90 x8 : b50c48680a080101
[35321.929099] x7 : 000017770c521080 x6 : 000000001d6c13f2
[35321.939865] x5 : 000000001d6c13f2 x4 : 000000000000000e
[35321.950619] x3 : 000000085ff97d82 x2 : 0000000000000000
[35321.961376] x1 : ffff000008a772d8 x0 : 0000000000000500
[35321.975193] Process qemu-system-aar (pid: 5560, stack limit = 0xffff80beb5128000)
[35321.990347] Stack: (0xffff80beb512bc30 to 0xffff80beb512c000)
[35322.001982] bc20: ffff80beb512bc50 ffff000008a79238
[35322.017817] bc40: ffff809e8fd7be00 000000000000004e ffff80beb512bc70 ffff000008a79488
[35322.033651] bc60: ffff809e8fd7be00 ffff00000881307c ffff80beb512bc90 ffff000008a79678
[35322.049489] bc80: ffff809e8fd7be00 ffff80beb512be00 ffff80beb512bcb0 ffff000008812f24
[35322.065321] bca0: ffff809e8fd7be00 000000000000004e ffff80beb512bd50 ffff0000088133f0
[35322.081165] bcc0: ffff809ece3e4900 0000000000011000 ffff80beb512bdd8 ffff80beb512be00
[35322.097001] bce0: 000000001d6c13a4 0000000000000015 0000000000000124 000000000000003f
[35322.112866] bd00: ffff000008bc2000 ffff00000847b5ac 0000000000020000 ffff80be00080000
[35322.128701] bd20: 0022000000000001 ffff80bed7fc0010 ffff000008100c38 0000000000000000
[35322.144539] bd40: 0000000000000000 0000000000040b08 ffff80beb512bd80 ffff000008288f80
[35322.160395] bd60: ffff000009138000 ffff809ee7cd3500 0000000000011000 ffff80beb512beb0
[35322.176255] bd80: ffff80beb512be30 ffff00000828a224 0000000000011000 ffff809ee7cd3500
[35322.192109] bda0: 000000001d6c13a4 ffff80beb512beb0 0000000000011000 0000000000000000
[35322.207974] bdc0: 0000000000000000 000000001d6c13a4 0000000000011000 ffff809ee7cd3500
[35322.223822] bde0: 000000000000004e 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[35322.239661] be00: ffff80be00000000 000000000000004e 0000000000010fb2 ffff80beb512bdc8
[35322.255519] be20: 0000000000000001 0000000000040b08 ffff80beb512be70 ffff00000828b464
[35322.271392] be40: ffff000009138000 ffff809ee7cd3501 ffff809ee7cd3500 000000001d6c13a4
[35322.287255] be60: 0000000000011000 0000000000000015 0000000000000000 ffff0000080833f0
[35322.303090] be80: 0000000000000000 000080bef0071000 ffffffffffffffff 0000ffff9d9689cc
[35322.318951] bea0: 0000000080000000 000080bef0071000 000000000000004e 0000000000040b08
[35322.334771] bec0: 000000000000000e 000000001d6c13a4 0000000000011000 0000ffff9cc89108
[35322.350640] bee0: 0000000000000002 0000ffff9cc89000 0000ffff9cc896f0 0000000000000000
[35322.366500] bf00: 000000000000003f 000000001da4ed90 a8c0d07aa8c0ad16 68c322bd3930cf7a
[35322.382358] bf20: 1080d422c00e5db6 0101000017773f52 e90ab50c48680a08 0000504d7b000000
[35322.398209] bf40: 0000000000000000 0000ffff9d9689a0 0000000000000014 0000000000000030
[35322.414063] bf60: 000000001d6c13a4 000000001d6c0db0 000000001d6d1db0 00000000006fbbc8
[35322.429901] bf80: 0000000000011000 000000001d6ab3e8 000000001d6ab3a4 00000000007ee4c8
[35322.445751] bfa0: 0000000000000000 0000fffff363ab70 0000ffff9d9689b8 0000fffff363ab30
[35322.461588] bfc0: 0000ffff9d9689cc 0000000080000000 000000000000000e 000000000000003f
[35322.477445] bfe0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff809ed043d758 0000000000000000
[35322.493283] Call trace:
[35322.498275] Exception stack(0xffff80beb512ba40 to 0xffff80beb512bb70)
[35322.511303] ba40: 0000000000000000 0001000000000000 ffff80beb512bc30 ffff000008a772fc
[35322.527152] ba60: 0000000040400149 0000000000000049 ffff000008bc2000 ffff80bed7fca880
[35322.542992] ba80: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[35322.558863] baa0: 0000000000000000 000000001d895758 ffff80beb512bb78 0000000000000000
[35322.574702] bac0: 000000050000000b 0000000800000001 0000000a00000001 0000000b00000001
[35322.590550] bae0: 0000000e00000001 0000001800010001 ffff80beb512bbf0 0000000000040b08
[35322.606416] bb00: 0000000000000500 ffff000008a772d8 0000000000000000 000000085ff97d82
[35322.622287] bb20: 000000000000000e 000000001d6c13f2 000000001d6c13f2 000017770c521080
[35322.638144] bb40: b50c48680a080101 000000001da4ed90 a8c0d07aa8c0ad16 68c322bd3930cf7a
[35322.653992] bb60: 1080d422c00e5db6 0101000017773f52
[35322.663908] [<ffff000008a772fc>] sock_wfree+0x24/0x80
[35322.674168] [<ffff000008a79238>] skb_release_head_state+0x68/0xf8
[35322.686535] [<ffff000008a79488>] skb_release_all+0x20/0x40
[35322.697663] [<ffff000008a79678>] consume_skb+0x38/0xd8
[35322.708120] [<ffff000008812f24>] tun_do_read.part.9+0x20c/0x4f0
[35322.720149] [<ffff0000088133f0>] tun_chr_read_iter+0xc0/0xe0
[35322.731638] [<ffff000008288f80>] __vfs_read+0x100/0x160
[35322.742249] [<ffff00000828a224>] vfs_read+0x8c/0x148
[35322.752344] [<ffff00000828b464>] SyS_read+0x6c/0xd8
[35322.762263] [<ffff0000080833f0>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28
[35322.773042] Code: d503201f f9400e93 b940e280 91051274 (f9403261)
Reported-by: Joseph DeVincentis <Joseph.DeVincentis@cavium.com>
Signed-off-by: George Cherian <george.cherian@cavium.com>
---
include/linux/ptr_ring.h | 13 +++++++++++++
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/ptr_ring.h b/include/linux/ptr_ring.h
index 37b4bb2..bc3b36b 100644
--- a/include/linux/ptr_ring.h
+++ b/include/linux/ptr_ring.h
@@ -106,6 +106,12 @@ static inline int __ptr_ring_produce(struct ptr_ring *r, void *ptr)
{
if (unlikely(!r->size) || r->queue[r->producer])
return -ENOSPC;
+ /*
+ * This barrier is necessary in order to prevent race condition with
+ * with __ptr_ring_consume(). By this we make sure all the prior
+ * writes to *ptr elements are updated.
+ */
+ wmb();
r->queue[r->producer++] = ptr;
if (unlikely(r->producer >= r->size))
@@ -275,6 +281,13 @@ static inline void *__ptr_ring_consume(struct ptr_ring *r)
if (ptr)
__ptr_ring_discard_one(r);
+ /*
+ * This barrier is necessary in order to prevent race condition with
+ * with __ptr_ring_produce(). Make sure all the elements of ptr is
+ * in sync with the earlier writes which was done prior to pushing
+ * it to ring
+ */
+ rmb();
return ptr;
}
--
2.1.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* RE: [PATCH] xen-netback: Fix logging message with spurious period after newline
From: Paul Durrant @ 2017-12-06 9:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: 'Joe Perches', Wei Liu
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
In-Reply-To: <7884b866cbeba808b63d9de871ace53970561f41.1512542267.git.joe@perches.com>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Joe Perches [mailto:joe@perches.com]
> Sent: 06 December 2017 06:40
> To: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>; Paul Durrant <Paul.Durrant@citrix.com>
> Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org; netdev@vger.kernel.org; linux-
> kernel@vger.kernel.org
> Subject: [PATCH] xen-netback: Fix logging message with spurious period
> after newline
>
> Using a period after a newline causes bad output.
>
> Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
> ---
> drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c b/drivers/net/xen-
> netback/interface.c
> index d6dff347f896..78ebe494fef0 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c
> @@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ static int xenvif_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct
> net_device *dev)
> /* Obtain the queue to be used to transmit this packet */
> index = skb_get_queue_mapping(skb);
> if (index >= num_queues) {
> - pr_warn_ratelimited("Invalid queue %hu for packet on
> interface %s\n.",
> + pr_warn_ratelimited("Invalid queue %hu for packet on
> interface %s\n",
> index, vif->dev->name);
> index %= num_queues;
> }
> --
> 2.15.0
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] ptr_ring: add barriers
From: George Cherian @ 2017-12-06 9:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Michael S. Tsirkin, linux-kernel
Cc: George Cherian, Jason Wang, davem, edumazet, netdev,
virtualization
In-Reply-To: <1512501990-30029-1-git-send-email-mst@redhat.com>
Hi Michael,
On 12/06/2017 12:59 AM, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> Users of ptr_ring expect that it's safe to give the
> data structure a pointer and have it be available
> to consumers, but that actually requires an smb_wmb
> or a stronger barrier.
This is not the exact situation we are seeing.
Let me try to explain the situation
Affected on ARM64 platform.
1) tun_net_xmit calls skb_array_produce, which pushes the skb to the
ptr_ring, this push is protected by a producer_lock.
2)Prior to this call the tun_net_xmit calls skb_orphan which calls the
skb->destructor and sets skb->destructor and skb->sk as NULL.
2.a) These 2 writes are getting reordered
3) At the same time in the receive side (tun_ring_recv), which gets
executed in another core calls skb_array_consume which pulls the skb
from ptr ring, this pull is protected by a consumer lock.
4) eventually calling the skb->destructor (sock_wfree) with stale values.
Also note that this issue is reproducible in a long run and doesn't
happen immediately after the launch of multiple VM's (infact the
particular test cases launches 56 VM's which does iperf back and forth)
>
> In absence of such barriers and on architectures that reorder writes,
> consumer might read an un=initialized value from an skb pointer stored
> in the skb array. This was observed causing crashes.
>
> To fix, add memory barriers. The barrier we use is a wmb, the
> assumption being that producers do not need to read the value so we do
> not need to order these reads.
It is not the case that producer is reading the value, but the consumer
reading stale value. So we need to have a strict rmb in place .
>
> Reported-by: George Cherian <george.cherian@cavium.com>
> Suggested-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
> ---
>
> George, could you pls report whether this patch fixes
> the issue for you?
>
> This seems to be needed in stable as well.
>
>
>
>
> include/linux/ptr_ring.h | 9 +++++++++
> 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/ptr_ring.h b/include/linux/ptr_ring.h
> index 37b4bb2..6866df4 100644
> --- a/include/linux/ptr_ring.h
> +++ b/include/linux/ptr_ring.h
> @@ -101,12 +101,18 @@ static inline bool ptr_ring_full_bh(struct ptr_ring *r)
>
> /* Note: callers invoking this in a loop must use a compiler barrier,
> * for example cpu_relax(). Callers must hold producer_lock.
> + * Callers are responsible for making sure pointer that is being queued
> + * points to a valid data.
> */
> static inline int __ptr_ring_produce(struct ptr_ring *r, void *ptr)
> {
> if (unlikely(!r->size) || r->queue[r->producer])
> return -ENOSPC;
>
> + /* Make sure the pointer we are storing points to a valid data. */
> + /* Pairs with smp_read_barrier_depends in __ptr_ring_consume. */
> + smp_wmb();
> +
> r->queue[r->producer++] = ptr;
> if (unlikely(r->producer >= r->size))
> r->producer = 0;
> @@ -275,6 +281,9 @@ static inline void *__ptr_ring_consume(struct ptr_ring *r)
> if (ptr)
> __ptr_ring_discard_one(r);
>
> + /* Make sure anyone accessing data through the pointer is up to date. */
> + /* Pairs with smp_wmb in __ptr_ring_produce. */
> + smp_read_barrier_depends();
> return ptr;
> }
>
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH V11 3/5] printk: hash addresses printed with %p
From: Geert Uytterhoeven @ 2017-12-06 8:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Linus Torvalds
Cc: Tobin C. Harding, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Jason A. Donenfeld, Theodore Ts'o, Kees Cook, Paolo Bonzini,
Tycho Andersen, Roberts, William C, Tejun Heo, Jordan Glover,
Greg KH, Petr Mladek, Joe Perches, Ian Campbell,
Sergey Senozhatsky, Catalin Marinas, Will Deacon, Steven Rostedt,
Chris Fries
In-Reply-To: <CA+55aFw3SyO7Dq5gVVyC1AahaFzvyGoZ6X8B7z2g5_4r8+GaZA@mail.gmail.com>
Hi Linus,
On Wed, Dec 6, 2017 at 12:33 AM, Linus Torvalds
<torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 5, 2017 at 2:57 PM, Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> wrote:
>> Lowest 3 is good enough for all natural types, up to long long.
>> We may still receive complaints from people who care about seeing if
>> a pointer is cacheline-aligned or not. Fixing that may need up to 7 bits, I'm
>> afraid, which is a bit too much to give up.
>
> I really think even the lowest three is a bit too much.
>
> Who really cares? If it's something that is particularly _about_
> alignment (ie an alignment trap), maybe just print out those bits
> separately.
If I'm not mistaken, some architectures don't generate alignment traps, but
just zero the LSBs.
> And for everything else? It's purely about getting used to it.
Yes, we will get used to it.
I agree that for debugging during development, we will just use %px and be
fine.
Storm in a glass of water, everybody will have forgotten by the time v4.16 is
released.
Gr{oetje,eeting}s,
Geert
--
Geert Uytterhoeven -- There's lots of Linux beyond ia32 -- geert@linux-m68k.org
In personal conversations with technical people, I call myself a hacker. But
when I'm talking to journalists I just say "programmer" or something like that.
-- Linus Torvalds
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH V11 4/5] vsprintf: add printk specifier %px
From: Sergey Senozhatsky @ 2017-12-06 8:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Geert Uytterhoeven
Cc: Linus Torvalds, Sergey Senozhatsky, Randy Dunlap, David Laight,
Kees Cook, Tobin C. Harding, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Jason A. Donenfeld, Theodore Ts'o, Paolo Bonzini,
Tycho Andersen, Roberts, William C, Tejun Heo, Jordan Glover,
Greg KH, Petr Mladek, Joe Perches, Ian Campbell,
Sergey Senozhatsky <
In-Reply-To: <CAMuHMdUebiN16BA6qLO+Wv2LetdYgbmd8E_e74hQj52yEUwPOQ@mail.gmail.com>
On (12/06/17 09:32), Geert Uytterhoeven wrote:
[..]
> >> show_fault_oops(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
> >> unsigned long address)
> >> ...
> >> printk(KERN_CONT " at %p\n", (void *) address);
> >> printk(KERN_ALERT "IP: %pS\n", (void *)regs->ip);
> >
> > So %pS isn't %p, and shows the symbolic name.
>
> If the symbolic name is available.
> Else it prints the non-hashed pointer value (FTR).
hm, indeed. and !CONFIG_KALLSYMS config turns %pS/%ps
into special_hex_number().
-ss
^ permalink raw reply
* [patch net-next] mlxsw: spectrum: handle NETIF_F_HW_TC changes correctly
From: Jiri Pirko @ 2017-12-06 8:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev; +Cc: davem, idosch, mlxsw
From: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Currently, whenever the NETIF_F_HW_TC feature changes, we silently
always allow it, but we actually do not disable the flows in HW
on disable. That breaks user's expectations. So just forbid
the feature disable in case there are any filters offloaded.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum.h | 1 +
.../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_flower.c | 2 +
3 files changed, 52 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum.c
index 2d0897b..dee1fd7 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum.c
@@ -1838,6 +1838,54 @@ static int mlxsw_sp_setup_tc(struct net_device *dev, enum tc_setup_type type,
}
}
+
+static int mlxsw_sp_feature_hw_tc(struct net_device *dev, bool enable)
+{
+ struct mlxsw_sp_port *mlxsw_sp_port = netdev_priv(dev);
+
+ if (!enable && (mlxsw_sp_port->acl_rule_count ||
+ !list_empty(&mlxsw_sp_port->mall_tc_list))) {
+ netdev_err(dev, "Active offloaded tc filters, can't turn hw_tc_offload off\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+typedef int (*mlxsw_sp_feature_handler)(struct net_device *dev, bool enable);
+
+static int mlxsw_sp_handle_feature(struct net_device *dev,
+ netdev_features_t wanted_features,
+ netdev_features_t feature,
+ mlxsw_sp_feature_handler feature_handler)
+{
+ netdev_features_t changes = wanted_features ^ dev->features;
+ bool enable = !!(wanted_features & feature);
+ int err;
+
+ if (!(changes & feature))
+ return 0;
+
+ err = feature_handler(dev, enable);
+ if (err) {
+ netdev_err(dev, "%s feature %pNF failed, err %d\n",
+ enable ? "Enable" : "Disable", &feature, err);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ if (enable)
+ dev->features |= feature;
+ else
+ dev->features &= ~feature;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+static int mlxsw_sp_set_features(struct net_device *dev,
+ netdev_features_t features)
+{
+ return mlxsw_sp_handle_feature(dev, features, NETIF_F_HW_TC,
+ mlxsw_sp_feature_hw_tc);
+}
+
static const struct net_device_ops mlxsw_sp_port_netdev_ops = {
.ndo_open = mlxsw_sp_port_open,
.ndo_stop = mlxsw_sp_port_stop,
@@ -1852,6 +1900,7 @@ static const struct net_device_ops mlxsw_sp_port_netdev_ops = {
.ndo_vlan_rx_add_vid = mlxsw_sp_port_add_vid,
.ndo_vlan_rx_kill_vid = mlxsw_sp_port_kill_vid,
.ndo_get_phys_port_name = mlxsw_sp_port_get_phys_port_name,
+ .ndo_set_features = mlxsw_sp_set_features,
};
static void mlxsw_sp_port_get_drvinfo(struct net_device *dev,
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum.h
index 432ab9b..a0adcd8 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum.h
@@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ struct mlxsw_sp_port {
struct mlxsw_sp_port_sample *sample;
struct list_head vlans_list;
struct mlxsw_sp_qdisc root_qdisc;
+ unsigned acl_rule_count;
};
static inline bool
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_flower.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_flower.c
index 2f0e578..cf84629 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_flower.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_flower.c
@@ -424,6 +424,7 @@ int mlxsw_sp_flower_replace(struct mlxsw_sp_port *mlxsw_sp_port, bool ingress,
goto err_rule_add;
mlxsw_sp_acl_ruleset_put(mlxsw_sp, ruleset);
+ mlxsw_sp_port->acl_rule_count++;
return 0;
err_rule_add:
@@ -455,6 +456,7 @@ void mlxsw_sp_flower_destroy(struct mlxsw_sp_port *mlxsw_sp_port, bool ingress,
}
mlxsw_sp_acl_ruleset_put(mlxsw_sp, ruleset);
+ mlxsw_sp_port->acl_rule_count--;
}
int mlxsw_sp_flower_stats(struct mlxsw_sp_port *mlxsw_sp_port, bool ingress,
--
2.9.5
^ permalink raw reply related
* RE: [PATCH net-next v3 4/4] net: fec: add phy_reset_after_clk_enable() support
From: Andy Duan @ 2017-12-06 8:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Richard Leitner, Richard Leitner,
robh+dt-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org,
mark.rutland-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org,
andrew-g2DYL2Zd6BY@public.gmane.org,
f.fainelli-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org,
frowand.list-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org
Cc: davem-fT/PcQaiUtIeIZ0/mPfg9Q@public.gmane.org,
geert+renesas-gXvu3+zWzMSzQB+pC5nmwQ@public.gmane.org,
sergei.shtylyov-M4DtvfQ/ZS1MRgGoP+s0PdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org,
baruch-NswTu9S1W3P6gbPvEgmw2w@public.gmane.org,
david.wu-TNX95d0MmH7DzftRWevZcw@public.gmane.org,
lukma-ynQEQJNshbs@public.gmane.org,
netdev-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
devicetree-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org
In-Reply-To: <1e7b3e7f-251d-4101-1441-702e891f2ca9-WcANXNA0UjBBDgjK7y7TUQ@public.gmane.org>
[-- Warning: decoded text below may be mangled, UTF-8 assumed --]
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8", Size: 2834 bytes --]
From: Richard Leitner <richard.leitner@skidata.com> Sent: Wednesday, December 06, 2017 4:12 PM
>To: Andy Duan <fugang.duan@nxp.com>; Richard Leitner <dev@g0hl1n.net>;
>robh+dt@kernel.org; mark.rutland@arm.com; andrew@lunn.ch;
>f.fainelli@gmail.com; frowand.list@gmail.com
>Cc: davem@davemloft.net; geert+renesas@glider.be;
>sergei.shtylyov@cogentembedded.com; baruch@tkos.co.il; david.wu@rock-
>chips.com; lukma@denx.de; netdev@vger.kernel.org;
>devicetree@vger.kernel.org; linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
>Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next v3 4/4] net: fec: add
>phy_reset_after_clk_enable() support
>
>Hi Andy,
>
>On 12/06/2017 02:50 AM, Andy Duan wrote:
>> From: Richard Leitner <dev@g0hl1n.net> Sent: Tuesday, December 05,
>> 2017 9:26 PM
>>> Some PHYs (for example the SMSC LAN8710/LAN8720) doesn't allow
>>> turning the refclk on and off again during operation (according to their
>datasheet).
>>> Nonetheless exactly this behaviour was introduced for power saving
>>> reasons by commit e8fcfcd5684a ("net: fec: optimize the clock
>>> management to save power").
>>> Therefore add support for the phy_reset_after_clk_enable function
>>> from phylib to mitigate this issue.
>
>...
>
>>> diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c
>>> b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c
>>> index 610573855213..8c3d0fb7db20 100644
>>> --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c
>>> +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c
>>> @@ -1862,6 +1862,8 @@ static int fec_enet_clk_enable(struct
>>> net_device *ndev, bool enable)
>>> ret = clk_prepare_enable(fep->clk_ref);
>>> if (ret)
>>> goto failed_clk_ref;
>>> +
>>> + phy_reset_after_clk_enable(ndev->phydev);
>>> } else {
>>> clk_disable_unprepare(fep->clk_ahb);
>>> clk_disable_unprepare(fep->clk_enet_out);
>>> @@ -2860,6 +2862,11 @@ fec_enet_open(struct net_device *ndev)
>>> if (ret)
>>> goto err_enet_mii_probe;
>>>
>>> + /* reset phy if needed here, due to the fact this is the first time we
>>> + * have the net_device to phy_driver link
>>> + */
>>> + phy_reset_after_clk_enable(ndev->phydev);
>>> +
>>
>> The patch series look better.
>> But why does it need to reset phy here since phy already is hard reset after
>clock enable.
>
>The problem here is that in fec_enet_open() the fec_enet_clk_enable() call is
>done before the phy is probed. Therefore (as mentioned in the
>comment) there's no link from the net_device (ndev) to the phy_driver
>(which holds the flags).
>
>Any suggestions for a better solution are highly appreciated here! Thanks!
>
>regards;Richard.L
Okay, I see.
For the patch: Acked-by: Fugang Duan <fugang.duan@nxp.com>
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^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [Patch net-next v2] act_mirred: get rid of mirred_list_lock spinlock
From: Jiri Pirko @ 2017-12-06 8:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Cong Wang; +Cc: netdev, Eric Dumazet, Jiri Pirko, Jamal Hadi Salim
In-Reply-To: <20171206001727.25731-2-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Wed, Dec 06, 2017 at 01:17:27AM CET, xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com wrote:
>TC actions are no longer freed in RCU callbacks and we should
>always have RTNL lock, so this spinlock is no longer needed.
>
>Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
>Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
>Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
>Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [Patch net-next v2] act_mirred: get rid of tcfm_ifindex from struct tcf_mirred
From: Jiri Pirko @ 2017-12-06 8:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Cong Wang; +Cc: netdev, Jiri Pirko, Jamal Hadi Salim
In-Reply-To: <20171206001727.25731-1-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Wed, Dec 06, 2017 at 01:17:26AM CET, xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com wrote:
>tcfm_dev always points to the correct netdev and we already
>hold a refcnt, so no need to use tcfm_ifindex to lookup again.
>
>If we would support moving target netdev across netns, using
>pointer would be better than ifindex.
>
>This also fixes dumping obsolete ifindex, now after the
>target device is gone we just dump 0 as ifindex.
>
>Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
>Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
>Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Thanks!
^ permalink raw reply
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