* Re: RFC: very rough draft of a bpf permission model
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2019-08-23 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexei Starovoitov
Cc: Andy Lutomirski, Daniel Borkmann, Song Liu, Kees Cook, Networking,
bpf, Alexei Starovoitov, Kernel Team, Lorenz Bauer, Jann Horn,
Greg KH, Linux API, LSM List, Chenbo Feng
In-Reply-To: <20190822232620.p5tql4rrlzlk35z7@ast-mbp.dhcp.thefacebook.com>
On Thu, Aug 22, 2019 at 4:26 PM Alexei Starovoitov
<alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> wrote:
> You're proposing all of the above in addition to CAP_BPF, right?
> Otherwise I don't see how it addresses the use cases I kept
> explaining for the last few weeks.
None of my proposal is intended to exclude changes like CAP_BPF to
make privileged bpf() operations need less privilege. But I think
it's very hard to evaluate CAP_BPF without both a full description of
exactly what CAP_BPF would do and what at least one full example of a
user would look like.
I also think that users who want CAP_BPF should look at manipulating
their effective capability set instead. A daemon that wants to use
bpf() but otherwise minimize the chance of accidentally causing a
problem can use capset() to clear its effective and inheritable masks.
Then, each time it wants to call bpf(), it could re-add CAP_SYS_ADMIN
or CAP_NET_ADMIN to its effective set, call bpf(), and then clear its
effective set again. This works in current kernels and is generally
good practice.
Aside from this, and depending on exactly what CAP_BPF would be, I
have some further concerns. Looking at your example in this email:
> Here is another example of use case that CAP_BPF is solving:
> The daemon X is started by pid=1 and currently runs as root.
> It loads a bunch of tracing progs and attaches them to kprobes
> and tracepoints. It also loads cgroup-bpf progs and attaches them
> to cgroups. All progs are collecting data about the system and
> logging it for further analysis.
This needs more than just bpf(). Creating a perf kprobe event
requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and without a perf kprobe event, you can't
attach a bpf program. And the privilege to attach bpf programs to
cgroups without any DAC or MAC checks (which is what the current API
does) is an extremely broad privilege that is not that much weaker
than CAP_SYS_ADMIN or CAP_NET_ADMIN. Also:
> This tracing bpf is looking into kernel memory
> and using bpf_probe_read. Clearly it's not _secure_. But it's _safe_.
> The system is not going to crash because of BPF,
> but it can easily crash because of simple coding bugs in the user
> space bits of that daemon.
The BPF verifier and interpreter, taken in isolation, may be extremely
safe, but attaching BPF programs to various hooks can easily take down
the system, deliberately or by accident. A handler, especially if it
can access user memory or otherwise fault, will explode if attached to
an inappropriate kprobe, hw_breakpoint, or function entry trace event.
(I and the other maintainers consider this to be a bug if it happens,
and we'll fix it, but these bugs definitely exist.) A cgroup-bpf hook
that blocks all network traffic will effectively kill a machine,
especially if it's a server. A bpf program that runs excessively
slowly attached to a high-frequency hook will kill the system, too.
(I bet a buggy bpf program that calls bpf_probe_read() on an unmapped
address repeatedly could be make extremely slow. Page faults take
thousands to tens of thousands of cycles.) A bpf firewall rule that's
wrong can cut a machine off from the network -- I've killed machines
using iptables more than once, and bpf isn't magically safer.
Something finer-grained can mitigate some of this. CAP_BPF as I think
you're imagining it will not.
I'm wondering if something like CAP_TRACING would make sense.
CAP_TRACING would allow operations that can reveal kernel memory and
other secret kernel state but that do not, by design, allow modifying
system behavior. So, for example, CAP_TRACING would allow privileged
perf_event_open() operations and privileged bpf verifier usage. But
it would not allow cgroup-bpf unless further restrictions were added,
and it would not allow the *_BY_ID operations, as those can modify
other users' bpf programs' behavior.
(To get CAP_TRACING to work with cgroup-bpf, there could be a flag to
attach a "tracing" bpf program to a cgroup. This program would run in
addition to normal or MULTI programs, but it would not be allowed to
return a rejection result.)
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2] riscv: add support for SECCOMP and SECCOMP_FILTER
From: Carlos Eduardo de Paula @ 2019-08-23 23:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Abdurachmanov
Cc: Paul Walmsley, Palmer Dabbelt, Albert Ou, Oleg Nesterov,
Kees Cook, Andy Lutomirski, Will Drewry, Shuah Khan,
Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, Martin KaFai Lau, Song Liu,
Yonghong Song, David Abdurachmanov, Thomas Gleixner,
Allison Randal, Alexios Zavras, Anup Patel, Vincent Chen,
Alan Kao, linux-riscv, linux-kernel, linux-kselftest, netdev, bpf
In-Reply-To: <20190822205533.4877-1-david.abdurachmanov@sifive.com>
On Thu, Aug 22, 2019 at 5:56 PM David Abdurachmanov
<david.abdurachmanov@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> This patch was extensively tested on Fedora/RISCV (applied by default on
> top of 5.2-rc7 kernel for <2 months). The patch was also tested with 5.3-rc
> on QEMU and SiFive Unleashed board.
>
> libseccomp (userspace) was rebased:
> https://github.com/seccomp/libseccomp/pull/134
>
> Fully passes libseccomp regression testing (simulation and live).
>
> There is one failing kernel selftest: global.user_notification_signal
>
> v1 -> v2:
> - return immediatly if secure_computing(NULL) returns -1
> - fixed whitespace issues
> - add missing seccomp.h
> - remove patch #2 (solved now)
> - add riscv to seccomp kernel selftest
>
> Cc: keescook@chromium.org
> Cc: me@carlosedp.com
>
> Signed-off-by: David Abdurachmanov <david.abdurachmanov@sifive.com>
> Tested-by: Carlos de Paula <me@carlosedp.com>
> ---
> arch/riscv/Kconfig | 14 ++++++++++
> arch/riscv/include/asm/seccomp.h | 10 +++++++
> arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h | 5 +++-
> arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S | 27 +++++++++++++++++--
> arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c | 10 +++++++
> tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c | 8 +++++-
> 6 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 arch/riscv/include/asm/seccomp.h
>
> diff --git a/arch/riscv/Kconfig b/arch/riscv/Kconfig
> index 59a4727ecd6c..441e63ff5adc 100644
> --- a/arch/riscv/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/riscv/Kconfig
> @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ config RISCV
> select GENERIC_SMP_IDLE_THREAD
> select GENERIC_ATOMIC64 if !64BIT
> select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
> + select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
> select HAVE_MEMBLOCK_NODE_MAP
> select HAVE_DMA_CONTIGUOUS
> select HAVE_FUTEX_CMPXCHG if FUTEX
> @@ -235,6 +236,19 @@ menu "Kernel features"
>
> source "kernel/Kconfig.hz"
>
> +config SECCOMP
> + bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
> + help
> + This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
> + that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
> + execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to
> + the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
> + syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in
> + their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is
> + enabled via prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP), it cannot be disabled
> + and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls
> + defined by each seccomp mode.
> +
> endmenu
>
> menu "Boot options"
> diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/seccomp.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/seccomp.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..bf7744ee3b3d
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/seccomp.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +
> +#ifndef _ASM_SECCOMP_H
> +#define _ASM_SECCOMP_H
> +
> +#include <asm/unistd.h>
> +
> +#include <asm-generic/seccomp.h>
> +
> +#endif /* _ASM_SECCOMP_H */
> diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h
> index 905372d7eeb8..a0b2a29a0da1 100644
> --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h
> +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h
> @@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ struct thread_info {
> #define TIF_MEMDIE 5 /* is terminating due to OOM killer */
> #define TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT 6 /* syscall tracepoint instrumentation */
> #define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT 7 /* syscall auditing */
> +#define TIF_SECCOMP 8 /* syscall secure computing */
>
> #define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)
> #define _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME (1 << TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME)
> @@ -82,11 +83,13 @@ struct thread_info {
> #define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED (1 << TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
> #define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)
> #define _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT)
> +#define _TIF_SECCOMP (1 << TIF_SECCOMP)
>
> #define _TIF_WORK_MASK \
> (_TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME | _TIF_SIGPENDING | _TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
>
> #define _TIF_SYSCALL_WORK \
> - (_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE | _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT | _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT)
> + (_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE | _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT | _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT | \
> + _TIF_SECCOMP )
>
> #endif /* _ASM_RISCV_THREAD_INFO_H */
> diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S b/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S
> index bc7a56e1ca6f..0bbedfa3e47d 100644
> --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S
> +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S
> @@ -203,8 +203,25 @@ check_syscall_nr:
> /* Check to make sure we don't jump to a bogus syscall number. */
> li t0, __NR_syscalls
> la s0, sys_ni_syscall
> - /* Syscall number held in a7 */
> - bgeu a7, t0, 1f
> + /*
> + * The tracer can change syscall number to valid/invalid value.
> + * We use syscall_set_nr helper in syscall_trace_enter thus we
> + * cannot trust the current value in a7 and have to reload from
> + * the current task pt_regs.
> + */
> + REG_L a7, PT_A7(sp)
> + /*
> + * Syscall number held in a7.
> + * If syscall number is above allowed value, redirect to ni_syscall.
> + */
> + bge a7, t0, 1f
> + /*
> + * Check if syscall is rejected by tracer or seccomp, i.e., a7 == -1.
> + * If yes, we pretend it was executed.
> + */
> + li t1, -1
> + beq a7, t1, ret_from_syscall_rejected
> + /* Call syscall */
> la s0, sys_call_table
> slli t0, a7, RISCV_LGPTR
> add s0, s0, t0
> @@ -215,6 +232,12 @@ check_syscall_nr:
> ret_from_syscall:
> /* Set user a0 to kernel a0 */
> REG_S a0, PT_A0(sp)
> + /*
> + * We didn't execute the actual syscall.
> + * Seccomp already set return value for the current task pt_regs.
> + * (If it was configured with SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO/TRACE)
> + */
> +ret_from_syscall_rejected:
> /* Trace syscalls, but only if requested by the user. */
> REG_L t0, TASK_TI_FLAGS(tp)
> andi t0, t0, _TIF_SYSCALL_WORK
> diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c
> index 368751438366..63e47c9f85f0 100644
> --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c
> +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c
> @@ -154,6 +154,16 @@ void do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
> if (tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
> syscall_set_nr(current, regs, -1);
>
> + /*
> + * Do the secure computing after ptrace; failures should be fast.
> + * If this fails we might have return value in a0 from seccomp
> + * (via SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO/TRACE).
> + */
> + if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1) {
> + syscall_set_nr(current, regs, -1);
> + return;
> + }
> +
> #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINTS
> if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT))
> trace_sys_enter(regs, syscall_get_nr(current, regs));
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
> index 6ef7f16c4cf5..492e0adad9d3 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
> @@ -112,6 +112,8 @@ struct seccomp_data {
> # define __NR_seccomp 383
> # elif defined(__aarch64__)
> # define __NR_seccomp 277
> +# elif defined(__riscv)
> +# define __NR_seccomp 277
> # elif defined(__hppa__)
> # define __NR_seccomp 338
> # elif defined(__powerpc__)
> @@ -1582,6 +1584,10 @@ TEST_F(TRACE_poke, getpid_runs_normally)
> # define ARCH_REGS struct user_pt_regs
> # define SYSCALL_NUM regs[8]
> # define SYSCALL_RET regs[0]
> +#elif defined(__riscv) && __riscv_xlen == 64
> +# define ARCH_REGS struct user_regs_struct
> +# define SYSCALL_NUM a7
> +# define SYSCALL_RET a0
> #elif defined(__hppa__)
> # define ARCH_REGS struct user_regs_struct
> # define SYSCALL_NUM gr[20]
> @@ -1671,7 +1677,7 @@ void change_syscall(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
> EXPECT_EQ(0, ret) {}
>
> #if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__powerpc__) || \
> - defined(__s390__) || defined(__hppa__)
> + defined(__s390__) || defined(__hppa__) || defined(__riscv)
> {
> regs.SYSCALL_NUM = syscall;
> }
> --
> 2.21.0
>
Kernel selftests results:
➜ uname -a
Linux fedora-unleashed 5.2.0-rc7-30159-g2d072d4-dirty #3 SMP Thu Jul 4
20:18:21 -03 2019 riscv64 riscv64 riscv64 GNU/Linux
➜ sudo ./seccomp_bpf
[==========] Running 74 tests from 1 test cases.
[ RUN ] global.mode_strict_support
[ OK ] global.mode_strict_support
[ RUN ] global.mode_strict_cannot_call_prctl
[ OK ] global.mode_strict_cannot_call_prctl
[ RUN ] global.no_new_privs_support
[ OK ] global.no_new_privs_support
[ RUN ] global.mode_filter_support
[ OK ] global.mode_filter_support
[ RUN ] global.mode_filter_without_nnp
[ OK ] global.mode_filter_without_nnp
[ RUN ] global.filter_size_limits
[ OK ] global.filter_size_limits
[ RUN ] global.filter_chain_limits
[ OK ] global.filter_chain_limits
[ RUN ] global.mode_filter_cannot_move_to_strict
[ OK ] global.mode_filter_cannot_move_to_strict
[ RUN ] global.mode_filter_get_seccomp
[ OK ] global.mode_filter_get_seccomp
[ RUN ] global.ALLOW_all
[ OK ] global.ALLOW_all
[ RUN ] global.empty_prog
[ OK ] global.empty_prog
[ RUN ] global.log_all
[ OK ] global.log_all
[ RUN ] global.unknown_ret_is_kill_inside
[ OK ] global.unknown_ret_is_kill_inside
[ RUN ] global.unknown_ret_is_kill_above_allow
[ OK ] global.unknown_ret_is_kill_above_allow
[ RUN ] global.KILL_all
[ OK ] global.KILL_all
[ RUN ] global.KILL_one
[ OK ] global.KILL_one
[ RUN ] global.KILL_one_arg_one
[ OK ] global.KILL_one_arg_one
[ RUN ] global.KILL_one_arg_six
[ OK ] global.KILL_one_arg_six
[ RUN ] global.KILL_thread
[ OK ] global.KILL_thread
[ RUN ] global.KILL_process
[ OK ] global.KILL_process
[ RUN ] global.arg_out_of_range
[ OK ] global.arg_out_of_range
[ RUN ] global.ERRNO_valid
[ OK ] global.ERRNO_valid
[ RUN ] global.ERRNO_zero
[ OK ] global.ERRNO_zero
[ RUN ] global.ERRNO_capped
[ OK ] global.ERRNO_capped
[ RUN ] global.ERRNO_order
[ OK ] global.ERRNO_order
[ RUN ] TRAP.dfl
[ OK ] TRAP.dfl
[ RUN ] TRAP.ign
[ OK ] TRAP.ign
[ RUN ] TRAP.handler
[ OK ] TRAP.handler
[ RUN ] precedence.allow_ok
[ OK ] precedence.allow_ok
[ RUN ] precedence.kill_is_highest
[ OK ] precedence.kill_is_highest
[ RUN ] precedence.kill_is_highest_in_any_order
[ OK ] precedence.kill_is_highest_in_any_order
[ RUN ] precedence.trap_is_second
[ OK ] precedence.trap_is_second
[ RUN ] precedence.trap_is_second_in_any_order
[ OK ] precedence.trap_is_second_in_any_order
[ RUN ] precedence.errno_is_third
[ OK ] precedence.errno_is_third
[ RUN ] precedence.errno_is_third_in_any_order
[ OK ] precedence.errno_is_third_in_any_order
[ RUN ] precedence.trace_is_fourth
[ OK ] precedence.trace_is_fourth
[ RUN ] precedence.trace_is_fourth_in_any_order
[ OK ] precedence.trace_is_fourth_in_any_order
[ RUN ] precedence.log_is_fifth
[ OK ] precedence.log_is_fifth
[ RUN ] precedence.log_is_fifth_in_any_order
[ OK ] precedence.log_is_fifth_in_any_order
[ RUN ] TRACE_poke.read_has_side_effects
[ OK ] TRACE_poke.read_has_side_effects
[ RUN ] TRACE_poke.getpid_runs_normally
[ OK ] TRACE_poke.getpid_runs_normally
[ RUN ] TRACE_syscall.ptrace_syscall_redirected
[ OK ] TRACE_syscall.ptrace_syscall_redirected
[ RUN ] TRACE_syscall.ptrace_syscall_errno
[ OK ] TRACE_syscall.ptrace_syscall_errno
[ RUN ] TRACE_syscall.ptrace_syscall_faked
[ OK ] TRACE_syscall.ptrace_syscall_faked
[ RUN ] TRACE_syscall.syscall_allowed
[ OK ] TRACE_syscall.syscall_allowed
[ RUN ] TRACE_syscall.syscall_redirected
[ OK ] TRACE_syscall.syscall_redirected
[ RUN ] TRACE_syscall.syscall_errno
[ OK ] TRACE_syscall.syscall_errno
[ RUN ] TRACE_syscall.syscall_faked
[ OK ] TRACE_syscall.syscall_faked
[ RUN ] TRACE_syscall.skip_after_RET_TRACE
[ OK ] TRACE_syscall.skip_after_RET_TRACE
[ RUN ] TRACE_syscall.kill_after_RET_TRACE
[ OK ] TRACE_syscall.kill_after_RET_TRACE
[ RUN ] TRACE_syscall.skip_after_ptrace
[ OK ] TRACE_syscall.skip_after_ptrace
[ RUN ] TRACE_syscall.kill_after_ptrace
[ OK ] TRACE_syscall.kill_after_ptrace
[ RUN ] global.seccomp_syscall
[ OK ] global.seccomp_syscall
[ RUN ] global.seccomp_syscall_mode_lock
[ OK ] global.seccomp_syscall_mode_lock
[ RUN ] global.detect_seccomp_filter_flags
[ OK ] global.detect_seccomp_filter_flags
[ RUN ] global.TSYNC_first
[ OK ] global.TSYNC_first
[ RUN ] TSYNC.siblings_fail_prctl
[ OK ] TSYNC.siblings_fail_prctl
[ RUN ] TSYNC.two_siblings_with_ancestor
[ OK ] TSYNC.two_siblings_with_ancestor
[ RUN ] TSYNC.two_sibling_want_nnp
[ OK ] TSYNC.two_sibling_want_nnp
[ RUN ] TSYNC.two_siblings_with_no_filter
[ OK ] TSYNC.two_siblings_with_no_filter
[ RUN ] TSYNC.two_siblings_with_one_divergence
[ OK ] TSYNC.two_siblings_with_one_divergence
[ RUN ] TSYNC.two_siblings_not_under_filter
[ OK ] TSYNC.two_siblings_not_under_filter
[ RUN ] global.syscall_restart
[ OK ] global.syscall_restart
[ RUN ] global.filter_flag_log
[ OK ] global.filter_flag_log
[ RUN ] global.get_action_avail
[ OK ] global.get_action_avail
[ RUN ] global.get_metadata
[ OK ] global.get_metadata
[ RUN ] global.user_notification_basic
[ OK ] global.user_notification_basic
[ RUN ] global.user_notification_kill_in_middle
[ OK ] global.user_notification_kill_in_middle
[ RUN ] global.user_notification_signal
[1] 5951 alarm sudo ./seccomp_bpf
carlosedp in ~ at fedora-unleashed
➜ sudo ./seccomp_benchmark
Calibrating reasonable sample size...
1564584448.964538790 - 1564584448.964529687 = 9103
1564584448.964588859 - 1564584448.964575204 = 13655
1564584448.964631342 - 1564584448.964604790 = 26552
1564584448.964710239 - 1564584448.964644997 = 65242
1564584448.964842239 - 1564584448.964726928 = 115311
1564584448.965072859 - 1564584448.964857411 = 215448
1564584448.965513618 - 1564584448.965089549 = 424069
1564584448.966417894 - 1564584448.965532584 = 885310
1564584448.968286377 - 1564584448.966443687 = 1842690
1564584448.971667549 - 1564584448.968314446 = 3353103
1564584448.978288790 - 1564584448.971694101 = 6594689
1564584448.991803618 - 1564584448.978313066 = 13490552
1564584449.017692308 - 1564584448.991836239 = 25856069
1564584449.069651756 - 1564584449.017713549 = 51938207
1564584449.173110928 - 1564584449.069673756 = 103437172
1564584449.380001204 - 1564584449.173132928 = 206868276
1564584449.793857618 - 1564584449.380041411 = 413816207
1564584450.625367342 - 1564584449.793898584 = 831468758
1564584452.299529411 - 1564584450.625426514 = 1674102897
1564584455.665938307 - 1564584452.299592376 = 3366345931
1564584462.331777479 - 1564584455.665973962 = 6665803517
Benchmarking 33554432 samples...
18.107882743 - 12.075641371 = 6032241372
getpid native: 179 ns
34.720410331 - 18.107978605 = 16612431726
getpid RET_ALLOW: 495 ns
Estimated seccomp overhead per syscall: 316 n
--
________________________________________
Carlos Eduardo de Paula
me@carlosedp.com
http://carlosedp.com
http://twitter.com/carlosedp
Linkedin
________________________________________
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCHv4 net 2/2] xfrm/xfrm_policy: fix dst dev null pointer dereference in collect_md mode
From: Jonathan Lemon @ 2019-08-23 22:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Hangbin Liu
Cc: netdev, Stefano Brivio, wenxu, Alexei Starovoitov,
David S . Miller, Eric Dumazet, Julian Anastasov
In-Reply-To: <20190822141949.29561-3-liuhangbin@gmail.com>
On 22 Aug 2019, at 7:19, Hangbin Liu wrote:
> In decode_session{4,6} there is a possibility that the skb dst dev is NULL,
> e,g, with tunnel collect_md mode, which will cause kernel crash.
> Here is what the code path looks like, for GRE:
>
> - ip6gre_tunnel_xmit
> - ip6gre_xmit_ipv6
> - __gre6_xmit
> - ip6_tnl_xmit
> - if skb->len - t->tun_hlen - eth_hlen > mtu; return -EMSGSIZE
> - icmpv6_send
> - icmpv6_route_lookup
> - xfrm_decode_session_reverse
> - decode_session4
> - oif = skb_dst(skb)->dev->ifindex; <-- here
> - decode_session6
> - oif = skb_dst(skb)->dev->ifindex; <-- here
>
> The reason is __metadata_dst_init() init dst->dev to NULL by default.
> We could not fix it in __metadata_dst_init() as there is no dev supplied.
> On the other hand, the skb_dst(skb)->dev is actually not needed as we
> called decode_session{4,6} via xfrm_decode_session_reverse(), so oif is not
> used by: fl4->flowi4_oif = reverse ? skb->skb_iif : oif;
>
> So make a dst dev check here should be clean and safe.
>
> v4: No changes.
>
> v3: No changes.
>
> v2: fix the issue in decode_session{4,6} instead of updating shared dst dev
> in {ip_md, ip6}_tunnel_xmit.
>
> Fixes: 8d79266bc48c ("ip6_tunnel: add collect_md mode to IPv6 tunnels")
> Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
This does resolve a local crash where the dev pointer is NULL.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2] riscv: add support for SECCOMP and SECCOMP_FILTER
From: Carlos Eduardo de Paula @ 2019-08-23 22:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Abdurachmanov
Cc: Paul Walmsley, Palmer Dabbelt, Albert Ou, Oleg Nesterov,
Kees Cook, Andy Lutomirski, Will Drewry, Shuah Khan,
Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, Martin KaFai Lau, Song Liu,
Yonghong Song, David Abdurachmanov, Thomas Gleixner,
Allison Randal, Alexios Zavras, Anup Patel, Vincent Chen,
Alan Kao, linux-riscv, linux-kernel, linux-kselftest, netdev, bpf
In-Reply-To: <20190822205533.4877-1-david.abdurachmanov@sifive.com>
On Thu, Aug 22, 2019 at 5:56 PM David Abdurachmanov
<david.abdurachmanov@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> This patch was extensively tested on Fedora/RISCV (applied by default on
> top of 5.2-rc7 kernel for <2 months). The patch was also tested with 5.3-rc
> on QEMU and SiFive Unleashed board.
>
> libseccomp (userspace) was rebased:
> https://github.com/seccomp/libseccomp/pull/134
>
> Fully passes libseccomp regression testing (simulation and live).
>
> There is one failing kernel selftest: global.user_notification_signal
>
> v1 -> v2:
> - return immediatly if secure_computing(NULL) returns -1
> - fixed whitespace issues
> - add missing seccomp.h
> - remove patch #2 (solved now)
> - add riscv to seccomp kernel selftest
>
> Cc: keescook@chromium.org
> Cc: me@carlosedp.com
>
> Signed-off-by: David Abdurachmanov <david.abdurachmanov@sifive.com>
> ---
> arch/riscv/Kconfig | 14 ++++++++++
> arch/riscv/include/asm/seccomp.h | 10 +++++++
> arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h | 5 +++-
> arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S | 27 +++++++++++++++++--
> arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c | 10 +++++++
> tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c | 8 +++++-
> 6 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 arch/riscv/include/asm/seccomp.h
>
> diff --git a/arch/riscv/Kconfig b/arch/riscv/Kconfig
> index 59a4727ecd6c..441e63ff5adc 100644
> --- a/arch/riscv/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/riscv/Kconfig
> @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ config RISCV
> select GENERIC_SMP_IDLE_THREAD
> select GENERIC_ATOMIC64 if !64BIT
> select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
> + select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
> select HAVE_MEMBLOCK_NODE_MAP
> select HAVE_DMA_CONTIGUOUS
> select HAVE_FUTEX_CMPXCHG if FUTEX
> @@ -235,6 +236,19 @@ menu "Kernel features"
>
> source "kernel/Kconfig.hz"
>
> +config SECCOMP
> + bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
> + help
> + This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
> + that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
> + execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to
> + the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
> + syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in
> + their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is
> + enabled via prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP), it cannot be disabled
> + and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls
> + defined by each seccomp mode.
> +
> endmenu
>
> menu "Boot options"
> diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/seccomp.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/seccomp.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..bf7744ee3b3d
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/seccomp.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +
> +#ifndef _ASM_SECCOMP_H
> +#define _ASM_SECCOMP_H
> +
> +#include <asm/unistd.h>
> +
> +#include <asm-generic/seccomp.h>
> +
> +#endif /* _ASM_SECCOMP_H */
> diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h
> index 905372d7eeb8..a0b2a29a0da1 100644
> --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h
> +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h
> @@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ struct thread_info {
> #define TIF_MEMDIE 5 /* is terminating due to OOM killer */
> #define TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT 6 /* syscall tracepoint instrumentation */
> #define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT 7 /* syscall auditing */
> +#define TIF_SECCOMP 8 /* syscall secure computing */
>
> #define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)
> #define _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME (1 << TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME)
> @@ -82,11 +83,13 @@ struct thread_info {
> #define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED (1 << TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
> #define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)
> #define _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT)
> +#define _TIF_SECCOMP (1 << TIF_SECCOMP)
>
> #define _TIF_WORK_MASK \
> (_TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME | _TIF_SIGPENDING | _TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
>
> #define _TIF_SYSCALL_WORK \
> - (_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE | _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT | _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT)
> + (_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE | _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT | _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT | \
> + _TIF_SECCOMP )
>
> #endif /* _ASM_RISCV_THREAD_INFO_H */
> diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S b/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S
> index bc7a56e1ca6f..0bbedfa3e47d 100644
> --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S
> +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S
> @@ -203,8 +203,25 @@ check_syscall_nr:
> /* Check to make sure we don't jump to a bogus syscall number. */
> li t0, __NR_syscalls
> la s0, sys_ni_syscall
> - /* Syscall number held in a7 */
> - bgeu a7, t0, 1f
> + /*
> + * The tracer can change syscall number to valid/invalid value.
> + * We use syscall_set_nr helper in syscall_trace_enter thus we
> + * cannot trust the current value in a7 and have to reload from
> + * the current task pt_regs.
> + */
> + REG_L a7, PT_A7(sp)
> + /*
> + * Syscall number held in a7.
> + * If syscall number is above allowed value, redirect to ni_syscall.
> + */
> + bge a7, t0, 1f
> + /*
> + * Check if syscall is rejected by tracer or seccomp, i.e., a7 == -1.
> + * If yes, we pretend it was executed.
> + */
> + li t1, -1
> + beq a7, t1, ret_from_syscall_rejected
> + /* Call syscall */
> la s0, sys_call_table
> slli t0, a7, RISCV_LGPTR
> add s0, s0, t0
> @@ -215,6 +232,12 @@ check_syscall_nr:
> ret_from_syscall:
> /* Set user a0 to kernel a0 */
> REG_S a0, PT_A0(sp)
> + /*
> + * We didn't execute the actual syscall.
> + * Seccomp already set return value for the current task pt_regs.
> + * (If it was configured with SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO/TRACE)
> + */
> +ret_from_syscall_rejected:
> /* Trace syscalls, but only if requested by the user. */
> REG_L t0, TASK_TI_FLAGS(tp)
> andi t0, t0, _TIF_SYSCALL_WORK
> diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c
> index 368751438366..63e47c9f85f0 100644
> --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c
> +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c
> @@ -154,6 +154,16 @@ void do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
> if (tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
> syscall_set_nr(current, regs, -1);
>
> + /*
> + * Do the secure computing after ptrace; failures should be fast.
> + * If this fails we might have return value in a0 from seccomp
> + * (via SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO/TRACE).
> + */
> + if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1) {
> + syscall_set_nr(current, regs, -1);
> + return;
> + }
> +
> #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINTS
> if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT))
> trace_sys_enter(regs, syscall_get_nr(current, regs));
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
> index 6ef7f16c4cf5..492e0adad9d3 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
> @@ -112,6 +112,8 @@ struct seccomp_data {
> # define __NR_seccomp 383
> # elif defined(__aarch64__)
> # define __NR_seccomp 277
> +# elif defined(__riscv)
> +# define __NR_seccomp 277
> # elif defined(__hppa__)
> # define __NR_seccomp 338
> # elif defined(__powerpc__)
> @@ -1582,6 +1584,10 @@ TEST_F(TRACE_poke, getpid_runs_normally)
> # define ARCH_REGS struct user_pt_regs
> # define SYSCALL_NUM regs[8]
> # define SYSCALL_RET regs[0]
> +#elif defined(__riscv) && __riscv_xlen == 64
> +# define ARCH_REGS struct user_regs_struct
> +# define SYSCALL_NUM a7
> +# define SYSCALL_RET a0
> #elif defined(__hppa__)
> # define ARCH_REGS struct user_regs_struct
> # define SYSCALL_NUM gr[20]
> @@ -1671,7 +1677,7 @@ void change_syscall(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
> EXPECT_EQ(0, ret) {}
>
> #if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__powerpc__) || \
> - defined(__s390__) || defined(__hppa__)
> + defined(__s390__) || defined(__hppa__) || defined(__riscv)
> {
> regs.SYSCALL_NUM = syscall;
> }
> --
> 2.21.0
>
Tested-by: Carlos de Paula <me@carlosedp.com>
--
________________________________________
Carlos Eduardo de Paula
me@carlosedp.com
http://carlosedp.com
http://twitter.com/carlosedp
Linkedin
________________________________________
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] net/mlx5: fix a -Wstringop-truncation warning
From: David Miller @ 2019-08-23 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: cai; +Cc: saeedm, leon, moshe, ferasda, eranbe, netdev, linux-rdma,
linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <1566590183-9898-1-git-send-email-cai@lca.pw>
Saeed, I assume I'll get this from you.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v4 net-next 4/7] ip6tlvs: Registration of TLV handlers and parameters
From: David Miller @ 2019-08-23 22:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: tom; +Cc: netdev, tom
In-Reply-To: <1566587643-16594-5-git-send-email-tom@herbertland.com>
From: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2019 12:14:00 -0700
> int off, enum ipeh_parse_errors error))
> {
> const unsigned char *nh = skb_network_header(skb);
> - const struct tlvtype_proc *curr;
> + const struct tlv_proc *curr;
> bool disallow_unknowns = false;
> int tlv_count = 0;
> int padlen = 0;
Please retain the reverse christmas tree ordering here.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH net-next] r8169: fix DMA issue on MIPS platform
From: David Miller @ 2019-08-23 22:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: hkallweit1; +Cc: nic_swsd, aaro.koskinen, netdev
In-Reply-To: <c732685d-591c-3dca-95b8-1207bdf0d37f@gmail.com>
From: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2019 20:07:26 +0200
> As reported by Aaro this patch causes network problems on
> MIPS Loongson platform. Therefore revert it.
>
> Fixes: f072218cca5b ("r8169: remove not needed call to dma_sync_single_for_device")
> Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
> Reported-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi>
Applied.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH net] Revert "r8169: remove not needed call to dma_sync_single_for_device"
From: David Miller @ 2019-08-23 22:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: hkallweit1; +Cc: nic_swsd, netdev, aaro.koskinen
In-Reply-To: <573e5947-3a12-f69d-d1b3-1b0d1c49f367@gmail.com>
From: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2019 19:57:49 +0200
> This reverts commit f072218cca5b076dd99f3dfa3aaafedfd0023a51.
>
> As reported by Aaro this patch causes network problems on
> MIPS Loongson platform. Therefore revert it.
>
> Fixes: f072218cca5b ("r8169: remove not needed call to dma_sync_single_for_device")
> Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
> Reported-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi>
Applied.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH net] ipv4: mpls: fix mpls_xmit for iptunnel
From: David Miller @ 2019-08-23 22:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: dsahern; +Cc: alexey.kodanev, netdev
In-Reply-To: <38b351be-b24e-cb05-7c93-74134796a9d7@gmail.com>
From: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2019 13:59:05 -0400
> I am traveling today and doubt I will be able to take a deep look at
> this until Monday.
I'll wait until you've had a chance to review this properly.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH net-next] drop_monitor: Make timestamps y2038 safe
From: David Miller @ 2019-08-23 21:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: idosch; +Cc: netdev, nhorman, arnd, andrew, ayal, mlxsw, idosch
In-Reply-To: <20190823154721.9927-1-idosch@idosch.org>
From: Ido Schimmel <idosch@idosch.org>
Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2019 18:47:21 +0300
> From: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
>
> Timestamps are currently communicated to user space as 'struct
> timespec', which is not considered y2038 safe since it uses a 32-bit
> signed value for seconds.
>
> Fix this while the API is still not part of any official kernel release
> by using 64-bit nanoseconds timestamps instead.
>
> Fixes: ca30707dee2b ("drop_monitor: Add packet alert mode")
> Fixes: 5e58109b1ea4 ("drop_monitor: Add support for packet alert mode for hardware drops")
> Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
Applied, thanks Ido.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH net-next] net/rds: Whitelist rdma_cookie and rx_tstamp for usercopy
From: David Miller @ 2019-08-23 21:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: dag.moxnes; +Cc: santosh.shilimkar, netdev, linux-rdma, rds-devel
In-Reply-To: <1566568998-26222-1-git-send-email-dag.moxnes@oracle.com>
From: Dag Moxnes <dag.moxnes@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2019 16:03:18 +0200
> Add the RDMA cookie and RX timestamp to the usercopy whitelist.
>
> After the introduction of hardened usercopy whitelisting
> (https://lwn.net/Articles/727322/), a warning is displayed when the
> RDMA cookie or RX timestamp is copied to userspace:
>
> kernel: WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 5750 at
> mm/usercopy.c:81 usercopy_warn+0x8e/0xa6
> [...]
> kernel: Call Trace:
> kernel: __check_heap_object+0xb8/0x11b
> kernel: __check_object_size+0xe3/0x1bc
> kernel: put_cmsg+0x95/0x115
> kernel: rds_recvmsg+0x43d/0x620 [rds]
> kernel: sock_recvmsg+0x43/0x4a
> kernel: ___sys_recvmsg+0xda/0x1e6
> kernel: ? __handle_mm_fault+0xcae/0xf79
> kernel: __sys_recvmsg+0x51/0x8a
> kernel: SyS_recvmsg+0x12/0x1c
> kernel: do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1ae
>
> When the whitelisting feature was introduced, the memory for the RDMA
> cookie and RX timestamp in RDS was not added to the whitelist, causing
> the warning above.
>
> Signed-off-by: Dag Moxnes <dag.moxnes@oracle.com>
> Tested-by: jenny.x.xu@oracle.com
Applied, with tested-by tag fixed.
Thanks.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH net] ipv6: propagate ipv6_add_dev's error returns out of ipv6_find_idev
From: David Miller @ 2019-08-23 21:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: sd; +Cc: netdev
In-Reply-To: <5bc330e3f8123eb139113ae93851cc17100c22da.1566566438.git.sd@queasysnail.net>
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2019 15:44:36 +0200
> Currently, ipv6_find_idev returns NULL when ipv6_add_dev fails,
> ignoring the specific error value. This results in addrconf_add_dev
> returning ENOBUFS in all cases, which is unfortunate in cases such as:
>
> # ip link add dummyX type dummy
> # ip link set dummyX mtu 1200 up
> # ip addr add 2000::/64 dev dummyX
> RTNETLINK answers: No buffer space available
>
> Commit a317a2f19da7 ("ipv6: fail early when creating netdev named all
> or default") introduced error returns in ipv6_add_dev. Before that,
> that function would simply return NULL for all failures.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Looks good, applied, thanks Sabrina.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH net-next] net/mlx5: Fix return code in case of hyperv wrong size read
From: David Miller @ 2019-08-23 21:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: eranbe; +Cc: netdev, saeedm, haiyangz
In-Reply-To: <1566563687-29760-1-git-send-email-eranbe@mellanox.com>
From: Eran Ben Elisha <eranbe@mellanox.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2019 15:34:47 +0300
> Return code value could be non deterministic in case of wrong size read.
> With this patch, if such error occurs, set rc to be -EIO.
>
> In addition, mlx5_hv_config_common() supports reading of
> HV_CONFIG_BLOCK_SIZE_MAX bytes only, fix to early return error with
> bad input.
>
> Fixes: 913d14e86657 ("net/mlx5: Add wrappers for HyperV PCIe operations")
> Reported-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Eran Ben Elisha <eranbe@mellanox.com>
Applied, thank you.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH net-next] net: ipv6: fix listify ip6_rcv_finish in case of forwarding
From: David Miller @ 2019-08-23 21:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: lucien.xin
Cc: netdev, linux-sctp, marcelo.leitner, nhorman, brouer, ecree,
dvyukov, syzkaller-bugs
In-Reply-To: <e355527b374f6ce70fcc286457f87592cd8f3dcc.1566559983.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com>
From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2019 19:33:03 +0800
> We need a similar fix for ipv6 as Commit 0761680d5215 ("net: ipv4: fix
> listify ip_rcv_finish in case of forwarding") does for ipv4.
>
> This issue can be reprocuded by syzbot since Commit 323ebb61e32b ("net:
> use listified RX for handling GRO_NORMAL skbs") on net-next. The call
> trace was:
...
> Fixes: d8269e2cbf90 ("net: ipv6: listify ipv6_rcv() and ip6_rcv_finish()")
> Fixes: 323ebb61e32b ("net: use listified RX for handling GRO_NORMAL skbs")
> Reported-by: syzbot+eb349eeee854e389c36d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Reported-by: syzbot+4a0643a653ac375612d1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Applied, thanks.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 1/2] rtnetlink: gate MAC address with an LSM hook
From: David Miller @ 2019-08-23 21:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jeffv; +Cc: netdev, linux-security-module, selinux
In-Reply-To: <CABXk95BF=RfqFSHU_---DRHDoKyFON5kS_vYJbc4ns2OS=_t0w@mail.gmail.com>
From: Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2019 13:41:38 +0200
> I could make this really generic by adding a single hook to the end of
> sock_msgrecv() which would allow an LSM to modify the message to omit
> the MAC address and any other information that we deem as sensitive in the
> future. Basically what Casey was suggesting. Thoughts on that approach?
Editing the SKB in place is generally frowned upon, and it could be cloned
and in used by other code paths even, so would need to be copied or COW'd.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH net 2/2] r8152: avoid using napi_disable after netif_napi_del.
From: David Miller @ 2019-08-23 21:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: hayeswang; +Cc: netdev, nic_swsd, linux-kernel, jslaby
In-Reply-To: <1394712342-15778-316-Taiwan-albertk@realtek.com>
From: Hayes Wang <hayeswang@realtek.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2019 16:53:02 +0800
> Exchange netif_napi_del() and unregister_netdev() in rtl8152_disconnect()
> to avoid using napi_disable() after netif_napi_del().
>
> Signed-off-by: Hayes Wang <hayeswang@realtek.com>
> ---
> drivers/net/usb/r8152.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/r8152.c b/drivers/net/usb/r8152.c
> index 690a24d1ef82..29390eda5251 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/usb/r8152.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/usb/r8152.c
> @@ -5364,8 +5364,8 @@ static void rtl8152_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf)
> if (tp) {
> rtl_set_unplug(tp);
>
> - netif_napi_del(&tp->napi);
> unregister_netdev(tp->netdev);
> + netif_napi_del(&tp->napi);
> cancel_delayed_work_sync(&tp->hw_phy_work);
> tp->rtl_ops.unload(tp);
> free_netdev(tp->netdev);
This is completely redundant because free_netdev() will perform all of
the necessary netif_napi_del() calls.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH net-next v4 0/2] r8152: save EEE
From: David Miller @ 2019-08-23 21:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: hayeswang; +Cc: netdev, nic_swsd, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <1394712342-15778-311-Taiwan-albertk@realtek.com>
From: Hayes Wang <hayeswang@realtek.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2019 15:33:39 +0800
> v4:
> For patch #2, remove redundant calling of "ocp_reg_write(tp, OCP_EEE_ADV, 0)".
>
> v3:
> For patch #2, fix the mistake caused by copying and pasting.
>
> v2:
> Adjust patch #1. The EEE has been disabled in the beginning of
> r8153_hw_phy_cfg() and r8153b_hw_phy_cfg(), so only check if
> it is necessary to enable EEE.
>
> Add the patch #2 for the helper function.
>
> v1:
> Saving the settings of EEE to avoid they become the default settings
> after reset_resume().
Series applied.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] wimax/i2400m: fix calculation of index, remove sizeof
From: David Miller @ 2019-08-23 21:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: colin.king
Cc: dan.carpenter, inaky.perez-gonzalez, linux-wimax, netdev,
kernel-janitors, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <300939a6-33b6-a941-1875-0f7fe610d441@canonical.com>
From: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2019 12:27:00 +0100
> On 23/08/2019 12:23, Dan Carpenter wrote:
>> On Fri, Aug 23, 2019 at 09:52:30AM +0100, Colin King wrote:
>>> From: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
>>>
>>> The subtraction of the two pointers is automatically scaled by the
>>> size of the size of the object the pointers point to, so the division
>>> by sizeof(*i2400m->barker) is incorrect. Fix this by removing the
>>> division. Also make index an unsigned int to clean up a checkpatch
>>> warning.
>>>
>>> Addresses-Coverity: ("Extra sizeof expression")
>>> Fixes: aba3792ac2d7 ("wimax/i2400m: rework bootrom initialization to be more flexible")
>>> Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
>>> ---
>>> drivers/net/wimax/i2400m/fw.c | 3 +--
>>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/drivers/net/wimax/i2400m/fw.c b/drivers/net/wimax/i2400m/fw.c
>>> index 489cba9b284d..599a703af6eb 100644
>>> --- a/drivers/net/wimax/i2400m/fw.c
>>> +++ b/drivers/net/wimax/i2400m/fw.c
>>> @@ -399,8 +399,7 @@ int i2400m_is_boot_barker(struct i2400m *i2400m,
>>> * associated with the device. */
>>> if (i2400m->barker
>>> && !memcmp(buf, i2400m->barker, sizeof(i2400m->barker->data))) {
>>> - unsigned index = (i2400m->barker - i2400m_barker_db)
>>> - / sizeof(*i2400m->barker);
>>> + unsigned int index = i2400m->barker - i2400m_barker_db;
>>> d_printf(2, dev, "boot barker cache-confirmed #%u/%08x\n",
>>> index, le32_to_cpu(i2400m->barker->data[0]));
>>
>> It's only used for this debug output. You may as well just delete it.
>>
>>> return 0;
>
> Deleting wrong debug code vs fixing debug code? I'd rather go for the
> latter.
It's been wrong since day one, so it's been useful for absolutely nobody.
This is also an ancient driver for hardware no longer in production.
Dan is right, just remove this stuff, thanks.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH net 0/9] rxrpc: Fix use of skb_cow_data()
From: David Miller @ 2019-08-23 21:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: dhowells; +Cc: netdev, linux-afs, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <27348.1566550348@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2019 09:52:28 +0100
> Question for you: how likely is a newly received buffer, through a UDP socket,
> to be 'cloned'?
Very unlikely, I'd say.
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH net-next v2 4/9] net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: create chip->info->ops->serdes_get_lane method
From: Marek Behún @ 2019-08-23 21:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev
Cc: Andrew Lunn, Vivien Didelot, Florian Fainelli, Vladimir Oltean,
Marek Behún
In-Reply-To: <20190823212603.13456-1-marek.behun@nic.cz>
Create a serdes_get_lane() method in the mv88e6xxx operations structure.
Use it instead of calling the different implementations.
Signed-off-by: Marek Behún <marek.behun@nic.cz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
---
drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c | 6 ++++++
drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.h | 3 +++
drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.c | 4 ++--
drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/serdes.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++------------
drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/serdes.h | 2 ++
5 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c
index 47927df6d8e0..dfffeaf925a4 100644
--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c
+++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c
@@ -3255,6 +3255,7 @@ static const struct mv88e6xxx_ops mv88e6190_ops = {
.vtu_getnext = mv88e6390_g1_vtu_getnext,
.vtu_loadpurge = mv88e6390_g1_vtu_loadpurge,
.serdes_power = mv88e6390_serdes_power,
+ .serdes_get_lane = mv88e6390_serdes_get_lane,
.serdes_irq_setup = mv88e6390_serdes_irq_setup,
.serdes_irq_free = mv88e6390_serdes_irq_free,
.gpio_ops = &mv88e6352_gpio_ops,
@@ -3301,6 +3302,7 @@ static const struct mv88e6xxx_ops mv88e6190x_ops = {
.vtu_getnext = mv88e6390_g1_vtu_getnext,
.vtu_loadpurge = mv88e6390_g1_vtu_loadpurge,
.serdes_power = mv88e6390x_serdes_power,
+ .serdes_get_lane = mv88e6390x_serdes_get_lane,
.serdes_irq_setup = mv88e6390x_serdes_irq_setup,
.serdes_irq_free = mv88e6390x_serdes_irq_free,
.gpio_ops = &mv88e6352_gpio_ops,
@@ -3347,6 +3349,7 @@ static const struct mv88e6xxx_ops mv88e6191_ops = {
.vtu_getnext = mv88e6390_g1_vtu_getnext,
.vtu_loadpurge = mv88e6390_g1_vtu_loadpurge,
.serdes_power = mv88e6390_serdes_power,
+ .serdes_get_lane = mv88e6390_serdes_get_lane,
.serdes_irq_setup = mv88e6390_serdes_irq_setup,
.serdes_irq_free = mv88e6390_serdes_irq_free,
.avb_ops = &mv88e6390_avb_ops,
@@ -3483,6 +3486,7 @@ static const struct mv88e6xxx_ops mv88e6290_ops = {
.vtu_getnext = mv88e6390_g1_vtu_getnext,
.vtu_loadpurge = mv88e6390_g1_vtu_loadpurge,
.serdes_power = mv88e6390_serdes_power,
+ .serdes_get_lane = mv88e6390_serdes_get_lane,
.serdes_irq_setup = mv88e6390_serdes_irq_setup,
.serdes_irq_free = mv88e6390_serdes_irq_free,
.gpio_ops = &mv88e6352_gpio_ops,
@@ -3800,6 +3804,7 @@ static const struct mv88e6xxx_ops mv88e6390_ops = {
.vtu_getnext = mv88e6390_g1_vtu_getnext,
.vtu_loadpurge = mv88e6390_g1_vtu_loadpurge,
.serdes_power = mv88e6390_serdes_power,
+ .serdes_get_lane = mv88e6390_serdes_get_lane,
.serdes_irq_setup = mv88e6390_serdes_irq_setup,
.serdes_irq_free = mv88e6390_serdes_irq_free,
.gpio_ops = &mv88e6352_gpio_ops,
@@ -3850,6 +3855,7 @@ static const struct mv88e6xxx_ops mv88e6390x_ops = {
.vtu_getnext = mv88e6390_g1_vtu_getnext,
.vtu_loadpurge = mv88e6390_g1_vtu_loadpurge,
.serdes_power = mv88e6390x_serdes_power,
+ .serdes_get_lane = mv88e6390x_serdes_get_lane,
.serdes_irq_setup = mv88e6390x_serdes_irq_setup,
.serdes_irq_free = mv88e6390x_serdes_irq_free,
.gpio_ops = &mv88e6352_gpio_ops,
diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.h b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.h
index a406be2f5652..35faf5be598b 100644
--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.h
+++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.h
@@ -443,6 +443,9 @@ struct mv88e6xxx_ops {
/* Power on/off a SERDES interface */
int (*serdes_power)(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port, bool on);
+ /* SERDES lane mapping */
+ int (*serdes_get_lane)(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port);
+
/* SERDES interrupt handling */
int (*serdes_irq_setup)(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port);
void (*serdes_irq_free)(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port);
diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.c b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.c
index c95cdb73e5a2..092176fd3d90 100644
--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.c
+++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.c
@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ int mv88e6390x_port_set_cmode(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port,
if (cmode == chip->ports[port].cmode)
return 0;
- lane = mv88e6390x_serdes_get_lane(chip, port);
+ lane = mv88e6xxx_serdes_get_lane(chip, port);
if (lane < 0 && lane != -ENODEV)
return lane;
@@ -466,7 +466,7 @@ int mv88e6390x_port_set_cmode(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port,
chip->ports[port].cmode = cmode;
- lane = mv88e6390x_serdes_get_lane(chip, port);
+ lane = mv88e6xxx_serdes_get_lane(chip, port);
if (lane < 0)
return lane;
diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/serdes.c b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/serdes.c
index 678aaba3d019..523f58c57972 100644
--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/serdes.c
+++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/serdes.c
@@ -286,10 +286,19 @@ void mv88e6352_serdes_irq_free(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port)
chip->ports[port].serdes_irq = 0;
}
-/* Return the SERDES lane address a port is using. Only Ports 9 and 10
- * have SERDES lanes. Returns -ENODEV if a port does not have a lane.
+/* Return the SERDES lane address a port is using. If a port has multiple lanes,
+ * should return the first lane the port is using. Should return -ENODEV if
+ * a port does not have a lane.
*/
-static int mv88e6390_serdes_get_lane(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port)
+int mv88e6xxx_serdes_get_lane(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port)
+{
+ if (!chip->info->ops->serdes_get_lane)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ return chip->info->ops->serdes_get_lane(chip, port);
+}
+
+int mv88e6390_serdes_get_lane(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port)
{
u8 cmode = chip->ports[port].cmode;
@@ -311,10 +320,6 @@ static int mv88e6390_serdes_get_lane(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port)
}
}
-/* Return the SERDES lane address a port is using. Ports 9 and 10 can
- * use multiple lanes. If so, return the first lane the port uses.
- * Returns -ENODEV if a port does not have a lane.
- */
int mv88e6390x_serdes_get_lane(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port)
{
u8 cmode_port9, cmode_port10, cmode_port;
@@ -466,7 +471,7 @@ int mv88e6390_serdes_power(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port, bool on)
{
int lane;
- lane = mv88e6390_serdes_get_lane(chip, port);
+ lane = mv88e6xxx_serdes_get_lane(chip, port);
if (lane == -ENODEV)
return 0;
@@ -485,7 +490,7 @@ int mv88e6390x_serdes_power(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port, bool on)
{
int lane;
- lane = mv88e6390x_serdes_get_lane(chip, port);
+ lane = mv88e6xxx_serdes_get_lane(chip, port);
if (lane == -ENODEV)
return 0;
@@ -638,7 +643,7 @@ static irqreturn_t mv88e6390_serdes_thread_fn(int irq, void *dev_id)
int lane;
int err;
- lane = mv88e6390x_serdes_get_lane(chip, port->port);
+ lane = mv88e6xxx_serdes_get_lane(chip, port->port);
mv88e6xxx_reg_lock(chip);
@@ -666,7 +671,7 @@ int mv88e6390x_serdes_irq_setup(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port)
int lane;
int err;
- lane = mv88e6390x_serdes_get_lane(chip, port);
+ lane = mv88e6xxx_serdes_get_lane(chip, port);
if (lane == -ENODEV)
return 0;
@@ -711,7 +716,7 @@ int mv88e6390_serdes_irq_setup(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port)
void mv88e6390x_serdes_irq_free(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port)
{
- int lane = mv88e6390x_serdes_get_lane(chip, port);
+ int lane = mv88e6xxx_serdes_get_lane(chip, port);
if (lane == -ENODEV)
return;
diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/serdes.h b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/serdes.h
index ff5b94439335..f2ca3bcc3893 100644
--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/serdes.h
+++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/serdes.h
@@ -74,6 +74,8 @@
#define MV88E6390_SGMII_PHY_STATUS_SPD_DPL_VALID BIT(11)
#define MV88E6390_SGMII_PHY_STATUS_LINK BIT(10)
+int mv88e6xxx_serdes_get_lane(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port);
+int mv88e6390_serdes_get_lane(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port);
int mv88e6390x_serdes_get_lane(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port);
int mv88e6341_serdes_power(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port, bool on);
int mv88e6352_serdes_power(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port, bool on);
--
2.21.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH net-next v2 0/9] net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: Peridot/Topaz SERDES changes
From: Marek Behún @ 2019-08-23 21:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev
Cc: Andrew Lunn, Vivien Didelot, Florian Fainelli, Vladimir Oltean,
Marek Behún
Hello,
this is the second version of changes for the Topaz/Peridot family of
switches. The patches apply on net-next.
Changes since v1:
- addressed David's reverse christmas tree issue
- as suggested by Andrew and Vivien, the hidden port register functions
were moved to port_hidden.c and the macros remain (with changed names)
in port.h
- the hidden port functions were renamed from mv88e6390_* to
mv88e6xxx_*, since they apply not only on Peridot
- I removed the second patch, since the extra newline character it deleted
was at a place that was reworked and moved in subsequent patch
Marek
Marek Behún (9):
net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: support 2500base-x in SGMII IRQ handler
net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: move hidden registers operations in own file
net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: fix port hidden register macros
net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: create chip->info->ops->serdes_get_lane method
net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: add serdes_get_lane method for Topaz family
net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: rename port cmode macro
net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: simplify SERDES code for Topaz and Peridot
net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: support Block Address setting in hidden registers
net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: fully support SERDES on Topaz family
drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c | 88 +++--------
drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.h | 3 +
drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.c | 88 ++++++++---
drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.h | 30 ++--
drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port_hidden.c | 70 +++++++++
drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/serdes.c | 194 ++++++++++--------------
drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/serdes.h | 9 +-
8 files changed, 273 insertions(+), 210 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port_hidden.c
--
2.21.0
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH net-next v2 9/9] net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: fully support SERDES on Topaz family
From: Marek Behún @ 2019-08-23 21:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev
Cc: Andrew Lunn, Vivien Didelot, Florian Fainelli, Vladimir Oltean,
Marek Behún
In-Reply-To: <20190823212603.13456-1-marek.behun@nic.cz>
Currently we support SERDES on the Topaz family in a limited way: no
IRQs and the cmode is not writable, thus the mode is determined by
strapping pins.
Marvell's examples though show how to make cmode writable on port 5 and
support SGMII autonegotiation. It is done by writing hidden registers,
for which we already have code.
This patch adds support for making the cmode for the SERDES port
writable on the Topaz family, and enables cmode setting and SERDES IRQs.
Tested on Turris Mox.
Signed-off-by: Marek Behún <marek.behun@nic.cz>
---
drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c | 6 +++
drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.c | 76 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.h | 4 ++
3 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c
index 202ccce65b1c..6525075f6bd3 100644
--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c
+++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c
@@ -2913,6 +2913,7 @@ static const struct mv88e6xxx_ops mv88e6141_ops = {
.port_disable_pri_override = mv88e6xxx_port_disable_pri_override,
.port_link_state = mv88e6352_port_link_state,
.port_get_cmode = mv88e6352_port_get_cmode,
+ .port_set_cmode = mv88e6341_port_set_cmode,
.port_setup_message_port = mv88e6xxx_setup_message_port,
.stats_snapshot = mv88e6390_g1_stats_snapshot,
.stats_set_histogram = mv88e6095_g1_stats_set_histogram,
@@ -2929,6 +2930,8 @@ static const struct mv88e6xxx_ops mv88e6141_ops = {
.vtu_loadpurge = mv88e6352_g1_vtu_loadpurge,
.serdes_power = mv88e6390_serdes_power,
.serdes_get_lane = mv88e6341_serdes_get_lane,
+ .serdes_irq_setup = mv88e6390_serdes_irq_setup,
+ .serdes_irq_free = mv88e6390_serdes_irq_free,
.gpio_ops = &mv88e6352_gpio_ops,
.phylink_validate = mv88e6341_phylink_validate,
};
@@ -3608,6 +3611,7 @@ static const struct mv88e6xxx_ops mv88e6341_ops = {
.port_disable_pri_override = mv88e6xxx_port_disable_pri_override,
.port_link_state = mv88e6352_port_link_state,
.port_get_cmode = mv88e6352_port_get_cmode,
+ .port_set_cmode = mv88e6341_port_set_cmode,
.port_setup_message_port = mv88e6xxx_setup_message_port,
.stats_snapshot = mv88e6390_g1_stats_snapshot,
.stats_set_histogram = mv88e6095_g1_stats_set_histogram,
@@ -3624,6 +3628,8 @@ static const struct mv88e6xxx_ops mv88e6341_ops = {
.vtu_loadpurge = mv88e6352_g1_vtu_loadpurge,
.serdes_power = mv88e6390_serdes_power,
.serdes_get_lane = mv88e6341_serdes_get_lane,
+ .serdes_irq_setup = mv88e6390_serdes_irq_setup,
+ .serdes_irq_free = mv88e6390_serdes_irq_free,
.gpio_ops = &mv88e6352_gpio_ops,
.avb_ops = &mv88e6390_avb_ops,
.ptp_ops = &mv88e6352_ptp_ops,
diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.c b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.c
index 815a7371977b..df6d78839a5d 100644
--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.c
+++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.c
@@ -392,17 +392,37 @@ phy_interface_t mv88e6390x_port_max_speed_mode(int port)
return PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_NA;
}
-int mv88e6390x_port_set_cmode(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port,
- phy_interface_t mode)
+static int mv88e6341_port_force_writable_cmode(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip,
+ int port)
+{
+ int err, addr;
+ u16 reg, bits;
+
+ addr = chip->info->port_base_addr + port;
+
+ err = mv88e6xxx_port_hidden_read(chip, 0x7, addr, 0, ®);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ bits = MV88E6341_PORT_RESERVED_1A_FORCE_CMODE |
+ MV88E6341_PORT_RESERVED_1A_SGMII_AN;
+
+ if ((reg & bits) == bits)
+ return 0;
+
+ reg |= bits;
+ return mv88e6xxx_port_hidden_write(chip, 0x7, addr, 0, reg);
+}
+
+static int mv88e6xxx_port_set_cmode(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port,
+ phy_interface_t mode, bool allow_over_2500,
+ bool make_cmode_writable)
{
int lane;
u16 cmode;
u16 reg;
int err;
- if (port != 9 && port != 10)
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-
/* Default to a slow mode, so freeing up SERDES interfaces for
* other ports which might use them for SFPs.
*/
@@ -421,9 +441,13 @@ int mv88e6390x_port_set_cmode(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port,
break;
case PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_XGMII:
case PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_XAUI:
+ if (!allow_over_2500)
+ return -EINVAL;
cmode = MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_XAUI;
break;
case PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_RXAUI:
+ if (!allow_over_2500)
+ return -EINVAL;
cmode = MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_RXAUI;
break;
default:
@@ -457,6 +481,12 @@ int mv88e6390x_port_set_cmode(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port,
if (err)
return err;
+ if (make_cmode_writable) {
+ err = mv88e6341_port_force_writable_cmode(chip, port);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+
reg &= ~MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_MASK;
reg |= cmode;
@@ -484,21 +514,37 @@ int mv88e6390x_port_set_cmode(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port,
return 0;
}
+int mv88e6390x_port_set_cmode(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port,
+ phy_interface_t mode)
+{
+ if (port != 9 && port != 10)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ return mv88e6xxx_port_set_cmode(chip, port, mode, true, false);
+}
+
int mv88e6390_port_set_cmode(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port,
phy_interface_t mode)
{
- switch (mode) {
- case PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_NA:
+ if (port != 9 && port != 10)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ if (mode == PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_NA)
+ return 0;
+
+ return mv88e6xxx_port_set_cmode(chip, port, mode, false, false);
+}
+
+int mv88e6341_port_set_cmode(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port,
+ phy_interface_t mode)
+{
+ if (port != 5)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ if (mode == PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_NA)
return 0;
- case PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_XGMII:
- case PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_XAUI:
- case PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_RXAUI:
- return -EINVAL;
- default:
- break;
- }
- return mv88e6390x_port_set_cmode(chip, port, mode);
+ return mv88e6xxx_port_set_cmode(chip, port, mode, false, true);
}
int mv88e6185_port_get_cmode(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port, u8 *cmode)
diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.h b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.h
index 04550cb3c3b3..4b7289a1fd8b 100644
--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.h
+++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.h
@@ -269,6 +269,8 @@
#define MV88E6XXX_PORT_RESERVED_1A_BLOCK_SHIFT 10
#define MV88E6XXX_PORT_RESERVED_1A_CTRL_PORT 0x04
#define MV88E6XXX_PORT_RESERVED_1A_DATA_PORT 0x05
+#define MV88E6341_PORT_RESERVED_1A_FORCE_CMODE 0x8000
+#define MV88E6341_PORT_RESERVED_1A_SGMII_AN 0x2000
int mv88e6xxx_port_read(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port, int reg,
u16 *val);
@@ -334,6 +336,8 @@ int mv88e6097_port_pause_limit(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port, u8 in,
u8 out);
int mv88e6390_port_pause_limit(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port, u8 in,
u8 out);
+int mv88e6341_port_set_cmode(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port,
+ phy_interface_t mode);
int mv88e6390_port_set_cmode(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port,
phy_interface_t mode);
int mv88e6390x_port_set_cmode(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port,
--
2.21.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH net-next v2 6/9] net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: rename port cmode macro
From: Marek Behún @ 2019-08-23 21:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev
Cc: Andrew Lunn, Vivien Didelot, Florian Fainelli, Vladimir Oltean,
Marek Behún
In-Reply-To: <20190823212603.13456-1-marek.behun@nic.cz>
This is a cosmetic update. We are removing the last underscore from
macros MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_100BASE_X and
MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASE_X. The 2500base-x version does not
have that underscore. Also PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_ macros do not have it
there.
Signed-off-by: Marek Behún <marek.behun@nic.cz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
---
drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.c | 4 +--
drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.h | 4 +--
drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/serdes.c | 50 +++++++++++++++---------------
3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.c b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.c
index 092176fd3d90..b1f66ea833ed 100644
--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.c
+++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.c
@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ int mv88e6390x_port_set_cmode(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port,
switch (mode) {
case PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_1000BASEX:
- cmode = MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASE_X;
+ cmode = MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASEX;
break;
case PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_SGMII:
cmode = MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_SGMII;
@@ -618,7 +618,7 @@ int mv88e6352_port_link_state(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port,
else
state->interface = PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_RGMII;
break;
- case MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASE_X:
+ case MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASEX:
state->interface = PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_1000BASEX;
break;
case MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_SGMII:
diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.h b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.h
index 58aecf5a7cb4..cd7aa7392dfe 100644
--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.h
+++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.h
@@ -43,8 +43,8 @@
#define MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_FLOW_CTL 0x0010
#define MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_MASK 0x000f
#define MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_RGMII 0x0007
-#define MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_100BASE_X 0x0008
-#define MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASE_X 0x0009
+#define MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_100BASEX 0x0008
+#define MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASEX 0x0009
#define MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_SGMII 0x000a
#define MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_2500BASEX 0x000b
#define MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_XAUI 0x000c
diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/serdes.c b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/serdes.c
index 1f40130bfb68..fd3a9b970b58 100644
--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/serdes.c
+++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/serdes.c
@@ -73,8 +73,8 @@ static bool mv88e6352_port_has_serdes(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port)
{
u8 cmode = chip->ports[port].cmode;
- if ((cmode == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_100BASE_X) ||
- (cmode == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASE_X) ||
+ if ((cmode == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_100BASEX) ||
+ (cmode == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASEX) ||
(cmode == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_SGMII))
return true;
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ int mv88e6341_serdes_get_lane(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port)
if (port != 5)
return -ENODEV;
- if (cmode == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASE_X ||
+ if (cmode == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASEX ||
cmode == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_SGMII ||
cmode == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_2500BASEX)
return MV88E6341_PORT5_LANE;
@@ -319,13 +319,13 @@ int mv88e6390_serdes_get_lane(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port)
switch (port) {
case 9:
- if (cmode == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASE_X ||
+ if (cmode == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASEX ||
cmode == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_SGMII ||
cmode == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_2500BASEX)
return MV88E6390_PORT9_LANE0;
return -ENODEV;
case 10:
- if (cmode == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASE_X ||
+ if (cmode == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASEX ||
cmode == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_SGMII ||
cmode == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_2500BASEX)
return MV88E6390_PORT10_LANE0;
@@ -345,53 +345,53 @@ int mv88e6390x_serdes_get_lane(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port)
switch (port) {
case 2:
- if (cmode_port9 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASE_X ||
+ if (cmode_port9 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASEX ||
cmode_port9 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_SGMII ||
cmode_port9 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_2500BASEX)
- if (cmode_port == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASE_X)
+ if (cmode_port == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASEX)
return MV88E6390_PORT9_LANE1;
return -ENODEV;
case 3:
- if (cmode_port9 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASE_X ||
+ if (cmode_port9 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASEX ||
cmode_port9 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_SGMII ||
cmode_port9 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_2500BASEX ||
cmode_port9 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_RXAUI)
- if (cmode_port == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASE_X)
+ if (cmode_port == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASEX)
return MV88E6390_PORT9_LANE2;
return -ENODEV;
case 4:
- if (cmode_port9 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASE_X ||
+ if (cmode_port9 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASEX ||
cmode_port9 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_SGMII ||
cmode_port9 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_2500BASEX ||
cmode_port9 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_RXAUI)
- if (cmode_port == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASE_X)
+ if (cmode_port == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASEX)
return MV88E6390_PORT9_LANE3;
return -ENODEV;
case 5:
- if (cmode_port10 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASE_X ||
+ if (cmode_port10 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASEX ||
cmode_port10 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_SGMII ||
cmode_port10 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_2500BASEX)
- if (cmode_port == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASE_X)
+ if (cmode_port == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASEX)
return MV88E6390_PORT10_LANE1;
return -ENODEV;
case 6:
- if (cmode_port10 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASE_X ||
+ if (cmode_port10 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASEX ||
cmode_port10 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_SGMII ||
cmode_port10 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_2500BASEX ||
cmode_port10 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_RXAUI)
- if (cmode_port == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASE_X)
+ if (cmode_port == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASEX)
return MV88E6390_PORT10_LANE2;
return -ENODEV;
case 7:
- if (cmode_port10 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASE_X ||
+ if (cmode_port10 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASEX ||
cmode_port10 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_SGMII ||
cmode_port10 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_2500BASEX ||
cmode_port10 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_RXAUI)
- if (cmode_port == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASE_X)
+ if (cmode_port == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASEX)
return MV88E6390_PORT10_LANE3;
return -ENODEV;
case 9:
- if (cmode_port9 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASE_X ||
+ if (cmode_port9 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASEX ||
cmode_port9 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_SGMII ||
cmode_port9 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_2500BASEX ||
cmode_port9 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_XAUI ||
@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ int mv88e6390x_serdes_get_lane(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port)
return MV88E6390_PORT9_LANE0;
return -ENODEV;
case 10:
- if (cmode_port10 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASE_X ||
+ if (cmode_port10 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASEX ||
cmode_port10 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_SGMII ||
cmode_port10 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_2500BASEX ||
cmode_port10 == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_XAUI ||
@@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ static int mv88e6390_serdes_power_lane(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port,
switch (cmode) {
case MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_SGMII:
- case MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASE_X:
+ case MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASEX:
case MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_2500BASEX:
return mv88e6390_serdes_power_sgmii(chip, lane, on);
case MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_XAUI:
@@ -570,7 +570,7 @@ static void mv88e6390_serdes_irq_link_sgmii(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip,
case MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_SGMII:
mode = PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_SGMII;
break;
- case MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASE_X:
+ case MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASEX:
mode = PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_1000BASEX;
break;
case MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_2500BASEX:
@@ -613,7 +613,7 @@ int mv88e6390_serdes_irq_enable(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port,
switch (cmode) {
case MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_SGMII:
- case MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASE_X:
+ case MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASEX:
case MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_2500BASEX:
err = mv88e6390_serdes_irq_enable_sgmii(chip, lane);
}
@@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ int mv88e6390_serdes_irq_disable(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port,
switch (cmode) {
case MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_SGMII:
- case MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASE_X:
+ case MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASEX:
case MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_2500BASEX:
err = mv88e6390_serdes_irq_disable_sgmii(chip, lane);
}
@@ -664,7 +664,7 @@ static irqreturn_t mv88e6390_serdes_thread_fn(int irq, void *dev_id)
switch (cmode) {
case MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_SGMII:
- case MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASE_X:
+ case MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASEX:
case MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_2500BASEX:
err = mv88e6390_serdes_irq_status_sgmii(chip, lane, &status);
if (err)
@@ -771,7 +771,7 @@ int mv88e6341_serdes_power(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port, bool on)
if (lane < 0)
return lane;
- if (cmode == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASE_X ||
+ if (cmode == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASEX ||
cmode == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_SGMII ||
cmode == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_2500BASEX)
return mv88e6390_serdes_power_sgmii(chip, lane, on);
--
2.21.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH net-next v2 7/9] net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: simplify SERDES code for Topaz and Peridot
From: Marek Behún @ 2019-08-23 21:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev
Cc: Andrew Lunn, Vivien Didelot, Florian Fainelli, Vladimir Oltean,
Marek Behún
In-Reply-To: <20190823212603.13456-1-marek.behun@nic.cz>
Now that we have correct serdes_get_lane() for Topaz and Peridot
families, we can merge the implementations of their other SERDES
functions. We can skip checking port number, since the serdes_get_lane()
method return -ENODEV if a given port does not have a lane or does not
support given cmode.
Signed-off-by: Marek Behún <marek.behun@nic.cz>
---
drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c | 16 +++---
drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.c | 4 +-
drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/serdes.c | 91 ++++--------------------------
drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/serdes.h | 4 --
4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 94 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c
index 6343af09fb1e..43cb48e2ef5f 100644
--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c
+++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c
@@ -2927,7 +2927,7 @@ static const struct mv88e6xxx_ops mv88e6141_ops = {
.reset = mv88e6352_g1_reset,
.vtu_getnext = mv88e6352_g1_vtu_getnext,
.vtu_loadpurge = mv88e6352_g1_vtu_loadpurge,
- .serdes_power = mv88e6341_serdes_power,
+ .serdes_power = mv88e6390_serdes_power,
.serdes_get_lane = mv88e6341_serdes_get_lane,
.gpio_ops = &mv88e6352_gpio_ops,
.phylink_validate = mv88e6341_phylink_validate,
@@ -3302,10 +3302,10 @@ static const struct mv88e6xxx_ops mv88e6190x_ops = {
.rmu_disable = mv88e6390_g1_rmu_disable,
.vtu_getnext = mv88e6390_g1_vtu_getnext,
.vtu_loadpurge = mv88e6390_g1_vtu_loadpurge,
- .serdes_power = mv88e6390x_serdes_power,
+ .serdes_power = mv88e6390_serdes_power,
.serdes_get_lane = mv88e6390x_serdes_get_lane,
- .serdes_irq_setup = mv88e6390x_serdes_irq_setup,
- .serdes_irq_free = mv88e6390x_serdes_irq_free,
+ .serdes_irq_setup = mv88e6390_serdes_irq_setup,
+ .serdes_irq_free = mv88e6390_serdes_irq_free,
.gpio_ops = &mv88e6352_gpio_ops,
.phylink_validate = mv88e6390x_phylink_validate,
};
@@ -3622,7 +3622,7 @@ static const struct mv88e6xxx_ops mv88e6341_ops = {
.reset = mv88e6352_g1_reset,
.vtu_getnext = mv88e6352_g1_vtu_getnext,
.vtu_loadpurge = mv88e6352_g1_vtu_loadpurge,
- .serdes_power = mv88e6341_serdes_power,
+ .serdes_power = mv88e6390_serdes_power,
.serdes_get_lane = mv88e6341_serdes_get_lane,
.gpio_ops = &mv88e6352_gpio_ops,
.avb_ops = &mv88e6390_avb_ops,
@@ -3856,10 +3856,10 @@ static const struct mv88e6xxx_ops mv88e6390x_ops = {
.rmu_disable = mv88e6390_g1_rmu_disable,
.vtu_getnext = mv88e6390_g1_vtu_getnext,
.vtu_loadpurge = mv88e6390_g1_vtu_loadpurge,
- .serdes_power = mv88e6390x_serdes_power,
+ .serdes_power = mv88e6390_serdes_power,
.serdes_get_lane = mv88e6390x_serdes_get_lane,
- .serdes_irq_setup = mv88e6390x_serdes_irq_setup,
- .serdes_irq_free = mv88e6390x_serdes_irq_free,
+ .serdes_irq_setup = mv88e6390_serdes_irq_setup,
+ .serdes_irq_free = mv88e6390_serdes_irq_free,
.gpio_ops = &mv88e6352_gpio_ops,
.avb_ops = &mv88e6390_avb_ops,
.ptp_ops = &mv88e6352_ptp_ops,
diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.c b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.c
index b1f66ea833ed..815a7371977b 100644
--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.c
+++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.c
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ int mv88e6390x_port_set_cmode(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port,
return err;
}
- err = mv88e6390x_serdes_power(chip, port, false);
+ err = mv88e6390_serdes_power(chip, port, false);
if (err)
return err;
}
@@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ int mv88e6390x_port_set_cmode(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port,
if (lane < 0)
return lane;
- err = mv88e6390x_serdes_power(chip, port, true);
+ err = mv88e6390_serdes_power(chip, port, true);
if (err)
return err;
diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/serdes.c b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/serdes.c
index fd3a9b970b58..7557d69c9f2a 100644
--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/serdes.c
+++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/serdes.c
@@ -464,26 +464,9 @@ static int mv88e6390_serdes_power_sgmii(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int lane,
return err;
}
-static int mv88e6390_serdes_power_lane(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port,
- int lane, bool on)
-{
- u8 cmode = chip->ports[port].cmode;
-
- switch (cmode) {
- case MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_SGMII:
- case MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASEX:
- case MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_2500BASEX:
- return mv88e6390_serdes_power_sgmii(chip, lane, on);
- case MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_XAUI:
- case MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_RXAUI:
- return mv88e6390_serdes_power_10g(chip, lane, on);
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
int mv88e6390_serdes_power(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port, bool on)
{
+ u8 cmode = chip->ports[port].cmode;
int lane;
lane = mv88e6xxx_serdes_get_lane(chip, port);
@@ -493,30 +476,14 @@ int mv88e6390_serdes_power(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port, bool on)
if (lane < 0)
return lane;
- switch (port) {
- case 9 ... 10:
- return mv88e6390_serdes_power_lane(chip, port, lane, on);
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-int mv88e6390x_serdes_power(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port, bool on)
-{
- int lane;
-
- lane = mv88e6xxx_serdes_get_lane(chip, port);
- if (lane == -ENODEV)
- return 0;
-
- if (lane < 0)
- return lane;
-
- switch (port) {
- case 2 ... 4:
- case 5 ... 7:
- case 9 ... 10:
- return mv88e6390_serdes_power_lane(chip, port, lane, on);
+ switch (cmode) {
+ case MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_SGMII:
+ case MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASEX:
+ case MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_2500BASEX:
+ return mv88e6390_serdes_power_sgmii(chip, lane, on);
+ case MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_XAUI:
+ case MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_RXAUI:
+ return mv88e6390_serdes_power_10g(chip, lane, on);
}
return 0;
@@ -681,7 +648,7 @@ static irqreturn_t mv88e6390_serdes_thread_fn(int irq, void *dev_id)
return ret;
}
-int mv88e6390x_serdes_irq_setup(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port)
+int mv88e6390_serdes_irq_setup(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port)
{
int lane;
int err;
@@ -721,15 +688,7 @@ int mv88e6390x_serdes_irq_setup(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port)
return mv88e6390_serdes_irq_enable(chip, port, lane);
}
-int mv88e6390_serdes_irq_setup(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port)
-{
- if (port < 9)
- return 0;
-
- return mv88e6390x_serdes_irq_setup(chip, port);
-}
-
-void mv88e6390x_serdes_irq_free(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port)
+void mv88e6390_serdes_irq_free(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port)
{
int lane = mv88e6xxx_serdes_get_lane(chip, port);
@@ -750,31 +709,3 @@ void mv88e6390x_serdes_irq_free(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port)
chip->ports[port].serdes_irq = 0;
}
-
-void mv88e6390_serdes_irq_free(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port)
-{
- if (port < 9)
- return;
-
- mv88e6390x_serdes_irq_free(chip, port);
-}
-
-int mv88e6341_serdes_power(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port, bool on)
-{
- u8 cmode = chip->ports[port].cmode;
- int lane;
-
- lane = mv88e6xxx_serdes_get_lane(chip, port);
- if (lane == -ENODEV)
- return 0;
-
- if (lane < 0)
- return lane;
-
- if (cmode == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_1000BASEX ||
- cmode == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_SGMII ||
- cmode == MV88E6XXX_PORT_STS_CMODE_2500BASEX)
- return mv88e6390_serdes_power_sgmii(chip, lane, on);
-
- return 0;
-}
diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/serdes.h b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/serdes.h
index de6f1939c541..7b4fd25fc4ea 100644
--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/serdes.h
+++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/serdes.h
@@ -78,14 +78,10 @@ int mv88e6xxx_serdes_get_lane(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port);
int mv88e6341_serdes_get_lane(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port);
int mv88e6390_serdes_get_lane(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port);
int mv88e6390x_serdes_get_lane(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port);
-int mv88e6341_serdes_power(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port, bool on);
int mv88e6352_serdes_power(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port, bool on);
int mv88e6390_serdes_power(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port, bool on);
-int mv88e6390x_serdes_power(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port, bool on);
int mv88e6390_serdes_irq_setup(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port);
void mv88e6390_serdes_irq_free(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port);
-int mv88e6390x_serdes_irq_setup(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port);
-void mv88e6390x_serdes_irq_free(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port);
int mv88e6352_serdes_get_sset_count(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port);
int mv88e6352_serdes_get_strings(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip,
int port, uint8_t *data);
--
2.21.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH net-next v2 8/9] net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: support Block Address setting in hidden registers
From: Marek Behún @ 2019-08-23 21:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev
Cc: Andrew Lunn, Vivien Didelot, Florian Fainelli, Vladimir Oltean,
Marek Behún
In-Reply-To: <20190823212603.13456-1-marek.behun@nic.cz>
Add support for setting the Block Address parameter when reading/writing
hidden registers. Marvell's mdio examples for SERDES settings on Topaz
use Block Address 0x7 when reading/writing hidden registers, although
the specification says that block must be set to 0xf.
Signed-off-by: Marek Behún <marek.behun@nic.cz>
---
drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c | 4 ++--
drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.h | 10 +++++-----
drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port_hidden.c | 12 ++++++------
3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c
index 43cb48e2ef5f..202ccce65b1c 100644
--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c
+++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c
@@ -2325,7 +2325,7 @@ static bool mv88e6390_setup_errata_applied(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip)
u16 val;
for (port = 0; port < mv88e6xxx_num_ports(chip); port++) {
- err = mv88e6xxx_port_hidden_read(chip, port, 0, &val);
+ err = mv88e6xxx_port_hidden_read(chip, 0xf, port, 0, &val);
if (err) {
dev_err(chip->dev,
"Error reading hidden register: %d\n", err);
@@ -2358,7 +2358,7 @@ static int mv88e6390_setup_errata(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip)
}
for (port = 0; port < mv88e6xxx_num_ports(chip); port++) {
- err = mv88e6xxx_port_hidden_write(chip, port, 0, 0x01c0);
+ err = mv88e6xxx_port_hidden_write(chip, 0xf, port, 0, 0x01c0);
if (err)
return err;
}
diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.h b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.h
index cd7aa7392dfe..04550cb3c3b3 100644
--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.h
+++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port.h
@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@
#define MV88E6XXX_PORT_RESERVED_1A_WRITE 0x4000
#define MV88E6XXX_PORT_RESERVED_1A_READ 0x0000
#define MV88E6XXX_PORT_RESERVED_1A_PORT_SHIFT 5
-#define MV88E6XXX_PORT_RESERVED_1A_BLOCK 0x3c00
+#define MV88E6XXX_PORT_RESERVED_1A_BLOCK_SHIFT 10
#define MV88E6XXX_PORT_RESERVED_1A_CTRL_PORT 0x04
#define MV88E6XXX_PORT_RESERVED_1A_DATA_PORT 0x05
@@ -353,10 +353,10 @@ int mv88e6095_port_set_upstream_port(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port,
int mv88e6xxx_port_disable_learn_limit(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port);
int mv88e6xxx_port_disable_pri_override(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port);
-int mv88e6xxx_port_hidden_write(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port, int reg,
- u16 val);
+int mv88e6xxx_port_hidden_write(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int block, int port,
+ int reg, u16 val);
int mv88e6xxx_port_hidden_wait(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip);
-int mv88e6xxx_port_hidden_read(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port, int reg,
- u16 *val);
+int mv88e6xxx_port_hidden_read(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int block, int port,
+ int reg, u16 *val);
#endif /* _MV88E6XXX_PORT_H */
diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port_hidden.c b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port_hidden.c
index 37520b6b8c89..fc0a45cb4f68 100644
--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port_hidden.c
+++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/port_hidden.c
@@ -15,8 +15,8 @@
/* The mv88e6390 and mv88e6341 have some hidden registers used for debug and
* development. The errata also makes use of them.
*/
-int mv88e6xxx_port_hidden_write(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port, int reg,
- u16 val)
+int mv88e6xxx_port_hidden_write(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int block, int port,
+ int reg, u16 val)
{
u16 ctrl;
int err;
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ int mv88e6xxx_port_hidden_write(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port, int reg,
ctrl = MV88E6XXX_PORT_RESERVED_1A_BUSY |
MV88E6XXX_PORT_RESERVED_1A_WRITE |
- MV88E6XXX_PORT_RESERVED_1A_BLOCK |
+ block << MV88E6XXX_PORT_RESERVED_1A_BLOCK_SHIFT |
port << MV88E6XXX_PORT_RESERVED_1A_PORT_SHIFT |
reg;
@@ -44,15 +44,15 @@ int mv88e6xxx_port_hidden_wait(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip)
MV88E6XXX_PORT_RESERVED_1A, bit, 0);
}
-int mv88e6xxx_port_hidden_read(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int port, int reg,
- u16 *val)
+int mv88e6xxx_port_hidden_read(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, int block, int port,
+ int reg, u16 *val)
{
u16 ctrl;
int err;
ctrl = MV88E6XXX_PORT_RESERVED_1A_BUSY |
MV88E6XXX_PORT_RESERVED_1A_READ |
- MV88E6XXX_PORT_RESERVED_1A_BLOCK |
+ block << MV88E6XXX_PORT_RESERVED_1A_BLOCK_SHIFT |
port << MV88E6XXX_PORT_RESERVED_1A_PORT_SHIFT |
reg;
--
2.21.0
^ permalink raw reply related
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