* Re: [PATCH bpf-next 5/5] selftests/bpf: add benchmark for uprobe vs. user_prog
From: Andrii Nakryiko @ 2020-08-03 1:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Song Liu
Cc: open list, bpf, Networking, Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann,
Kernel Team, john fastabend, KP Singh, Jesper Dangaard Brouer,
Daniel Xu
In-Reply-To: <20200801084721.1812607-6-songliubraving@fb.com>
On Sat, Aug 1, 2020 at 1:50 AM Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> wrote:
>
> Add a benchmark to compare performance of
> 1) uprobe;
> 2) user program w/o args;
> 3) user program w/ args;
> 4) user program w/ args on random cpu.
>
Can you please add it to the existing benchmark runner instead, e.g.,
along the other bench_trigger benchmarks? No need to re-implement
benchmark setup. And also that would also allow to compare existing
ways of cheaply triggering a program vs this new _USER program?
If the performance is not significantly better than other ways, do you
think it still makes sense to add a new BPF program type? I think
triggering KPROBE/TRACEPOINT from bpf_prog_test_run() would be very
nice, maybe it's possible to add that instead of a new program type?
Either way, let's see comparison with other program triggering
mechanisms first.
> Sample output:
>
> ./test_progs -t uprobe_vs_user_prog -v
> test_uprobe_vs_user_prog:PASS:uprobe_vs_user_prog__open_and_load 0 nsec
> test_uprobe_vs_user_prog:PASS:get_base_addr 0 nsec
> test_uprobe_vs_user_prog:PASS:attach_uprobe 0 nsec
> run_perf_test:PASS:uprobe 0 nsec
> Each uprobe uses 1419 nanoseconds
> run_perf_test:PASS:user_prog_no_args 0 nsec
> Each user_prog_no_args uses 313 nanoseconds
> run_perf_test:PASS:user_prog_with_args 0 nsec
> Each user_prog_with_args uses 335 nanoseconds
> run_perf_test:PASS:user_prog_with_args_on_cpu 0 nsec
> Each user_prog_with_args_on_cpu uses 2821 nanoseconds
> Summary: 1/0 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED
>
> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
> ---
> .../bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_vs_user_prog.c | 101 ++++++++++++++++++
> .../selftests/bpf/progs/uprobe_vs_user_prog.c | 21 ++++
> 2 files changed, 122 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_vs_user_prog.c
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/uprobe_vs_user_prog.c
>
[...]
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH bpf-next 4/5] selftests/bpf: move two functions to test_progs.c
From: Andrii Nakryiko @ 2020-08-03 1:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Song Liu
Cc: open list, bpf, Networking, Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann,
Kernel Team, john fastabend, KP Singh, Jesper Dangaard Brouer,
Daniel Xu
In-Reply-To: <20200801084721.1812607-5-songliubraving@fb.com>
On Sat, Aug 1, 2020 at 1:50 AM Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> wrote:
>
> Move time_get_ns() and get_base_addr() to test_progs.c, so they can be
> used in other tests.
>
> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
> ---
> .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/attach_probe.c | 21 -------------
> .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/test_overhead.c | 8 -----
> tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++
> tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.h | 2 ++
> 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
>
[...]
> static int test_task_rename(const char *prog)
> {
> int i, fd, duration = 0, err;
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c
> index b1e4dadacd9b4..c9e6a5ad5b9a4 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c
> @@ -622,6 +622,36 @@ int cd_flavor_subdir(const char *exec_name)
> return chdir(flavor);
> }
>
> +__u64 time_get_ns(void)
> +{
I'd try to avoid adding stuff to test_progs.c. There is generic
testing_helpers.c, maybe let's put this there?
> + struct timespec ts;
> +
> + clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts);
> + return ts.tv_sec * 1000000000ull + ts.tv_nsec;
> +}
> +
> +ssize_t get_base_addr(void)
> +{
This would definitely be better in trace_helpers.c, though.
> + size_t start, offset;
> + char buf[256];
> + FILE *f;
> +
[...]
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH bpf-next 3/5] selftests/bpf: add selftest for BPF_PROG_TYPE_USER
From: Andrii Nakryiko @ 2020-08-03 1:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Song Liu
Cc: open list, bpf, Networking, Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann,
Kernel Team, john fastabend, KP Singh, Jesper Dangaard Brouer,
Daniel Xu
In-Reply-To: <20200801084721.1812607-4-songliubraving@fb.com>
On Sat, Aug 1, 2020 at 1:50 AM Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> wrote:
>
> This test checks the correctness of BPF_PROG_TYPE_USER program, including:
> running on the right cpu, passing in correct args, returning retval, and
> being able to call bpf_get_stack|stackid.
>
> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
> ---
> .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/user_prog.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++
> tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/user_prog.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 108 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/user_prog.c
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/user_prog.c
>
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/user_prog.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/user_prog.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000000..416707b3bff01
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/user_prog.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +/* Copyright (c) 2020 Facebook */
> +#include <test_progs.h>
> +#include "user_prog.skel.h"
> +
> +static int duration;
> +
> +void test_user_prog(void)
> +{
> + struct bpf_user_prog_args args = {{0, 1, 2, 3, 4}};
> + struct bpf_prog_test_run_attr attr = {};
> + struct user_prog *skel;
> + int i, numcpu, ret;
> +
> + skel = user_prog__open_and_load();
> +
> + if (CHECK(!skel, "user_prog__open_and_load",
> + "skeleton open_and_laod failed\n"))
> + return;
> +
> + numcpu = libbpf_num_possible_cpus();
nit: possible doesn't mean online right now, so it will fail on
offline or non-present CPUs
> +
> + attr.prog_fd = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.user_func);
> + attr.data_size_in = sizeof(args);
> + attr.data_in = &args;
> +
> + /* start from -1, so we test cpu_plus == 0 */
> + for (i = -1; i < numcpu; i++) {
> + args.args[0] = i + 1;
> + attr.cpu_plus = i + 1;
> + ret = bpf_prog_test_run_xattr(&attr);
> + CHECK(ret, "bpf_prog_test_run_xattr", "returns error\n");
> +
> + /* skip two tests for i == -1 */
> + if (i == -1)
> + continue;
> + CHECK(attr.retval != i + 2, "bpf_prog_test_run_xattr",
> + "doesn't get expected retval\n");
> + CHECK(skel->data->sum != 11 + i, "user_prog_args_test",
> + "sum of args doesn't match\n");
> + }
> +
> + CHECK(skel->data->cpu_match == 0, "cpu_match_test", "failed\n");
> + CHECK(skel->bss->get_stack_success != numcpu + 1, "test_bpf_get_stack",
> + "failed on %d cores\n", numcpu - skel->bss->get_stack_success);
> + CHECK(skel->bss->get_stackid_success != numcpu + 1,
> + "test_bpf_get_stackid",
> + "failed on %d cores\n",
> + numcpu + 1 - skel->bss->get_stackid_success);
> +
> + user_prog__destroy(skel);
> +}
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/user_prog.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/user_prog.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000000..cf320e97f107a
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/user_prog.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +/* Copyright (c) 2020 Facebook */
> +#include "vmlinux.h"
> +#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
> +#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
> +
> +char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
> +
> +#ifndef PERF_MAX_STACK_DEPTH
> +#define PERF_MAX_STACK_DEPTH 127
> +#endif
> +
> +typedef __u64 stack_trace_t[PERF_MAX_STACK_DEPTH];
> +
> +struct {
> + __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE);
> + __uint(max_entries, 16384);
> + __uint(key_size, sizeof(__u32));
> + __uint(value_size, sizeof(stack_trace_t));
> +} stackmap SEC(".maps");
> +
> +volatile int cpu_match = 1;
> +volatile __u64 sum = 1;
> +volatile int get_stack_success = 0;
> +volatile int get_stackid_success = 0;
> +volatile __u64 stacktrace[PERF_MAX_STACK_DEPTH];
nit: no need for volatile for non-static variables
> +
> +SEC("user")
> +int user_func(struct bpf_user_prog_ctx *ctx)
If you put args in bpf_user_prog_ctx as a first field, you should be
able to re-use the BPF_PROG macro to access those arguments in a more
user-friendly way.
> +{
> + int cpu = bpf_get_smp_processor_id();
> + __u32 key = cpu;
> + long stackid, err;
> +
> + /* check the program runs on the right cpu */
> + if (ctx->args[0] && ctx->args[0] != cpu + 1)
> + cpu_match = 0;
> +
> + /* check the sum of arguments are correct */
> + sum = ctx->args[0] + ctx->args[1] + ctx->args[2] +
> + ctx->args[3] + ctx->args[4];
> +
> + /* check bpf_get_stackid works */
> + stackid = bpf_get_stackid(ctx, &stackmap, 0);
> + if (stackid >= 0)
> + get_stackid_success++;
> +
> + /* check bpf_get_stack works */
> + err = bpf_get_stack(ctx, (void *)stacktrace,
> + PERF_MAX_STACK_DEPTH * sizeof(__u64),
> + BPF_F_USER_STACK);
> + if (err >= 0)
> + get_stack_success++;
> +
> + return cpu + 2;
> +}
> --
> 2.24.1
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH bpf-next 2/5] libbpf: support BPF_PROG_TYPE_USER programs
From: Andrii Nakryiko @ 2020-08-03 1:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Song Liu
Cc: open list, bpf, Networking, Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann,
Kernel Team, john fastabend, KP Singh, Jesper Dangaard Brouer,
Daniel Xu
In-Reply-To: <20200801084721.1812607-3-songliubraving@fb.com>
On Sat, Aug 1, 2020 at 1:50 AM Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> wrote:
>
> Add cpu_plus to bpf_prog_test_run_attr. Add BPF_PROG_SEC "user" for
> BPF_PROG_TYPE_USER programs.
>
> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
> ---
> tools/lib/bpf/bpf.c | 1 +
> tools/lib/bpf/bpf.h | 3 +++
> tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c | 1 +
> tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_probes.c | 1 +
> 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.c b/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.c
> index e1bdf214f75fe..b28c3daa9c270 100644
> --- a/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.c
> +++ b/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.c
> @@ -693,6 +693,7 @@ int bpf_prog_test_run_xattr(struct bpf_prog_test_run_attr *test_attr)
> attr.test.ctx_size_in = test_attr->ctx_size_in;
> attr.test.ctx_size_out = test_attr->ctx_size_out;
> attr.test.repeat = test_attr->repeat;
> + attr.test.cpu_plus = test_attr->cpu_plus;
>
> ret = sys_bpf(BPF_PROG_TEST_RUN, &attr, sizeof(attr));
> test_attr->data_size_out = attr.test.data_size_out;
> diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.h b/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.h
> index 6d367e01d05e9..0c799740df566 100644
> --- a/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.h
> +++ b/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.h
> @@ -205,6 +205,9 @@ struct bpf_prog_test_run_attr {
> void *ctx_out; /* optional */
> __u32 ctx_size_out; /* in: max length of ctx_out
> * out: length of cxt_out */
> + __u32 cpu_plus; /* specify which cpu to run the test with
> + * cpu_plus = cpu_id + 1.
> + * If cpu_plus = 0, run on current cpu */
We can't do this due to ABI guarantees. We'll have to add a new API
using OPTS arguments.
> };
>
> LIBBPF_API int bpf_prog_test_run_xattr(struct bpf_prog_test_run_attr *test_attr);
> diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c b/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c
> index b9f11f854985b..9ce175a486214 100644
> --- a/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c
> +++ b/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c
> @@ -6922,6 +6922,7 @@ static const struct bpf_sec_def section_defs[] = {
> BPF_PROG_SEC("lwt_out", BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT),
> BPF_PROG_SEC("lwt_xmit", BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT),
> BPF_PROG_SEC("lwt_seg6local", BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_SEG6LOCAL),
> + BPF_PROG_SEC("user", BPF_PROG_TYPE_USER),
let's do "user/" for consistency with most other prog types (and nice
separation between prog type and custom user name)
> BPF_APROG_SEC("cgroup_skb/ingress", BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB,
> BPF_CGROUP_INET_INGRESS),
> BPF_APROG_SEC("cgroup_skb/egress", BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB,
> diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_probes.c b/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_probes.c
> index 5a3d3f0784081..163013084000e 100644
> --- a/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_probes.c
> +++ b/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_probes.c
> @@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ probe_load(enum bpf_prog_type prog_type, const struct bpf_insn *insns,
> case BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS:
> case BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT:
> case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM:
> + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_USER:
> default:
> break;
> }
> --
> 2.24.1
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH bpf-next 2/2] libbpf: support new uapi for map element bpf iterator
From: Andrii Nakryiko @ 2020-08-03 1:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Yonghong Song
Cc: bpf, Networking, Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, Kernel Team
In-Reply-To: <20200802042127.2119901-1-yhs@fb.com>
On Sat, Aug 1, 2020 at 9:22 PM Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> wrote:
>
> Previous commit adjusted kernel uapi for map
> element bpf iterator. This patch adjusted libbpf API
> due to uapi change.
>
> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
> ---
> tools/lib/bpf/bpf.c | 4 +++-
> tools/lib/bpf/bpf.h | 5 +++--
> tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c | 7 +++++--
> 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.c b/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.c
> index eab14c97c15d..c75a84398d51 100644
> --- a/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.c
> +++ b/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.c
> @@ -598,7 +598,9 @@ int bpf_link_create(int prog_fd, int target_fd,
> attr.link_create.prog_fd = prog_fd;
> attr.link_create.target_fd = target_fd;
> attr.link_create.attach_type = attach_type;
> - attr.link_create.flags = OPTS_GET(opts, flags, 0);
> + attr.link_create.iter_info =
> + ptr_to_u64(OPTS_GET(opts, iter_info, (void *)0));
> + attr.link_create.iter_info_len = OPTS_GET(opts, iter_info_len, 0);
>
> return sys_bpf(BPF_LINK_CREATE, &attr, sizeof(attr));
> }
> diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.h b/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.h
> index 28855fd5b5f4..c9895f191305 100644
> --- a/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.h
> +++ b/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.h
> @@ -170,9 +170,10 @@ LIBBPF_API int bpf_prog_detach2(int prog_fd, int attachable_fd,
>
> struct bpf_link_create_opts {
> size_t sz; /* size of this struct for forward/backward compatibility */
> - __u32 flags;
I'd actually keep flags in link_create_ops, as it's part of the kernel
UAPI anyways, we won't have to add it later. Just pass it through into
bpf_attr.
> + union bpf_iter_link_info *iter_info;
> + __u32 iter_info_len;
> };
> -#define bpf_link_create_opts__last_field flags
> +#define bpf_link_create_opts__last_field iter_info_len
>
> LIBBPF_API int bpf_link_create(int prog_fd, int target_fd,
> enum bpf_attach_type attach_type,
> diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c b/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c
> index 7be04e45d29c..dc8fabf9d30d 100644
> --- a/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c
> +++ b/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c
> @@ -8298,6 +8298,7 @@ bpf_program__attach_iter(struct bpf_program *prog,
> const struct bpf_iter_attach_opts *opts)
> {
> DECLARE_LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_link_create_opts, link_create_opts);
> + union bpf_iter_link_info linfo;
> char errmsg[STRERR_BUFSIZE];
> struct bpf_link *link;
> int prog_fd, link_fd;
> @@ -8307,8 +8308,10 @@ bpf_program__attach_iter(struct bpf_program *prog,
> return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>
> if (OPTS_HAS(opts, map_fd)) {
> - target_fd = opts->map_fd;
> - link_create_opts.flags = BPF_ITER_LINK_MAP_FD;
> + memset(&linfo, 0, sizeof(linfo));
> + linfo.map.map_fd = opts->map_fd;
> + link_create_opts.iter_info = &linfo;
> + link_create_opts.iter_info_len = sizeof(linfo);
Maybe instead of having map_fd directly in bpf_iter_attach_opts, let's
just accept bpf_iter_link_info and its len directly from the user?
Right now kernel UAPI and libbpf API for customizing iterator
attachment differ. It would be simpler to keep them in sync and we
won't have to discuss how to evolve bpf_iter_attach_opts as we add
more customization for different types of iterators. Thoughts?
> }
>
> prog_fd = bpf_program__fd(prog);
> --
> 2.24.1
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH bpf-next 1/2] bpf: change uapi for bpf iterator map elements
From: Andrii Nakryiko @ 2020-08-03 1:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Yonghong Song
Cc: bpf, Networking, Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, Kernel Team
In-Reply-To: <20200802042126.2119843-1-yhs@fb.com>
On Sat, Aug 1, 2020 at 9:22 PM Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> wrote:
>
> Commit a5cbe05a6673 ("bpf: Implement bpf iterator for
> map elements") added bpf iterator support for
> map elements. The map element bpf iterator requires
> info to identify a particular map. In the above
> commit, the attr->link_create.target_fd is used
> to carry map_fd and an enum bpf_iter_link_info
> is added to uapi to specify the target_fd actually
> representing a map_fd:
> enum bpf_iter_link_info {
> BPF_ITER_LINK_UNSPEC = 0,
> BPF_ITER_LINK_MAP_FD = 1,
>
> MAX_BPF_ITER_LINK_INFO,
> };
>
> This is an extensible approach as we can grow
> enumerator for pid, cgroup_id, etc. and we can
> unionize target_fd for pid, cgroup_id, etc.
> But in the future, there are chances that
> more complex customization may happen, e.g.,
> for tasks, it could be filtered based on
> both cgroup_id and user_id.
>
> This patch changed the uapi to have fields
> __aligned_u64 iter_info;
> __u32 iter_info_len;
> for additional iter_info for link_create.
> The iter_info is defined as
> union bpf_iter_link_info {
> struct {
> __u32 map_fd;
> } map;
> };
>
> So future extension for additional customization
> will be easier. The bpf_iter_link_info will be
> passed to target callback to validate and generic
> bpf_iter framework does not need to deal it any
> more.
>
> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
> ---
> include/linux/bpf.h | 10 ++++---
> include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 15 +++++-----
> kernel/bpf/bpf_iter.c | 52 +++++++++++++++-------------------
> kernel/bpf/map_iter.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++------
> kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 2 +-
> net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++------
> tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 15 +++++-----
> 7 files changed, 104 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-)
>
[...]
> int bpf_iter_link_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *prog)
> {
> + union bpf_iter_link_info __user *ulinfo;
> struct bpf_link_primer link_primer;
> struct bpf_iter_target_info *tinfo;
> - struct bpf_iter_aux_info aux = {};
> + union bpf_iter_link_info linfo;
> struct bpf_iter_link *link;
> - u32 prog_btf_id, target_fd;
> + u32 prog_btf_id, linfo_len;
> bool existed = false;
> - struct bpf_map *map;
> int err;
>
> + memset(&linfo, 0, sizeof(union bpf_iter_link_info));
> +
> + ulinfo = u64_to_user_ptr(attr->link_create.iter_info);
> + linfo_len = attr->link_create.iter_info_len;
> + if (ulinfo && linfo_len) {
We probably want to be more strict here: if either pointer or len is
non-zero, both should be present and valid. Otherwise we can have
garbage in iter_info, as long as iter_info_len is zero.
> + err = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(ulinfo, sizeof(linfo),
> + linfo_len);
> + if (err)
> + return err;
> + linfo_len = min_t(u32, linfo_len, sizeof(linfo));
> + if (copy_from_user(&linfo, ulinfo, linfo_len))
> + return -EFAULT;
> + }
> +
> prog_btf_id = prog->aux->attach_btf_id;
> mutex_lock(&targets_mutex);
> list_for_each_entry(tinfo, &targets, list) {
> @@ -411,13 +425,6 @@ int bpf_iter_link_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *prog)
> if (!existed)
> return -ENOENT;
>
> - /* Make sure user supplied flags are target expected. */
> - target_fd = attr->link_create.target_fd;
> - if (attr->link_create.flags != tinfo->reg_info->req_linfo)
> - return -EINVAL;
> - if (!attr->link_create.flags && target_fd)
> - return -EINVAL;
> -
Please still ensure that no flags are specified.
> link = kzalloc(sizeof(*link), GFP_USER | __GFP_NOWARN);
> if (!link)
> return -ENOMEM;
> @@ -431,28 +438,15 @@ int bpf_iter_link_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *prog)
> return err;
> }
>
[...]
> -static int bpf_iter_check_map(struct bpf_prog *prog,
> - struct bpf_iter_aux_info *aux)
> +static int bpf_iter_attach_map(struct bpf_prog *prog,
> + union bpf_iter_link_info *linfo,
> + struct bpf_iter_aux_info *aux)
> {
> - struct bpf_map *map = aux->map;
> + struct bpf_map *map;
> + int err = -EINVAL;
>
> - if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE)
> + if (!linfo->map.map_fd)
> return -EINVAL;
This could be -EBADF?
>
> - if (prog->aux->max_rdonly_access > map->value_size)
> - return -EACCES;
> + map = bpf_map_get_with_uref(linfo->map.map_fd);
> + if (IS_ERR(map))
> + return PTR_ERR(map);
> +
> + if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE)
> + goto put_map;
> +
> + if (prog->aux->max_rdonly_access > map->value_size) {
> + err = -EACCES;
> + goto put_map;
> + }
[...]
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] tools/bpf/bpftool: Fix wrong return value in do_dump()
From: Andrii Nakryiko @ 2020-08-03 1:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tianjia Zhang
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, Martin Lau, Song Liu,
Yonghong Song, Andrii Nakryiko, john fastabend, KP Singh,
Quentin Monnet, Jakub Kicinski, Toke Høiland-Jørgensen,
Tobias Klauser, Jiri Olsa, Networking, bpf, open list,
tianjia.zhang
In-Reply-To: <20200802111540.5384-1-tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
On Sun, Aug 2, 2020 at 4:16 AM Tianjia Zhang
<tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com> wrote:
>
> In case of btf_id does not exist, a negative error code -ENOENT
> should be returned.
>
> Fixes: c93cc69004df3 ("bpftool: add ability to dump BTF types")
> Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
> Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
> ---
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
> tools/bpf/bpftool/btf.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/tools/bpf/bpftool/btf.c b/tools/bpf/bpftool/btf.c
> index faac8189b285..c2f1fd414820 100644
> --- a/tools/bpf/bpftool/btf.c
> +++ b/tools/bpf/bpftool/btf.c
> @@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ static int do_dump(int argc, char **argv)
> goto done;
> }
> if (!btf) {
> - err = ENOENT;
> + err = -ENOENT;
> p_err("can't find btf with ID (%u)", btf_id);
> goto done;
> }
> --
> 2.26.2
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: KASAN: use-after-free Write in __sco_sock_close
From: syzbot @ 2020-08-03 0:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: coreteam, davem, devel, gregkh, johan.hedberg, kaber, kadlec,
kuba, linux-bluetooth, linux-kernel, linux-media, marcel, mchehab,
mchehab, netdev, netfilter-devel, pablo, syzkaller-bugs
In-Reply-To: <000000000000ab11c505abeb19f5@google.com>
syzbot has bisected this issue to:
commit 43ea43b9d8b27b7acd443ec59319faa3cdb8a616
Author: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
Date: Wed Oct 12 11:21:43 2016 +0000
[media] radio-bcm2048: don't ignore errors
bisection log: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/bisect.txt?x=1036e6a4900000
start commit: ac3a0c84 Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/g..
git tree: upstream
final oops: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/report.txt?x=1236e6a4900000
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=1436e6a4900000
kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=e59ee776d5aa8d55
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=077eca30d3cb7c02b273
syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=12cf1904900000
C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=10d52e14900000
Reported-by: syzbot+077eca30d3cb7c02b273@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 43ea43b9d8b2 ("[media] radio-bcm2048: don't ignore errors")
For information about bisection process see: https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#bisection
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference in bpf_prog_ADDR
From: Eric Dumazet @ 2020-08-02 23:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: syzbot, andriin, ast, bpf, daniel, davem, hawk, john.fastabend,
kafai, kpsingh, kuba, linux-kernel, netdev, songliubraving,
syzkaller-bugs, yhs
In-Reply-To: <00000000000006209e05abecc711@google.com>
On 8/2/20 3:45 PM, syzbot wrote:
> Hello,
>
> syzbot found the following issue on:
>
> HEAD commit: ac3a0c84 Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/g..
> git tree: upstream
> console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=13234970900000
> kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=c0cfcf935bcc94d2
> dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=192a7fbbece55f740074
> compiler: gcc (GCC) 10.1.0-syz 20200507
> syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=141541ea900000
>
> IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
> Reported-by: syzbot+192a7fbbece55f740074@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
>
> BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
> #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
> #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
> PGD 9176a067 P4D 9176a067 PUD 9176b067 PMD 0
> Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
> CPU: 1 PID: 8142 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.8.0-rc7-syzkaller #0
> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
> RIP: 0010:bpf_prog_e48ebe87b99394c4+0x1f/0x590
> Code: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 48 81 ec 00 00 00 00 53 41 55 41 56 41 57 6a 00 31 c0 48 8b 47 28 <48> 8b 40 00 8b 80 00 01 00 00 5b 41 5f 41 5e 41 5d 5b c9 c3 cc cc
> RSP: 0018:ffffc900038a7b00 EFLAGS: 00010246
> RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: dffffc0000000000
> RDX: ffff88808cfb0200 RSI: ffffc90000e7e038 RDI: ffffc900038a7ca8
> RBP: ffffc900038a7b28 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
> R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffc90000e7e000
> R13: ffffc90000e7e000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000
> FS: 00007fda07fef700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000091769000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
> Call Trace:
> bpf_prog_run_xdp include/linux/filter.h:734 [inline]
> bpf_test_run+0x221/0xc70 net/bpf/test_run.c:47
> bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0x2ca/0x510 net/bpf/test_run.c:524
> bpf_prog_test_run kernel/bpf/syscall.c:2983 [inline]
> __do_sys_bpf+0x2117/0x4b10 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4135
> do_syscall_64+0x60/0xe0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:384
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
> RIP: 0033:0x45cc79
> Code: 2d b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 fb b5 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
> RSP: 002b:00007fda07feec78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000141
> RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000001740 RCX: 000000000045cc79
> RDX: 0000000000000028 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: 000000000000000a
> RBP: 000000000078bfe0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
> R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000078bfac
> R13: 00007ffc3ef769bf R14: 00007fda07fef9c0 R15: 000000000078bfac
> Modules linked in:
> CR2: 0000000000000000
> ---[ end trace b2d24107e7fdae7d ]---
> RIP: 0010:bpf_prog_e48ebe87b99394c4+0x1f/0x590
> Code: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 48 81 ec 00 00 00 00 53 41 55 41 56 41 57 6a 00 31 c0 48 8b 47 28 <48> 8b 40 00 8b 80 00 01 00 00 5b 41 5f 41 5e 41 5d 5b c9 c3 cc cc
> RSP: 0018:ffffc900038a7b00 EFLAGS: 00010246
> RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: dffffc0000000000
> RDX: ffff88808cfb0200 RSI: ffffc90000e7e038 RDI: ffffc900038a7ca8
> RBP: ffffc900038a7b28 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
> R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffc90000e7e000
> R13: ffffc90000e7e000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000
> FS: 00007fda07fef700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000091769000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
>
>
> ---
> This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
> See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot.
> syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@googlegroups.com.
>
> syzbot will keep track of this issue. See:
> https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#status for how to communicate with syzbot.
> syzbot can test patches for this issue, for details see:
> https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#testing-patches
>
# https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=d60883a0b19a778d2bcab55f3f6459467f4a3ea7
# See https://goo.gl/kgGztJ for information about syzkaller reproducers.
#{"threaded":true,"collide":true,"repeat":true,"procs":6,"sandbox":"none","fault_call":-1,"tun":true,"netdev":true,"resetnet":true,"cgroups":true,"binfmt_misc":true,"close_fds":true,"vhci":true,"tmpdir":true,"segv":true}
bpf$PROG_LOAD(0x5, &(0x7f00000ba000)={0x6, 0x4, &(0x7f0000346fc8)=@framed={{}, [@alu={0x8000000201a7f19, 0x0, 0x201a7fa6, 0x0, 0x1, 0x14}]}, &(0x7f0000000040)='syzkaller\x00', 0x1, 0xfb, &(0x7f0000002880)=""/251, 0x0, 0x0, [], 0x0, 0x21}, 0x48)
r0 = bpf$PROG_LOAD(0x5, &(0x7f00002a0fb8)={0x13, 0x4, &(0x7f0000000480)=ANY=[@ANYBLOB="8500000011000000350000000000000085000000230000009500000d000000003c8ea5932cf669ebecab19b3fd50fec5eade4bb02a231016bc5733a4f152b8bdfdfebcfdaf3d5363dd79d50034e58579eda0cfe296"], &(0x7f0000000140)='GPL\x00', 0x4, 0x99, &(0x7f0000000180)=""/153, 0x0, 0x0, [], 0x0, 0x0, 0xffffffffffffffff, 0x8, 0x0, 0x0, 0x10, 0x0, 0xfffffffffffffd0c}, 0x64)
bpf$BPF_PROG_TEST_RUN(0xa, &(0x7f0000000080)={r0, 0x1000000, 0xe, 0x0, &(0x7f00000000c0)="61df712bc884fed5722780b6c2a7", 0x0, 0x8000, 0x0, 0xff9f}, 0x28)
Not clear how a BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_SEG6LOCAL ends up using bpf_prog_test_run_xdp() ?
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v3 7/9] net: phy: dp83640: Use generic helper function
From: Richard Cochran @ 2020-08-02 22:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kurt Kanzenbach
Cc: Andrew Lunn, Vivien Didelot, Florian Fainelli, David S. Miller,
Jakub Kicinski, Jiri Pirko, Ido Schimmel, Heiner Kallweit,
Russell King, Grygorii Strashko, Ivan Khoronzhuk, Samuel Zou,
netdev, Petr Machata
In-Reply-To: <20200730080048.32553-8-kurt@linutronix.de>
On Thu, Jul 30, 2020 at 10:00:46AM +0200, Kurt Kanzenbach wrote:
> In order to reduce code duplication between ptp drivers, generic helper
> functions were introduced. Use them.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kurt Kanzenbach <kurt@linutronix.de>
> ---
> drivers/net/phy/dp83640.c | 69 +++++++++------------------------------
> 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/dp83640.c b/drivers/net/phy/dp83640.c
> index 50fb7d16b75a..1cd987e3d0f2 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/phy/dp83640.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/phy/dp83640.c
> @@ -803,46 +803,28 @@ static int decode_evnt(struct dp83640_private *dp83640,
>
> static int match(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int type, struct rxts *rxts)
> {
> - unsigned int offset = 0;
> - u8 *msgtype, *data = skb_mac_header(skb);
> - __be16 *seqid;
> + struct ptp_header *hdr;
> + u8 msgtype;
> + u16 seqid;
> u16 hash;
>
> /* check sequenceID, messageType, 12 bit hash of offset 20-29 */
>
> - if (type & PTP_CLASS_VLAN)
> - offset += VLAN_HLEN;
> -
> - switch (type & PTP_CLASS_PMASK) {
> - case PTP_CLASS_IPV4:
> - offset += ETH_HLEN + IPV4_HLEN(data + offset) + UDP_HLEN;
> - break;
> - case PTP_CLASS_IPV6:
> - offset += ETH_HLEN + IP6_HLEN + UDP_HLEN;
> - break;
> - case PTP_CLASS_L2:
> - offset += ETH_HLEN;
> - break;
> - default:
> + hdr = ptp_parse_header(skb, type);
> + if (!hdr)
> return 0;
> - }
>
> - if (skb->len + ETH_HLEN < offset + OFF_PTP_SEQUENCE_ID + sizeof(*seqid))
> - return 0;
> + msgtype = ptp_get_msgtype(hdr, type);
>
> - if (unlikely(type & PTP_CLASS_V1))
> - msgtype = data + offset + OFF_PTP_CONTROL;
> - else
> - msgtype = data + offset;
> - if (rxts->msgtype != (*msgtype & 0xf))
> + if (rxts->msgtype != (msgtype & 0xf))
> return 0;
>
> - seqid = (__be16 *)(data + offset + OFF_PTP_SEQUENCE_ID);
> - if (rxts->seqid != ntohs(*seqid))
> + seqid = be16_to_cpu(hdr->sequence_id);
> + if (rxts->seqid != seqid)
> return 0;
>
> hash = ether_crc(DP83640_PACKET_HASH_LEN,
> - data + offset + DP83640_PACKET_HASH_OFFSET) >> 20;
> + (unsigned char *)&hdr->source_port_identity) >> 20;
Looks like DP83640_PACKET_HASH_OFFSET can be removed now.
Tested-by: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH bpf-next v5 1/2] bpf: setup socket family and addresses in bpf_prog_test_run_skb
From: Alexei Starovoitov @ 2020-08-02 22:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Dmitry Yakunin; +Cc: daniel, netdev, bpf, sdf
In-Reply-To: <20200802213631.78937-2-zeil@yandex-team.ru>
On Mon, Aug 03, 2020 at 12:36:30AM +0300, Dmitry Yakunin wrote:
> Now it's impossible to test all branches of cgroup_skb bpf program which
> accesses skb->family and skb->{local,remote}_ip{4,6} fields because they
> are zeroed during socket allocation. This commit fills socket family and
> addresses from related fields in constructed skb.
>
> v2:
> - fix build without CONFIG_IPV6 (kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>)
>
> v3:
> - check skb length before access to inet headers (Eric Dumazet)
>
> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Yakunin <zeil@yandex-team.ru>
> ---
> net/bpf/test_run.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/net/bpf/test_run.c b/net/bpf/test_run.c
> index b03c469..8d69295 100644
> --- a/net/bpf/test_run.c
> +++ b/net/bpf/test_run.c
> @@ -449,6 +449,27 @@ int bpf_prog_test_run_skb(struct bpf_prog *prog, const union bpf_attr *kattr,
> skb->protocol = eth_type_trans(skb, current->nsproxy->net_ns->loopback_dev);
> skb_reset_network_header(skb);
>
> + switch (skb->protocol) {
> + case htons(ETH_P_IP):
> + sk->sk_family = AF_INET;
> + if (pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr))) {
skb was just inited with __skb_put(skb, size);
Looking at pskb_may_pull() messes with my brain too much,
since it should never go into __pskb_pull_tail path.
Can you open code the skb->len check instead?
if (sizeof(struct iphdr) <= skb_headlen(skb)) {
> + sk->sk_rcv_saddr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
> + sk->sk_daddr = ip_hdr(skb)->daddr;
> + }
> + break;
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
> + case htons(ETH_P_IPV6):
> + sk->sk_family = AF_INET6;
> + if (pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr))) {
> + sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
> + sk->sk_v6_daddr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr;
> + }
> + break;
> +#endif
> + default:
> + break;
> + }
> +
> if (is_l2)
> __skb_push(skb, hh_len);
> if (is_direct_pkt_access)
> --
> 2.7.4
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [Linux-kernel-mentees] [PATCH net] rds: Prevent kernel-infoleak in rds_notify_queue_get()
From: Joe Perches @ 2020-08-02 22:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jason Gunthorpe
Cc: Leon Romanovsky, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Peilin Ye, Santosh Shilimkar,
David S. Miller, Jakub Kicinski, Dan Carpenter, Arnd Bergmann,
linux-kernel-mentees, netdev, linux-rdma, rds-devel, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <20200802222843.GP24045@ziepe.ca>
On Sun, 2020-08-02 at 19:28 -0300, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> On Sun, Aug 02, 2020 at 03:23:58PM -0700, Joe Perches wrote:
> > On Sun, 2020-08-02 at 19:10 -0300, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> > > On Sat, Aug 01, 2020 at 08:38:33AM +0300, Leon Romanovsky wrote:
> > >
> > > > I'm using {} instead of {0} because of this GCC bug.
> > > > https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=53119
> > >
> > > This is why the {} extension exists..
> >
> > There is no guarantee that the gcc struct initialization {}
> > extension also zeros padding.
>
> We just went over this. Yes there is, C11 requires it.
c11 is not c90. The kernel uses c90.
^ permalink raw reply
* BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference in bpf_prog_ADDR
From: syzbot @ 2020-08-02 22:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: andriin, ast, bpf, daniel, davem, hawk, john.fastabend, kafai,
kpsingh, kuba, linux-kernel, netdev, songliubraving,
syzkaller-bugs, yhs
Hello,
syzbot found the following issue on:
HEAD commit: ac3a0c84 Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/g..
git tree: upstream
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=13234970900000
kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=c0cfcf935bcc94d2
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=192a7fbbece55f740074
compiler: gcc (GCC) 10.1.0-syz 20200507
syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=141541ea900000
IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: syzbot+192a7fbbece55f740074@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 9176a067 P4D 9176a067 PUD 9176b067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 1 PID: 8142 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.8.0-rc7-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:bpf_prog_e48ebe87b99394c4+0x1f/0x590
Code: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 48 81 ec 00 00 00 00 53 41 55 41 56 41 57 6a 00 31 c0 48 8b 47 28 <48> 8b 40 00 8b 80 00 01 00 00 5b 41 5f 41 5e 41 5d 5b c9 c3 cc cc
RSP: 0018:ffffc900038a7b00 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: dffffc0000000000
RDX: ffff88808cfb0200 RSI: ffffc90000e7e038 RDI: ffffc900038a7ca8
RBP: ffffc900038a7b28 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffc90000e7e000
R13: ffffc90000e7e000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007fda07fef700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000091769000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
bpf_prog_run_xdp include/linux/filter.h:734 [inline]
bpf_test_run+0x221/0xc70 net/bpf/test_run.c:47
bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0x2ca/0x510 net/bpf/test_run.c:524
bpf_prog_test_run kernel/bpf/syscall.c:2983 [inline]
__do_sys_bpf+0x2117/0x4b10 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4135
do_syscall_64+0x60/0xe0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:384
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x45cc79
Code: 2d b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 fb b5 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007fda07feec78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000141
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000001740 RCX: 000000000045cc79
RDX: 0000000000000028 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: 000000000000000a
RBP: 000000000078bfe0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000078bfac
R13: 00007ffc3ef769bf R14: 00007fda07fef9c0 R15: 000000000078bfac
Modules linked in:
CR2: 0000000000000000
---[ end trace b2d24107e7fdae7d ]---
RIP: 0010:bpf_prog_e48ebe87b99394c4+0x1f/0x590
Code: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 48 81 ec 00 00 00 00 53 41 55 41 56 41 57 6a 00 31 c0 48 8b 47 28 <48> 8b 40 00 8b 80 00 01 00 00 5b 41 5f 41 5e 41 5d 5b c9 c3 cc cc
RSP: 0018:ffffc900038a7b00 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: dffffc0000000000
RDX: ffff88808cfb0200 RSI: ffffc90000e7e038 RDI: ffffc900038a7ca8
RBP: ffffc900038a7b28 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffc90000e7e000
R13: ffffc90000e7e000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007fda07fef700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000091769000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
---
This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot.
syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@googlegroups.com.
syzbot will keep track of this issue. See:
https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#status for how to communicate with syzbot.
syzbot can test patches for this issue, for details see:
https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#testing-patches
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH v5 bpf-next 3/4] bpf: Add kernel module with user mode driver that populates bpffs.
From: Alexei Starovoitov @ 2020-08-02 22:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: davem; +Cc: daniel, netdev, bpf, kernel-team
In-Reply-To: <20200802222950.34696-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Add kernel module with user mode driver that populates bpffs with
BPF iterators.
$ mount bpffs /my/bpffs/ -t bpf
$ ls -la /my/bpffs/
total 4
drwxrwxrwt 2 root root 0 Jul 2 00:27 .
drwxr-xr-x 19 root root 4096 Jul 2 00:09 ..
-rw------- 1 root root 0 Jul 2 00:27 maps.debug
-rw------- 1 root root 0 Jul 2 00:27 progs.debug
The user mode driver will load BPF Type Formats, create BPF maps, populate BPF
maps, load two BPF programs, attach them to BPF iterators, and finally send two
bpf_link IDs back to the kernel.
The kernel will pin two bpf_links into newly mounted bpffs instance under
names "progs.debug" and "maps.debug". These two files become human readable.
$ cat /my/bpffs/progs.debug
id name attached
11 dump_bpf_map bpf_iter_bpf_map
12 dump_bpf_prog bpf_iter_bpf_prog
27 test_pkt_access
32 test_main test_pkt_access test_pkt_access
33 test_subprog1 test_pkt_access_subprog1 test_pkt_access
34 test_subprog2 test_pkt_access_subprog2 test_pkt_access
35 test_subprog3 test_pkt_access_subprog3 test_pkt_access
36 new_get_skb_len get_skb_len test_pkt_access
37 new_get_skb_ifindex get_skb_ifindex test_pkt_access
38 new_get_constant get_constant test_pkt_access
The BPF program dump_bpf_prog() in iterators.bpf.c is printing this data about
all BPF programs currently loaded in the system. This information is unstable
and will change from kernel to kernel as ".debug" suffix conveys.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
init/Kconfig | 2 +
kernel/bpf/Makefile | 1 +
kernel/bpf/inode.c | 116 +++++++++++++++++-
kernel/bpf/preload/Kconfig | 18 +++
kernel/bpf/preload/Makefile | 21 ++++
kernel/bpf/preload/bpf_preload.h | 16 +++
kernel/bpf/preload/bpf_preload_kern.c | 91 ++++++++++++++
kernel/bpf/preload/bpf_preload_umd_blob.S | 7 ++
.../preload/iterators/bpf_preload_common.h | 13 ++
kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/iterators.c | 94 ++++++++++++++
10 files changed, 376 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/preload/Kconfig
create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/preload/Makefile
create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/preload/bpf_preload.h
create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/preload/bpf_preload_kern.c
create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/preload/bpf_preload_umd_blob.S
create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/bpf_preload_common.h
create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/iterators.c
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 0498af567f70..2adc1fa31fa1 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -2313,3 +2313,5 @@ config ARCH_HAS_SYNC_CORE_BEFORE_USERMODE
# <asm/syscall_wrapper.h>.
config ARCH_HAS_SYSCALL_WRAPPER
def_bool n
+
+source "kernel/bpf/preload/Kconfig"
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/Makefile b/kernel/bpf/Makefile
index e6eb9c0402da..19e137aae40e 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/bpf/Makefile
@@ -29,3 +29,4 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_BPF_JIT),y)
obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += bpf_struct_ops.o
obj-${CONFIG_BPF_LSM} += bpf_lsm.o
endif
+obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_PRELOAD) += preload/
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/inode.c b/kernel/bpf/inode.c
index fb878ba3f22f..b48a56f53495 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/inode.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/inode.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include <linux/bpf_trace.h>
+#include "preload/bpf_preload.h"
enum bpf_type {
BPF_TYPE_UNSPEC = 0,
@@ -369,9 +370,10 @@ static struct dentry *
bpf_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, unsigned flags)
{
/* Dots in names (e.g. "/sys/fs/bpf/foo.bar") are reserved for future
- * extensions.
+ * extensions. That allows popoulate_bpffs() create special files.
*/
- if (strchr(dentry->d_name.name, '.'))
+ if ((dir->i_mode & S_IALLUGO) &&
+ strchr(dentry->d_name.name, '.'))
return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
return simple_lookup(dir, dentry, flags);
@@ -409,6 +411,27 @@ static const struct inode_operations bpf_dir_iops = {
.unlink = simple_unlink,
};
+/* pin iterator link into bpffs */
+static int bpf_iter_link_pin_kernel(struct dentry *parent,
+ const char *name, struct bpf_link *link)
+{
+ umode_t mode = S_IFREG | S_IRUSR;
+ struct dentry *dentry;
+ int ret;
+
+ inode_lock(parent->d_inode);
+ dentry = lookup_one_len(name, parent, strlen(name));
+ if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+ inode_unlock(parent->d_inode);
+ return PTR_ERR(dentry);
+ }
+ ret = bpf_mkobj_ops(dentry, mode, link, &bpf_link_iops,
+ &bpf_iter_fops);
+ dput(dentry);
+ inode_unlock(parent->d_inode);
+ return ret;
+}
+
static int bpf_obj_do_pin(const char __user *pathname, void *raw,
enum bpf_type type)
{
@@ -638,6 +661,91 @@ static int bpf_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
return 0;
}
+struct bpf_preload_ops *bpf_preload_ops;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_preload_ops);
+
+static bool bpf_preload_mod_get(void)
+{
+ /* If bpf_preload.ko wasn't loaded earlier then load it now.
+ * When bpf_preload is built into vmlinux the module's __init
+ * function will populate it.
+ */
+ if (!bpf_preload_ops) {
+ request_module("bpf_preload");
+ if (!bpf_preload_ops)
+ return false;
+ }
+ /* And grab the reference, so the module doesn't disappear while the
+ * kernel is interacting with the kernel module and its UMD.
+ */
+ if (!try_module_get(bpf_preload_ops->owner)) {
+ pr_err("bpf_preload module get failed.\n");
+ return false;
+ }
+ return true;
+}
+
+static void bpf_preload_mod_put(void)
+{
+ if (bpf_preload_ops)
+ /* now user can "rmmod bpf_preload" if necessary */
+ module_put(bpf_preload_ops->owner);
+}
+
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_preload_lock);
+
+static int populate_bpffs(struct dentry *parent)
+{
+ struct bpf_preload_info objs[BPF_PRELOAD_LINKS] = {};
+ struct bpf_link *links[BPF_PRELOAD_LINKS] = {};
+ int err = 0, i;
+
+ /* grab the mutex to make sure the kernel interactions with bpf_preload
+ * UMD are serialized
+ */
+ mutex_lock(&bpf_preload_lock);
+
+ /* if bpf_preload.ko wasn't built into vmlinux then load it */
+ if (!bpf_preload_mod_get())
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!bpf_preload_ops->info.tgid) {
+ /* preload() will start UMD that will load BPF iterator programs */
+ err = bpf_preload_ops->preload(objs);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_put;
+ for (i = 0; i < BPF_PRELOAD_LINKS; i++) {
+ links[i] = bpf_link_by_id(objs[i].link_id);
+ if (IS_ERR(links[i])) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(links[i]);
+ goto out_put;
+ }
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < BPF_PRELOAD_LINKS; i++) {
+ err = bpf_iter_link_pin_kernel(parent,
+ objs[i].link_name, links[i]);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_put;
+ /* do not unlink successfully pinned links even
+ * if later link fails to pin
+ */
+ links[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ /* finish() will tell UMD process to exit */
+ err = bpf_preload_ops->finish();
+ if (err)
+ goto out_put;
+ }
+out_put:
+ bpf_preload_mod_put();
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&bpf_preload_lock);
+ for (i = 0; i < BPF_PRELOAD_LINKS && err; i++)
+ if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(links[i]))
+ bpf_link_put(links[i]);
+ return err;
+}
+
static int bpf_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
{
static const struct tree_descr bpf_rfiles[] = { { "" } };
@@ -654,8 +762,8 @@ static int bpf_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
inode = sb->s_root->d_inode;
inode->i_op = &bpf_dir_iops;
inode->i_mode &= ~S_IALLUGO;
+ populate_bpffs(sb->s_root);
inode->i_mode |= S_ISVTX | opts->mode;
-
return 0;
}
@@ -705,6 +813,8 @@ static int __init bpf_init(void)
{
int ret;
+ mutex_init(&bpf_preload_lock);
+
ret = sysfs_create_mount_point(fs_kobj, "bpf");
if (ret)
return ret;
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/preload/Kconfig b/kernel/bpf/preload/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b8ba5a9398ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/bpf/preload/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+menuconfig BPF_PRELOAD
+ bool "Preload BPF file system with kernel specific program and map iterators"
+ depends on BPF
+ help
+ This builds kernel module with several embedded BPF programs that are
+ pinned into BPF FS mount point as human readable files that are
+ useful in debugging and introspection of BPF programs and maps.
+
+if BPF_PRELOAD
+config BPF_PRELOAD_UMD
+ tristate "bpf_preload kernel module with user mode driver"
+ depends on CC_CAN_LINK
+ depends on m || CC_CAN_LINK_STATIC
+ default m
+ help
+ This builds bpf_preload kernel module with embedded user mode driver.
+endif
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/preload/Makefile b/kernel/bpf/preload/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..191d82209842
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/bpf/preload/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+LIBBPF := $(srctree)/../../tools/lib/bpf
+userccflags += -I $(srctree)/tools/include/ -I $(srctree)/tools/include/uapi -I $(LIBBPF) \
+ -I $(srctree)/tools/lib/ \
+ -I $(srctree)/kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/ -Wno-int-conversion \
+ -DCOMPAT_NEED_REALLOCARRAY
+
+userprogs := bpf_preload_umd
+
+LIBBPF_O := $(LIBBPF)/bpf.o $(LIBBPF)/libbpf.o $(LIBBPF)/btf.o $(LIBBPF)/libbpf_errno.o \
+ $(LIBBPF)/str_error.o $(LIBBPF)/hashmap.o $(LIBBPF)/libbpf_probes.o
+
+bpf_preload_umd-objs := iterators/iterators.o $(LIBBPF_O)
+
+userldflags += -lelf -lz
+
+$(obj)/bpf_preload_umd_blob.o: $(obj)/bpf_preload_umd
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_PRELOAD_UMD) += bpf_preload.o
+bpf_preload-objs += bpf_preload_kern.o bpf_preload_umd_blob.o
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/preload/bpf_preload.h b/kernel/bpf/preload/bpf_preload.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2f9932276f2e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/bpf/preload/bpf_preload.h
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _BPF_PRELOAD_H
+#define _BPF_PRELOAD_H
+
+#include <linux/usermode_driver.h>
+#include "iterators/bpf_preload_common.h"
+
+struct bpf_preload_ops {
+ struct umd_info info;
+ int (*preload)(struct bpf_preload_info *);
+ int (*finish)(void);
+ struct module *owner;
+};
+extern struct bpf_preload_ops *bpf_preload_ops;
+#define BPF_PRELOAD_LINKS 2
+#endif
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/preload/bpf_preload_kern.c b/kernel/bpf/preload/bpf_preload_kern.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..79c5772465f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/bpf/preload/bpf_preload_kern.c
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/pid.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+#include "bpf_preload.h"
+
+extern char bpf_preload_umd_start;
+extern char bpf_preload_umd_end;
+
+static int preload(struct bpf_preload_info *obj);
+static int finish(void);
+
+static struct bpf_preload_ops umd_ops = {
+ .info.driver_name = "bpf_preload",
+ .preload = preload,
+ .finish = finish,
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+};
+
+static int preload(struct bpf_preload_info *obj)
+{
+ int magic = BPF_PRELOAD_START;
+ loff_t pos = 0;
+ int i, err;
+ ssize_t n;
+
+ err = fork_usermode_driver(&umd_ops.info);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* send the start magic to let UMD proceed with loading BPF progs */
+ n = kernel_write(umd_ops.info.pipe_to_umh,
+ &magic, sizeof(magic), &pos);
+ if (n != sizeof(magic))
+ return -EPIPE;
+
+ /* receive bpf_link IDs and names from UMD */
+ pos = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < BPF_PRELOAD_LINKS; i++) {
+ n = kernel_read(umd_ops.info.pipe_from_umh,
+ &obj[i], sizeof(*obj), &pos);
+ if (n != sizeof(*obj))
+ return -EPIPE;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int finish(void)
+{
+ int magic = BPF_PRELOAD_END;
+ struct pid *tgid;
+ loff_t pos = 0;
+ ssize_t n;
+
+ /* send the last magic to UMD. It will do a normal exit. */
+ n = kernel_write(umd_ops.info.pipe_to_umh,
+ &magic, sizeof(magic), &pos);
+ if (n != sizeof(magic))
+ return -EPIPE;
+ tgid = umd_ops.info.tgid;
+ wait_event(tgid->wait_pidfd, thread_group_exited(tgid));
+ umd_ops.info.tgid = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init load_umd(void)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ err = umd_load_blob(&umd_ops.info, &bpf_preload_umd_start,
+ &bpf_preload_umd_end - &bpf_preload_umd_start);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ bpf_preload_ops = &umd_ops;
+ return err;
+}
+
+static void __exit fini_umd(void)
+{
+ bpf_preload_ops = NULL;
+ /* kill UMD in case it's still there due to earlier error */
+ kill_pid(umd_ops.info.tgid, SIGKILL, 1);
+ umd_ops.info.tgid = NULL;
+ umd_unload_blob(&umd_ops.info);
+}
+late_initcall(load_umd);
+module_exit(fini_umd);
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/preload/bpf_preload_umd_blob.S b/kernel/bpf/preload/bpf_preload_umd_blob.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d0fe58c0734a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/bpf/preload/bpf_preload_umd_blob.S
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+ .section .init.rodata, "a"
+ .global bpf_preload_umd_start
+bpf_preload_umd_start:
+ .incbin "bpf_preload_umd"
+ .global bpf_preload_umd_end
+bpf_preload_umd_end:
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/bpf_preload_common.h b/kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/bpf_preload_common.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8464d1a48c05
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/bpf_preload_common.h
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _BPF_PRELOAD_COMMON_H
+#define _BPF_PRELOAD_COMMON_H
+
+#define BPF_PRELOAD_START 0x5555
+#define BPF_PRELOAD_END 0xAAAA
+
+struct bpf_preload_info {
+ char link_name[16];
+ int link_id;
+};
+
+#endif
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/iterators.c b/kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/iterators.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b7ff87939172
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/iterators.c
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (c) 2020 Facebook */
+#include <argp.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <bpf/libbpf.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf.h>
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#include "iterators.skel.h"
+#include "bpf_preload_common.h"
+
+int to_kernel = -1;
+int from_kernel = 0;
+
+static int send_link_to_kernel(struct bpf_link *link, const char *link_name)
+{
+ struct bpf_preload_info obj = {};
+ struct bpf_link_info info = {};
+ __u32 info_len = sizeof(info);
+ int err;
+
+ err = bpf_obj_get_info_by_fd(bpf_link__fd(link), &info, &info_len);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ obj.link_id = info.id;
+ if (strlen(link_name) >= sizeof(obj.link_name))
+ return -E2BIG;
+ strcpy(obj.link_name, link_name);
+ if (write(to_kernel, &obj, sizeof(obj)) != sizeof(obj))
+ return -EPIPE;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ struct rlimit rlim = { RLIM_INFINITY, RLIM_INFINITY };
+ struct iterators_bpf *skel;
+ int err, magic;
+ int debug_fd;
+
+ debug_fd = open("/dev/console", O_WRONLY | O_NOCTTY | O_CLOEXEC);
+ if (debug_fd < 0)
+ return 1;
+ to_kernel = dup(1);
+ close(1);
+ dup(debug_fd);
+ /* now stdin and stderr point to /dev/console */
+
+ read(from_kernel, &magic, sizeof(magic));
+ if (magic != BPF_PRELOAD_START) {
+ printf("bad start magic %d\n", magic);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ setrlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, &rlim);
+ /* libbpf opens BPF object and loads it into the kernel */
+ skel = iterators_bpf__open_and_load();
+ if (!skel) {
+ /* iterators.skel.h is little endian.
+ * libbpf doesn't support automatic little->big conversion
+ * of BPF bytecode yet.
+ * The program load will fail in such case.
+ */
+ printf("Failed load could be due to wrong endianness\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ err = iterators_bpf__attach(skel);
+ if (err)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ /* send two bpf_link IDs with names to the kernel */
+ err = send_link_to_kernel(skel->links.dump_bpf_map, "maps.debug");
+ if (err)
+ goto cleanup;
+ err = send_link_to_kernel(skel->links.dump_bpf_prog, "progs.debug");
+ if (err)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ /* The kernel will proceed with pinnging the links in bpffs.
+ * UMD will wait on read from pipe.
+ */
+ read(from_kernel, &magic, sizeof(magic));
+ if (magic != BPF_PRELOAD_END) {
+ printf("bad final magic %d\n", magic);
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ }
+cleanup:
+ iterators_bpf__destroy(skel);
+
+ return err != 0;
+}
--
2.23.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v5 bpf-next 4/4] selftests/bpf: Add bpffs preload test.
From: Alexei Starovoitov @ 2020-08-02 22:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: davem; +Cc: daniel, netdev, bpf, kernel-team
In-Reply-To: <20200802222950.34696-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Add a test that mounts two bpffs instances and checks progs.debug
and maps.debug for sanity data.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
.../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/test_bpffs.c | 94 +++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 94 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/test_bpffs.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/test_bpffs.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/test_bpffs.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..172c999e523c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/test_bpffs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (c) 2020 Facebook */
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <sched.h>
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <test_progs.h>
+
+#define TDIR "/sys/kernel/debug"
+
+static int read_iter(char *file)
+{
+ /* 1024 should be enough to get contiguous 4 "iter" letters at some point */
+ char buf[1024];
+ int fd, len;
+
+ fd = open(file, 0);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return -1;
+ while ((len = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0)
+ if (strstr(buf, "iter")) {
+ close(fd);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ close(fd);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int fn(void)
+{
+ int err, duration = 0;
+
+ err = unshare(CLONE_NEWNS);
+ if (CHECK(err, "unshare", "failed: %d\n", errno))
+ goto out;
+
+ err = mount("", "/", "", MS_REC | MS_PRIVATE, NULL);
+ if (CHECK(err, "mount /", "failed: %d\n", errno))
+ goto out;
+
+ err = umount(TDIR);
+ if (CHECK(err, "umount " TDIR, "failed: %d\n", errno))
+ goto out;
+
+ err = mount("none", TDIR, "tmpfs", 0, NULL);
+ if (CHECK(err, "mount", "mount root failed: %d\n", errno))
+ goto out;
+
+ err = mkdir(TDIR "/fs1", 0777);
+ if (CHECK(err, "mkdir "TDIR"/fs1", "failed: %d\n", errno))
+ goto out;
+ err = mkdir(TDIR "/fs2", 0777);
+ if (CHECK(err, "mkdir "TDIR"/fs2", "failed: %d\n", errno))
+ goto out;
+
+ err = mount("bpf", TDIR "/fs1", "bpf", 0, NULL);
+ if (CHECK(err, "mount bpffs "TDIR"/fs1", "failed: %d\n", errno))
+ goto out;
+ err = mount("bpf", TDIR "/fs2", "bpf", 0, NULL);
+ if (CHECK(err, "mount bpffs " TDIR "/fs2", "failed: %d\n", errno))
+ goto out;
+
+ err = read_iter(TDIR "/fs1/maps.debug");
+ if (CHECK(err, "reading " TDIR "/fs1/maps.debug", "failed\n"))
+ goto out;
+ err = read_iter(TDIR "/fs2/progs.debug");
+ if (CHECK(err, "reading " TDIR "/fs2/progs.debug", "failed\n"))
+ goto out;
+out:
+ umount(TDIR "/fs1");
+ umount(TDIR "/fs2");
+ rmdir(TDIR "/fs1");
+ rmdir(TDIR "/fs2");
+ umount(TDIR);
+ exit(err);
+}
+
+void test_test_bpffs(void)
+{
+ int err, duration = 0, status = 0;
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ pid = fork();
+ if (CHECK(pid == -1, "clone", "clone failed %d", errno))
+ return;
+ if (pid == 0)
+ fn();
+ err = waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
+ if (CHECK(err == -1 && errno != ECHILD, "waitpid", "failed %d", errno))
+ return;
+ if (CHECK(WEXITSTATUS(status), "bpffs test ", "failed %d", WEXITSTATUS(status)))
+ return;
+}
--
2.23.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v5 bpf-next 2/4] bpf: Add BPF program and map iterators as built-in BPF programs.
From: Alexei Starovoitov @ 2020-08-02 22:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: davem; +Cc: daniel, netdev, bpf, kernel-team
In-Reply-To: <20200802222950.34696-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
The program and map iterators work similar to seq_file-s.
Once the program is pinned in bpffs it can be read with "cat" tool
to print human readable output. In this case about BPF programs and maps.
For example:
$ cat /sys/fs/bpf/progs.debug
id name attached
5 dump_bpf_map bpf_iter_bpf_map
6 dump_bpf_prog bpf_iter_bpf_prog
$ cat /sys/fs/bpf/maps.debug
id name max_entries
3 iterator.rodata 1
To avoid kernel build dependency on clang 10 separate bpf skeleton generation
into manual "make" step and instead check-in generated .skel.h into git.
Unlike 'bpftool prog show' in-kernel BTF name is used (when available)
to print full name of BPF program instead of 16-byte truncated name.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
---
kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/.gitignore | 2 +
kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/Makefile | 57 +++
kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/README | 4 +
kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/iterators.bpf.c | 114 +++++
kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/iterators.skel.h | 410 ++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 587 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/.gitignore
create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/Makefile
create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/README
create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/iterators.bpf.c
create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/iterators.skel.h
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/.gitignore b/kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ffdb70230c8b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/.output
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/Makefile b/kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..28fa8c1440f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+OUTPUT := .output
+CLANG ?= clang
+LLC ?= llc
+LLVM_STRIP ?= llvm-strip
+DEFAULT_BPFTOOL := $(OUTPUT)/sbin/bpftool
+BPFTOOL ?= $(DEFAULT_BPFTOOL)
+LIBBPF_SRC := $(abspath ../../../../tools/lib/bpf)
+BPFOBJ := $(OUTPUT)/libbpf.a
+BPF_INCLUDE := $(OUTPUT)
+INCLUDES := -I$(OUTPUT) -I$(BPF_INCLUDE) -I$(abspath ../../../../tools/lib) \
+ -I$(abspath ../../../../tools/include/uapi)
+CFLAGS := -g -Wall
+
+abs_out := $(abspath $(OUTPUT))
+ifeq ($(V),1)
+Q =
+msg =
+else
+Q = @
+msg = @printf ' %-8s %s%s\n' "$(1)" "$(notdir $(2))" "$(if $(3), $(3))";
+MAKEFLAGS += --no-print-directory
+submake_extras := feature_display=0
+endif
+
+.DELETE_ON_ERROR:
+
+.PHONY: all clean
+
+all: iterators.skel.h
+
+clean:
+ $(call msg,CLEAN)
+ $(Q)rm -rf $(OUTPUT) iterators
+
+iterators.skel.h: $(OUTPUT)/iterators.bpf.o | $(BPFTOOL)
+ $(call msg,GEN-SKEL,$@)
+ $(Q)$(BPFTOOL) gen skeleton $< > $@
+
+
+$(OUTPUT)/iterators.bpf.o: iterators.bpf.c $(BPFOBJ) | $(OUTPUT)
+ $(call msg,BPF,$@)
+ $(Q)$(CLANG) -g -O2 -target bpf $(INCLUDES) \
+ -c $(filter %.c,$^) -o $@ && \
+ $(LLVM_STRIP) -g $@
+
+$(OUTPUT):
+ $(call msg,MKDIR,$@)
+ $(Q)mkdir -p $(OUTPUT)
+
+$(BPFOBJ): $(wildcard $(LIBBPF_SRC)/*.[ch] $(LIBBPF_SRC)/Makefile) | $(OUTPUT)
+ $(Q)$(MAKE) $(submake_extras) -C $(LIBBPF_SRC) \
+ OUTPUT=$(abspath $(dir $@))/ $(abspath $@)
+
+$(DEFAULT_BPFTOOL):
+ $(Q)$(MAKE) $(submake_extras) -C ../../../../tools/bpf/bpftool \
+ prefix= OUTPUT=$(abs_out)/ DESTDIR=$(abs_out) install
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/README b/kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/README
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7fd6d39a9ad2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/README
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+WARNING:
+If you change "iterators.bpf.c" do "make -j" in this directory to rebuild "iterators.skel.h".
+Make sure to have clang 10 installed.
+See Documentation/bpf/bpf_devel_QA.rst
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/iterators.bpf.c b/kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/iterators.bpf.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5ded550b2ed6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/iterators.bpf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (c) 2020 Facebook */
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_core_read.h>
+
+#pragma clang attribute push (__attribute__((preserve_access_index)), apply_to = record)
+struct seq_file;
+struct bpf_iter_meta {
+ struct seq_file *seq;
+ __u64 session_id;
+ __u64 seq_num;
+};
+
+struct bpf_map {
+ __u32 id;
+ char name[16];
+ __u32 max_entries;
+};
+
+struct bpf_iter__bpf_map {
+ struct bpf_iter_meta *meta;
+ struct bpf_map *map;
+};
+
+struct btf_type {
+ __u32 name_off;
+};
+
+struct btf_header {
+ __u32 str_len;
+};
+
+struct btf {
+ const char *strings;
+ struct btf_type **types;
+ struct btf_header hdr;
+};
+
+struct bpf_prog_aux {
+ __u32 id;
+ char name[16];
+ const char *attach_func_name;
+ struct bpf_prog *linked_prog;
+ struct bpf_func_info *func_info;
+ struct btf *btf;
+};
+
+struct bpf_prog {
+ struct bpf_prog_aux *aux;
+};
+
+struct bpf_iter__bpf_prog {
+ struct bpf_iter_meta *meta;
+ struct bpf_prog *prog;
+};
+#pragma clang attribute pop
+
+static const char *get_name(struct btf *btf, long btf_id, const char *fallback)
+{
+ struct btf_type **types, *t;
+ unsigned int name_off;
+ const char *str;
+
+ if (!btf)
+ return fallback;
+ str = btf->strings;
+ types = btf->types;
+ bpf_probe_read_kernel(&t, sizeof(t), types + btf_id);
+ name_off = BPF_CORE_READ(t, name_off);
+ if (name_off >= btf->hdr.str_len)
+ return fallback;
+ return str + name_off;
+}
+
+SEC("iter/bpf_map")
+int dump_bpf_map(struct bpf_iter__bpf_map *ctx)
+{
+ struct seq_file *seq = ctx->meta->seq;
+ __u64 seq_num = ctx->meta->seq_num;
+ struct bpf_map *map = ctx->map;
+
+ if (!map)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (seq_num == 0)
+ BPF_SEQ_PRINTF(seq, " id name max_entries\n");
+
+ BPF_SEQ_PRINTF(seq, "%4u %-16s%6d\n", map->id, map->name, map->max_entries);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("iter/bpf_prog")
+int dump_bpf_prog(struct bpf_iter__bpf_prog *ctx)
+{
+ struct seq_file *seq = ctx->meta->seq;
+ __u64 seq_num = ctx->meta->seq_num;
+ struct bpf_prog *prog = ctx->prog;
+ struct bpf_prog_aux *aux;
+
+ if (!prog)
+ return 0;
+
+ aux = prog->aux;
+ if (seq_num == 0)
+ BPF_SEQ_PRINTF(seq, " id name attached\n");
+
+ BPF_SEQ_PRINTF(seq, "%4u %-16s %s %s\n", aux->id,
+ get_name(aux->btf, aux->func_info[0].type_id, aux->name),
+ aux->attach_func_name, aux->linked_prog->aux->name);
+ return 0;
+}
+char LICENSE[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/iterators.skel.h b/kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/iterators.skel.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c3171357dc4f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/iterators.skel.h
@@ -0,0 +1,410 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (LGPL-2.1 OR BSD-2-Clause) */
+
+/* THIS FILE IS AUTOGENERATED! */
+#ifndef __ITERATORS_BPF_SKEL_H__
+#define __ITERATORS_BPF_SKEL_H__
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <bpf/libbpf.h>
+
+struct iterators_bpf {
+ struct bpf_object_skeleton *skeleton;
+ struct bpf_object *obj;
+ struct {
+ struct bpf_map *rodata;
+ } maps;
+ struct {
+ struct bpf_program *dump_bpf_map;
+ struct bpf_program *dump_bpf_prog;
+ } progs;
+ struct {
+ struct bpf_link *dump_bpf_map;
+ struct bpf_link *dump_bpf_prog;
+ } links;
+ struct iterators_bpf__rodata {
+ char dump_bpf_map____fmt[35];
+ char dump_bpf_map____fmt_1[14];
+ char dump_bpf_prog____fmt[32];
+ char dump_bpf_prog____fmt_2[17];
+ } *rodata;
+};
+
+static void
+iterators_bpf__destroy(struct iterators_bpf *obj)
+{
+ if (!obj)
+ return;
+ if (obj->skeleton)
+ bpf_object__destroy_skeleton(obj->skeleton);
+ free(obj);
+}
+
+static inline int
+iterators_bpf__create_skeleton(struct iterators_bpf *obj);
+
+static inline struct iterators_bpf *
+iterators_bpf__open_opts(const struct bpf_object_open_opts *opts)
+{
+ struct iterators_bpf *obj;
+
+ obj = (typeof(obj))calloc(1, sizeof(*obj));
+ if (!obj)
+ return NULL;
+ if (iterators_bpf__create_skeleton(obj))
+ goto err;
+ if (bpf_object__open_skeleton(obj->skeleton, opts))
+ goto err;
+
+ return obj;
+err:
+ iterators_bpf__destroy(obj);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static inline struct iterators_bpf *
+iterators_bpf__open(void)
+{
+ return iterators_bpf__open_opts(NULL);
+}
+
+static inline int
+iterators_bpf__load(struct iterators_bpf *obj)
+{
+ return bpf_object__load_skeleton(obj->skeleton);
+}
+
+static inline struct iterators_bpf *
+iterators_bpf__open_and_load(void)
+{
+ struct iterators_bpf *obj;
+
+ obj = iterators_bpf__open();
+ if (!obj)
+ return NULL;
+ if (iterators_bpf__load(obj)) {
+ iterators_bpf__destroy(obj);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return obj;
+}
+
+static inline int
+iterators_bpf__attach(struct iterators_bpf *obj)
+{
+ return bpf_object__attach_skeleton(obj->skeleton);
+}
+
+static inline void
+iterators_bpf__detach(struct iterators_bpf *obj)
+{
+ return bpf_object__detach_skeleton(obj->skeleton);
+}
+
+static inline int
+iterators_bpf__create_skeleton(struct iterators_bpf *obj)
+{
+ struct bpf_object_skeleton *s;
+
+ s = (typeof(s))calloc(1, sizeof(*s));
+ if (!s)
+ return -1;
+ obj->skeleton = s;
+
+ s->sz = sizeof(*s);
+ s->name = "iterators_bpf";
+ s->obj = &obj->obj;
+
+ /* maps */
+ s->map_cnt = 1;
+ s->map_skel_sz = sizeof(*s->maps);
+ s->maps = (typeof(s->maps))calloc(s->map_cnt, s->map_skel_sz);
+ if (!s->maps)
+ goto err;
+
+ s->maps[0].name = "iterator.rodata";
+ s->maps[0].map = &obj->maps.rodata;
+ s->maps[0].mmaped = (void **)&obj->rodata;
+
+ /* programs */
+ s->prog_cnt = 2;
+ s->prog_skel_sz = sizeof(*s->progs);
+ s->progs = (typeof(s->progs))calloc(s->prog_cnt, s->prog_skel_sz);
+ if (!s->progs)
+ goto err;
+
+ s->progs[0].name = "dump_bpf_map";
+ s->progs[0].prog = &obj->progs.dump_bpf_map;
+ s->progs[0].link = &obj->links.dump_bpf_map;
+
+ s->progs[1].name = "dump_bpf_prog";
+ s->progs[1].prog = &obj->progs.dump_bpf_prog;
+ s->progs[1].link = &obj->links.dump_bpf_prog;
+
+ s->data_sz = 7128;
+ s->data = (void *)"\
+\x7f\x45\x4c\x46\x02\x01\x01\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\x01\0\xf7\0\x01\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\
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+\x0e\0\x79\x12\0\0\0\0\0\0\x79\x26\0\0\0\0\0\0\x79\x17\x08\0\0\0\0\0\x15\x07\
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+\0\0\0\0\xbf\xa4\0\0\0\0\0\0\x07\x04\0\0\xd0\xff\xff\xff\x79\xa1\xc8\xff\0\0\0\
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+\0\0\0\x85\0\0\0\x7e\0\0\0\xb7\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\x95\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\x20\x20\x69\x64\
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+\0\x07\0\0\0\x08\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\x10\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\x7b\0\0\0\x03\x4c\xff\x6f\0\0\
+\0\x80\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\x17\0\0\0\0\0\0\x07\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\
+\0\0\x01\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\x91\0\0\0\x03\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\
+\0\0\0\0\0\0\x07\x17\0\0\0\0\0\0\x0a\x01\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\x01\0\0\0\
+\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0";
+
+ return 0;
+err:
+ bpf_object__destroy_skeleton(s);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+#endif /* __ITERATORS_BPF_SKEL_H__ */
--
2.23.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v5 bpf-next 1/4] bpf: Factor out bpf_link_by_id() helper.
From: Alexei Starovoitov @ 2020-08-02 22:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: davem; +Cc: daniel, netdev, bpf, kernel-team
In-Reply-To: <20200802222950.34696-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Refactor the code a bit to extract bpf_link_by_id() helper.
It's similar to existing bpf_prog_by_id().
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
---
include/linux/bpf.h | 1 +
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
index cef4ef0d2b4e..f611e03e111c 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -1356,6 +1356,7 @@ int btf_check_type_match(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *prog,
struct btf *btf, const struct btf_type *t);
struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_by_id(u32 id);
+struct bpf_link *bpf_link_by_id(u32 id);
const struct bpf_func_proto *bpf_base_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id);
#else /* !CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index 2f343ce15747..5d5b0259fab8 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -4014,40 +4014,50 @@ static int link_detach(union bpf_attr *attr)
return ret;
}
-static int bpf_link_inc_not_zero(struct bpf_link *link)
+static struct bpf_link *bpf_link_inc_not_zero(struct bpf_link *link)
{
- return atomic64_fetch_add_unless(&link->refcnt, 1, 0) ? 0 : -ENOENT;
+ return atomic64_fetch_add_unless(&link->refcnt, 1, 0) ? link : ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
}
-#define BPF_LINK_GET_FD_BY_ID_LAST_FIELD link_id
-
-static int bpf_link_get_fd_by_id(const union bpf_attr *attr)
+struct bpf_link *bpf_link_by_id(u32 id)
{
struct bpf_link *link;
- u32 id = attr->link_id;
- int fd, err;
- if (CHECK_ATTR(BPF_LINK_GET_FD_BY_ID))
- return -EINVAL;
-
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return -EPERM;
+ if (!id)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
spin_lock_bh(&link_idr_lock);
- link = idr_find(&link_idr, id);
/* before link is "settled", ID is 0, pretend it doesn't exist yet */
+ link = idr_find(&link_idr, id);
if (link) {
if (link->id)
- err = bpf_link_inc_not_zero(link);
+ link = bpf_link_inc_not_zero(link);
else
- err = -EAGAIN;
+ link = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
} else {
- err = -ENOENT;
+ link = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
}
spin_unlock_bh(&link_idr_lock);
+ return link;
+}
- if (err)
- return err;
+#define BPF_LINK_GET_FD_BY_ID_LAST_FIELD link_id
+
+static int bpf_link_get_fd_by_id(const union bpf_attr *attr)
+{
+ struct bpf_link *link;
+ u32 id = attr->link_id;
+ int fd;
+
+ if (CHECK_ATTR(BPF_LINK_GET_FD_BY_ID))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ link = bpf_link_by_id(id);
+ if (IS_ERR(link))
+ return PTR_ERR(link);
fd = bpf_link_new_fd(link);
if (fd < 0)
--
2.23.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v5 bpf-next 0/4] bpf: Populate bpffs with map and prog iterators
From: Alexei Starovoitov @ 2020-08-02 22:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: davem; +Cc: daniel, netdev, bpf, kernel-team
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
v4->v5:
- addressed Song and Andrii feedback. s/pages/max_entries/
v3->v4:
- took THIS_MODULE in patch 3 as suggested by Daniel to simplify the code.
- converted BPF iterator to use BTF (when available) to print full BPF program name
instead of 16-byte truncated version.
This is something I've been using drgn scripts for.
Take a look at get_name() in iterators.bpf.c to see how short it is comparing
to what user space bpftool would have to do to print the same full name:
. get prog info via obj_info_by_fd
. do get_fd_by_id from info->btf_id
. fetch potentially large BTF of the program from the kernel
. parse that BTF in user space to figure out all type boundaries and string section
. read info->func_info to get btf_id of func_proto from there
. find that btf_id in the parsed BTF
That's quite a bit work for bpftool comparing to few lines in get_name().
I guess would be good to make bpftool do this info extraction anyway.
While doing this BTF reading in the kernel realized that the verifier is not smart
enough to follow double pointers (added to my todo list), otherwise get_name()
would have been even shorter.
v2->v3:
- fixed module unload race (Daniel)
- added selftest (Daniel)
- fixed build bot warning
v1->v2:
- changed names to 'progs.debug' and 'maps.debug' to hopefully better indicate
instability of the text output. Having dot in the name also guarantees
that these special files will not conflict with normal bpf objects pinned
in bpffs, since dot is disallowed for normal pins.
- instead of hard coding link_name in the core bpf moved into UMD.
- cleanedup error handling.
- addressed review comments from Yonghong and Andrii.
This patch set is the first real user of user moder driver facility. The
general use case for user mode driver is to ship vmlinux with preloaded BPF
programs. In this particular case the user mode driver populates bpffs instance
with two BPF iterators. In several months BPF_LSM project would need to preload
the kernel with its own set of BPF programs and attach to LSM hooks instead of
bpffs. BPF iterators and BPF_LSM are unstable from uapi perspective. They are
tracing based and peek into arbitrary kernel data structures. One can question
why a kernel module cannot embed BPF programs inside. The reason is that libbpf
is necessary to load them. First libbpf loads BPF Type Format, then creates BPF
maps, populates them. Then it relocates code sections inside BPF programs,
loads BPF programs, and finally attaches them to events. Theoretically libbpf
can be rewritten to work in the kernel, but that is massive undertaking. The
maintenance of in-kernel libbpf and user space libbpf would be another
challenge. Another obstacle to embedding BPF programs into kernel module is
sys_bpf api. Loading of programs, BTF, maps goes through the verifier. It
validates and optimizes the code. It's possible to provide in-kernel api to all
of sys_bpf commands (load progs, create maps, update maps, load BTF, etc), but
that is huge amount of work and forever maintenance headache.
Hence the decision is to ship vmlinux with user mode drivers that load
BPF programs. Just like kernel modules extend vmlinux BPF programs
are safe extensions of the kernel and some of them need to ship with vmlinux.
This patch set adds a kernel module with user mode driver that populates bpffs
with two BPF iterators.
$ mount bpffs /my/bpffs/ -t bpf
$ ls -la /my/bpffs/
total 4
drwxrwxrwt 2 root root 0 Jul 2 00:27 .
drwxr-xr-x 19 root root 4096 Jul 2 00:09 ..
-rw------- 1 root root 0 Jul 2 00:27 maps.debug
-rw------- 1 root root 0 Jul 2 00:27 progs.debug
The user mode driver will load BPF Type Formats, create BPF maps, populate BPF
maps, load two BPF programs, attach them to BPF iterators, and finally send two
bpf_link IDs back to the kernel.
The kernel will pin two bpf_links into newly mounted bpffs instance under
names "progs.debug" and "maps.debug". These two files become human readable.
$ cat /my/bpffs/progs.debug
id name attached
11 dump_bpf_map bpf_iter_bpf_map
12 dump_bpf_prog bpf_iter_bpf_prog
27 test_pkt_access
32 test_main test_pkt_access test_pkt_access
33 test_subprog1 test_pkt_access_subprog1 test_pkt_access
34 test_subprog2 test_pkt_access_subprog2 test_pkt_access
35 test_subprog3 test_pkt_access_subprog3 test_pkt_access
36 new_get_skb_len get_skb_len test_pkt_access
37 new_get_skb_ifindex get_skb_ifindex test_pkt_access
38 new_get_constant get_constant test_pkt_access
The BPF program dump_bpf_prog() in iterators.bpf.c is printing this data about
all BPF programs currently loaded in the system. This information is unstable
and will change from kernel to kernel.
In some sence this output is similar to 'bpftool prog show' that is using
stable api to retreive information about BPF programs. The BPF subsytems grows
quickly and there is always demand to show as much info about BPF things as
possible. But we cannot expose all that info via stable uapi of bpf syscall,
since the details change so much. Right now a BPF program can be attached to
only one other BPF program. Folks are working on patches to enable
multi-attach, but for debugging it's necessary to see the current state. There
is no uapi for that, but above output shows it:
37 new_get_skb_ifindex get_skb_ifindex test_pkt_access
38 new_get_constant get_constant test_pkt_access
[1] [2] [3]
[1] is the full name of BPF prog from BTF.
[2] is the name of function inside target BPF prog.
[3] is the name of target BPF prog.
[2] and [3] are not exposed via uapi, since they will change from single to
multi soon. There are many other cases where bpf internals are useful for
debugging, but shouldn't be exposed via uapi due to high rate of changes.
systemd mounts /sys/fs/bpf at the start, so this kernel module with user mode
driver needs to be available early. BPF_LSM most likely would need to preload
BPF programs even earlier.
Few interesting observations:
- though bpffs comes with two human readble files "progs.debug" and
"maps.debug" they can be removed. 'rm -f /sys/fs/bpf/progs.debug' will remove
bpf_link and kernel will automatically unload corresponding BPF progs, maps,
BTFs. In the future '-o remount' will be able to restore them. This is not
implemented yet.
- 'ps aux|grep bpf_preload' shows nothing. User mode driver loaded BPF
iterators and exited. Nothing is lingering in user space at this point.
- We can consider giving 0644 permissions to "progs.debug" and "maps.debug"
to allow unprivileged users see BPF things loaded in the system.
We cannot do so with "bpftool prog show", since it's using cap_sys_admin
parts of bpf syscall.
- The functionality split between core kernel, bpf_preload kernel module and
user mode driver is very similar to bpfilter style of interaction.
- Similar BPF iterators can be used as unstable extensions to /proc.
Like mounting /proc can prepopolate some subdirectory in there with
a BPF iterator that will print QUIC sockets instead of tcp and udp.
Alexei Starovoitov (4):
bpf: Factor out bpf_link_by_id() helper.
bpf: Add BPF program and map iterators as built-in BPF programs.
bpf: Add kernel module with user mode driver that populates bpffs.
selftests/bpf: Add bpffs preload test.
include/linux/bpf.h | 1 +
init/Kconfig | 2 +
kernel/bpf/Makefile | 1 +
kernel/bpf/inode.c | 116 ++++-
kernel/bpf/preload/Kconfig | 18 +
kernel/bpf/preload/Makefile | 21 +
kernel/bpf/preload/bpf_preload.h | 16 +
kernel/bpf/preload/bpf_preload_kern.c | 91 ++++
kernel/bpf/preload/bpf_preload_umd_blob.S | 7 +
kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/.gitignore | 2 +
kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/Makefile | 57 +++
kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/README | 4 +
.../preload/iterators/bpf_preload_common.h | 13 +
kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/iterators.bpf.c | 114 +++++
kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/iterators.c | 94 ++++
kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/iterators.skel.h | 410 ++++++++++++++++++
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 46 +-
.../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/test_bpffs.c | 94 ++++
18 files changed, 1086 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/preload/Kconfig
create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/preload/Makefile
create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/preload/bpf_preload.h
create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/preload/bpf_preload_kern.c
create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/preload/bpf_preload_umd_blob.S
create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/.gitignore
create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/Makefile
create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/README
create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/bpf_preload_common.h
create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/iterators.bpf.c
create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/iterators.c
create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/iterators.skel.h
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/test_bpffs.c
--
2.23.0
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [Linux-kernel-mentees] [PATCH net] rds: Prevent kernel-infoleak in rds_notify_queue_get()
From: Jason Gunthorpe @ 2020-08-02 22:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Joe Perches
Cc: Leon Romanovsky, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Peilin Ye, Santosh Shilimkar,
David S. Miller, Jakub Kicinski, Dan Carpenter, Arnd Bergmann,
linux-kernel-mentees, netdev, linux-rdma, rds-devel, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <fb7ec4d4ed78e6ae7fa6c04abb24d1c00dc2b0f7.camel@perches.com>
On Sun, Aug 02, 2020 at 03:23:58PM -0700, Joe Perches wrote:
> On Sun, 2020-08-02 at 19:10 -0300, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> > On Sat, Aug 01, 2020 at 08:38:33AM +0300, Leon Romanovsky wrote:
> >
> > > I'm using {} instead of {0} because of this GCC bug.
> > > https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=53119
> >
> > This is why the {} extension exists..
>
> There is no guarantee that the gcc struct initialization {}
> extension also zeros padding.
We just went over this. Yes there is, C11 requires it.
Jason
^ permalink raw reply
* RE: [PATCH] hv_netvsc: Add validation for untrusted Hyper-V values
From: Haiyang Zhang @ 2020-08-02 22:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andres Beltran, KY Srinivasan, Stephen Hemminger,
wei.liu@kernel.org
Cc: linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Michael Kelley, parri.andrea@gmail.com, Saruhan Karademir,
David S . Miller, Jakub Kicinski, netdev@vger.kernel.org
In-Reply-To: <20200728225321.26570-1-lkmlabelt@gmail.com>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Andres Beltran <lkmlabelt@gmail.com>
> Sent: Tuesday, July 28, 2020 6:53 PM
> To: KY Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>; Haiyang Zhang
> <haiyangz@microsoft.com>; Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com>;
> wei.liu@kernel.org
> Cc: linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org; linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org; Michael
> Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>; parri.andrea@gmail.com; Saruhan
> Karademir <skarade@microsoft.com>; Andres Beltran <lkmlabelt@gmail.com>;
> David S . Miller <davem@davemloft.net>; Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>;
> netdev@vger.kernel.org
> Subject: [PATCH] hv_netvsc: Add validation for untrusted Hyper-V values
>
> For additional robustness in the face of Hyper-V errors or malicious
> behavior, validate all values that originate from packets that Hyper-V
> has sent to the guest in the host-to-guest ring buffer. Ensure that
> invalid values cannot cause indexing off the end of an array, or
> subvert an existing validation via integer overflow. Ensure that
> outgoing packets do not have any leftover guest memory that has not
> been zeroed out.
>
> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
> Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
> Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Andres Beltran <lkmlabelt@gmail.com>
> ---
> drivers/net/hyperv/hyperv_net.h | 4 ++
> drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc.c | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c | 7 +++
> drivers/net/hyperv/rndis_filter.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++---
> 4 files changed, 163 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/net/hyperv/hyperv_net.h b/drivers/net/hyperv/hyperv_net.h
> index f43b614f2345..7df5943fa46f 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/hyperv/hyperv_net.h
> +++ b/drivers/net/hyperv/hyperv_net.h
> @@ -860,6 +860,10 @@ static inline u32 netvsc_rqstor_size(unsigned long
> ringbytes)
> ringbytes / NETVSC_MIN_IN_MSG_SIZE;
> }
>
> +#define NETVSC_XFER_HEADER_SIZE(rng_cnt) \
> + (offsetof(struct vmtransfer_page_packet_header, ranges) + \
> + (rng_cnt) * sizeof(struct vmtransfer_page_range))
> +
> struct multi_send_data {
> struct sk_buff *skb; /* skb containing the pkt */
> struct hv_netvsc_packet *pkt; /* netvsc pkt pending */
> diff --git a/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc.c b/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc.c
> index 79b907a29433..7aa5276a1f36 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc.c
> @@ -398,6 +398,15 @@ static int netvsc_init_buf(struct hv_device *device,
> net_device->recv_section_size = resp->sections[0].sub_alloc_size;
> net_device->recv_section_cnt = resp->sections[0].num_sub_allocs;
>
> + /* Ensure buffer will not overflow */
> + if (net_device->recv_section_size < NETVSC_MTU_MIN ||
> (u64)net_device->recv_section_size *
> + (u64)net_device->recv_section_cnt > (u64)buf_size) {
> + netdev_err(ndev, "invalid recv_section_size %u\n",
> + net_device->recv_section_size);
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> +
> /* Setup receive completion ring.
> * Add 1 to the recv_section_cnt because at least one entry in a
> * ring buffer has to be empty.
> @@ -479,6 +488,12 @@ static int netvsc_init_buf(struct hv_device *device,
> /* Parse the response */
> net_device->send_section_size = init_packet->msg.
> v1_msg.send_send_buf_complete.section_size;
> + if (net_device->send_section_size < NETVSC_MTU_MIN) {
> + netdev_err(ndev, "invalid send_section_size %u\n",
> + net_device->send_section_size);
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
>
> /* Section count is simply the size divided by the section size. */
> net_device->send_section_cnt = buf_size / net_device-
> >send_section_size;
> @@ -770,12 +785,24 @@ static void netvsc_send_completion(struct
> net_device *ndev,
> int budget)
> {
> const struct nvsp_message *nvsp_packet = hv_pkt_data(desc);
> + u32 msglen = hv_pkt_datalen(desc);
> +
> + /* Ensure packet is big enough to read header fields */
> + if (msglen < sizeof(struct nvsp_message_header)) {
> + netdev_err(ndev, "nvsp_message length too small: %u\n",
> msglen);
> + return;
> + }
>
> switch (nvsp_packet->hdr.msg_type) {
> case NVSP_MSG_TYPE_INIT_COMPLETE:
> case NVSP_MSG1_TYPE_SEND_RECV_BUF_COMPLETE:
> case NVSP_MSG1_TYPE_SEND_SEND_BUF_COMPLETE:
> case NVSP_MSG5_TYPE_SUBCHANNEL:
> + if (msglen < sizeof(struct nvsp_message)) {
> + netdev_err(ndev, "nvsp_msg5 length too small: %u\n",
> + msglen);
> + return;
> + }
struct nvsp_message includes all message types, so its length is the longest type,
The messages from older host version are not necessarily reaching the
sizeof(struct nvsp_message).
Testing on both new and older hosts are recommended, in case I didn't find out all issues
like this one.
Thanks,
- Haiyang
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [Linux-kernel-mentees] [PATCH net] rds: Prevent kernel-infoleak in rds_notify_queue_get()
From: Joe Perches @ 2020-08-02 22:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jason Gunthorpe, Leon Romanovsky
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, Peilin Ye, Santosh Shilimkar, David S. Miller,
Jakub Kicinski, Dan Carpenter, Arnd Bergmann,
linux-kernel-mentees, netdev, linux-rdma, rds-devel, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <20200802221020.GN24045@ziepe.ca>
On Sun, 2020-08-02 at 19:10 -0300, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> On Sat, Aug 01, 2020 at 08:38:33AM +0300, Leon Romanovsky wrote:
>
> > I'm using {} instead of {0} because of this GCC bug.
> > https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=53119
>
> This is why the {} extension exists..
There is no guarantee that the gcc struct initialization {}
extension also zeros padding.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [Linux-kernel-mentees] [PATCH net] rds: Prevent kernel-infoleak in rds_notify_queue_get()
From: Jason Gunthorpe @ 2020-08-02 22:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Leon Romanovsky
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, Peilin Ye, Santosh Shilimkar, David S. Miller,
Jakub Kicinski, Dan Carpenter, Arnd Bergmann,
linux-kernel-mentees, netdev, linux-rdma, rds-devel, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <20200801053833.GK75549@unreal>
On Sat, Aug 01, 2020 at 08:38:33AM +0300, Leon Romanovsky wrote:
> I'm using {} instead of {0} because of this GCC bug.
> https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=53119
This is why the {} extension exists..
Jason
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH bpf-next] tools build: propagate build failures from tools/build/Makefile.build
From: Jiri Olsa @ 2020-08-02 21:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrii Nakryiko
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko, bpf, Networking, Alexei Starovoitov,
Daniel Borkmann, Kernel Team, Jiri Olsa, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
In-Reply-To: <CAEf4Bzb=LBGsORPCh90=PF=WL+rdOKiBf8yDfJNwd8p2AKUK1A@mail.gmail.com>
On Sun, Aug 02, 2020 at 11:22:07AM -0700, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
> On Sun, Aug 2, 2020 at 9:11 AM Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Thu, Jul 30, 2020 at 07:42:44PM -0700, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
> > > The '&&' command seems to have a bad effect when $(cmd_$(1)) exits with
> > > non-zero effect: the command failure is masked (despite `set -e`) and all but
> > > the first command of $(dep-cmd) is executed (successfully, as they are mostly
> > > printfs), thus overall returning 0 in the end.
> >
> > nice, thanks for digging into this,
> > any idea why is the failure masked?
>
> Two things.
>
> 1. In make, assume you have command f = a in one function and g = b; c
> in another. If you write f && g, you end up with (a && b); c, right?
>
> 2. Try this shell script:
>
> set -ex
> false && true
> true
>
> It will return success. It won't execute the first true command, as
> expected, but won't terminate the shell as you'd expect from set -e.
>
> So basically, having a "logical operator" in a sequence of commands
> negates the effect of `set -e`. Intuitively I'd expect that from ||,
> but seems like && does that as well. if [] has similar effect -- any
> failing command in an if check doesn't trigger an early termination of
> a script.
nice, thanks for explanation
jirka
>
> >
> > Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
> >
> > jirka
> >
> > >
> > > This means in practice that despite compilation errors, tools's build Makefile
> > > will return success. We see this very reliably with libbpf's Makefile, which
> > > doesn't get compilation error propagated properly. This in turns causes issues
> > > with selftests build, as well as bpftool and other projects that rely on
> > > building libbpf.
> > >
> > > The fix is simple: don't use &&. Given `set -e`, we don't need to chain
> > > commands with &&. The shell will exit on first failure, giving desired
> > > behavior and propagating error properly.
> > >
> > > Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
> > > Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
> > > Fixes: 275e2d95591e ("tools build: Move dependency copy into function")
> > > Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
> > > ---
> > >
> > > I'm sending this against bpf-next tree, given libbpf is affected enough for me
> > > to debug this fun problem that no one seemed to notice (or care, at least) in
> > > almost 5 years. If there is a better kernel tree, please let me know.
> > >
> > > tools/build/Build.include | 3 ++-
> > > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/tools/build/Build.include b/tools/build/Build.include
> > > index 9ec01f4454f9..585486e40995 100644
> > > --- a/tools/build/Build.include
> > > +++ b/tools/build/Build.include
> > > @@ -74,7 +74,8 @@ dep-cmd = $(if $(wildcard $(fixdep)),
> > > # dependencies in the cmd file
> > > if_changed_dep = $(if $(strip $(any-prereq) $(arg-check)), \
> > > @set -e; \
> > > - $(echo-cmd) $(cmd_$(1)) && $(dep-cmd))
> > > + $(echo-cmd) $(cmd_$(1)); \
> > > + $(dep-cmd))
> > >
> > > # if_changed - execute command if any prerequisite is newer than
> > > # target, or command line has changed
> > > --
> > > 2.24.1
> > >
> >
>
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH bpf-next v5 2/2] bpf: allow to specify ifindex for skb in bpf_prog_test_run_skb
From: Dmitry Yakunin @ 2020-08-02 21:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: alexei.starovoitov, daniel, netdev, bpf; +Cc: sdf
In-Reply-To: <20200802213631.78937-1-zeil@yandex-team.ru>
Now skb->dev is unconditionally set to the loopback device in current net
namespace. But if we want to test bpf program which contains code branch
based on ifindex condition (eg filters out localhost packets) it is useful
to allow specifying of ifindex from userspace. This patch adds such option
through ctx_in (__sk_buff) parameter.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Yakunin <zeil@yandex-team.ru>
---
net/bpf/test_run.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++--
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/skb_ctx.c | 5 +++++
2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/bpf/test_run.c b/net/bpf/test_run.c
index 8d69295..369ce90 100644
--- a/net/bpf/test_run.c
+++ b/net/bpf/test_run.c
@@ -327,6 +327,12 @@ static int convert___skb_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct __sk_buff *__skb)
/* priority is allowed */
if (!range_is_zero(__skb, offsetofend(struct __sk_buff, priority),
+ offsetof(struct __sk_buff, ifindex)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* ifindex is allowed */
+
+ if (!range_is_zero(__skb, offsetofend(struct __sk_buff, ifindex),
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, cb)))
return -EINVAL;
@@ -381,6 +387,7 @@ static void convert_skb_to___skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct __sk_buff *__skb)
__skb->mark = skb->mark;
__skb->priority = skb->priority;
+ __skb->ifindex = skb->dev->ifindex;
__skb->tstamp = skb->tstamp;
memcpy(__skb->cb, &cb->data, QDISC_CB_PRIV_LEN);
__skb->wire_len = cb->pkt_len;
@@ -391,6 +398,8 @@ int bpf_prog_test_run_skb(struct bpf_prog *prog, const union bpf_attr *kattr,
union bpf_attr __user *uattr)
{
bool is_l2 = false, is_direct_pkt_access = false;
+ struct net *net = current->nsproxy->net_ns;
+ struct net_device *dev = net->loopback_dev;
u32 size = kattr->test.data_size_in;
u32 repeat = kattr->test.repeat;
struct __sk_buff *ctx = NULL;
@@ -432,7 +441,7 @@ int bpf_prog_test_run_skb(struct bpf_prog *prog, const union bpf_attr *kattr,
kfree(ctx);
return -ENOMEM;
}
- sock_net_set(sk, current->nsproxy->net_ns);
+ sock_net_set(sk, net);
sock_init_data(NULL, sk);
skb = build_skb(data, 0);
@@ -446,7 +455,14 @@ int bpf_prog_test_run_skb(struct bpf_prog *prog, const union bpf_attr *kattr,
skb_reserve(skb, NET_SKB_PAD + NET_IP_ALIGN);
__skb_put(skb, size);
- skb->protocol = eth_type_trans(skb, current->nsproxy->net_ns->loopback_dev);
+ if (ctx && ctx->ifindex > 1) {
+ dev = dev_get_by_index(net, ctx->ifindex);
+ if (!dev) {
+ ret = -ENODEV;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ skb->protocol = eth_type_trans(skb, dev);
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
switch (skb->protocol) {
@@ -502,6 +518,8 @@ int bpf_prog_test_run_skb(struct bpf_prog *prog, const union bpf_attr *kattr,
ret = bpf_ctx_finish(kattr, uattr, ctx,
sizeof(struct __sk_buff));
out:
+ if (dev && dev != net->loopback_dev)
+ dev_put(dev);
kfree_skb(skb);
bpf_sk_storage_free(sk);
kfree(sk);
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/skb_ctx.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/skb_ctx.c
index 7021b92..25de86a 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/skb_ctx.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/skb_ctx.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ void test_skb_ctx(void)
.cb[3] = 4,
.cb[4] = 5,
.priority = 6,
+ .ifindex = 1,
.tstamp = 7,
.wire_len = 100,
.gso_segs = 8,
@@ -92,6 +93,10 @@ void test_skb_ctx(void)
"ctx_out_priority",
"skb->priority == %d, expected %d\n",
skb.priority, 7);
+ CHECK_ATTR(skb.ifindex != 1,
+ "ctx_out_ifindex",
+ "skb->ifindex == %d, expected %d\n",
+ skb.ifindex, 1);
CHECK_ATTR(skb.tstamp != 8,
"ctx_out_tstamp",
"skb->tstamp == %lld, expected %d\n",
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH bpf-next v5 1/2] bpf: setup socket family and addresses in bpf_prog_test_run_skb
From: Dmitry Yakunin @ 2020-08-02 21:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: alexei.starovoitov, daniel, netdev, bpf; +Cc: sdf
In-Reply-To: <20200802213631.78937-1-zeil@yandex-team.ru>
Now it's impossible to test all branches of cgroup_skb bpf program which
accesses skb->family and skb->{local,remote}_ip{4,6} fields because they
are zeroed during socket allocation. This commit fills socket family and
addresses from related fields in constructed skb.
v2:
- fix build without CONFIG_IPV6 (kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>)
v3:
- check skb length before access to inet headers (Eric Dumazet)
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Yakunin <zeil@yandex-team.ru>
---
net/bpf/test_run.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/bpf/test_run.c b/net/bpf/test_run.c
index b03c469..8d69295 100644
--- a/net/bpf/test_run.c
+++ b/net/bpf/test_run.c
@@ -449,6 +449,27 @@ int bpf_prog_test_run_skb(struct bpf_prog *prog, const union bpf_attr *kattr,
skb->protocol = eth_type_trans(skb, current->nsproxy->net_ns->loopback_dev);
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
+ switch (skb->protocol) {
+ case htons(ETH_P_IP):
+ sk->sk_family = AF_INET;
+ if (pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr))) {
+ sk->sk_rcv_saddr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
+ sk->sk_daddr = ip_hdr(skb)->daddr;
+ }
+ break;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+ case htons(ETH_P_IPV6):
+ sk->sk_family = AF_INET6;
+ if (pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr))) {
+ sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
+ sk->sk_v6_daddr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr;
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
if (is_l2)
__skb_push(skb, hh_len);
if (is_direct_pkt_access)
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related
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