From: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com>
To: Zero Mark <patzilla007@gmail.com>,
Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: security@kernel.org, "David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, Zero Mark <patzilla007@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] net/packet: fix TOCTOU race on mmap'd vnet_hdr in tpacket_snd()
Date: Fri, 17 Apr 2026 04:15:52 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <willemdebruijn.kernel.1683671b10e8@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260417060714.35488-1-patzilla007@gmail.com>
Zero Mark wrote:
> In tpacket_snd(), when PACKET_VNET_HDR is enabled, vnet_hdr points
> directly into the mmap'd TX ring buffer shared with userspace. The
> kernel validates the header via __packet_snd_vnet_parse() but then
> re-reads all fields later in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(). A concurrent
> userspace thread can modify the vnet_hdr fields (gso_type, gso_size,
> flags, csum_start, csum_offset) between validation and use, bypassing
> all safety checks.
>
> This can lead to:
> - Out-of-bounds checksum writes via crafted csum_start/csum_offset
> - Malicious GSO segmentation parameters
> - Kernel memory corruption and potential local privilege escalation
>
> The non-TPACKET path (packet_snd()) already correctly copies vnet_hdr
> to a stack-local variable. All other vnet_hdr consumers in the kernel
> (tun.c, tap.c, virtio_net.c) also use stack copies. The TPACKET TX
> path is the only caller of virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() that reads directly
> from user-controlled shared memory.
>
> Fix this by copying vnet_hdr from the mmap'd ring buffer to a
> stack-local variable before validation and use, consistent with the
> approach used in packet_snd() and all other callers.
>
> Exploitation requires CAP_NET_RAW, which can be obtained without
> special privileges via user namespaces.
>
> Confirmed with a PoC on Linux 6.8.0 (Ubuntu): kprobe tracing on
> skb_partial_csum_set captured 77 race wins in 500,000 iterations.
No need to add such details on exploitability of bugs.
> Affects all kernels since PACKET_VNET_HDR support was added to the
> TPACKET TX path (~v3.14).
>
> Fixes: 9ed988e5 ("packet: add vnet_hdr support for tpacket_snd")
This patch does not exist. Also 12-char SHA1.
I think this should be
Fixes: 1d036d25e560 ("packet: tpacket_snd gso and checksum offload")
> Signed-off-by: Zero Mark <patzilla007@gmail.com>
Thanks for the fix!
Only it does not apply cleanly. Please mark fixes [PATCH net] and
ensure that they apply to current netdev-net/main
https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/maintainer-netdev.html
> ---
> net/packet/af_packet.c | 14 ++++++++------
> 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
> index abcdef012345..fedcba654321 100644
> --- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
> +++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
> @@ -2725,7 +2725,8 @@ static int tpacket_parse_header(struct packet_sock *po, void *frame,
> static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg)
> {
> struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
> struct net_device *dev;
> - struct virtio_net_hdr *vnet_hdr = NULL;
> + struct virtio_net_hdr vnet_hdr;
> + bool has_vnet_hdr = false;
> struct sockcm_cookie sockc;
> __be16 proto;
> int err, reserve = 0;
> @@ -2828,16 +2829,17 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg)
> if (po->has_vnet_hdr) {
> - vnet_hdr = data;
> - data += sizeof(*vnet_hdr);
> - tp_len -= sizeof(*vnet_hdr);
> + memcpy(&vnet_hdr, data, sizeof(vnet_hdr));
Move the tp_len < 0 check before memcpy
> + data += sizeof(vnet_hdr);
> + tp_len -= sizeof(vnet_hdr);
> if (tp_len < 0 ||
> - __packet_snd_vnet_parse(vnet_hdr, tp_len)) {
> + __packet_snd_vnet_parse(&vnet_hdr, tp_len)) {
> tp_len = -EINVAL;
> goto tpacket_error;
> }
> copylen = __virtio16_to_cpu(vio_le(),
> - vnet_hdr->hdr_len);
> + vnet_hdr.hdr_len);
> + has_vnet_hdr = true;
> }
> copylen = max_t(int, copylen, dev->hard_header_len);
> skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(&po->sk,
> @@ -2875,11 +2877,11 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg)
> }
>
> - if (po->has_vnet_hdr) {
> - if (virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(skb, vnet_hdr, vio_le())) {
> + if (has_vnet_hdr) {
> + if (virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(skb, &vnet_hdr, vio_le())) {
> tp_len = -EINVAL;
> goto tpacket_error;
> }
> - virtio_net_hdr_set_proto(skb, vnet_hdr);
> + virtio_net_hdr_set_proto(skb, &vnet_hdr);
> }
>
> skb->destructor = tpacket_destruct_skb;
> --
> 2.43.0
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-17 8:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <CAHOBGNBvZOXGzzMDuHWw1RrRvbg4TZVH34jVDhc1nkHbW_URXA@mail.gmail.com>
2026-04-17 6:07 ` [PATCH] net/packet: fix TOCTOU race on mmap'd vnet_hdr in tpacket_snd() Zero Mark
2026-04-17 8:15 ` Willem de Bruijn [this message]
2026-04-17 13:36 ` [PATCH net] " Zero Mark
2026-04-17 20:01 ` Willem de Bruijn
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=willemdebruijn.kernel.1683671b10e8@gmail.com \
--to=willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com \
--cc=davem@davemloft.net \
--cc=edumazet@google.com \
--cc=kuba@kernel.org \
--cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=patzilla007@gmail.com \
--cc=security@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox