From: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>, jamal <hadi@cyberus.ca>,
Evgeniy Polyakov <zbr@ioremap.net>,
Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org,
Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
Subject: [RFC 5/9] snet: introduce snet_event.c and snet_event.h
Date: Sat, 2 Jan 2010 14:04:12 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1262437456-24476-6-git-send-email-sam@synack.fr> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1262437456-24476-1-git-send-email-sam@synack.fr>
This patch adds the snet's subsystem responsive of managing events
snet is using the word 'event' for a couple of values [syscall, protocol]. For
example, [listen, tcp] or [sendmsg, dccp] are events.
This patch introduces a hastable 'event_hash' and operations (add/remove/search..)
in order to manage which events have to be protected.
With the help of the communication's subsystem, managing orders are coming from
userspace.
Signed-off-by: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
---
security/snet/include/snet_event.h | 20 +++
security/snet/snet_event.c | 229 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 249 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/snet/include/snet_event.h
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_event.c
diff --git a/security/snet/include/snet_event.h b/security/snet/include/snet_event.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2c71ca7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/include/snet_event.h
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+#ifndef _SNET_EVENT_H
+#define _SNET_EVENT_H
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+
+extern unsigned int event_hash_size;
+
+/* manipulate the events hash table */
+int snet_event_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb);
+int snet_event_is_registered(const enum snet_syscall syscall, const u8 protocol);
+int snet_event_insert(const enum snet_syscall syscall, const u8 protocol);
+int snet_event_remove(const enum snet_syscall syscall, const u8 protocol);
+void snet_event_flush(void);
+void snet_event_dumpall(void);
+
+/* init function */
+int snet_event_init(void);
+/* exit funtion */
+int snet_event_exit(void);
+
+#endif /* _SNET_EVENT_H */
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_event.c b/security/snet/snet_event.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6ac5646
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_event.c
@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/jhash.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/netlink.h>
+
+#include "snet.h"
+#include "snet_event.h"
+#include "snet_netlink.h"
+
+static struct list_head *event_hash;
+static rwlock_t event_hash_lock = __RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED();
+
+struct snet_event_entry {
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct snet_event se;
+};
+
+/* lookup for a event_hash - before using this function, lock event_hash_lock */
+static struct snet_event_entry *__snet_event_lookup(const enum snet_syscall syscall,
+ const u8 protocol)
+{
+ unsigned int h = 0;
+ struct list_head *l;
+ struct snet_event_entry *s;
+ struct snet_event t;
+
+ if (!event_hash)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* building the element to look for */
+ t.syscall = syscall;
+ t.protocol = protocol;
+
+ /* computing its hash value */
+ h = jhash(&t, sizeof(struct snet_event), 0) % event_hash_size;
+ l = &event_hash[h];
+
+ list_for_each_entry(s, l, list) {
+ if ((s->se.protocol == protocol) &&
+ (s->se.syscall == syscall)) {
+ return s;
+ }
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int snet_event_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
+{
+ unsigned int i = 0, n = 0;
+ int ret = -1;
+ unsigned hashs_to_skip = cb->args[0];
+ unsigned events_to_skip = cb->args[1];
+ struct list_head *l;
+ struct snet_event_entry *s;
+
+ read_lock_bh(&event_hash_lock);
+
+ if (!event_hash)
+ goto errout;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < event_hash_size; i++) {
+ if (i < hashs_to_skip)
+ continue;
+ l = &event_hash[i];
+ n = 0;
+ list_for_each_entry(s, l, list) {
+ if (++n < events_to_skip)
+ continue;
+ ret = snet_nl_list_fill_info(skb,
+ NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).pid,
+ cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq,
+ NLM_F_MULTI,
+ s->se.protocol,
+ s->se.syscall);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto errout;
+ }
+ }
+
+errout:
+ read_unlock_bh(&event_hash_lock);
+
+ cb->args[0] = i;
+ cb->args[1] = n;
+ return skb->len;
+}
+
+/* void snet_event_dumpall() */
+/* { */
+/* unsigned int i = 0; */
+/* struct list_head *l; */
+/* struct snet_event_entry *s; */
+
+/* snet_dbg("entering\n"); */
+/* read_lock_bh(&event_hash_lock); */
+/* for (i = 0; i < (event_hash_size - 1); i++) { */
+/* l = &hash[i]; */
+/* list_for_each_entry(s, l, list) { */
+/* snet_dbg("[%d, %d, %d]\n", i, */
+/* s->se.protocol, s->se.syscall); */
+/* } */
+/* } */
+/* read_unlock_bh(&event_hash_lock); */
+/* snet_dbg("exiting\n"); */
+/* return; */
+/* } */
+
+/*
+ * check if a event is registered or not
+ * return 1 if event is registered, 0 if not
+ */
+int snet_event_is_registered(const enum snet_syscall syscall, const u8 protocol)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ read_lock_bh(&event_hash_lock);
+ if (__snet_event_lookup(syscall, protocol) != NULL)
+ ret = 1;
+ read_unlock_bh(&event_hash_lock);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* adding a event */
+int snet_event_insert(const enum snet_syscall syscall, const u8 protocol)
+{
+ struct snet_event_entry *data = NULL;
+ unsigned int h = 0;
+
+ data = kzalloc(sizeof(struct snet_event_entry), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ write_lock_bh(&event_hash_lock);
+ /* check if event is already registered */
+ if (!event_hash || __snet_event_lookup(syscall, protocol) != NULL) {
+ write_unlock_bh(&event_hash_lock);
+ kfree(data);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ data->se.syscall = syscall;
+ data->se.protocol = protocol;
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&(data->list));
+ h = jhash(&(data->se), sizeof(struct snet_event), 0) % event_hash_size;
+ list_add_tail(&data->list, &event_hash[h]);
+ write_unlock_bh(&event_hash_lock);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* removing a event */
+int snet_event_remove(const enum snet_syscall syscall, const u8 protocol)
+{
+ struct snet_event_entry *data = NULL;
+
+ write_lock_bh(&event_hash_lock);
+ data = __snet_event_lookup(syscall, protocol);
+ if (data == NULL) {
+ write_unlock_bh(&event_hash_lock);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ list_del(&data->list);
+ write_unlock_bh(&event_hash_lock);
+ kfree(data);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* flushing all events */
+void __snet_event_flush(void)
+{
+ struct snet_event_entry *data = NULL;
+ unsigned int i = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < event_hash_size; i++) {
+ while (!list_empty(&event_hash[i])) {
+ data = list_entry(event_hash[i].next,
+ struct snet_event_entry, list);
+ list_del(&data->list);
+ kfree(data);
+ }
+ }
+ return;
+}
+
+void snet_event_flush(void)
+{
+ write_lock_bh(&event_hash_lock);
+ if (event_hash)
+ __snet_event_flush();
+ write_unlock_bh(&event_hash_lock);
+ return;
+}
+
+/* init function */
+int snet_event_init(void)
+{
+ int err = 0, i = 0;
+
+ event_hash = kzalloc(sizeof(struct list_head) * event_hash_size,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!event_hash) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING
+ "snet: can't alloc memory for event_hash\n");
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < event_hash_size; i++)
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&(event_hash[i]));
+
+out:
+ return err;
+}
+
+/* exit function */
+int snet_event_exit(void)
+{
+ write_lock_bh(&event_hash_lock);
+ if (event_hash) {
+ __snet_event_flush();
+ kfree(event_hash);
+ event_hash = NULL;
+ }
+ write_unlock_bh(&event_hash_lock);
+
+ return 0;
+}
--
1.6.3.3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2010-01-02 13:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 61+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2010-01-02 13:04 [RFC 0/9] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls Samir Bellabes
2010-01-02 13:04 ` [RFC 1/9] lsm: add security_socket_closed() Samir Bellabes
2010-01-04 18:33 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-01-02 13:04 ` [RFC 2/9] Revert "lsm: Remove the socket_post_accept() hook" Samir Bellabes
2010-01-04 18:36 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-01-05 0:31 ` Tetsuo Handa
2010-01-05 0:38 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-01-02 13:04 ` [RFC 3/9] snet: introduce security/snet, Makefile and Kconfig changes Samir Bellabes
2010-01-04 18:39 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-01-06 6:04 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-02 13:04 ` [RFC 4/9] snet: introduce snet_core.c and snet.h Samir Bellabes
2010-01-04 14:43 ` Patrick McHardy
2010-01-06 18:23 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-06 19:46 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-06 19:58 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2010-01-23 2:07 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-23 2:18 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2010-01-07 14:34 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-07 14:53 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-07 14:58 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-08 4:32 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-04 18:42 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-01-06 6:12 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-02 13:04 ` Samir Bellabes [this message]
2010-01-02 20:09 ` [RFC 5/9] snet: introduce snet_event.c and snet_event.h Evgeniy Polyakov
2010-01-02 23:38 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-04 19:08 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-01-08 7:21 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-08 15:34 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-01-08 17:44 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-08 17:51 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-08 18:10 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-01-02 13:04 ` [RFC 6/9] snet: introduce snet_hooks.c and snet_hook.h Samir Bellabes
2010-01-02 20:13 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2010-01-03 11:10 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-03 19:16 ` Stephen Hemminger
2010-01-03 22:26 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-02 13:04 ` [RFC 7/9] snet: introduce snet_netlink.c and snet_netlink.h Samir Bellabes
2010-01-04 15:08 ` Patrick McHardy
2010-01-13 4:19 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-13 4:28 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-13 5:36 ` Patrick McHardy
2010-01-13 4:36 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-13 4:41 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-13 6:03 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-13 6:20 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-15 7:02 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-15 9:15 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-16 1:59 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-17 5:42 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-23 19:33 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-02 13:04 ` [RFC 8/9] snet: introduce snet_verdict.c and snet_verdict.h Samir Bellabes
2010-01-02 13:04 ` [RFC 9/9] snet: introduce snet_utils.c and snet_utils.h Samir Bellabes
2010-01-03 16:57 ` [RFC 0/9] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls jamal
2010-01-05 7:26 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-05 8:20 ` Tetsuo Handa
2010-01-05 14:09 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-01-06 0:23 ` [PATCH] LSM: Update comment on security_sock_rcv_skb Tetsuo Handa
2010-01-06 3:27 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-01-10 21:53 ` James Morris
2010-01-10 16:20 ` [RFC 0/9] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls jamal
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