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From: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>, jamal <hadi@cyberus.ca>,
	Evgeniy Polyakov <zbr@ioremap.net>,
	Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org,
	Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
Subject: [RFC 5/9] snet: introduce snet_event.c and snet_event.h
Date: Sat,  2 Jan 2010 14:04:12 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1262437456-24476-6-git-send-email-sam@synack.fr> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1262437456-24476-1-git-send-email-sam@synack.fr>

This patch adds the snet's subsystem responsive of managing events

snet is using the word 'event' for a couple of values [syscall, protocol]. For
example, [listen, tcp] or [sendmsg, dccp] are events.
This patch introduces a hastable 'event_hash' and operations (add/remove/search..)
in order to manage which events have to be protected.
With the help of the communication's subsystem, managing orders are coming from
userspace.

Signed-off-by: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
---
 security/snet/include/snet_event.h |   20 +++
 security/snet/snet_event.c         |  229 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 249 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 security/snet/include/snet_event.h
 create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_event.c

diff --git a/security/snet/include/snet_event.h b/security/snet/include/snet_event.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2c71ca7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/include/snet_event.h
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+#ifndef _SNET_EVENT_H
+#define _SNET_EVENT_H
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+
+extern unsigned int event_hash_size;
+
+/* manipulate the events hash table */
+int snet_event_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb);
+int snet_event_is_registered(const enum snet_syscall syscall, const u8 protocol);
+int snet_event_insert(const enum snet_syscall syscall, const u8 protocol);
+int snet_event_remove(const enum snet_syscall syscall, const u8 protocol);
+void snet_event_flush(void);
+void snet_event_dumpall(void);
+
+/* init function */
+int snet_event_init(void);
+/* exit funtion */
+int snet_event_exit(void);
+
+#endif /* _SNET_EVENT_H */
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_event.c b/security/snet/snet_event.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6ac5646
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_event.c
@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/jhash.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/netlink.h>
+
+#include "snet.h"
+#include "snet_event.h"
+#include "snet_netlink.h"
+
+static struct list_head *event_hash;
+static rwlock_t event_hash_lock = __RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED();
+
+struct snet_event_entry {
+	struct list_head list;
+	struct snet_event se;
+};
+
+/* lookup for a event_hash - before using this function, lock event_hash_lock */
+static struct snet_event_entry *__snet_event_lookup(const enum snet_syscall syscall,
+						   const u8 protocol)
+{
+	unsigned int h = 0;
+	struct list_head *l;
+	struct snet_event_entry *s;
+	struct snet_event t;
+
+	if (!event_hash)
+		return NULL;
+
+	/* building the element to look for */
+	t.syscall = syscall;
+	t.protocol = protocol;
+
+	/* computing its hash value */
+	h = jhash(&t, sizeof(struct snet_event), 0) % event_hash_size;
+	l = &event_hash[h];
+
+	list_for_each_entry(s, l, list) {
+		if ((s->se.protocol == protocol) &&
+		    (s->se.syscall == syscall)) {
+			return s;
+		}
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+int snet_event_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
+{
+	unsigned int i = 0, n = 0;
+	int ret = -1;
+	unsigned hashs_to_skip = cb->args[0];
+	unsigned events_to_skip = cb->args[1];
+	struct list_head *l;
+	struct snet_event_entry *s;
+
+	read_lock_bh(&event_hash_lock);
+
+	if (!event_hash)
+		goto errout;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < event_hash_size; i++) {
+		if (i < hashs_to_skip)
+			continue;
+		l = &event_hash[i];
+		n = 0;
+		list_for_each_entry(s, l, list) {
+			if (++n < events_to_skip)
+				continue;
+			ret = snet_nl_list_fill_info(skb,
+						     NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).pid,
+						     cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq,
+						     NLM_F_MULTI,
+						     s->se.protocol,
+						     s->se.syscall);
+			if (ret < 0)
+				goto errout;
+		}
+	}
+
+errout:
+	read_unlock_bh(&event_hash_lock);
+
+	cb->args[0] = i;
+	cb->args[1] = n;
+	return skb->len;
+}
+
+/* void snet_event_dumpall() */
+/* { */
+/*	unsigned int i = 0; */
+/*	struct list_head *l; */
+/*	struct snet_event_entry *s; */
+
+/*	snet_dbg("entering\n"); */
+/*	read_lock_bh(&event_hash_lock); */
+/*	for (i = 0; i < (event_hash_size - 1); i++) { */
+/*		l = &hash[i]; */
+/*		list_for_each_entry(s, l, list) { */
+/*			snet_dbg("[%d, %d, %d]\n", i, */
+/*				 s->se.protocol, s->se.syscall); */
+/*		} */
+/*	} */
+/*	read_unlock_bh(&event_hash_lock); */
+/*	snet_dbg("exiting\n"); */
+/*	return; */
+/* } */
+
+/*
+ * check if a event is registered or not
+ * return 1 if event is registered, 0 if not
+ */
+int snet_event_is_registered(const enum snet_syscall syscall, const u8 protocol)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	read_lock_bh(&event_hash_lock);
+	if (__snet_event_lookup(syscall, protocol) != NULL)
+		ret = 1;
+	read_unlock_bh(&event_hash_lock);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* adding a event */
+int snet_event_insert(const enum snet_syscall syscall, const u8 protocol)
+{
+	struct snet_event_entry *data = NULL;
+	unsigned int h = 0;
+
+	data = kzalloc(sizeof(struct snet_event_entry), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	write_lock_bh(&event_hash_lock);
+	/* check if event is already registered */
+	if (!event_hash || __snet_event_lookup(syscall, protocol) != NULL) {
+		write_unlock_bh(&event_hash_lock);
+		kfree(data);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	data->se.syscall = syscall;
+	data->se.protocol = protocol;
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&(data->list));
+	h = jhash(&(data->se), sizeof(struct snet_event), 0) % event_hash_size;
+	list_add_tail(&data->list, &event_hash[h]);
+	write_unlock_bh(&event_hash_lock);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* removing a event */
+int snet_event_remove(const enum snet_syscall syscall, const u8 protocol)
+{
+	struct snet_event_entry *data = NULL;
+
+	write_lock_bh(&event_hash_lock);
+	data = __snet_event_lookup(syscall, protocol);
+	if (data == NULL) {
+		write_unlock_bh(&event_hash_lock);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	list_del(&data->list);
+	write_unlock_bh(&event_hash_lock);
+	kfree(data);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* flushing all events */
+void __snet_event_flush(void)
+{
+	struct snet_event_entry *data = NULL;
+	unsigned int i = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < event_hash_size; i++) {
+		while (!list_empty(&event_hash[i])) {
+			data = list_entry(event_hash[i].next,
+					  struct snet_event_entry, list);
+			list_del(&data->list);
+			kfree(data);
+		}
+	}
+	return;
+}
+
+void snet_event_flush(void)
+{
+	write_lock_bh(&event_hash_lock);
+	if (event_hash)
+		__snet_event_flush();
+	write_unlock_bh(&event_hash_lock);
+	return;
+}
+
+/* init function */
+int snet_event_init(void)
+{
+	int err = 0, i = 0;
+
+	event_hash = kzalloc(sizeof(struct list_head) * event_hash_size,
+			     GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!event_hash) {
+		printk(KERN_WARNING
+		       "snet: can't alloc memory for event_hash\n");
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < event_hash_size; i++)
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&(event_hash[i]));
+
+out:
+	return err;
+}
+
+/* exit function */
+int snet_event_exit(void)
+{
+	write_lock_bh(&event_hash_lock);
+	if (event_hash) {
+		__snet_event_flush();
+		kfree(event_hash);
+		event_hash = NULL;
+	}
+	write_unlock_bh(&event_hash_lock);
+
+	return 0;
+}
-- 
1.6.3.3


  parent reply	other threads:[~2010-01-02 13:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 61+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2010-01-02 13:04 [RFC 0/9] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls Samir Bellabes
2010-01-02 13:04 ` [RFC 1/9] lsm: add security_socket_closed() Samir Bellabes
2010-01-04 18:33   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-01-02 13:04 ` [RFC 2/9] Revert "lsm: Remove the socket_post_accept() hook" Samir Bellabes
2010-01-04 18:36   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-01-05  0:31     ` Tetsuo Handa
2010-01-05  0:38       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-01-02 13:04 ` [RFC 3/9] snet: introduce security/snet, Makefile and Kconfig changes Samir Bellabes
2010-01-04 18:39   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-01-06  6:04     ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-02 13:04 ` [RFC 4/9] snet: introduce snet_core.c and snet.h Samir Bellabes
2010-01-04 14:43   ` Patrick McHardy
2010-01-06 18:23     ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-06 19:46     ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-06 19:58       ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2010-01-23  2:07         ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-23  2:18           ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2010-01-07 14:34     ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-07 14:53     ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-07 14:58       ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-08  4:32     ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-04 18:42   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-01-06  6:12     ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-02 13:04 ` Samir Bellabes [this message]
2010-01-02 20:09   ` [RFC 5/9] snet: introduce snet_event.c and snet_event.h Evgeniy Polyakov
2010-01-02 23:38     ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-04 19:08   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-01-08  7:21     ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-08 15:34       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-01-08 17:44         ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-08 17:51           ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-08 18:10             ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-01-02 13:04 ` [RFC 6/9] snet: introduce snet_hooks.c and snet_hook.h Samir Bellabes
2010-01-02 20:13   ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2010-01-03 11:10     ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-03 19:16       ` Stephen Hemminger
2010-01-03 22:26         ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-02 13:04 ` [RFC 7/9] snet: introduce snet_netlink.c and snet_netlink.h Samir Bellabes
2010-01-04 15:08   ` Patrick McHardy
2010-01-13  4:19     ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-13  4:28     ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-13  5:36       ` Patrick McHardy
2010-01-13  4:36     ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-13  4:41     ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-13  6:03     ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-13  6:20     ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-15  7:02     ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-15  9:15     ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-16  1:59     ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-17  5:42     ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-23 19:33     ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-02 13:04 ` [RFC 8/9] snet: introduce snet_verdict.c and snet_verdict.h Samir Bellabes
2010-01-02 13:04 ` [RFC 9/9] snet: introduce snet_utils.c and snet_utils.h Samir Bellabes
2010-01-03 16:57 ` [RFC 0/9] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls jamal
2010-01-05  7:26   ` Samir Bellabes
2010-01-05  8:20     ` Tetsuo Handa
2010-01-05 14:09       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-01-06  0:23         ` [PATCH] LSM: Update comment on security_sock_rcv_skb Tetsuo Handa
2010-01-06  3:27           ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-01-10 21:53           ` James Morris
2010-01-10 16:20     ` [RFC 0/9] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls jamal

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