From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Patrick McHardy Subject: ipvs 02/04: Add boundary check on ioctl arguments Date: Fri, 8 Jan 2010 17:42:10 +0100 (MET) Message-ID: <20100108164207.28066.52850.sendpatchset@x2.localnet> References: <20100108164204.28066.44430.sendpatchset@x2.localnet> Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, Patrick McHardy , netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org To: davem@davemloft.net Return-path: Received: from stinky.trash.net ([213.144.137.162]:35874 "EHLO stinky.trash.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753992Ab0AHQmL (ORCPT ); Fri, 8 Jan 2010 11:42:11 -0500 In-Reply-To: <20100108164204.28066.44430.sendpatchset@x2.localnet> Sender: netfilter-devel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: commit 04bcef2a83f40c6db24222b27a52892cba39dffb Author: Arjan van de Ven Date: Mon Jan 4 16:37:12 2010 +0100 ipvs: Add boundary check on ioctl arguments The ipvs code has a nifty system for doing the size of ioctl command copies; it defines an array with values into which it indexes the cmd to find the right length. Unfortunately, the ipvs code forgot to check if the cmd was in the range that the array provides, allowing for an index outside of the array, which then gives a "garbage" result into the length, which then gets used for copying into a stack buffer. Fix this by adding sanity checks on these as well as the copy size. [ horms@verge.net.au: adjusted limit to IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX ] Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven Acked-by: Julian Anastasov Signed-off-by: Simon Horman Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c index 6bde12d..c37ac2d 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c +++ b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c @@ -2077,6 +2077,10 @@ do_ip_vs_set_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, unsigned int len) if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; + if (cmd < IP_VS_BASE_CTL || cmd > IP_VS_SO_SET_MAX) + return -EINVAL; + if (len < 0 || len > MAX_ARG_LEN) + return -EINVAL; if (len != set_arglen[SET_CMDID(cmd)]) { pr_err("set_ctl: len %u != %u\n", len, set_arglen[SET_CMDID(cmd)]); @@ -2352,17 +2356,25 @@ do_ip_vs_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len) { unsigned char arg[128]; int ret = 0; + unsigned int copylen; if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; + if (cmd < IP_VS_BASE_CTL || cmd > IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX) + return -EINVAL; + if (*len < get_arglen[GET_CMDID(cmd)]) { pr_err("get_ctl: len %u < %u\n", *len, get_arglen[GET_CMDID(cmd)]); return -EINVAL; } - if (copy_from_user(arg, user, get_arglen[GET_CMDID(cmd)]) != 0) + copylen = get_arglen[GET_CMDID(cmd)]; + if (copylen > 128) + return -EINVAL; + + if (copy_from_user(arg, user, copylen) != 0) return -EFAULT; if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&__ip_vs_mutex))