[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.0 62/99] ipvs: do not schedule icmp errors from tunnels

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.0 62/99] ipvs: do not schedule icmp errors from tunnels

[Sasha Levin]

From: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>

[ Upstream commit 0261ea1bd1eb0da5c0792a9119b8655cf33c80a3 ]

We can receive ICMP errors from client or from
tunneling real server. While the former can be
scheduled to real server, the latter should
not be scheduled, they are decapsulated only when
existing connection is found.

Fixes: 6044eeffafbe ("ipvs: attempt to schedule icmp packets")
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_core.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_core.c b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_core.c
index 235205c93e14..df112b27246a 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_core.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_core.c
@@ -1647,7 +1647,7 @@ ip_vs_in_icmp(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, struct sk_buff *skb, int *related,
 	if (!cp) {
 		int v;
 
-		if (!sysctl_schedule_icmp(ipvs))
+		if (ipip || !sysctl_schedule_icmp(ipvs))
 			return NF_ACCEPT;
 
 		if (!ip_vs_try_to_schedule(ipvs, AF_INET, skb, pd, &v, &cp, &ciph))
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.0 63/99] netfilter: ctnetlink: don't use conntrack/expect object addresses as id

[Sasha Levin]

From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>

[ Upstream commit 3c79107631db1f7fd32cf3f7368e4672004a3010 ]

else, we leak the addresses to userspace via ctnetlink events
and dumps.

Compute an ID on demand based on the immutable parts of nf_conn struct.

Another advantage compared to using an address is that there is no
immediate re-use of the same ID in case the conntrack entry is freed and
reallocated again immediately.

Fixes: 3583240249ef ("[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack_expect: kill unique ID")
Fixes: 7f85f914721f ("[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack: kill unique ID")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack.h |  2 ++
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c    | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++----
 3 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack.h b/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack.h
index 249d0a5b12b8..63fd47e924b9 100644
--- a/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack.h
+++ b/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack.h
@@ -318,6 +318,8 @@ struct nf_conn *nf_ct_tmpl_alloc(struct net *net,
 				 gfp_t flags);
 void nf_ct_tmpl_free(struct nf_conn *tmpl);
 
+u32 nf_ct_get_id(const struct nf_conn *ct);
+
 static inline void
 nf_ct_set(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nf_conn *ct, enum ip_conntrack_info info)
 {
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c
index 9dd4c2048a2b..1982faf21ebb 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/random.h>
 #include <linux/jhash.h>
+#include <linux/siphash.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
 #include <linux/moduleparam.h>
@@ -424,6 +425,40 @@ nf_ct_invert_tuple(struct nf_conntrack_tuple *inverse,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nf_ct_invert_tuple);
 
+/* Generate a almost-unique pseudo-id for a given conntrack.
+ *
+ * intentionally doesn't re-use any of the seeds used for hash
+ * table location, we assume id gets exposed to userspace.
+ *
+ * Following nf_conn items do not change throughout lifetime
+ * of the nf_conn after it has been committed to main hash table:
+ *
+ * 1. nf_conn address
+ * 2. nf_conn->ext address
+ * 3. nf_conn->master address (normally NULL)
+ * 4. tuple
+ * 5. the associated net namespace
+ */
+u32 nf_ct_get_id(const struct nf_conn *ct)
+{
+	static __read_mostly siphash_key_t ct_id_seed;
+	unsigned long a, b, c, d;
+
+	net_get_random_once(&ct_id_seed, sizeof(ct_id_seed));
+
+	a = (unsigned long)ct;
+	b = (unsigned long)ct->master ^ net_hash_mix(nf_ct_net(ct));
+	c = (unsigned long)ct->ext;
+	d = (unsigned long)siphash(&ct->tuplehash, sizeof(ct->tuplehash),
+				   &ct_id_seed);
+#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
+	return siphash_4u64((u64)a, (u64)b, (u64)c, (u64)d, &ct_id_seed);
+#else
+	return siphash_4u32((u32)a, (u32)b, (u32)c, (u32)d, &ct_id_seed);
+#endif
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nf_ct_get_id);
+
 static void
 clean_from_lists(struct nf_conn *ct)
 {
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 1213beb5a714..36619ad8ab8c 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/siphash.h>
 
 #include <linux/netfilter.h>
 #include <net/netlink.h>
@@ -485,7 +486,9 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_ct_synproxy(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nf_conn *ct)
 
 static int ctnetlink_dump_id(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
 {
-	if (nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_ID, htonl((unsigned long)ct)))
+	__be32 id = (__force __be32)nf_ct_get_id(ct);
+
+	if (nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_ID, id))
 		goto nla_put_failure;
 	return 0;
 
@@ -1286,8 +1289,9 @@ static int ctnetlink_del_conntrack(struct net *net, struct sock *ctnl,
 	}
 
 	if (cda[CTA_ID]) {
-		u_int32_t id = ntohl(nla_get_be32(cda[CTA_ID]));
-		if (id != (u32)(unsigned long)ct) {
+		__be32 id = nla_get_be32(cda[CTA_ID]);
+
+		if (id != (__force __be32)nf_ct_get_id(ct)) {
 			nf_ct_put(ct);
 			return -ENOENT;
 		}
@@ -2694,6 +2698,25 @@ static int ctnetlink_exp_dump_mask(struct sk_buff *skb,
 
 static const union nf_inet_addr any_addr;
 
+static __be32 nf_expect_get_id(const struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp)
+{
+	static __read_mostly siphash_key_t exp_id_seed;
+	unsigned long a, b, c, d;
+
+	net_get_random_once(&exp_id_seed, sizeof(exp_id_seed));
+
+	a = (unsigned long)exp;
+	b = (unsigned long)exp->helper;
+	c = (unsigned long)exp->master;
+	d = (unsigned long)siphash(&exp->tuple, sizeof(exp->tuple), &exp_id_seed);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
+	return (__force __be32)siphash_4u64((u64)a, (u64)b, (u64)c, (u64)d, &exp_id_seed);
+#else
+	return (__force __be32)siphash_4u32((u32)a, (u32)b, (u32)c, (u32)d, &exp_id_seed);
+#endif
+}
+
 static int
 ctnetlink_exp_dump_expect(struct sk_buff *skb,
 			  const struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp)
@@ -2741,7 +2764,7 @@ ctnetlink_exp_dump_expect(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	}
 #endif
 	if (nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_EXPECT_TIMEOUT, htonl(timeout)) ||
-	    nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_EXPECT_ID, htonl((unsigned long)exp)) ||
+	    nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_EXPECT_ID, nf_expect_get_id(exp)) ||
 	    nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_EXPECT_FLAGS, htonl(exp->flags)) ||
 	    nla_put_be32(skb, CTA_EXPECT_CLASS, htonl(exp->class)))
 		goto nla_put_failure;
@@ -3046,7 +3069,8 @@ static int ctnetlink_get_expect(struct net *net, struct sock *ctnl,
 
 	if (cda[CTA_EXPECT_ID]) {
 		__be32 id = nla_get_be32(cda[CTA_EXPECT_ID]);
-		if (ntohl(id) != (u32)(unsigned long)exp) {
+
+		if (id != nf_expect_get_id(exp)) {
 			nf_ct_expect_put(exp);
 			return -ENOENT;
 		}
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.0 64/99] netfilter: nf_tables: prevent shift wrap in nft_chain_parse_hook()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>

[ Upstream commit 33d1c018179d0a30c39cc5f1682b77867282694b ]

I believe that "hook->num" can be up to UINT_MAX.  Shifting more than
31 bits would is undefined in C but in practice it would lead to shift
wrapping.  That would lead to an array overflow in nf_tables_addchain():

	ops->hook       = hook.type->hooks[ops->hooknum];

Fixes: fe19c04ca137 ("netfilter: nf_tables: remove nhooks field from struct nft_af_info")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
index e2aac80f9b7b..25c2b98b9a96 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
@@ -1502,7 +1502,7 @@ static int nft_chain_parse_hook(struct net *net,
 		if (IS_ERR(type))
 			return PTR_ERR(type);
 	}
-	if (!(type->hook_mask & (1 << hook->num)))
+	if (hook->num > NF_MAX_HOOKS || !(type->hook_mask & (1 << hook->num)))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
 	if (type->type == NFT_CHAIN_T_NAT &&
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.0 65/99] netfilter: nat: fix icmp id randomization

[Sasha Levin]

From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>

[ Upstream commit 5bdac418f33f60b07a34e01e722889140ee8fac9 ]

Sven Auhagen reported that a 2nd ping request will fail if 'fully-random'
mode is used.

Reason is that if no proto information is given, min/max are both 0,
so we set the icmp id to 0 instead of chosing a random value between
0 and 65535.

Update test case as well to catch this, without fix this yields:
[..]
ERROR: cannot ping ns1 from ns2 with ip masquerade fully-random (attempt 2)
ERROR: cannot ping ns1 from ns2 with ipv6 masquerade fully-random (attempt 2)

... becaus 2nd ping clashes with existing 'id 0' icmp conntrack and gets
dropped.

Fixes: 203f2e78200c27e ("netfilter: nat: remove l4proto->unique_tuple")
Reported-by: Sven Auhagen <sven.auhagen@voleatech.de>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c                  | 11 ++++--
 tools/testing/selftests/netfilter/nft_nat.sh | 36 +++++++++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c
index d159e9e7835b..ade527565127 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c
@@ -358,9 +358,14 @@ static void nf_nat_l4proto_unique_tuple(struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple,
 	case IPPROTO_ICMPV6:
 		/* id is same for either direction... */
 		keyptr = &tuple->src.u.icmp.id;
-		min = range->min_proto.icmp.id;
-		range_size = ntohs(range->max_proto.icmp.id) -
-			     ntohs(range->min_proto.icmp.id) + 1;
+		if (!(range->flags & NF_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_SPECIFIED)) {
+			min = 0;
+			range_size = 65536;
+		} else {
+			min = ntohs(range->min_proto.icmp.id);
+			range_size = ntohs(range->max_proto.icmp.id) -
+				     ntohs(range->min_proto.icmp.id) + 1;
+		}
 		goto find_free_id;
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_CT_PROTO_GRE)
 	case IPPROTO_GRE:
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/netfilter/nft_nat.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/netfilter/nft_nat.sh
index 8ec76681605c..3194007cf8d1 100755
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/netfilter/nft_nat.sh
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/netfilter/nft_nat.sh
@@ -321,6 +321,7 @@ EOF
 
 test_masquerade6()
 {
+	local natflags=$1
 	local lret=0
 
 	ip netns exec ns0 sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding=1 > /dev/null
@@ -354,13 +355,13 @@ ip netns exec ns0 nft -f - <<EOF
 table ip6 nat {
 	chain postrouting {
 		type nat hook postrouting priority 0; policy accept;
-		meta oif veth0 masquerade
+		meta oif veth0 masquerade $natflags
 	}
 }
 EOF
 	ip netns exec ns2 ping -q -c 1 dead:1::99 > /dev/null # ping ns2->ns1
 	if [ $? -ne 0 ] ; then
-		echo "ERROR: cannot ping ns1 from ns2 with active ipv6 masquerading"
+		echo "ERROR: cannot ping ns1 from ns2 with active ipv6 masquerade $natflags"
 		lret=1
 	fi
 
@@ -397,19 +398,26 @@ EOF
 		fi
 	done
 
+	ip netns exec ns2 ping -q -c 1 dead:1::99 > /dev/null # ping ns2->ns1
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ] ; then
+		echo "ERROR: cannot ping ns1 from ns2 with active ipv6 masquerade $natflags (attempt 2)"
+		lret=1
+	fi
+
 	ip netns exec ns0 nft flush chain ip6 nat postrouting
 	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
 		echo "ERROR: Could not flush ip6 nat postrouting" 1>&2
 		lret=1
 	fi
 
-	test $lret -eq 0 && echo "PASS: IPv6 masquerade for ns2"
+	test $lret -eq 0 && echo "PASS: IPv6 masquerade $natflags for ns2"
 
 	return $lret
 }
 
 test_masquerade()
 {
+	local natflags=$1
 	local lret=0
 
 	ip netns exec ns0 sysctl net.ipv4.conf.veth0.forwarding=1 > /dev/null
@@ -417,7 +425,7 @@ test_masquerade()
 
 	ip netns exec ns2 ping -q -c 1 10.0.1.99 > /dev/null # ping ns2->ns1
 	if [ $? -ne 0 ] ; then
-		echo "ERROR: canot ping ns1 from ns2"
+		echo "ERROR: cannot ping ns1 from ns2 $natflags"
 		lret=1
 	fi
 
@@ -443,13 +451,13 @@ ip netns exec ns0 nft -f - <<EOF
 table ip nat {
 	chain postrouting {
 		type nat hook postrouting priority 0; policy accept;
-		meta oif veth0 masquerade
+		meta oif veth0 masquerade $natflags
 	}
 }
 EOF
 	ip netns exec ns2 ping -q -c 1 10.0.1.99 > /dev/null # ping ns2->ns1
 	if [ $? -ne 0 ] ; then
-		echo "ERROR: cannot ping ns1 from ns2 with active ip masquerading"
+		echo "ERROR: cannot ping ns1 from ns2 with active ip masquere $natflags"
 		lret=1
 	fi
 
@@ -485,13 +493,19 @@ EOF
 		fi
 	done
 
+	ip netns exec ns2 ping -q -c 1 10.0.1.99 > /dev/null # ping ns2->ns1
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ] ; then
+		echo "ERROR: cannot ping ns1 from ns2 with active ip masquerade $natflags (attempt 2)"
+		lret=1
+	fi
+
 	ip netns exec ns0 nft flush chain ip nat postrouting
 	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
 		echo "ERROR: Could not flush nat postrouting" 1>&2
 		lret=1
 	fi
 
-	test $lret -eq 0 && echo "PASS: IP masquerade for ns2"
+	test $lret -eq 0 && echo "PASS: IP masquerade $natflags for ns2"
 
 	return $lret
 }
@@ -750,8 +764,12 @@ test_local_dnat
 test_local_dnat6
 
 reset_counters
-test_masquerade
-test_masquerade6
+test_masquerade ""
+test_masquerade6 ""
+
+reset_counters
+test_masquerade "fully-random"
+test_masquerade6 "fully-random"
 
 reset_counters
 test_redirect
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.0 74/99] netfilter: never get/set skb->tstamp

[Sasha Levin]

From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>

[ Upstream commit 916f6efae62305796e012e7c3a7884a267cbacbf ]

setting net.netfilter.nf_conntrack_timestamp=1 breaks xmit with fq
scheduler.  skb->tstamp might be "refreshed" using ktime_get_real(),
but fq expects CLOCK_MONOTONIC.

This patch removes all places in netfilter that check/set skb->tstamp:

1. To fix the bogus "start" time seen with conntrack timestamping for
   outgoing packets, never use skb->tstamp and always use current time.
2. In nfqueue and nflog, only use skb->tstamp for incoming packets,
   as determined by current hook (prerouting, input, forward).
3. xt_time has to use system clock as well rather than skb->tstamp.
   We could still use skb->tstamp for prerouting/input/foward, but
   I see no advantage to make this conditional.

Fixes: fb420d5d91c1 ("tcp/fq: move back to CLOCK_MONOTONIC")
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Michal Soltys <soltys@ziu.info>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c |  7 ++-----
 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c     |  2 +-
 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c   |  2 +-
 net/netfilter/xt_time.c           | 23 ++++++++++++++---------
 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c
index 1982faf21ebb..d7ac2f82bb6d 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c
@@ -983,12 +983,9 @@ __nf_conntrack_confirm(struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	/* set conntrack timestamp, if enabled. */
 	tstamp = nf_conn_tstamp_find(ct);
-	if (tstamp) {
-		if (skb->tstamp == 0)
-			__net_timestamp(skb);
+	if (tstamp)
+		tstamp->start = ktime_get_real_ns();
 
-		tstamp->start = ktime_to_ns(skb->tstamp);
-	}
 	/* Since the lookup is lockless, hash insertion must be done after
 	 * starting the timer and setting the CONFIRMED bit. The RCU barriers
 	 * guarantee that no other CPU can find the conntrack before the above
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c
index b1f9c5303f02..0b3347570265 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c
@@ -540,7 +540,7 @@ __build_packet_message(struct nfnl_log_net *log,
 			goto nla_put_failure;
 	}
 
-	if (skb->tstamp) {
+	if (hooknum <= NF_INET_FORWARD && skb->tstamp) {
 		struct nfulnl_msg_packet_timestamp ts;
 		struct timespec64 kts = ktime_to_timespec64(skb->tstamp);
 		ts.sec = cpu_to_be64(kts.tv_sec);
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index 0dcc3592d053..e057b2961d31 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -582,7 +582,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
 	if (nfqnl_put_bridge(entry, skb) < 0)
 		goto nla_put_failure;
 
-	if (entskb->tstamp) {
+	if (entry->state.hook <= NF_INET_FORWARD && entskb->tstamp) {
 		struct nfqnl_msg_packet_timestamp ts;
 		struct timespec64 kts = ktime_to_timespec64(entskb->tstamp);
 
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_time.c b/net/netfilter/xt_time.c
index c13bcd0ab491..8dbb4d48f2ed 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_time.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_time.c
@@ -163,19 +163,24 @@ time_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par)
 	s64 stamp;
 
 	/*
-	 * We cannot use get_seconds() instead of __net_timestamp() here.
+	 * We need real time here, but we can neither use skb->tstamp
+	 * nor __net_timestamp().
+	 *
+	 * skb->tstamp and skb->skb_mstamp_ns overlap, however, they
+	 * use different clock types (real vs monotonic).
+	 *
 	 * Suppose you have two rules:
-	 * 	1. match before 13:00
-	 * 	2. match after 13:00
+	 *	1. match before 13:00
+	 *	2. match after 13:00
+	 *
 	 * If you match against processing time (get_seconds) it
 	 * may happen that the same packet matches both rules if
-	 * it arrived at the right moment before 13:00.
+	 * it arrived at the right moment before 13:00, so it would be
+	 * better to check skb->tstamp and set it via __net_timestamp()
+	 * if needed.  This however breaks outgoing packets tx timestamp,
+	 * and causes them to get delayed forever by fq packet scheduler.
 	 */
-	if (skb->tstamp == 0)
-		__net_timestamp((struct sk_buff *)skb);
-
-	stamp = ktime_to_ns(skb->tstamp);
-	stamp = div_s64(stamp, NSEC_PER_SEC);
+	stamp = get_seconds();
 
 	if (info->flags & XT_TIME_LOCAL_TZ)
 		/* Adjust for local timezone */
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.0 75/99] netfilter: fix nf_l4proto_log_invalid to log invalid packets

[Sasha Levin]

From: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit d48668052b2603b6262459625c86108c493588dd ]

It doesn't log a packet if sysctl_log_invalid isn't equal to protonum
OR sysctl_log_invalid isn't equal to IPPROTO_RAW. This sentence is
always true. I believe we need to replace OR to AND.

Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Fixes: c4f3db1595827 ("netfilter: conntrack: add and use nf_l4proto_log_invalid")
Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto.c
index 859f5d07a915..78361e462e80 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto.c
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ void nf_l4proto_log_invalid(const struct sk_buff *skb,
 	struct va_format vaf;
 	va_list args;
 
-	if (net->ct.sysctl_log_invalid != protonum ||
+	if (net->ct.sysctl_log_invalid != protonum &&
 	    net->ct.sysctl_log_invalid != IPPROTO_RAW)
 		return;
 
-- 
2.20.1