From: Tabriz Hasanli <cybersec467@gmail.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, ntfs3@lists.linux.dev
Cc: almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com, w@1wt.eu,
Tabriz Hasanli <cybersec467@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] fs/ntfs3: validate target index entry in check_if_alloc_index/check_if_root_index
Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2026 10:23:44 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260831142344.472594-2-cybersec467@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260831142344.472594-1-cybersec467@gmail.com>
check_if_alloc_index() and check_if_root_index() walk the index entry
chain to verify that lrh->attr_off lands on a valid entry boundary.
However they have two gaps:
(a) They do not stop at de_is_last() — they walk past the last real
entry into the trailing gap between the last entry's end and
hdr->used, which check_index_header() leaves unvalidated.
(b) They do not validate the TARGET entry at attr_off — the walk exits
as soon as o == attr_off without checking the entry's size, flags,
or bounds.
This allows attr_off to point to an attacker-controlled "fake entry"
in the trailing gap of a crafted NTFS image's $LogFile. Four do_action()
cases then use the unvalidated entry:
SetIndexEntryVcnAllocation / SetIndexEntryVcnRoot:
de_set_vbn_le() writes 8 bytes at e + e->size - 8.
Crafted e->size yields an 8-byte OOB write up to ~64KB past the
buffer.
UpdateFileNameAllocation / UpdateFileNameRoot:
memmove() writes 56 bytes at a fixed offset from e. If e is near
the buffer end, this overflows by up to 0x50 bytes.
The sibling DeleteIndexEntryAllocation case (commit fc4626bb3656) and
UpdateRecordData cases (commit 3e127829e57f) already carry per-site
guards for the same class of attack; this patch closes the gap at the
validator level so all current and future callers are protected.
Fix both functions to:
- stop walking at de_is_last()
- validate the target entry: size is 8-byte aligned, >= minimum
entry size, and does not extend past hdr->used
Found by static source analysis and confirmed with userspace ASan
harnesses transcribing the kernel's exact validation logic on a
512-byte INDEX_BUFFER with faithful check_index_buffer() geometry.
Signed-off-by: Tabriz Hasanli <cybersec467@gmail.com>
---
fs/ntfs3/fslog.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c b/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c
index ed50c1d0c..d73e3ff1e 100644
--- a/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c
+++ b/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c
@@ -2953,10 +2953,13 @@ static inline bool check_if_root_index(const struct ATTRIB *attr,
u32 o = PtrOffset(attr, hdr) + de_off;
const struct NTFS_DE *e = Add2Ptr(hdr, de_off);
u32 asize = le32_to_cpu(attr->size);
+ u32 used = le32_to_cpu(hdr->used);
+ bool has_subnode = hdr_has_subnode(hdr);
+ u32 min_de = has_subnode ? sizeof(struct NTFS_DE) + sizeof(u64)
+ : sizeof(struct NTFS_DE);
+ u16 esize;
while (o < ao) {
- u16 esize;
-
if (o >= asize)
break;
@@ -2964,11 +2967,24 @@ static inline bool check_if_root_index(const struct ATTRIB *attr,
if (!esize)
break;
+ if (de_is_last(e))
+ break;
+
o += esize;
+ de_off += esize;
e = Add2Ptr(e, esize);
}
- return o == ao;
+ if (o != ao)
+ return false;
+
+ /* Validate the target entry itself. */
+ esize = le16_to_cpu(e->size);
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED(esize, 8) || esize < min_de ||
+ size_add(de_off, esize) > used)
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
}
static inline bool check_if_alloc_index(const struct INDEX_HDR *hdr,
@@ -2978,10 +2994,12 @@ static inline bool check_if_alloc_index(const struct INDEX_HDR *hdr,
u32 o = offsetof(struct INDEX_BUFFER, ihdr) + de_off;
const struct NTFS_DE *e = Add2Ptr(hdr, de_off);
u32 used = le32_to_cpu(hdr->used);
+ bool has_subnode = hdr_has_subnode(hdr);
+ u32 min_de = has_subnode ? sizeof(struct NTFS_DE) + sizeof(u64)
+ : sizeof(struct NTFS_DE);
+ u16 esize;
while (o < attr_off) {
- u16 esize;
-
if (de_off >= used)
break;
@@ -2989,12 +3007,24 @@ static inline bool check_if_alloc_index(const struct INDEX_HDR *hdr,
if (!esize)
break;
+ if (de_is_last(e))
+ break;
+
o += esize;
de_off += esize;
e = Add2Ptr(e, esize);
}
- return o == attr_off;
+ if (o != attr_off)
+ return false;
+
+ /* Validate the target entry itself. */
+ esize = le16_to_cpu(e->size);
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED(esize, 8) || esize < min_de ||
+ size_add(de_off, esize) > used)
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
}
static inline void change_attr_size(struct MFT_REC *rec, struct ATTRIB *attr,
--
2.53.0
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-31 14:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-31 14:23 [PATCH 0/1] fs/ntfs3: fix OOB writes in do_action() log replay via unvalidated trailing index entry Tabriz Hasanli
2026-08-31 14:23 ` Tabriz Hasanli [this message]
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