From: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
To: vova tokarev <vladimirelitokarev@gmail.com>
Cc: almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com, security@kernel.org,
ntfs3@lists.linux.dev
Subject: Re: Fwd: InjectionBunny: NTFS3 SUID injection leading to local privilege escalation
Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2026 11:12:26 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <apqLejWrecEZkyhw@eldamar.lan> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGBKPgPiXyKWtjgYSACnugmG1XPs=mPg-Zu-xQziUZ1k921+qA@mail.gmail.com>
Hi Vladimir,
On Fri, Aug 07, 2026 at 01:39:35PM +0300, vova tokarev wrote:
> Hi,
>
> It's been almost two months since I reported this, and I haven't heard
> back. I recently learned I should reach out to the subsystem maintainer
> directly, so forwarding this to you.
>
> I noticed that CVE-2026-63833 (commit f8d420949b33) was assigned and
> merged for a related issue -- blocking setxattr() writes to $LX*
> names. However, this only fixes one of the two attack vectors I
> reported. The primary vector in my original report remains open:
>
> A pre-crafted NTFS image (e.g. USB drive) with $LXUID=0, $LXGID=0,
> $LXMOD=0104755 already in the MFT produces a setuid-root binary the
> moment the volume is mounted. No setxattr() is involved -- the EAs
> are on disk. The -EPERM check doesn't help.
>
> The root cause is still at fs/ntfs3/xattr.c:1022:
>
> inode->i_mode = le32_to_cpu(value[2]);
>
> This loads S_ISUID/S_ISGID directly from untrusted on-disk data.
> Desktop automounters (udisks) mount NTFS with suid by default, so
> plugging in a crafted USB gives any local user euid=0.
>
> Suggested one-line fix:
>
> - inode->i_mode = le32_to_cpu(value[2]);
> + inode->i_mode = le32_to_cpu(value[2]) & ~(S_ISUID | S_ISGID);
>
> I have a full PoC and working demo (included in my original report
> below). Would love to hear your thoughts.
AFAICS, this did not got a patch yet. Would you mind submitting a
patch to Konstantin? I'm adding Konstantin Komarov explicitly to this
thread.
Konstantin, context from
https://lore.kernel.org/ntfs3/CAGBKPgPiXyKWtjgYSACnugmG1XPs=mPg-Zu-xQziUZ1k921+qA@mail.gmail.com/
.
Regards,
Salvatore
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-04 9:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <CAGBKPgMqBMsBH4mm2fwggA8rJZ3R15nPxuEh0emOeVpX2kgHPA@mail.gmail.com>
2026-08-07 10:39 ` Fwd: InjectionBunny: NTFS3 SUID injection leading to local privilege escalation vova tokarev
2026-09-04 9:12 ` Salvatore Bonaccorso [this message]
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