From: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@Huawei.com>
To: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Cc: <linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org>, <nvdimm@lists.linux.dev>,
<dan.j.williams@intel.com>, <ira.weiny@intel.com>,
<vishal.l.verma@intel.com>, <alison.schofield@intel.com>,
<dave@stgolabs.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 12/18] tools/testing/cxl: Add "passphrase secure erase" opcode support
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2022 11:08:31 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221115110831.00001fa4@Huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <166845805415.2496228.732168029765896218.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com>
On Mon, 14 Nov 2022 13:34:14 -0700
Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> wrote:
> Add support to emulate a CXL mem device support the "passphrase secure
> erase" operation.
>
> Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
The logic in here gives me a headache but I'm not sure it's correct yet...
If you can figure out what is supposed to happen if this is called
with Passphrase Type == master before the master passphrase has been set
then you are doing better than me.
Unlike for the User passphrase, where the language " .. and the user passphrase
is not currently set or is not supported by the device, this value is ignored."
to me implies we wipe the device and clear the non existent user pass phrase,
the not set master passphrase case isn't covered as far as I can see.
The user passphrase question raises a futher question (see inline)
Thoughts?
Other than that some suggestions inline but nothing functional, so up to you.
Either way
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
> ---
> tools/testing/cxl/test/mem.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 65 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/tools/testing/cxl/test/mem.c b/tools/testing/cxl/test/mem.c
> index 90607597b9a4..fc28f7cc147a 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/cxl/test/mem.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/cxl/test/mem.c
> @@ -362,6 +362,68 @@ static int mock_unlock_security(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, struct cxl_mbox_cmd
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static int mock_passphrase_secure_erase(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds,
> + struct cxl_mbox_cmd *cmd)
> +{
> + struct cxl_mock_mem_pdata *mdata = dev_get_platdata(cxlds->dev);
> + struct cxl_pass_erase *erase;
> +
> + if (cmd->size_in != sizeof(*erase))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (cmd->size_out != 0)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + erase = cmd->payload_in;
> + if (mdata->security_state & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_FROZEN) {
> + cmd->return_code = CXL_MBOX_CMD_RC_SECURITY;
> + return -ENXIO;
> + }
> +
> + if (mdata->security_state & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PLIMIT &&
> + erase->type == CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_USER) {
> + cmd->return_code = CXL_MBOX_CMD_RC_SECURITY;
> + return -ENXIO;
> + }
> +
> + if (mdata->security_state & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_MASTER_PLIMIT &&
> + erase->type == CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_MASTER) {
> + cmd->return_code = CXL_MBOX_CMD_RC_SECURITY;
> + return -ENXIO;
> + }
> +
> + if (erase->type == CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_MASTER &&
> + mdata->security_state & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_MASTER_PASS_SET) {
> + if (memcmp(mdata->master_pass, erase->pass, NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN)) {
> + master_plimit_check(mdata);
> + cmd->return_code = CXL_MBOX_CMD_RC_PASSPHRASE;
> + return -ENXIO;
> + }
> + mdata->master_limit = 0;
> + mdata->user_limit = 0;
> + mdata->security_state &= ~CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PASS_SET;
> + memset(mdata->user_pass, 0, NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN);
> + mdata->security_state &= ~CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_LOCKED;
> + return 0;
> + }
What to do if the masterpass phrase isn't set?
Even if we return 0, I'd slightly prefer to see that done locally so refactor as
if (erase->type == CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_MASTER) {
if (!(mdata->security_state & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATATE_MASTER_PASS_SET)) {
return 0; /* ? */
if (memcmp)...
} else { /* CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_USER */ //or make it a switch.
> +
> + if (erase->type == CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_USER &&
> + mdata->security_state & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PASS_SET) {
Given we aren't actually scrambling the encryption keys (as we don't have any ;)
it doesn't make a functional difference, but to line up with the spec, I would
consider changing this to explicitly have the path for no user passphrase set.
if (erase->type == CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_USER) {
if (mdata->security_state & CXL_MEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PASS_SET) {
if (memcmp(mdata->user_pass, erase->pass, NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN)) {
user_plimit_check(mdata);
cmd->return_code = CXL_MBOX_CMD_RC_PASSPHRASE;
return -ENXIO;
}
mdata->user_limit = 0;
mdata->security_state &= ~CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PASS_SET;
memset(mdata->user_pass, 0, NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN);
}
/* Change encryption keys */
return 0;
}
> + if (memcmp(mdata->user_pass, erase->pass, NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN)) {
> + user_plimit_check(mdata);
> + cmd->return_code = CXL_MBOX_CMD_RC_PASSPHRASE;
> + return -ENXIO;
> + }
> +
> + mdata->user_limit = 0;
> + mdata->security_state &= ~CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PASS_SET;
> + memset(mdata->user_pass, 0, NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN);
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> + return 0;
With above changes you can never reach here.
> +}
> +
> static int mock_get_lsa(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, struct cxl_mbox_cmd *cmd)
> {
> struct cxl_mbox_get_lsa *get_lsa = cmd->payload_in;
> @@ -470,6 +532,9 @@ static int cxl_mock_mbox_send(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, struct cxl_mbox_cmd *
> case CXL_MBOX_OP_UNLOCK:
> rc = mock_unlock_security(cxlds, cmd);
> break;
> + case CXL_MBOX_OP_PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE:
> + rc = mock_passphrase_secure_erase(cxlds, cmd);
> + break;
> default:
> break;
> }
>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-11-15 11:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-11-14 20:33 [PATCH v4 00/18] Introduce security commands for CXL pmem device Dave Jiang
2022-11-14 20:33 ` [PATCH v4 01/18] cxl/pmem: Introduce nvdimm_security_ops with ->get_flags() operation Dave Jiang
2022-11-14 20:33 ` [PATCH v4 02/18] tools/testing/cxl: Add "Get Security State" opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-11-14 20:33 ` [PATCH v4 03/18] cxl/pmem: Add "Set Passphrase" security command support Dave Jiang
2022-11-14 20:33 ` [PATCH v4 04/18] tools/testing/cxl: Add "Set Passphrase" opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-11-14 20:33 ` [PATCH v4 05/18] cxl/pmem: Add Disable Passphrase security command support Dave Jiang
2022-11-14 20:33 ` [PATCH v4 06/18] tools/testing/cxl: Add "Disable" security opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-11-14 20:33 ` [PATCH v4 07/18] cxl/pmem: Add "Freeze Security State" security command support Dave Jiang
2022-11-14 20:33 ` [PATCH v4 08/18] tools/testing/cxl: Add "Freeze Security State" security opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-11-14 20:33 ` [PATCH v4 09/18] cxl/pmem: Add "Unlock" security command support Dave Jiang
2022-11-14 20:34 ` [PATCH v4 10/18] tools/testing/cxl: Add "Unlock" security opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-11-14 20:34 ` [PATCH v4 11/18] cxl/pmem: Add "Passphrase Secure Erase" security command support Dave Jiang
2022-11-14 20:34 ` [PATCH v4 12/18] tools/testing/cxl: Add "passphrase secure erase" opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-11-15 11:08 ` Jonathan Cameron [this message]
2022-11-15 15:57 ` Dave Jiang
2022-11-15 17:01 ` Dave Jiang
2022-11-16 11:43 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-11-16 21:54 ` Dave Jiang
2022-11-17 11:26 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-11-16 11:37 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-11-14 20:34 ` [PATCH v4 13/18] nvdimm/cxl/pmem: Add support for master passphrase disable security command Dave Jiang
2022-11-14 22:27 ` Ben Cheatham
2022-11-14 22:49 ` Dave Jiang
2022-11-14 20:34 ` [PATCH v4 14/18] cxl/pmem: add id attribute to CXL based nvdimm Dave Jiang
2022-11-14 20:34 ` [PATCH v4 15/18] tools/testing/cxl: add mechanism to lock mem device for testing Dave Jiang
2022-11-14 20:34 ` [PATCH v4 16/18] cxl/pmem: add provider name to cxl pmem dimm attribute group Dave Jiang
2022-11-14 20:34 ` [PATCH v4 17/18] libnvdimm: Introduce CONFIG_NVDIMM_SECURITY_TEST flag Dave Jiang
2022-11-14 20:34 ` [PATCH v4 18/18] cxl: add dimm_id support for __nvdimm_create() Dave Jiang
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