From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Pengpeng Hou" <pengpeng@iscas.ac.cn>
Cc: nvdimm@lists.linux.dev
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 5/5] ACPI: NFIT: bound the platform capability mask
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2026 15:33:21 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260813153321.D71F51F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260813152037.25828-1-pengpeng@iscas.ac.cn>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] The `acpi_nfit_init` function fails to restore list elements on error paths, leading to memory leaks and complete state corruption for existing NVDIMM devices during hot-updates.
--
--- Patch [5]: [PATCH v2 5/5] ACPI: NFIT: bound the platform capability mask ---
commit bbbfd46d3c5bf4ec32e49479ec84620dc0f64973
Author: Pengpeng Hou <pengpeng@iscas.ac.cn>
ACPI: NFIT: bound the platform capability mask
The platform capability subtable parser reads highest_capability and
capabilities without first requiring the fixed structure to be present.
This commit adds checks to prevent out-of-bounds reads and undefined shifts.
> diff --git a/drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c b/drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c
> index 84c70f1941c57..7638d4dc8c6da 100644
> --- a/drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c
> +++ b/drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c
> @@ -987,7 +987,14 @@ static bool add_platform_cap(struct acpi_nfit_desc *acpi_desc,
> struct device *dev = acpi_desc->dev;
> u32 mask;
>
> - mask = (1 << (pcap->highest_capability + 1)) - 1;
> + if (pcap->header.length < sizeof(*pcap))
> + return false;
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does adding this new early return expose
a state corruption bug during hot-updates?
In acpi_nfit_init(), existing NFIT resources are moved to a local stack
variable before parsing:
acpi_nfit_init() {
...
list_cut_position(&prev.spas, &acpi_desc->spas,
acpi_desc->spas.prev);
...
If the newly added capability length check fails, it appears the table
parsing aborts:
if (IS_ERR(data)) {
dev_dbg(dev, "nfit table parsing error: %ld\n", PTR_ERR(data));
rc = PTR_ERR(data);
goto out_unlock;
}
Which jumps directly to the exit label:
out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&acpi_desc->init_mutex);
return rc;
}
Since the elements in the local prev lists are never restored to
acpi_desc on this error path, do these devm-managed items become permanently
leaked with dangling list pointers when prev goes out of scope?
> +
> + if (pcap->highest_capability >= 31)
> + mask = U32_MAX;
> + else
> + mask = (1U << (pcap->highest_capability + 1)) - 1;
> +
> acpi_desc->platform_cap = pcap->capabilities & mask;
> dev_dbg(dev, "cap: %#x\n", acpi_desc->platform_cap);
> return true;
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260813150948.17239-1-pengpeng@iscas.ac.cn?part=5
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-13 15:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-13 15:09 [PATCH v2 0/5] ACPI: NFIT: harden subtable extent validation Pengpeng Hou
2026-08-13 15:11 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] ACPI: NFIT: validate subtable extents before dispatch Pengpeng Hou
2026-08-13 15:41 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-13 15:13 ` [PATCH v2 2/5] ACPI: NFIT: accept SPA structures with an unused location cookie Pengpeng Hou
2026-08-13 15:35 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-13 15:16 ` [PATCH v2 3/5] ACPI: NFIT: validate interleave and flush array extents Pengpeng Hou
2026-08-13 15:38 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-13 15:18 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] ACPI: NFIT: validate control region extent Pengpeng Hou
2026-08-13 15:38 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-13 15:20 ` [PATCH v2 5/5] ACPI: NFIT: bound the platform capability mask Pengpeng Hou
2026-08-13 15:33 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-08-13 22:51 ` [PATCH v2 0/5] ACPI: NFIT: harden subtable extent validation Alison Schofield
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