From: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Scott Murray <scott.murray@konsulko.com>
Cc: openembedded-architecture
<openembedded-architecture@lists.openembedded.org>,
openembedded-core <openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org>
Subject: Re: [Openembedded-architecture] OE-Core/Yocto Project's first CVE (CVE-2017-9731)
Date: Thu, 29 Jun 2017 23:08:43 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1498774123.9571.5.camel@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LFD.2.20.1706281335150.8288@godzilla.spiteful.org>
On Wed, 2017-06-28 at 13:38 -0400, Scott Murray wrote:
> On Mon, 19 Jun 2017, Richard Purdie wrote:
>
> >
> > I suspect this has been missed by some people so I want to spell it
> > out. We have our first CVE in OE-Core itself.
> >
> > The issue is limited to binary ipks potentially exposing sensitive
> > information through the "Source:" field which contained the full
> > SRC_URI. Those urls could potentially contain sensitive information
> > about servers and credentials.
> >
> > After discussion, I ended up changing the field to contain the
> > recipe
> > filename (no path). There was talk of filtering the urls however if
> > you
> > try, it becomes clear that sensitive elements can remain and no
> > solution is likely 100% effective. The other package backends don't
> > do
> > this at all so this brings ipk more into line with them. Simply
> > clearing the field doesn't work with the current opkg-utils. It can
> > be
> > changed but the change becomes more invasive.
> >
> > This fix has been merged to master.
> >
> > I also did take the decision to backport this change back to
> > pyro/morty/krogoth too. I appreciate this can cause some disruption
> > to
> > people who rely on SRC_URI being in the Source: field however I
> > couldn't see any other realistic way forward.
> I noticed that this wasn't CC'ed to the yocto-security mailing list.
> Was that just an oversight, or should that mailing list be considered
> defunct at this point?
Sorry, it was oversight...
Cheers,
Richard
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-29 22:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-06-19 10:38 OE-Core/Yocto Project's first CVE (CVE-2017-9731) Richard Purdie
2017-06-19 13:20 ` [Openembedded-architecture] " Philip Balister
2017-06-19 13:29 ` Burton, Ross
2017-06-19 13:32 ` Philip Balister
2017-06-19 14:05 ` Mark Hatle
2017-06-19 15:31 ` Sean Hudson
2017-06-20 9:30 ` Paul Eggleton
2017-06-20 13:27 ` Sean Hudson
2017-06-20 13:43 ` Paul Eggleton
2017-06-22 9:21 ` Richard Purdie
2017-06-19 14:06 ` Mark Hatle
2017-06-27 7:11 ` Sona Sarmadi
2017-06-28 17:38 ` [Openembedded-architecture] " Scott Murray
2017-06-29 22:08 ` Richard Purdie [this message]
2017-06-30 20:17 ` Scott Murray
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