* [RFC] Adding PURL identifiers to SPDX 3.0.1 install package elements @ 2026-04-08 13:19 Martin von Willebrand 2026-04-08 21:23 ` [OE-core] " Richard Purdie 0 siblings, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread From: Martin von Willebrand @ 2026-04-08 13:19 UTC (permalink / raw) To: openembedded-core Hi all, While working with ORT (OSS Review Toolkit) to analyse Yocto-generated SPDX 3.0.1 documents for ongoing vulnerability management and monitoring, I noticed that install package elements (`software_primaryPurpose: install`) carry only a wildcard CPE identifier, e.g.: cpe:2.3:*:*:busybox:1.36.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:* ORT recently released an SPDX analyzer (since ORT 83.0) targeting Yocto 5.0 generated SPDX 3.0.1 documents, which makes this gap more visible: the analyzer can consume the package graph, but the identifiers available are not sufficient to drive post-release CVE monitoring against external vulnerability databases such as NVD or VulnerableCode, since wildcard CPEs cannot be used directly as query keys. If I understand correctly, sbom-cve-check faces the same underlying limitation. In our understanding it would benefit from this change too, though the two approaches are complementary rather than overlapping. The upstream download URL for tarball-based packages is available at build time and is already derived from SRC_URI via `fetch_data_to_uri()` in `spdx30_tasks.py`. A PURL constructed from that URL and placed directly as an `externalIdentifier` on the install package element would give downstream consumers a durable, canonical identifier for post-release vulnerability monitoring. Before drafting a patch I wanted to ask: 1. Is there a specific reason PURL is not currently emitted on install package elements — policy, technical constraint, or simply not yet done? 2. Would a contribution adding PURL for example as an `externalIdentifier` on install packages (derived from SRC_URI fetch data) be welcome in OE-Core master? Happy to hear comments, and discuss scope and approach before writing code. Thanks, Martin von Willebrand Double Open -- Double Open Oy c/o HH Partners, Attorneys-at-law Eteläesplanadi 22 A 00130 Helsinki, Finland Registered Office: Helsinki Trade Register: Finnish Trade Register (PRH) Business ID: FI33824962 Managing Director: Martin von Willebrand ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* Re: [OE-core] [RFC] Adding PURL identifiers to SPDX 3.0.1 install package elements 2026-04-08 13:19 [RFC] Adding PURL identifiers to SPDX 3.0.1 install package elements Martin von Willebrand @ 2026-04-08 21:23 ` Richard Purdie 2026-04-09 8:55 ` Martin von Willebrand 0 siblings, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread From: Richard Purdie @ 2026-04-08 21:23 UTC (permalink / raw) To: martin.vonwillebrand, openembedded-core; +Cc: Joshua Watt On Wed, 2026-04-08 at 16:19 +0300, Martin von Willebrand via lists.openembedded.org wrote: > While working with ORT (OSS Review Toolkit) to analyse Yocto-generated > SPDX 3.0.1 documents for ongoing vulnerability management and > monitoring, I noticed that install package elements > (`software_primaryPurpose: install`) carry only a wildcard CPE > identifier, e.g.: > > cpe:2.3:*:*:busybox:1.36.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:* > > ORT recently released an SPDX analyzer (since ORT 83.0) targeting Yocto > 5.0 generated SPDX 3.0.1 documents, which makes this gap more visible: > the analyzer can consume the package graph, but the identifiers > available are not sufficient to drive post-release CVE monitoring > against external vulnerability databases such as NVD or VulnerableCode, > since wildcard CPEs cannot be used directly as query keys. > > If I understand correctly, sbom-cve-check faces the same underlying > limitation. In our understanding it would benefit from this change too, > though the two approaches are complementary rather than overlapping. > > The upstream download URL for tarball-based packages is available at > build time and is already derived from SRC_URI via `fetch_data_to_uri()` > in `spdx30_tasks.py`. A PURL constructed from that URL and placed > directly as an `externalIdentifier` on the install package element would > give downstream consumers a durable, canonical identifier for > post-release vulnerability monitoring. > > Before drafting a patch I wanted to ask: > > 1. Is there a specific reason PURL is not currently emitted on install > package elements — policy, technical constraint, or simply not yet done? > 2. Would a contribution adding PURL for example as an > `externalIdentifier` on install packages (derived from SRC_URI fetch > data) be welcome in OE-Core master? > > Happy to hear comments, and discuss scope and approach before writing code. I'm not sure this is as simple as it first appears. We support the notion of "premirrors" and "mirrors", which are searched before and after the primary SRC_URI. We validate a checksum of the resulting download to verify we did get what we expected but it doesn't always come from that SRC_URI but can be cached. I guess we assume you use the unmodified original SRC_URI? What happens if there are two items in SRC_URI? If we patch the tarball with other entries in SRC_URI, is the PURL still valid? What happens in the cases where the recipe uses git to fetch the sources instead of a tarball? Can the external tooling not look at the url data already in the SPDX output and work out the purls itself if it wants to? I guess what I'm saying is we're trying to avoid too much "processing" of the data we put into the SPDX so I'm cautious about duplicating info. If the purl is always derived from the SRC_URI and we include that, should we be adding the extra data? I'm not trying to be negative, I'm just worried about where this might lead and the corner cases that may be involved. Coping Joshua who I suspect also may have thoughts on this. Cheers, Richard ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* Re: [OE-core] [RFC] Adding PURL identifiers to SPDX 3.0.1 install package elements 2026-04-08 21:23 ` [OE-core] " Richard Purdie @ 2026-04-09 8:55 ` Martin von Willebrand 2026-04-09 13:21 ` Joshua Watt 0 siblings, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread From: Martin von Willebrand @ 2026-04-09 8:55 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Richard Purdie, openembedded-core; +Cc: Joshua Watt On 4/9/2026 12:23 AM, Richard Purdie wrote: > On Wed, 2026-04-08 at 16:19 +0300, Martin von Willebrand via lists.openembedded.org wrote: >> While working with ORT (OSS Review Toolkit) to analyse Yocto-generated >> SPDX 3.0.1 documents for ongoing vulnerability management and >> monitoring, I noticed that install package elements >> (`software_primaryPurpose: install`) carry only a wildcard CPE >> identifier, e.g.: >> >> cpe:2.3:*:*:busybox:1.36.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:* >> >> ORT recently released an SPDX analyzer (since ORT 83.0) targeting Yocto >> 5.0 generated SPDX 3.0.1 documents, which makes this gap more visible: >> the analyzer can consume the package graph, but the identifiers >> available are not sufficient to drive post-release CVE monitoring >> against external vulnerability databases such as NVD or VulnerableCode, >> since wildcard CPEs cannot be used directly as query keys. >> >> If I understand correctly, sbom-cve-check faces the same underlying >> limitation. In our understanding it would benefit from this change too, >> though the two approaches are complementary rather than overlapping. >> >> The upstream download URL for tarball-based packages is available at >> build time and is already derived from SRC_URI via `fetch_data_to_uri()` >> in `spdx30_tasks.py`. A PURL constructed from that URL and placed >> directly as an `externalIdentifier` on the install package element would >> give downstream consumers a durable, canonical identifier for >> post-release vulnerability monitoring. >> >> Before drafting a patch I wanted to ask: >> >> 1. Is there a specific reason PURL is not currently emitted on install >> package elements — policy, technical constraint, or simply not yet done? >> 2. Would a contribution adding PURL for example as an >> `externalIdentifier` on install packages (derived from SRC_URI fetch >> data) be welcome in OE-Core master? >> >> Happy to hear comments, and discuss scope and approach before writing code. > I'm not sure this is as simple as it first appears. We support the > notion of "premirrors" and "mirrors", which are searched before and > after the primary SRC_URI. We validate a checksum of the resulting > download to verify we did get what we expected but it doesn't always > come from that SRC_URI but can be cached. I guess we assume you use the > unmodified original SRC_URI? > > What happens if there are two items in SRC_URI? If we patch the tarball > with other entries in SRC_URI, is the PURL still valid? > > What happens in the cases where the recipe uses git to fetch the > sources instead of a tarball? > > Can the external tooling not look at the url data already in the SPDX > output and work out the purls itself if it wants to? > > I guess what I'm saying is we're trying to avoid too much "processing" > of the data we put into the SPDX so I'm cautious about duplicating > info. If the purl is always derived from the SRC_URI and we include > that, should we be adding the extra data? > > I'm not trying to be negative, I'm just worried about where this might > lead and the corner cases that may be involved. > > Coping Joshua who I suspect also may have thoughts on this. > > Cheers, > > Richard > Thanks for the detailed response and raising up the edge cases — I'll try to address them below: On mirrors and premirrors: yes, we would use the canonical upstream SRC_URI, not the actual fetch location. The upstream URI would be correct for CVE matching purposes, the point is not to record build-time fetch provenance. On multiple SRC_URI entries and patches: a PURL would identify the upstream package, not the downstream patched artefact — consistent with how the CPE is already handled. CVEs are filed against upstream versions, and that is what both identifiers reference. On git sources: you're right, a git fetch produces a revision-pinned URI that does not map cleanly to a standard PURL. Scoping an initial contribution to non-git fetchers would sidestep this for now and cover the majority of cases. On whether consumers can derive the PURL themselves: for the generic case (pkg:generic/busybox@1.36.1), yes — name and version are already on the install package element and any consumer can construct that trivially, as long as they undestand Yocto's package structure. The real value of doing this in OE is the ecosystem-typed cases: pkg:pypi, pkg:npm, pkg:cpan, and similar. The bbclass inheritance information that determines ecosystem type — inherit pypi, inherit npm, inherit cpan — exists exclusively in the recipes and is not recoverable by downstream consumers from the SPDX output, with or without SPDX_INCLUDE_SOURCES. It looks like that information is available to OE at build time and nowhere else in the chain. That said, we would propose emitting PURLs on all install package elements — ecosystem-typed where the recipe provides that information, pkg:generic otherwise. Partial coverage would produce an inconsistent SPDX where some packages have PURLs and others do not, which is worse than either extreme. And even the generic case, while derivable, removes the need for consumers to understand Yocto's package structure at all. The broader argument for doing this in OE: PURL is now an ECMA standard (ECMA-426) and is on the path to becoming an ISO standard. It is the identifier that the supply chain tooling ecosystem — ORT, Dependency-Track, CycloneDX, and others — is converging on for package matching. OE already takes the position that canonical package identifiers belong in the SPDX output, by emitting CPE on install package elements. PURL is the natural complement to that. It is of course the community's call whether this belongs in OE or downstream. If this doesn't belong in OE, we could instead document the (limited) derivation algorithm so consumers can implement it consistently. But to me it looks that OE is the right place, and that the ecosystem-typed cases, removal of need to understand Yocto's package structure, as well as explicit purl support make it worth doing in OE rather than leaving it to downstream. Thanks, Martin ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* Re: [OE-core] [RFC] Adding PURL identifiers to SPDX 3.0.1 install package elements 2026-04-09 8:55 ` Martin von Willebrand @ 2026-04-09 13:21 ` Joshua Watt 2026-04-10 7:46 ` Martin von Willebrand 0 siblings, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread From: Joshua Watt @ 2026-04-09 13:21 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Martin von Willebrand; +Cc: Richard Purdie, OE-core, Stefano Tondo [-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 6737 bytes --] On Thu, Apr 9, 2026, 2:56 AM Martin von Willebrand < martin.vonwillebrand@doubleopen.io> wrote: > On 4/9/2026 12:23 AM, Richard Purdie wrote: > > On Wed, 2026-04-08 at 16:19 +0300, Martin von Willebrand via > lists.openembedded.org wrote: > >> While working with ORT (OSS Review Toolkit) to analyse Yocto-generated > >> SPDX 3.0.1 documents for ongoing vulnerability management and > >> monitoring, I noticed that install package elements > >> (`software_primaryPurpose: install`) carry only a wildcard CPE > >> identifier, e.g.: > >> > >> cpe:2.3:*:*:busybox:1.36.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:* > >> > >> ORT recently released an SPDX analyzer (since ORT 83.0) targeting Yocto > >> 5.0 generated SPDX 3.0.1 documents, which makes this gap more visible: > >> the analyzer can consume the package graph, but the identifiers > >> available are not sufficient to drive post-release CVE monitoring > >> against external vulnerability databases such as NVD or VulnerableCode, > >> since wildcard CPEs cannot be used directly as query keys. > >> > >> If I understand correctly, sbom-cve-check faces the same underlying > >> limitation. In our understanding it would benefit from this change too, > >> though the two approaches are complementary rather than overlapping. > >> > >> The upstream download URL for tarball-based packages is available at > >> build time and is already derived from SRC_URI via `fetch_data_to_uri()` > >> in `spdx30_tasks.py`. A PURL constructed from that URL and placed > >> directly as an `externalIdentifier` on the install package element would > >> give downstream consumers a durable, canonical identifier for > >> post-release vulnerability monitoring. > >> > >> Before drafting a patch I wanted to ask: > >> > >> 1. Is there a specific reason PURL is not currently emitted on install > >> package elements — policy, technical constraint, or simply not yet done? > >> 2. Would a contribution adding PURL for example as an > >> `externalIdentifier` on install packages (derived from SRC_URI fetch > >> data) be welcome in OE-Core master? > >> > >> Happy to hear comments, and discuss scope and approach before writing > code. > > I'm not sure this is as simple as it first appears. We support the > > notion of "premirrors" and "mirrors", which are searched before and > > after the primary SRC_URI. We validate a checksum of the resulting > > download to verify we did get what we expected but it doesn't always > > come from that SRC_URI but can be cached. I guess we assume you use the > > unmodified original SRC_URI? > > > > What happens if there are two items in SRC_URI? If we patch the tarball > > with other entries in SRC_URI, is the PURL still valid? > > > > What happens in the cases where the recipe uses git to fetch the > > sources instead of a tarball? > > > > Can the external tooling not look at the url data already in the SPDX > > output and work out the purls itself if it wants to? > > > > I guess what I'm saying is we're trying to avoid too much "processing" > > of the data we put into the SPDX so I'm cautious about duplicating > > info. If the purl is always derived from the SRC_URI and we include > > that, should we be adding the extra data? > > > > I'm not trying to be negative, I'm just worried about where this might > > lead and the corner cases that may be involved. > > > > Coping Joshua who I suspect also may have thoughts on this. > > > > Cheers, > > > > Richard > > > Thanks for the detailed response and raising up the edge cases — I'll try > to address them below: Can you try again with spdx output from the latest master branch of yocto? Stefano (CC'd) just recently did a lot of work in this area > On mirrors and premirrors: yes, we would use the canonical upstream > SRC_URI, > not the actual fetch location. The upstream URI would be correct for CVE > matching purposes, the point is not to record build-time fetch provenance. > > On multiple SRC_URI entries and patches: a PURL would identify the upstream > package, not the downstream patched artefact — consistent with how the CPE > is > already handled. CVEs are filed against upstream versions, and that is what > both identifiers reference. > > On git sources: you're right, a git fetch produces a revision-pinned URI > that > does not map cleanly to a standard PURL. Scoping an initial contribution to > non-git fetchers would sidestep this for now and cover the majority of > cases. > > On whether consumers can derive the PURL themselves: for the generic case > (pkg:generic/busybox@1.36.1), yes — name and version are already on the > install package element and any consumer can construct that trivially, as > long as they undestand Yocto's package structure. > > The real value of doing this in OE is the ecosystem-typed cases: pkg:pypi, > pkg:npm, pkg:cpan, and similar. The bbclass inheritance information that > determines ecosystem type — inherit pypi, inherit npm, inherit cpan — > exists > exclusively in the recipes and is not recoverable by downstream consumers > from > the SPDX output, with or without SPDX_INCLUDE_SOURCES. It looks like that > information is available to OE at build time and nowhere else in the chain. > > That said, we would propose emitting PURLs on all install package elements > — > ecosystem-typed where the recipe provides that information, pkg:generic > otherwise. Partial coverage would produce an inconsistent SPDX where some > packages have PURLs and others do not, which is worse than either extreme. > And even the generic case, while derivable, removes the need for consumers > to understand Yocto's package structure at all. > > The broader argument for doing this in OE: PURL is now an ECMA standard > (ECMA-426) and is on the path to becoming an ISO standard. It is the > identifier > that the supply chain tooling ecosystem — ORT, Dependency-Track, CycloneDX, > and others — is converging on for package matching. OE already > takes the position that canonical package identifiers belong in the SPDX > output, > by emitting CPE on install package elements. PURL is the natural > complement to > that. > > It is of course the community's call whether this belongs in OE or > downstream. If > this doesn't belong in OE, we could instead document the (limited) > derivation > algorithm so consumers can implement it consistently. But to me it looks > that OE > is the right place, and that the ecosystem-typed cases, removal of need to > understand Yocto's package structure, as well as explicit purl support > make it > worth doing in OE rather than leaving it to downstream. > > Thanks, Martin > > [-- Attachment #2: Type: text/html, Size: 8026 bytes --] ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* Re: [OE-core] [RFC] Adding PURL identifiers to SPDX 3.0.1 install package elements 2026-04-09 13:21 ` Joshua Watt @ 2026-04-10 7:46 ` Martin von Willebrand 0 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread From: Martin von Willebrand @ 2026-04-10 7:46 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Joshua Watt; +Cc: Richard Purdie, OE-core, Stefano Tondo On 4/9/2026 4:21 PM, Joshua Watt wrote: > Can you try again with spdx output from the latest master branch of yocto? Hi Joshua, Thanks for the pointer to master — I've now tested with a fresh OE-Core master build. A few follow-up questions: On PURL: I can see that pkg:yocto PURLs and ecosystem-typed PURLs (pkg:pypi, pkg:npm, pkg:cpan) are already in master — that's great, and addresses the gap I raised. Are there plans to backport this to scarthgap/5.0? And would contributions toward that backport be welcome? On the SPDX output format: master produces a distributed, content-addressed store rather than the self-contained single-file SBOM that the scarthgap backport generates. The rationale for the single-file format in 5.0 seems clear — a self-contained document that downstream tools can consume without understanding the Yocto store layout. Is that self-contained output planned for walnascar/6.0, or is the expectation that downstream tools will assemble the full SBOM from the distributed store themselves? Thanks, Martin ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2026-04-10 7:46 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 5+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2026-04-08 13:19 [RFC] Adding PURL identifiers to SPDX 3.0.1 install package elements Martin von Willebrand 2026-04-08 21:23 ` [OE-core] " Richard Purdie 2026-04-09 8:55 ` Martin von Willebrand 2026-04-09 13:21 ` Joshua Watt 2026-04-10 7:46 ` Martin von Willebrand
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox