From: Sinan Kaya <okaya@kernel.org>
To: openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org
Subject: [sumo] [PATCH v1 2/2] git: CVE-2018-11233
Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2018 03:55:15 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181005035515.4922-2-okaya@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181005035515.4922-1-okaya@kernel.org>
* CVE-2018-11233
Code to sanity-check pathnames on NTFS can result in reading
out-of-bounds memory.
Affects < 2.17.1
CVE: CVE-2018-11233
Ref: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1583888
Signed-off-by: Sinan Kaya <okaya@kernel.org>
---
.../git/files/CVE-2018-11233.patch | 44 +++++++++++++++++++
meta/recipes-devtools/git/git.inc | 3 +-
2 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2018-11233.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2018-11233.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2018-11233.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f4468cf2fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/files/CVE-2018-11233.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From 014281e62b7920a6d710a85089e00ca012b0744c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
+Date: Sun, 13 May 2018 12:09:42 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] is_ntfs_dotgit: use a size_t for traversing string
+
+We walk through the "name" string using an int, which can
+wrap to a negative value and cause us to read random memory
+before our array (e.g., by creating a tree with a name >2GB,
+since "int" is still 32 bits even on most 64-bit platforms).
+Worse, this is easy to trigger during the fsck_tree() check,
+which is supposed to be protecting us from malicious
+garbage.
+
+Note one bit of trickiness in the existing code: we
+sometimes assign -1 to "len" at the end of the loop, and
+then rely on the "len++" in the for-loop's increment to take
+it back to 0. This is still legal with a size_t, since
+assigning -1 will turn into SIZE_MAX, which then wraps
+around to 0 on increment.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
+CVE: CVE-2018-11233
+Upstream-Status: Backport[https://github.com/git/git/commit/11a9f4d807a0d71dc6eff51bb87baf4ca2cccf1d]
+Signed-off-by: Sinan Kaya <okaya@kernel.org>
+---
+ path.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/path.c b/path.c
+index da8b65573..d31c795ff 100644
+--- a/path.c
++++ b/path.c
+@@ -1305,7 +1305,7 @@ static int only_spaces_and_periods(const char *path, size_t len, size_t skip)
+
+ int is_ntfs_dotgit(const char *name)
+ {
+- int len;
++ size_t len;
+
+ for (len = 0; ; len++)
+ if (!name[len] || name[len] == '\\' || is_dir_sep(name[len])) {
+--
+2.19.0
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/git/git.inc b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/git.inc
index bea23ec783..8603c045cc 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/git/git.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/git.inc
@@ -8,7 +8,8 @@ PROVIDES_append_class-native = " git-replacement-native"
SRC_URI = "${KERNELORG_MIRROR}/software/scm/git/git-${PV}.tar.gz;name=tarball \
${KERNELORG_MIRROR}/software/scm/git/git-manpages-${PV}.tar.gz;name=manpages \
- file://CVE-2018-11235.patch"
+ file://CVE-2018-11235.patch \
+ file://CVE-2018-11233.patch"
S = "${WORKDIR}/git-${PV}"
--
2.19.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-05 3:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-10-05 3:55 [sumo] [PATCH v1 1/2] ncurses: CVE-2018-10754 Sinan Kaya
2018-10-05 3:55 ` Sinan Kaya [this message]
2018-10-05 4:48 ` Sinan Kaya
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20181005035515.4922-2-okaya@kernel.org \
--to=okaya@kernel.org \
--cc=openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox