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From: Siddharth <sdoshi@mvista.com>
To: openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org
Cc: Siddharth Doshi <sdoshi@mvista.com>
Subject: [OE-core][scarthgap][PATCH 08/13] vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-55895
Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2026 01:49:00 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260722201905.491897-8-sdoshi@mvista.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260722201905.491897-1-sdoshi@mvista.com>

From: Siddharth Doshi <sdoshi@mvista.com>

Picking patch as per [1], and same patch is mentioned in [2]

References:
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55895
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-55895

Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <sdoshi@mvista.com>
---
 .../vim/files/CVE-2026-55895.patch            | 53 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc              |  1 +
 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-55895.patch

diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-55895.patch b/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-55895.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0084006b72
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-55895.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+From 0d286458d71ff7b4d759621dd9a567aa9354819a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Yasuhiro Matsumoto <mattn.jp@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 21:00:28 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 11/17] patch 9.2.0663: [security]: runtime(netrw): code
+ injection in local file deletion
+
+Problem:  [security]: s:NetrwLocalRmFile() escapes only the backslash in
+          the file name before passing it to :execute, so a name
+          containing "|" injects arbitrary Ex commands when the file is
+          deleted (cipher-creator)
+Solution: Use fnameescape() to correctly escape the file name
+          (Yasuhiro Matsumoto).
+
+Github Security Advisory:
+https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-vhh8-v6wx-hjjh
+
+Supported by AI
+
+Signed-off-by: Yasuhiro Matsumoto <mattn.jp@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <cb@256bit.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/55bc757a5d436e59d50fe43f7cda94b118f86cb2]
+CVE: CVE-2026-55895
+Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <sdoshi@mvista.com>
+---
+ runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim b/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim
+index 9014ca339b..af43f469d1 100644
+--- a/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim
++++ b/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim
+@@ -3025,7 +3025,7 @@ function s:NetrwBrowse(islocal,dirname)
+     elseif !a:islocal && dirname !~ '[\/]$' && dirname !~ '^"'
+         " s:NetrwBrowse :  remote regular file handler {{{3
+         if bufname(dirname) != ""
+-            exe "NetrwKeepj b ".bufname(dirname)
++            exe "NetrwKeepj b ".fnameescape(bufname(dirname))
+         else
+             " attempt transfer of remote regular file
+ 
+@@ -8737,7 +8737,7 @@ function s:NetrwLocalRmFile(path, fname, all)
+             call netrw#msg#Notify('ERROR', printf("unable to delete <%s>!", rmfile))
+         else
+             " Remove file only if there are no pending changes
+-            execute printf('silent! bwipeout %s', rmfile)
++            execute printf('silent! bwipeout %s', fnameescape(rmfile))
+         endif
+ 
+     elseif dir && (all || empty(ok))
+-- 
+2.44.4
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc b/meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc
index 64e3eab106..5a4778fe7c 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \
            file://CVE-2026-47167.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-55693.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-55892.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-55895.patch \
            "
 
 PV .= ".1683"
-- 
2.34.1



  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-07-22 20:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-07-22 20:18 [OE-core][scarthgap][PATCH 01/13] vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-28422 Siddharth
2026-07-22 20:18 ` [OE-core][scarthgap][PATCH 02/13] vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-42307 Siddharth
2026-07-22 20:18 ` [OE-core][scarthgap][PATCH 03/13] vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-43961 Siddharth
2026-07-22 20:18 ` [OE-core][scarthgap][PATCH 04/13] vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-47162 Siddharth
2026-07-22 20:18 ` [OE-core][scarthgap][PATCH 05/13] vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-47167 Siddharth
2026-07-22 20:18 ` [OE-core][scarthgap][PATCH 06/13] vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-55693 Siddharth
2026-07-22 20:18 ` [OE-core][scarthgap][PATCH 07/13] vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-55892 Siddharth
2026-07-22 20:19 ` Siddharth [this message]
2026-07-22 20:19 ` [OE-core][scarthgap][PATCH 09/13] vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-57452 Siddharth
2026-07-22 20:19 ` [OE-core][scarthgap][PATCH 10/13] vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-57455 Siddharth
2026-07-22 20:19 ` [OE-core][scarthgap][PATCH 11/13] vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-59856 Siddharth
2026-07-22 20:19 ` [OE-core][scarthgap][PATCH 12/13] vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-59857 Siddharth
2026-07-22 20:19 ` [OE-core][scarthgap][PATCH 13/13] vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-59858 Siddharth
2026-07-22 23:48 ` [OE-core][scarthgap][PATCH 01/13] vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-28422 Yoann Congal

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