From: Junjie Cao <junjie.cao@linux.dev>
To: openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org
Cc: paul@pbarker.dev, randy.macleod@windriver.com,
Venkata.Navuduri@windriver.com
Subject: [OE-core][PATCH v2 09/10] cve-exclusion: set status for CVE-2023-6238
Date: Mon, 3 Aug 2026 01:48:26 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260803084827.1348810-10-junjie.cao@linux.dev> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260803084827.1348810-1-junjie.cao@linux.dev>
NVME_IOCTL_IO_CMD and the io_uring passthrough path accept a
metadata length from userspace without checking it against the number of
blocks and the namespace metadata size that the device uses to size the
transfer, so the device can DMA past the end of the buffer.
Kanchan Joshi posted a stopgap removing unprivileged passthrough,
reviewed by Christoph Hellwig and applied for nvme-6.6:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nvme/20231016060519.231880-1-joshi.k@samsung.com/
It was then backed out. Keith Busch wrote "I believe this large change
is a bit too late for 6.6 ... It's backed out now", to which Christoph
Hellwig replied "We leave an exploitable hole in, so I don't think
waiting any longer is an option". No replacement has been merged: the
commits the patch would have reverted are all still present, and
nvme_map_user_request() still passes the user-supplied metadata length
straight to blk_rq_integrity_map_user() with no cross-check.
The exposure was introduced by
855b7717f44b ("nvme: fine-granular CAP_SYS_ADMIN for nvme io commands")
in v6.2, so branches carrying older kernels are not affected. Debian
reached the same conclusion independently, marking the older suites
"Vulnerable code not present":
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-6238
Red Hat rates it Low because the device node is root-only by default:
https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2023-6238
CC: Paul Barker <paul@pbarker.dev>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)
Signed-off-by: Junjie Cao <junjie.cao@linux.dev>
---
changes in v2:
- split out of the single combined patch, one CVE per patch as requested
- added primary source links (disclosures, distribution trackers, mailing
list threads, upstream commits) to every commit message
- added the three CVEs with no upstream fix as "unpatched" entries instead
of leaving them undocumented
- disclosed AI assistance per the contributor guide
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/20260802143444.1178575-1-junjie.cao@linux.dev/
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc b/meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc
index 0647586f..506d3705 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc
@@ -244,3 +244,11 @@ patch was withdrawn by its author and the affected fs/jfs code is unchanged"
# The CVE names usb_giveback_urb(), which does not exist; the reporter's PoC
# and Ubuntu's break-fix data both point at drivers/media/rc/imon.c.
CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-4010] = "fixed-version: Fixed from version 6.18"
+
+# The user metadata length is not checked against the length the device
+# derives from the command. The fix was applied to nvme-6.6 and then backed
+# out; nothing has landed since. Kernels before v6.2 predate unprivileged
+# passthrough (855b7717f44b) and are not affected.
+# https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nvme/20231016060519.231880-1-joshi.k@samsung.com/
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-6238] = "unpatched: the proposed fix was applied to \
+nvme-6.6 and then reverted, no upstream fix has landed since"
--
2.43.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-03 8:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-03 8:48 [OE-core][PATCH v2 00/10] cve-exclusion: triage ten kernel CVEs lacking upstream fix data Junjie Cao
2026-08-03 8:48 ` [OE-core][PATCH v2 01/10] cve-exclusion: set status for CVE-2019-14899 Junjie Cao
2026-08-03 8:48 ` [OE-core][PATCH v2 02/10] cve-exclusion: set status for CVE-2021-3714 Junjie Cao
2026-08-03 8:48 ` [OE-core][PATCH v2 03/10] cve-exclusion: set status for CVE-2021-3864 Junjie Cao
2026-08-03 8:48 ` [OE-core][PATCH v2 04/10] cve-exclusion: set status for CVE-2022-0400 Junjie Cao
2026-08-03 8:48 ` [OE-core][PATCH v2 05/10] cve-exclusion: set status for CVE-2022-1247 Junjie Cao
2026-08-03 8:48 ` [OE-core][PATCH v2 06/10] cve-exclusion: set status for CVE-2022-4543 Junjie Cao
2026-08-03 8:48 ` [OE-core][PATCH v2 07/10] cve-exclusion: set status for CVE-2023-3397 Junjie Cao
2026-08-03 8:48 ` [OE-core][PATCH v2 08/10] cve-exclusion: set status for CVE-2023-4010 Junjie Cao
2026-08-03 8:48 ` Junjie Cao [this message]
2026-08-03 8:48 ` [OE-core][PATCH v2 10/10] cve-exclusion: set status for CVE-2023-6240 Junjie Cao
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