From: Junjie Cao <junjie.cao@linux.dev>
To: openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org
Cc: paul@pbarker.dev
Subject: [OE-core][PATCH] cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2022-0400
Date: Sun, 23 Aug 2026 23:30:34 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260824043034.1457687-1-junjie.cao@linux.dev> (raw)
The CVE describes an out-of-bounds read in the SMC protocol stack, but
the originating report, Red Hat bug 2040604, was never made public and
no tracker records affected code or a fix.
On request, Red Hat PSIRT identified the affected code (ticket
PSIRTSUPT-22046, summarized in the public bug [1]): the v2_ext_offset
field of an incoming CLC proposal message is used to compute a memory
offset without validation, in the chain smc_clc_msg_hdr_valid() ->
smc_clc_msg_prop_valid() -> smc_get_clc_v2_ext() (net/smc/smc_clc.h).
The unchecked read dates from the introduction of V2 CLC proposal
parsing in v5.10 (8c3dca341aea); at the time of the report,
smc_get_clc_v2_ext() checked the offset only for zero and
smc_clc_msg_prop_valid() dereferenced the resulting pointer. It is
closed by the v6.13 validation of exactly these fields:
https://git.kernel.org/linus/7863c9f3d24ba49dbead7e03dfbe40deb5888fdf
("net/smc: check v2_ext_offset/eid_cnt/ism_gid_cnt when receiving
proposal msg", v6.13)
The kernel CVE team assigned that commit CVE-2024-49568, recording the
issue introduced in 5.10 and fixed in 6.6.68, 6.12.7 and 6.13:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/2025011142-CVE-2024-49568-e5f6@gregkh/
CVE-2022-0400 predates the kernel CNA and no tracker has connected it
to this fix.
[1] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2044575#c23
CC: Paul Barker <paul@pbarker.dev>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)
Signed-off-by: Junjie Cao <junjie.cao@linux.dev>
---
Previously 4/9 of the triage series: v3 proposed "disputed" and the
patch was dropped pending more information from Red Hat, which has now
been provided. Applies on top of the "triage eight kernel CVEs" v4
series.
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/20260812072842.1176341-1-junjie.cao@linux.dev/
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 9 +++++++++
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc b/meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc
index 8714173c..1505f9b3 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc
@@ -260,3 +260,12 @@ CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-6238] = "unpatched: Proposed fix was not merged"
# https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2023-6240
CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-6240] = "unpatched: Fixed in RHEL but patch not identified \
publicly"
+
+# The originating report (Red Hat bug 2040604) is not public. On request,
+# Red Hat PSIRT identified the affected code: the v2_ext_offset of an
+# incoming SMC CLC proposal message was used without validation in
+# net/smc/smc_clc.h. Introduced in v5.10, fixed by the v6.13 proposal
+# message validation, which upstream tracks as CVE-2024-49568.
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2044575#c23
+# Fix https://git.kernel.org/linus/7863c9f3d24ba49dbead7e03dfbe40deb5888fdf
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2022-0400] = "fixed-version: Fixed from version 6.13"
--
2.43.0
next reply other threads:[~2026-08-24 2:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-24 4:30 Junjie Cao [this message]
2026-08-24 8:31 ` [OE-core][PATCH] cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2022-0400 Paul Barker
2026-08-24 16:25 ` Junjie Cao
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