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From: Jaipaul Cheernam <jaipaul.cheernam@est.tech>
To: openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org
Subject: [wrynose][PATCH 1/7] libpcap: Fix CVE-2026-0799
Date: Thu, 10 Sep 2026 07:11:48 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260910051154.30595-2-jaipaul.cheernam@est.tech> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260910051154.30595-1-jaipaul.cheernam@est.tech>

NVD: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0799
Upstream-commit: https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/libpcap/commit/48e8960a7108e9e828f9d7bdc7e97bdab841aec7
Signed-off-by: Jaipaul Cheernam <jaipaul.cheernam@est.tech>
---
 .../libpcap/libpcap/01-CVE-2026-0799.patch    | 87 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../libpcap/libpcap_1.10.6.bb                 |  1 +
 2 files changed, 88 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/libpcap/libpcap/01-CVE-2026-0799.patch

diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/libpcap/libpcap/01-CVE-2026-0799.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/libpcap/libpcap/01-CVE-2026-0799.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..58289d7e3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/libpcap/libpcap/01-CVE-2026-0799.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+From 3c55fdefa576c7a06feab86a9e4341be414de49b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Denis Ovsienko <denis@ovsienko.info>
+Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2026 13:33:41 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2026-0799: Access M[] safely in the BPF interpreter.
+
+Include Security identified and reported this problem as a potential
+vulnerability in 2018 (case reference "I7").  Their work was sponsored
+by Mozilla under the Secure Open Source program.  The vulnerability has
+been independently confirmed only recently.
+
+The current revision of pcapint_filter_with_aux_data() can, but does not
+check whether a scratch memory register index is valid in the "ld M[k]",
+"ldx M[k]", "st M[k]" and "stx M[k]" BPF instructions, and assumes this
+is always the case.  This holds for programs that have been generated or
+validated by libpcap.
+
+However, this does not necessarily hold for programs that come via
+pcap_offline_filter() or [deprecated] bpf_filter() from an external
+source and have not been explicitly validated.  If the interpreter
+executes such a program with an invalid index, it will read/write the
+process memory at arbitrary locations starting at the current stack
+frame.  Depending on the address, the memory layout and the OS, this can
+result in stack buffer overflow, SIGSEGV, SIGBUS or other effects.  To
+fix this, in the interpreter reject the packet if the index is invalid.
+
+(backported from commit 569f8fd3524192acbabf93c9cd704471bb38f84a)
+
+(cherry picked from commit 48e8960a7108e9e828f9d7bdc7e97bdab841aec7)
+
+Notes on backporting to 1.10.6:
+ - The CHANGES entry added by this and the following CVE patches is a
+   downstream addition to record the backported security fixes.  It does not
+   come from upstream: rather than import the upstream 1.10.7 changelog block
+   (which also lists unrelated, non-backported changes) or claim a 1.10.7
+   release in a 1.10.6 tree, a dedicated "1.10.6 + backported CVE fixes"
+   section is used, listing only the CVEs actually backported here.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/libpcap/commit/48e8960a7108e9e828f9d7bdc7e97bdab841aec7]
+CVE: CVE-2026-0799
+Signed-off-by: Jaipaul Cheernam <jaipaul.cheernam@est.tech>
+---
+ CHANGES      | 4 ++++
+ bpf_filter.c | 8 ++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
+diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
+index cb603f8..74f8ddf 100644
+--- a/CHANGES
++++ b/CHANGES
+@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
++1.10.6 + backported CVE fixes / The Tcpdump Group
++  Backported security fixes:
++    CVE-2026-0799: Access M[] safely in the BPF interpreter.
++
+ Tuesday, December 30, 2025 / The Tcpdump Group
+   Summary for 1.10.6 libpcap release
+     General:
+diff --git a/bpf_filter.c b/bpf_filter.c
+index 9b899bbb..510dbd9c 100644
+--- a/bpf_filter.c
++++ b/bpf_filter.c
+@@ -217,18 +217,26 @@ DIAG_ON_DEFAULT_ONLY_SWITCH
+ 			continue;
+ 
+ 		case BPF_LD|BPF_MEM:
++			if (pc->k >= BPF_MEMWORDS)
++				return 0;
+ 			A = mem[pc->k];
+ 			continue;
+ 
+ 		case BPF_LDX|BPF_MEM:
++			if (pc->k >= BPF_MEMWORDS)
++				return 0;
+ 			X = mem[pc->k];
+ 			continue;
+ 
+ 		case BPF_ST:
++			if (pc->k >= BPF_MEMWORDS)
++				return 0;
+ 			mem[pc->k] = A;
+ 			continue;
+ 
+ 		case BPF_STX:
++			if (pc->k >= BPF_MEMWORDS)
++				return 0;
+ 			mem[pc->k] = X;
+ 			continue;
+ 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/libpcap/libpcap_1.10.6.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/libpcap/libpcap_1.10.6.bb
index d381a4eb2f..265c46e3bd 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/libpcap/libpcap_1.10.6.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/libpcap/libpcap_1.10.6.bb
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ DEPENDS = "flex-native bison-native"
 
 SRC_URI = "https://www.tcpdump.org/release/${BP}.tar.xz \
 	   file://0001-Fix-error-messages-about-32-bit-integer-overflow.patch \
+	   file://01-CVE-2026-0799.patch \
           "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "ec97d1206bdd19cb6bdd043eaa9f0037aa732262ec68e070fd7c7b5f834d5dfc"
 


  reply	other threads:[~2026-09-10  5:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-09-10  5:11 [wrynose][PATCH 0/7] libpcap: backport seven CVE fixes from 1.10.7 Jaipaul Cheernam
2026-09-10  5:11 ` Jaipaul Cheernam [this message]
2026-09-10  5:11 ` [wrynose][PATCH 2/7] libpcap: Fix CVE-2026-31912 Jaipaul Cheernam
2026-09-10  5:11 ` [wrynose][PATCH 3/7] libpcap: Fix CVE-2026-31911 Jaipaul Cheernam
2026-09-10  5:11 ` [wrynose][PATCH 4/7] libpcap: Fix CVE-2026-6244 Jaipaul Cheernam
2026-09-10  5:11 ` [wrynose][PATCH 5/7] libpcap: Fix CVE-2026-6554 Jaipaul Cheernam
2026-09-10  5:11 ` [wrynose][PATCH 6/7] libpcap: Fix CVE-2026-18313 Jaipaul Cheernam
2026-09-10  5:11 ` [wrynose][PATCH 7/7] libpcap: Fix CVE-2026-18238 Jaipaul Cheernam

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