From: Paul Barker <paul@pbarker.dev>
To: Venkata Navduri <vnavudur@oak-lpgbuild12.wrs.com>,
openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org
Cc: Randy.MacLeod@windriver.com,
Navuduri Venkata Adhitya <Venkata.Navuduri@windriver.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] cve-exclusion: set status for CVE-2023-3640
Date: Fri, 07 Aug 2026 11:06:01 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <96bda687997ea3315101939f266b402138a931b7.camel@pbarker.dev> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260806170452.1411788-1-vnavudur@oak-lpgbuild12.wrs.com>
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On Thu, 2026-08-06 at 17:04 +0000, Venkata Navduri wrote:
> From: Navuduri Venkata Adhitya <Venkata.Navuduri@windriver.com>
>
> The x86 cpu_entry_area KASLR bypass (CVE-2023-3640) was fixed in
> v6.2-rc1 by commit 97e3d26b5e5f ("x86/mm: Randomize per-cpu entry
> area") from Peter Zijlstra.
>
> The fix is already present in all Yocto releases shipping kernel >=6.2.
>
> Signed-off-by: Navuduri Venkata Adhitya <Venkata.Navuduri@windriver.com>
Hi,
Commit 97e3d26b5e5f371b3ee223d94dd123e6c442ba80 is the fix for
CVE-2023-0597 [1].
On NVD, the description of CVE-2023-3640 [2] includes:
Based on the previous CVE-2023-0597, the 'Randomize per-cpu entry
area' feature was implemented in /arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c, which
works through the init_cea_offsets() function when KASLR is enabled.
However, despite this feature, there is still a risk of per-cpu entry
area leaks.
So this CVE appears to be about remaining issues after the fix in that
commit.
[1]: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2023-0597
[2]: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2023-3640
Best regards,
--
Paul Barker
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parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-07 10:06 UTC|newest]
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[parent not found: <20260806170452.1411788-1-vnavudur@oak-lpgbuild12.wrs.com>]
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