From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail-pg0-f65.google.com (mail-pg0-f65.google.com [74.125.83.65]) by mail.openembedded.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3656A606CB; Mon, 2 Jan 2017 17:43:51 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-pg0-f65.google.com with SMTP id i5so30992156pgh.2; Mon, 02 Jan 2017 09:43:52 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=subject:to:references:cc:from:message-id:date:user-agent :mime-version:in-reply-to; bh=jByXUyuWIfRx0AeoFgte8YuK5RCQiPMsE9kwd9d6M3k=; b=c9q4ZnHfi+kOJeM17K98+gzwDQkkeEpUO/IpLF4VgH9qrOM9EtkFGD8H1ODDj7R9Du inJMeUiVXAbohVGv6hM8tCVwi6y+vWBgvBK0WkTvDI8gHwSKR0bw+SiOOVHHbpVdc1z4 wAsDtC+6w3deMVMaW8yTOZpOUSX/mWypBKHn5VgwD9tQJKs39jb32PNyzLODiiuw22fp G8VAaeTSVyBufyJbFehkt36guUYPptfBbSrcld8TLViZxKxdog3xE0WOoWPVwgSRY3Hd 8ZevDSbeE6+YxOoSW/WCyiU+vR3xbE029AfH1rK2WfznZCpbH2oVMk+qK5b0VOzwgg4c TJyw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:subject:to:references:cc:from:message-id:date :user-agent:mime-version:in-reply-to; bh=jByXUyuWIfRx0AeoFgte8YuK5RCQiPMsE9kwd9d6M3k=; b=ifEVEkRdHG1na3xwHoaPDiZoZfcISUjP2eexFiBZP3mWhmu5GEAQOOcdoTxa53d3we gPnW120BoKzUz29yhb9GuKLgDYh5ac3tMGSkt66azsrP/i3wOvQ4ATA918czOtsR8p96 msltGjY86IJ3830tfsIA6YzZEhRXlDZZBEfdFNsdZfn9boRr4BDllAajqXZo0ycF42Gf 3HGu4jtPTXO5M7y7v+D9fhh4EQP96UrZJ23DCWkr/c6b2I+XS4Nn9xH+u9c+QQvyfJHR 38ku3mxCxMxZA/cm07sMQ6rYxaYGDBy23GEq6mf/K+HxpwFCmKTP/rYteEEWk0UG866z ZBXw== X-Gm-Message-State: AIkVDXJ6U7zvA0PZRBkwUvy9ax/4YcI5sRlg4Njq1FQWrCo7VK3nVQf5KLlEn7InREt8dQ== X-Received: by 10.84.213.150 with SMTP id g22mr127664718pli.11.1483379032365; Mon, 02 Jan 2017 09:43:52 -0800 (PST) Received: from ?IPv6:2601:202:4001:9ea0:ea2a:eaff:fe0e:629e? ([2601:202:4001:9ea0:ea2a:eaff:fe0e:629e]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id j130sm109727041pgc.2.2017.01.02.09.43.51 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Mon, 02 Jan 2017 09:43:51 -0800 (PST) To: Martin Jansa , openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org, Armin Kuster References: <20160923222224.3285.13563@opal.openembedded.org> <20160923222225.E2A2A50174@opal.openembedded.org> <20161222152130.GD3544@jama> From: akuster808 Message-ID: Date: Mon, 2 Jan 2017 09:43:50 -0800 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/45.5.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20161222152130.GD3544@jama> Cc: openembedded-commits@lists.openembedded.org Subject: Re: [oe-commits] [openembedded-core] 02/20: openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2177 X-BeenThere: openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Patches and discussions about the oe-core layer List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 02 Jan 2017 17:43:53 -0000 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="------------9234C485E3A4981B113ECF69" --------------9234C485E3A4981B113ECF69 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On 12/22/2016 07:21 AM, Martin Jansa wrote: > On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 10:22:26PM +0000, git@git.openembedded.org wrote: >> rpurdie pushed a commit to branch jethro >> in repository openembedded-core. > This change and CVE-2016-8610.patch seems to be missing in krogoth branch. got them now. > > OE @ ~/openembedded-core $ git diff origin/jethro origin/krogoth -- meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb | grep CVE > - file://CVE-2016-2177.patch \ > - file://CVE-2016-2178.patch \ > + file://CVE-2016-2178.patch \ > + file://CVE-2016-2179.patch \ > file://CVE-2016-2180.patch \ > file://CVE-2016-2181_p1.patch \ > file://CVE-2016-2181_p2.patch \ > file://CVE-2016-6303.patch \ > file://CVE-2016-6304.patch \ > file://CVE-2016-6306.patch \ > - file://CVE-2016-2179.patch \ > - file://CVE-2016-8610.patch \ > > Is there some pending pull request for krogoth? There is also that tzdata version lower in krogoth than jethro I've reported a while ago: Yes there was a pull request but it did not contain that change. got this too now. Armin > > OE @ ~/openembedded-core $ git diff origin/jethro origin/krogoth -- meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/ > diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/tzdata_2016i.bb b/meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/tzdata_2016g.bb > similarity index 94% > rename from meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/tzdata_2016i.bb > rename to meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/tzdata_2016g.bb > >> commit 5781eb9a6e6bf8984b090a488d2a326bf9fafcf8 >> Author: Armin Kuster >> AuthorDate: Sat Jul 16 16:04:11 2016 -0700 >> >> openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2177 >> >> Affects openssl <= 1.0.2h >> CVSS v2 Base Score: 7.5 HIGH >> >> Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster >> Signed-off-by: Ross Burton >> (cherry picked from commit 2848c7d3e454cbc84cba9183f23ccdf3e9200ec9) >> Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster >> --- >> .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch | 286 +++++++++++++++++++++ >> .../recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb | 1 + >> 2 files changed, 287 insertions(+) >> >> diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch >> new file mode 100644 >> index 0000000..df36d5f >> --- /dev/null >> +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch >> @@ -0,0 +1,286 @@ >> +From a004e72b95835136d3f1ea90517f706c24c03da7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >> +From: Matt Caswell >> +Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 11:10:26 +0100 >> +Subject: [PATCH] Avoid some undefined pointer arithmetic >> + >> +A common idiom in the codebase is: >> + >> +if (p + len > limit) >> +{ >> + return; /* Too long */ >> +} >> + >> +Where "p" points to some malloc'd data of SIZE bytes and >> +limit == p + SIZE >> + >> +"len" here could be from some externally supplied data (e.g. from a TLS >> +message). >> + >> +The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well >> +defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually >> +undefined behaviour. >> + >> +For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation >> +provides an address for "p" such that "p + len" actually overflows for >> +values of len that are too big and therefore p + len < limit! >> + >> +Issue reported by Guido Vranken. >> + >> +CVE-2016-2177 >> + >> +Reviewed-by: Rich Salz >> + >> +Upstream-Status: Backport >> +CVE: CVE-2016-2177 >> + >> +Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster >> + >> + >> +--- >> + ssl/s3_srvr.c | 14 +++++++------- >> + ssl/ssl_sess.c | 2 +- >> + ssl/t1_lib.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------- >> + 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-) >> + >> +diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c >> +index ab28702..ab7f690 100644 >> +--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c >> ++++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c >> +@@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) >> + >> + session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); >> + >> +- if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) { >> ++ if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= (d + n) - p) { >> + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; >> + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); >> + goto f_err; >> +@@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) >> + /* get the session-id */ >> + j = *(p++); >> + >> +- if (p + j > d + n) { >> ++ if ((d + n) - p < j) { >> + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; >> + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); >> + goto f_err; >> +@@ -1054,14 +1054,14 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) >> + >> + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { >> + /* cookie stuff */ >> +- if (p + 1 > d + n) { >> ++ if ((d + n) - p < 1) { >> + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; >> + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); >> + goto f_err; >> + } >> + cookie_len = *(p++); >> + >> +- if (p + cookie_len > d + n) { >> ++ if ((d + n ) - p < cookie_len) { >> + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; >> + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); >> + goto f_err; >> +@@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) >> + } >> + } >> + >> +- if (p + 2 > d + n) { >> ++ if ((d + n ) - p < 2) { >> + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; >> + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); >> + goto f_err; >> +@@ -1145,7 +1145,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) >> + } >> + >> + /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */ >> +- if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) { >> ++ if ((d + n) - p < i + 1) { >> + /* not enough data */ >> + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; >> + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); >> +@@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) >> + >> + /* compression */ >> + i = *(p++); >> +- if ((p + i) > (d + n)) { >> ++ if ((d + n) - p < i) { >> + /* not enough data */ >> + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; >> + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); >> +diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c >> +index b182998..54ee783 100644 >> +--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c >> ++++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c >> +@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, >> + int r; >> + #endif >> + >> +- if (session_id + len > limit) { >> ++ if (limit - session_id < len) { >> + fatal = 1; >> + goto err; >> + } >> +diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c >> +index fb64607..cdac011 100644 >> +--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c >> ++++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c >> +@@ -1867,11 +1867,11 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, >> + 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ >> + }; >> + >> +- if (data >= (limit - 2)) >> ++ if (limit - data <= 2) >> + return; >> + data += 2; >> + >> +- if (data > (limit - 4)) >> ++ if (limit - data < 4) >> + return; >> + n2s(data, type); >> + n2s(data, size); >> +@@ -1879,7 +1879,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, >> + if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) >> + return; >> + >> +- if (data + size > limit) >> ++ if (limit - data < size) >> + return; >> + data += size; >> + >> +@@ -1887,7 +1887,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, >> + const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); >> + const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock); >> + >> +- if (data + len1 + len2 != limit) >> ++ if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2)) >> + return; >> + if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0) >> + return; >> +@@ -1896,7 +1896,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, >> + } else { >> + const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); >> + >> +- if (data + len != limit) >> ++ if (limit - data != (int)(len)) >> + return; >> + if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0) >> + return; >> +@@ -2053,19 +2053,19 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, >> + if (data == limit) >> + goto ri_check; >> + >> +- if (data > (limit - 2)) >> ++ if (limit - data < 2) >> + goto err; >> + >> + n2s(data, len); >> + >> +- if (data + len != limit) >> ++ if (limit - data != len) >> + goto err; >> + >> +- while (data <= (limit - 4)) { >> ++ while (limit - data >= 4) { >> + n2s(data, type); >> + n2s(data, size); >> + >> +- if (data + size > (limit)) >> ++ if (limit - data < size) >> + goto err; >> + # if 0 >> + fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size); >> +@@ -2472,18 +2472,18 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s, >> + if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0) >> + return 1; >> + >> +- if (data >= limit - 2) >> ++ if (limit - data <= 2) >> + return 1; >> + n2s(data, len); >> + >> +- if (data > limit - len) >> ++ if (limit - data < len) >> + return 1; >> + >> +- while (data <= limit - 4) { >> ++ while (limit - data >= 4) { >> + n2s(data, type); >> + n2s(data, size); >> + >> +- if (data + size > limit) >> ++ if (limit - data < size) >> + return 1; >> + if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0) >> + return 0; >> +@@ -2569,20 +2569,20 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, >> + SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); >> + # endif >> + >> +- if (data >= (d + n - 2)) >> ++ if ((d + n) - data <= 2) >> + goto ri_check; >> + >> + n2s(data, length); >> +- if (data + length != d + n) { >> ++ if ((d + n) - data != length) { >> + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; >> + return 0; >> + } >> + >> +- while (data <= (d + n - 4)) { >> ++ while ((d + n) - data >= 4) { >> + n2s(data, type); >> + n2s(data, size); >> + >> +- if (data + size > (d + n)) >> ++ if ((d + n) - data < size) >> + goto ri_check; >> + >> + if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) >> +@@ -3307,29 +3307,33 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, >> + /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ >> + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { >> + i = *(p++); >> +- p += i; >> +- if (p >= limit) >> ++ >> ++ if (limit - p <= i) >> + return -1; >> ++ >> ++ p += i; >> + } >> + /* Skip past cipher list */ >> + n2s(p, i); >> +- p += i; >> +- if (p >= limit) >> ++ if (limit - p <= i) >> + return -1; >> ++ p += i; >> ++ >> + /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ >> + i = *(p++); >> +- p += i; >> +- if (p > limit) >> ++ if (limit - p < i) >> + return -1; >> ++ p += i; >> ++ >> + /* Now at start of extensions */ >> +- if ((p + 2) >= limit) >> ++ if (limit - p <= 2) >> + return 0; >> + n2s(p, i); >> +- while ((p + 4) <= limit) { >> ++ while (limit - p >= 4) { >> + unsigned short type, size; >> + n2s(p, type); >> + n2s(p, size); >> +- if (p + size > limit) >> ++ if (limit - p < size) >> + return 0; >> + if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { >> + int r; >> +-- >> +2.3.5 >> + >> diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb >> index ea40275..4135a31 100644 >> --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb >> +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb >> @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://configure-targets.patch \ >> file://openssl-1.0.2a-x32-asm.patch \ >> file://ptest_makefile_deps.patch \ >> file://parallel.patch \ >> + file://CVE-2016-2177.patch \ >> " >> >> SRC_URI[md5sum] = "9392e65072ce4b614c1392eefc1f23d0" >> >> -- >> To stop receiving notification emails like this one, please contact >> the administrator of this repository. >> -- >> _______________________________________________ >> Openembedded-commits mailing list >> Openembedded-commits@lists.openembedded.org >> http://lists.openembedded.org/mailman/listinfo/openembedded-commits > > --------------9234C485E3A4981B113ECF69 Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit



On 12/22/2016 07:21 AM, Martin Jansa wrote:
On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 10:22:26PM +0000, git@git.openembedded.org wrote:

rpurdie pushed a commit to branch jethro
in repository openembedded-core.

This change and CVE-2016-8610.patch seems to be missing in krogoth branch.

got them now.


OE @ ~/openembedded-core $ git diff origin/jethro  origin/krogoth -- meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb | grep CVE
-            file://CVE-2016-2177.patch \
-            file://CVE-2016-2178.patch \
+           file://CVE-2016-2178.patch \
+            file://CVE-2016-2179.patch \
             file://CVE-2016-2180.patch \
             file://CVE-2016-2181_p1.patch \
             file://CVE-2016-2181_p2.patch \
             file://CVE-2016-6303.patch \
             file://CVE-2016-6304.patch \
             file://CVE-2016-6306.patch \
-            file://CVE-2016-2179.patch \
-            file://CVE-2016-8610.patch \

Is there some pending pull request for krogoth? There is also that tzdata version lower in krogoth than jethro I've reported a while ago:
Yes there was a pull request but it did not contain that change. got this too now.

Armin

OE @ ~/openembedded-core $ git diff origin/jethro  origin/krogoth -- meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/tzdata_2016i.bb b/meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/tzdata_2016g.bb
similarity index 94%
rename from meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/tzdata_2016i.bb
rename to meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/tzdata_2016g.bb


commit 5781eb9a6e6bf8984b090a488d2a326bf9fafcf8
Author: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
AuthorDate: Sat Jul 16 16:04:11 2016 -0700

    openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2177
    
    Affects openssl <= 1.0.2h
    CVSS v2 Base Score: 7.5 HIGH
    
    Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
    Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
    (cherry picked from commit 2848c7d3e454cbc84cba9183f23ccdf3e9200ec9)
    Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
---
 .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch            | 286 +++++++++++++++++++++
 .../recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb |   1 +
 2 files changed, 287 insertions(+)

diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..df36d5f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,286 @@
+From a004e72b95835136d3f1ea90517f706c24c03da7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 11:10:26 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Avoid some undefined pointer arithmetic
+
+A common idiom in the codebase is:
+
+if (p + len > limit)
+{
+    return; /* Too long */
+}
+
+Where "p" points to some malloc'd data of SIZE bytes and
+limit == p + SIZE
+
+"len" here could be from some externally supplied data (e.g. from a TLS
+message).
+
+The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well
+defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually
+undefined behaviour.
+
+For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation
+provides an address for "p" such that "p + len" actually overflows for
+values of len that are too big and therefore p + len < limit!
+
+Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
+
+CVE-2016-2177
+
+Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2016-2177
+
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+
+---
+ ssl/s3_srvr.c  | 14 +++++++-------
+ ssl/ssl_sess.c |  2 +-
+ ssl/t1_lib.c   | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
+ 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+index ab28702..ab7f690 100644
+--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
++++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+@@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ 
+         session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ 
+-        if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
++        if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= (d + n) - p) {
+             al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+             goto f_err;
+@@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+     /* get the session-id */
+     j = *(p++);
+ 
+-    if (p + j > d + n) {
++    if ((d + n) - p < j) {
+         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+         goto f_err;
+@@ -1054,14 +1054,14 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ 
+     if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+         /* cookie stuff */
+-        if (p + 1 > d + n) {
++        if ((d + n) - p < 1) {
+             al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+             goto f_err;
+         }
+         cookie_len = *(p++);
+ 
+-        if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
++        if ((d + n ) - p < cookie_len) {
+             al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+             goto f_err;
+@@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+         }
+     }
+ 
+-    if (p + 2 > d + n) {
++    if ((d + n ) - p < 2) {
+         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+         goto f_err;
+@@ -1145,7 +1145,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+     }
+ 
+     /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
+-    if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
++    if ((d + n) - p < i + 1) {
+         /* not enough data */
+         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+@@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ 
+     /* compression */
+     i = *(p++);
+-    if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
++    if ((d + n) - p < i) {
+         /* not enough data */
+         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
+index b182998..54ee783 100644
+--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c
++++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
+@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
+     int r;
+ #endif
+ 
+-    if (session_id + len > limit) {
++    if (limit - session_id < len) {
+         fatal = 1;
+         goto err;
+     }
+diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+index fb64607..cdac011 100644
+--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+@@ -1867,11 +1867,11 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
+         0x02, 0x03,             /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
+     };
+ 
+-    if (data >= (limit - 2))
++    if (limit - data <= 2)
+         return;
+     data += 2;
+ 
+-    if (data > (limit - 4))
++    if (limit - data < 4)
+         return;
+     n2s(data, type);
+     n2s(data, size);
+@@ -1879,7 +1879,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
+     if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
+         return;
+ 
+-    if (data + size > limit)
++    if (limit - data < size)
+         return;
+     data += size;
+ 
+@@ -1887,7 +1887,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
+         const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+         const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
+ 
+-        if (data + len1 + len2 != limit)
++        if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2))
+             return;
+         if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
+             return;
+@@ -1896,7 +1896,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
+     } else {
+         const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+ 
+-        if (data + len != limit)
++        if (limit - data != (int)(len))
+             return;
+         if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
+             return;
+@@ -2053,19 +2053,19 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
+     if (data == limit)
+         goto ri_check;
+ 
+-    if (data > (limit - 2))
++    if (limit - data < 2)
+         goto err;
+ 
+     n2s(data, len);
+ 
+-    if (data + len != limit)
++    if (limit - data != len)
+         goto err;
+ 
+-    while (data <= (limit - 4)) {
++    while (limit - data >= 4) {
+         n2s(data, type);
+         n2s(data, size);
+ 
+-        if (data + size > (limit))
++        if (limit - data < size)
+             goto err;
+ # if 0
+         fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
+@@ -2472,18 +2472,18 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s,
+     if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0)
+         return 1;
+ 
+-    if (data >= limit - 2)
++    if (limit - data <= 2)
+         return 1;
+     n2s(data, len);
+ 
+-    if (data > limit - len)
++    if (limit - data < len)
+         return 1;
+ 
+-    while (data <= limit - 4) {
++    while (limit - data >= 4) {
+         n2s(data, type);
+         n2s(data, size);
+ 
+-        if (data + size > limit)
++        if (limit - data < size)
+             return 1;
+         if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0)
+             return 0;
+@@ -2569,20 +2569,20 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
+                              SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
+ # endif
+ 
+-    if (data >= (d + n - 2))
++    if ((d + n) - data <= 2)
+         goto ri_check;
+ 
+     n2s(data, length);
+-    if (data + length != d + n) {
++    if ((d + n) - data != length) {
+         *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
+-    while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
++    while ((d + n) - data >= 4) {
+         n2s(data, type);
+         n2s(data, size);
+ 
+-        if (data + size > (d + n))
++        if ((d + n) - data < size)
+             goto ri_check;
+ 
+         if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
+@@ -3307,29 +3307,33 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
+     /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
+     if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+         i = *(p++);
+-        p += i;
+-        if (p >= limit)
++
++        if (limit - p <= i)
+             return -1;
++
++        p += i;
+     }
+     /* Skip past cipher list */
+     n2s(p, i);
+-    p += i;
+-    if (p >= limit)
++    if (limit - p <= i)
+         return -1;
++    p += i;
++
+     /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
+     i = *(p++);
+-    p += i;
+-    if (p > limit)
++    if (limit - p < i)
+         return -1;
++    p += i;
++
+     /* Now at start of extensions */
+-    if ((p + 2) >= limit)
++    if (limit - p <= 2)
+         return 0;
+     n2s(p, i);
+-    while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
++    while (limit - p >= 4) {
+         unsigned short type, size;
+         n2s(p, type);
+         n2s(p, size);
+-        if (p + size > limit)
++        if (limit - p < size)
+             return 0;
+         if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
+             int r;
+-- 
+2.3.5
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb
index ea40275..4135a31 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://configure-targets.patch \
             file://openssl-1.0.2a-x32-asm.patch \
             file://ptest_makefile_deps.patch  \
             file://parallel.patch \
+            file://CVE-2016-2177.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "9392e65072ce4b614c1392eefc1f23d0"

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