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From: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
To: collin.funk1@gmail.com, openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org,
	Leonid Iziumtsev <leonid.iziumtsev@est.tech>
Subject: Re: [OE-core][PATCH 0/2] coreutils: fix multiple CVEs
Date: Sat, 01 Aug 2026 07:41:19 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <f92d86a076733c5368cae9c94fb76a14cac2cafc.camel@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <m1o6fm66ok.fsf@gmail.com>

On Fri, 2026-07-31 at 17:11 -0700, Collin Funk via lists.openembedded.org wrote:
> Leonid Iziumtsev said:
> 
> > This series backports upstream fixes to coreutils 9.11 to address
> > multiple CVEs.
> > 
> > Leonid Iziumtsev (2):
> >   coreutils: fix CVE-2026-56391
> >   coreutils: fix CVE-2026-56392
> > 
> >  .../coreutils/coreutils/CVE-2026-56391.patch  | 66 +++++++++++++++++++
> >  .../coreutils/coreutils/CVE-2026-56392.patch  | 65 ++++++++++++++++++
> >  meta/recipes-core/coreutils/coreutils_9.11.bb |  2 +
> >  3 files changed, 133 insertions(+)
> >  create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/coreutils/coreutils/CVE-2026-56391.patch
> >  create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/coreutils/coreutils/CVE-2026-56392.patch
> 
> Note that CVEs don't really have a security impact. I'm mildly annoyed
> there were assigned. It seems that Afine's entire existence as a company
> is sending LLM generated essays to maintainers, bogus a large portion of
> the time. For the others, which have dubious security implications, they
> file CVEs with exaggerations [1].
> 
> Theoretically CVE-2026-56392 could allow problematic writes to the heap,
> but that would require you to run it with untrusted slop as the input
> and as arguments. If someone can do that on your system, they have much
> better things to do.

Sadly, I suspect this is becoming all the more common and I share your
frustrations.

We have an difficult position on whether to take things or not as we
probably don't have the time/experience to tell in many cases and not
taking a CVE fix means we'd get beaten over the head with the patch for
ever more as "there is a security problem" :(.

Cheers,

Richard


  reply	other threads:[~2026-08-01  6:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-07-31 11:56 [OE-core][PATCH 0/2] coreutils: fix multiple CVEs Leonid Iziumtsev
2026-07-31 11:56 ` [OE-core][PATCH 1/2] coreutils: fix CVE-2026-56391 Leonid Iziumtsev
2026-07-31 11:56 ` [OE-core][PATCH 2/2] coreutils: fix CVE-2026-56392 Leonid Iziumtsev
2026-08-01  0:11 ` [OE-core][PATCH 0/2] coreutils: fix multiple CVEs Collin Funk
2026-08-01  6:41   ` Richard Purdie [this message]
2026-08-01  7:02     ` Collin Funk
2026-08-02 21:30       ` Richard Purdie

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