From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Jarkko Sakkinen Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 18/23] platform/x86: Intel SGX driver Date: Sat, 24 Nov 2018 08:15:21 -0800 Message-ID: <20181124161521.GB30310@linux.intel.com> References: <20181116010412.23967-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> <20181116010412.23967-19-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> <20181120111508.GA26127@wind.enjellic.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20181120111508.GA26127@wind.enjellic.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org To: "Dr. Greg" Cc: Andy Lutomirski , X86 ML , Platform Driver , linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, Dave Hansen , "Christopherson, Sean J" , nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, "Ayoun, Serge" , shay.katz-zamir@intel.com, haitao.huang@linux.intel.com, Andy Shevchenko , Thomas Gleixner , "Svahn, Kai" , mark.shanahan@intel.com, Suresh Siddha , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , "H. Peter Anvin" , Darren Hart , andy@infradead.org, LKML List-Id: platform-driver-x86.vger.kernel.org On Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 05:15:08AM -0600, Dr. Greg wrote: > Malware would not necessarily need the Intel attestation service. > Once access to the PROVISION bit is available, malware teams could > simply build their own attestation service. AFAIK not possible as they wouldn't have access to the root provisioning key. Can be confirmed from the SDM's key derivation table (41-56). /Jarkko