From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Jarkko Sakkinen Subject: Re: [intel-sgx-kernel-dev] [PATCH v11 13/13] intel_sgx: in-kernel launch enclave Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2018 12:41:08 +0300 Message-ID: <73b7e4e3712074b73f4ac8211699d24dfdced6bf.camel@linux.intel.com> References: <20180608171216.26521-14-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> <20180611115255.GC22164@hmswarspite.think-freely.org> <20180612174535.GE19168@hmswarspite.think-freely.org> <20180620210158.GA24328@linux.intel.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: In-Reply-To: Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org To: Nathaniel McCallum , sean.j.christopherson@intel.com Cc: jethro@fortanix.com, luto@kernel.org, Neil Horman , x86@kernel.org, platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, intel-sgx-kernel-dev@lists.01.org, hpa@zytor.com, dvhart@infradead.org, tglx@linutronix.de, andy@infradead.org, Peter Jones List-Id: platform-driver-x86.vger.kernel.org On Thu, 2018-06-21 at 08:32 -0400, Nathaniel McCallum wrote: > This implies that it should be possible to create MSR activation (and > an embedded launch enclave?) entirely as a UEFI module. The kernel > would still get to manage who has access to /dev/sgx and other > important non-cryptographic policy details. Users would still be able > to control the cryptographic policy details (via BIOS Secure Boot > configuration that exists today). Distributions could still control > cryptographic policy details via signing of the UEFI module with their > own Secure Boot key (or using something like shim). The UEFI module > (and possibly the external launch enclave) could be distributed via > linux-firmware. > > Andy/Neil, does this work for you? Nothing against having UEFI module for MSR activation step. And we would move the existing in-kernel LE to firmware so that it is avaible for locked-in-to-non-Intel-values case? /Jarkko