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From: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, qemu-riscv@nongnu.org,
	qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, qemu-block@nongnu.org,
	qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, qemu-arm@nongnu.org,
	"Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 09/28] hw/net: mark e1000, e1000e, IGB, rtl8139 & sPAPR VLAN as secure
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2026 15:36:08 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260911143627.2743803-10-berrange@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260911143627.2743803-1-berrange@redhat.com>

Historically most NICs are only interesting for non-virtualization
use cases and have not been written with malicious guests in mind.

As a general rule either virtio-net or xen-net should be used in
all virtualized guests requiring a security boundary.

There are a handful of exceptions resulting from historical usage
in the x86 world, to support virtualized guests lacking virtio
support.

Thus the rtl8139, e1000, e1000e & IGB NICs are declared to provide
a security boundary.

The PPC sPAPR Virutal LAN device is also marked secure.

Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
---
 hw/net/e1000.c      | 1 +
 hw/net/e1000e.c     | 1 +
 hw/net/igb.c        | 1 +
 hw/net/rtl8139.c    | 1 +
 hw/net/spapr_llan.c | 1 +
 5 files changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/hw/net/e1000.c b/hw/net/e1000.c
index 202ad40401..da0667c40e 100644
--- a/hw/net/e1000.c
+++ b/hw/net/e1000.c
@@ -1759,6 +1759,7 @@ static void e1000_register_types(void)
         type_info.parent = TYPE_E1000_BASE;
         type_info.class_data = info;
         type_info.class_init = e1000_class_init;
+        type_info.secure = true,
 
         type_register_static(&type_info);
     }
diff --git a/hw/net/e1000e.c b/hw/net/e1000e.c
index 9faf0c74c3..96737ddb51 100644
--- a/hw/net/e1000e.c
+++ b/hw/net/e1000e.c
@@ -721,6 +721,7 @@ static const TypeInfo e1000e_info = {
     .instance_size = sizeof(E1000EState),
     .class_init = e1000e_class_init,
     .instance_init = e1000e_instance_init,
+    .secure = true,
     .interfaces = (const InterfaceInfo[]) {
         { INTERFACE_PCIE_DEVICE },
         { }
diff --git a/hw/net/igb.c b/hw/net/igb.c
index c076807e71..0bd03efea0 100644
--- a/hw/net/igb.c
+++ b/hw/net/igb.c
@@ -635,6 +635,7 @@ static const TypeInfo igb_info = {
     .instance_size = sizeof(IGBState),
     .class_init = igb_class_init,
     .instance_init = igb_instance_init,
+    .secure = true,
     .interfaces = (const InterfaceInfo[]) {
         { INTERFACE_PCIE_DEVICE },
         { }
diff --git a/hw/net/rtl8139.c b/hw/net/rtl8139.c
index 16479284ee..38bc16f312 100644
--- a/hw/net/rtl8139.c
+++ b/hw/net/rtl8139.c
@@ -3450,6 +3450,7 @@ static const TypeInfo rtl8139_info = {
     .instance_size = sizeof(RTL8139State),
     .class_init    = rtl8139_class_init,
     .instance_init = rtl8139_instance_init,
+    .secure        = true,
     .interfaces = (const InterfaceInfo[]) {
         { INTERFACE_CONVENTIONAL_PCI_DEVICE },
         { },
diff --git a/hw/net/spapr_llan.c b/hw/net/spapr_llan.c
index 550848307d..c7ac58273c 100644
--- a/hw/net/spapr_llan.c
+++ b/hw/net/spapr_llan.c
@@ -873,6 +873,7 @@ static const TypeInfo spapr_vlan_info = {
     .class_init    = spapr_vlan_class_init,
     .instance_init = spapr_vlan_instance_init,
     .instance_finalize = spapr_vlan_instance_finalize,
+    .secure        = true,
 };
 
 static void spapr_vlan_register_types(void)
-- 
2.55.0



  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-09-11 14:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-09-11 14:35 [PATCH 00/28] Mark user creatable devices for secure for virt use case Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 01/28] hw: mark secure machines for x86, s390, ppc, arm, loonarch, riscv Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 02/28] accel: mark kvm and xen accelerators as secure Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 03/28] hw: mark all virtio PCI devices " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 04/28] hw: mark all virtio CCW " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 05/28] hw: mark all vhost devices a secure Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 06/28] hw: mark all remaining virtio object types as secure Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 07/28] hw/vfio: mark all VFIO object classes " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 08/28] hw/xen: mark all Xen related object types as being secure Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` Daniel P. Berrangé [this message]
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 10/28] hw/usb: mark commonly used USB devices/hosts as secure Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 11/28] hw/watchdog: mark some watchdog devices " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 12/28] hw/scsi: mark spapr and vmware SCSI controllers " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 13/28] hw/scsi: mark SCSI disk endpoint devices " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 14/28] hw/ide: mark ICH9 and ide-hd/ide-cd " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 15/28] hw: define most common PCI types " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 16:50   ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 16/28] hw/pci-host: mark common x86, ppc, arm and s390 PCI hosts " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 17/28] hw/display: mark bochs, cirrus, qxl, VGA, ramfb " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 18/28] hw/tpm: mark all TPM implementations " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 19/28] hw/misc: mark pvpanic, vmcoreinfo " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 20/28] hw/audio: mark Intel HDA devices & codecs " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 21/28] hw/char: mark common serial / console devicess a secure Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 22/28] hw/mem: mark nvdimm, pc-dimm & spapr-nvdimm devices as secure Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 23/28] hw/uefi: mark the EFI vars service " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 24/28] hw/acpi: mark erst, vmclock and vmgenid devices " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 25/28] hw: mark KVM clock and RTC " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 26/28] hw: device AMD, Intel and ARM IOMMUs " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 27/28] hw/input: mark PS/2 and PC Keyboard devices " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 28/28] hw/i386: mark vmmouse / vmport " Daniel P. Berrangé

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