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From: "Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: "Lendacky, Thomas" <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>,
	"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"qemu-devel@nongnu.org" <qemu-devel@nongnu.org>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>, "Borislav Petkov" <bp@suse.de>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 08/10] KVM: X86: Introduce KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS hypercall
Date: Fri, 3 May 2019 14:25:04 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <0f120899-c4fb-724a-00f9-997c362efd37@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <d31531fe-f01c-817b-06e5-f06b5968b266@amd.com>



On 4/26/19 4:39 PM, Lendacky, Thomas wrote:
> On 4/24/19 11:10 AM, Singh, Brijesh wrote:
>> The hypercall can be used by the SEV guest to notify the page encryption
> 
> This hyercall is used by the SEV guest to notify a change in the page...
> 
>> status to the hypervisor. The hypercall should be invoked only when
>> the encryption attribute is changed from encrypted -> decrypted and vice
>> versa. By default all the guest pages should be considered encrypted.
> 
> By default all guest page are considered
> 
>>
>> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
>> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
>> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
>> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
>> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
>> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
>> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
>> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>> Cc: x86@kernel.org
>> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
>> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
>> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
>> ---
>>   Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt | 14 +++++
>>   arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h          |  2 +
>>   arch/x86/kvm/svm.c                       | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>   arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c                   |  1 +
>>   arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                       |  5 ++
>>   include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h            |  1 +
>>   6 files changed, 92 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt
>> index da24c138c8d1..ecd44e488679 100644
>> --- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt
>> +++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt
>> @@ -141,3 +141,17 @@ a0 corresponds to the APIC ID in the third argument (a2), bit 1
>>   corresponds to the APIC ID a2+1, and so on.
>>   
>>   Returns the number of CPUs to which the IPIs were delivered successfully.
>> +
>> +7. KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS
>> +-------------------------
>> +Architecture: x86
>> +Status: active
>> +Purpose: Notify the encryption status changes in guest page table (SEV guest)
>> +
>> +a0: the guest physical address of the start page
>> +a1: the number of pages
>> +a2: set or clear the encryption attribute
> 
> a2: encryption attribute
> 
>> +
>> +   Where:
>> +	* 1: Encryption attribute is set
>> +	* 0: Encryption attribute is cleared
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
>> index a9d03af34030..adb0ca035b97 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
>> @@ -1196,6 +1196,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
>>   	uint16_t (*nested_get_evmcs_version)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>>   
>>   	bool (*need_emulation_on_page_fault)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>> +	int (*page_enc_status_hc)(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa,
>> +				  unsigned long sz, unsigned long mode);
>>   };
>>   
>>   struct kvm_arch_async_pf {
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
>> index 74b57ab742ad..f024f208b052 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
>> @@ -138,6 +138,8 @@ struct kvm_sev_info {
>>   	int fd;			/* SEV device fd */
>>   	unsigned long pages_locked; /* Number of pages locked */
>>   	struct list_head regions_list;  /* List of registered regions */
>> +	unsigned long *page_enc_bmap;
>> +	unsigned long page_enc_bmap_size;
>>   };
>>   
>>   struct kvm_svm {
>> @@ -1911,6 +1913,8 @@ static void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
>>   
>>   	sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle);
>>   	sev_asid_free(kvm);
>> +
>> +	kvfree(sev->page_enc_bmap);
>>   }
>>   
>>   static void avic_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
>> @@ -7370,6 +7374,69 @@ static int sev_receive_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
>>   	return ret;
>>   }
>>   
>> +static int sev_resize_page_enc_bitmap(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long new_size)
>> +{
>> +	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
>> +	unsigned long *map;
>> +	unsigned long sz;
>> +
>> +	if (sev->page_enc_bmap_size >= new_size)
>> +		return 0;
>> +
>> +	sz = ALIGN(new_size, BITS_PER_LONG) / 8;
>> +
>> +	if (sz > PAGE_SIZE)
>> +		map = vmalloc(sz);
>> +	else
>> +		map = kmalloc(sz, GFP_KERNEL);
> 
> Any reason this can't always be vmalloc()?
> 

Yes, we can use vmalloc() unconditionally. The bitmap size will be
mostly greater than PAGE_SIZE hence the above is useless anyway.


>> +
>> +	if (!map) {
>> +		pr_err_once("Failed to allocate decrypted bitmap size %lx\n", sz);
>> +		return 1;
> 
> Should this be -ENOMEM?
> 
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	/* mark the page encrypted (by default) */
>> +	memset(map, 0xff, sz);
>> +
>> +	bitmap_copy(map, sev->page_enc_bmap, sev->page_enc_bmap_size);
>> +	kvfree(sev->page_enc_bmap);
>> +
>> +	sev->page_enc_bmap = map;
>> +	sev->page_enc_bmap_size = new_size;
>> +
>> +	return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int svm_page_enc_status_hc(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa,
>> +				  unsigned long npages, unsigned long enc)
>> +{
>> +	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
>> +	gfn_t gfn_start, gfn_end;
>> +	int r;
> 
> int ret; ?  "r" at first confused me.


I will fix it in next rev.


> 
>> +
>> +	if (!npages)
>> +		return 0;
>> +
>> +	gfn_start = gpa_to_gfn(gpa);
>> +	gfn_end = gfn_start + npages;
>> +
>> +	mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
>> +
>> +	r = 1;
>> +	if (sev_resize_page_enc_bitmap(kvm, gfn_end))
> 
> ret = sev_resize_...
> if (ret)
> 
>> +		goto unlock;
>> +
>> +	if (enc)
>> +		__bitmap_set(sev->page_enc_bmap, gfn_start, gfn_end - gfn_start);
>> +	else
>> +		__bitmap_clear(sev->page_enc_bmap, gfn_start, gfn_end - gfn_start);
>> +
>> +	r = 0;
> 
> If you do the above, this is not needed.
> 

Yes agreed. thanks

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: "Lendacky, Thomas" <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>,
	"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"qemu-devel@nongnu.org" <qemu-devel@nongnu.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@suse.de>
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 08/10] KVM: X86: Introduce KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS hypercall
Date: Fri, 3 May 2019 14:25:04 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <0f120899-c4fb-724a-00f9-997c362efd37@amd.com> (raw)
Message-ID: <20190503142504.1pf1LEo3MATyjgLd5e_ucSBn7ApP7m188G2co0_70Uc@z> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <d31531fe-f01c-817b-06e5-f06b5968b266@amd.com>



On 4/26/19 4:39 PM, Lendacky, Thomas wrote:
> On 4/24/19 11:10 AM, Singh, Brijesh wrote:
>> The hypercall can be used by the SEV guest to notify the page encryption
> 
> This hyercall is used by the SEV guest to notify a change in the page...
> 
>> status to the hypervisor. The hypercall should be invoked only when
>> the encryption attribute is changed from encrypted -> decrypted and vice
>> versa. By default all the guest pages should be considered encrypted.
> 
> By default all guest page are considered
> 
>>
>> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
>> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
>> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
>> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
>> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
>> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
>> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
>> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>> Cc: x86@kernel.org
>> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
>> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
>> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
>> ---
>>   Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt | 14 +++++
>>   arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h          |  2 +
>>   arch/x86/kvm/svm.c                       | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>   arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c                   |  1 +
>>   arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                       |  5 ++
>>   include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h            |  1 +
>>   6 files changed, 92 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt
>> index da24c138c8d1..ecd44e488679 100644
>> --- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt
>> +++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt
>> @@ -141,3 +141,17 @@ a0 corresponds to the APIC ID in the third argument (a2), bit 1
>>   corresponds to the APIC ID a2+1, and so on.
>>   
>>   Returns the number of CPUs to which the IPIs were delivered successfully.
>> +
>> +7. KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS
>> +-------------------------
>> +Architecture: x86
>> +Status: active
>> +Purpose: Notify the encryption status changes in guest page table (SEV guest)
>> +
>> +a0: the guest physical address of the start page
>> +a1: the number of pages
>> +a2: set or clear the encryption attribute
> 
> a2: encryption attribute
> 
>> +
>> +   Where:
>> +	* 1: Encryption attribute is set
>> +	* 0: Encryption attribute is cleared
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
>> index a9d03af34030..adb0ca035b97 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
>> @@ -1196,6 +1196,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
>>   	uint16_t (*nested_get_evmcs_version)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>>   
>>   	bool (*need_emulation_on_page_fault)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>> +	int (*page_enc_status_hc)(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa,
>> +				  unsigned long sz, unsigned long mode);
>>   };
>>   
>>   struct kvm_arch_async_pf {
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
>> index 74b57ab742ad..f024f208b052 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
>> @@ -138,6 +138,8 @@ struct kvm_sev_info {
>>   	int fd;			/* SEV device fd */
>>   	unsigned long pages_locked; /* Number of pages locked */
>>   	struct list_head regions_list;  /* List of registered regions */
>> +	unsigned long *page_enc_bmap;
>> +	unsigned long page_enc_bmap_size;
>>   };
>>   
>>   struct kvm_svm {
>> @@ -1911,6 +1913,8 @@ static void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
>>   
>>   	sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle);
>>   	sev_asid_free(kvm);
>> +
>> +	kvfree(sev->page_enc_bmap);
>>   }
>>   
>>   static void avic_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
>> @@ -7370,6 +7374,69 @@ static int sev_receive_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
>>   	return ret;
>>   }
>>   
>> +static int sev_resize_page_enc_bitmap(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long new_size)
>> +{
>> +	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
>> +	unsigned long *map;
>> +	unsigned long sz;
>> +
>> +	if (sev->page_enc_bmap_size >= new_size)
>> +		return 0;
>> +
>> +	sz = ALIGN(new_size, BITS_PER_LONG) / 8;
>> +
>> +	if (sz > PAGE_SIZE)
>> +		map = vmalloc(sz);
>> +	else
>> +		map = kmalloc(sz, GFP_KERNEL);
> 
> Any reason this can't always be vmalloc()?
> 

Yes, we can use vmalloc() unconditionally. The bitmap size will be
mostly greater than PAGE_SIZE hence the above is useless anyway.


>> +
>> +	if (!map) {
>> +		pr_err_once("Failed to allocate decrypted bitmap size %lx\n", sz);
>> +		return 1;
> 
> Should this be -ENOMEM?
> 
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	/* mark the page encrypted (by default) */
>> +	memset(map, 0xff, sz);
>> +
>> +	bitmap_copy(map, sev->page_enc_bmap, sev->page_enc_bmap_size);
>> +	kvfree(sev->page_enc_bmap);
>> +
>> +	sev->page_enc_bmap = map;
>> +	sev->page_enc_bmap_size = new_size;
>> +
>> +	return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int svm_page_enc_status_hc(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa,
>> +				  unsigned long npages, unsigned long enc)
>> +{
>> +	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
>> +	gfn_t gfn_start, gfn_end;
>> +	int r;
> 
> int ret; ?  "r" at first confused me.


I will fix it in next rev.


> 
>> +
>> +	if (!npages)
>> +		return 0;
>> +
>> +	gfn_start = gpa_to_gfn(gpa);
>> +	gfn_end = gfn_start + npages;
>> +
>> +	mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
>> +
>> +	r = 1;
>> +	if (sev_resize_page_enc_bitmap(kvm, gfn_end))
> 
> ret = sev_resize_...
> if (ret)
> 
>> +		goto unlock;
>> +
>> +	if (enc)
>> +		__bitmap_set(sev->page_enc_bmap, gfn_start, gfn_end - gfn_start);
>> +	else
>> +		__bitmap_clear(sev->page_enc_bmap, gfn_start, gfn_end - gfn_start);
>> +
>> +	r = 0;
> 
> If you do the above, this is not needed.
> 

Yes agreed. thanks

  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-05-03 14:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-04-24 16:09 [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 00/10] Add AMD SEV guest live migration support Singh, Brijesh
2019-04-24 16:09 ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-04-24 16:09 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 01/10] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV SEND_START command Singh, Brijesh
2019-04-24 16:09   ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-04-26 14:10   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-04-26 14:10     ` Borislav Petkov
2019-04-26 14:29     ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-04-26 14:29       ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-04-26 20:43       ` Borislav Petkov
2019-04-26 20:43         ` Borislav Petkov
2019-04-29 15:01         ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-04-29 15:01           ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-04-29 16:36           ` Borislav Petkov
2019-04-29 16:36             ` Borislav Petkov
2019-04-29 16:43             ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-04-29 16:43               ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-04-24 16:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 02/10] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEND_UPDATE_DATA command Singh, Brijesh
2019-04-24 16:10   ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-04-26 20:31   ` Lendacky, Thomas
2019-04-26 20:31     ` Lendacky, Thomas
2019-04-29 16:54     ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-04-29 16:54       ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-04-24 16:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 03/10] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH command Singh, Brijesh
2019-04-24 16:10   ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-04-24 16:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 04/10] KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START command Singh, Brijesh
2019-04-24 16:10   ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-04-26 21:08   ` Lendacky, Thomas
2019-04-26 21:08     ` Lendacky, Thomas
2019-04-24 16:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 05/10] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command Singh, Brijesh
2019-04-24 16:10   ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-04-26 21:11   ` Lendacky, Thomas
2019-04-26 21:11     ` Lendacky, Thomas
2019-04-24 16:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 06/10] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH command Singh, Brijesh
2019-04-24 16:10   ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-04-26 21:11   ` Lendacky, Thomas
2019-04-26 21:11     ` Lendacky, Thomas
2019-04-24 16:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 07/10] KVM: x86: Add AMD SEV specific Hypercall3 Singh, Brijesh
2019-04-24 16:10   ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-04-24 16:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 08/10] KVM: X86: Introduce KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS hypercall Singh, Brijesh
2019-04-24 16:10   ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-04-26 21:39   ` Lendacky, Thomas
2019-04-26 21:39     ` Lendacky, Thomas
2019-05-03 14:25     ` Singh, Brijesh [this message]
2019-05-03 14:25       ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-04-24 16:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 09/10] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_GET_PAGE_ENC_BITMAP ioctl Singh, Brijesh
2019-04-24 16:10   ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-04-24 16:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 10/10] mm: x86: Invoke hypercall when page encryption status is changed Singh, Brijesh
2019-04-24 16:10   ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-04-24 19:15 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 00/10] Add AMD SEV guest live migration support Steve Rutherford
2019-04-24 19:15   ` Steve Rutherford via Qemu-devel
2019-04-24 21:32   ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-04-24 21:32     ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-04-25  0:18     ` Steve Rutherford
2019-04-25  0:18       ` Steve Rutherford via Qemu-devel
2019-04-25  2:15       ` Singh, Brijesh
2019-04-25  2:15         ` Singh, Brijesh

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