From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from mailman by lists.gnu.org with tmda-scanned (Exim 4.43) id 1Miboo-0001qa-0e for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Tue, 01 Sep 2009 18:27:14 -0400 Received: from exim by lists.gnu.org with spam-scanned (Exim 4.43) id 1Miboi-0001nI-Ut for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Tue, 01 Sep 2009 18:27:13 -0400 Received: from [199.232.76.173] (port=32999 helo=monty-python.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.43) id 1Miboi-0001n3-Dv for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Tue, 01 Sep 2009 18:27:08 -0400 Received: from moutng.kundenserver.de ([212.227.126.177]:55676) by monty-python.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.60) (envelope-from ) id 1Miboh-0006kM-79 for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Tue, 01 Sep 2009 18:27:07 -0400 Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] QEMU as a "virtual smart card"? From: Laurent Vivier In-Reply-To: <20090831180825.6ed2ea55@bud-laptop> References: <20090831180825.6ed2ea55@bud-laptop> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Date: Wed, 02 Sep 2009 00:27:02 +0200 Message-Id: <1251844022.5774.4.camel@Quad> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable List-Id: qemu-devel.nongnu.org List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: "Bud P. Bruegger" Cc: qemu-devel@nongnu.org, John Forrester Le lundi 31 ao=C3=BBt 2009 =C3=A0 18:08 +0200, Bud P. Bruegger a =C3=A9crit= : > Hello everyone, >=20 > we are thinking of a possibly "exotic" use of QEMU and would like to > ask your advice on whether we are going in the right direction. >=20 > We are pondering of how to use a virtual machine to have some security > features normally associated with hard tokens such as smart cards. =20 >=20 > In particular, one of the key concepts of smart cards is that they can > store secret keys that never leave the device but can only be used by a > trusted and protected internal CPU for encryption/signing. =20 >=20 > At least looking naively at QEMU, it seems that its CPU and RAM are > well protected from the host operating system--in a way to say make it > practically impossible for some malware to extract the secret key used > in a virtual machine. =20 >=20 > Is this a valid conception of what QEMU does? How good is the > isolation of a virtual machine from the host operating system. =20 >=20 > We are also interested in the isolation of input devices, in > particularly the keyboard as to prevent PIN sniffing. My "naive" > impression is that key logging for a PS/2 keyboard is probably more > difficult than with a USB keyboard. Is there any thruth to my > misconception? >=20 > Finally one last question questions: >=20 > * Is there any way of getting exclusive access to an USB pen drive > from a virtual machine, preventing the host operating system to say take > an image of the content? >=20 > many thanks in advance for any input and illuminations! In fact, you want to do that: http://www.myglobull.com/ ? Regards, Laurent --=20 --------------------- laurent@vivier.eu ---------------------- "Tout ce qui est impossible reste =C3=A0 accomplir" Jules Verne "Things are only impossible until they're not" Jean-Luc Picard