[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 0/3] Sandboxing Qemu guests with Libseccomp

[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 0/3] Sandboxing Qemu guests with Libseccomp

[Eduardo Otubo]

Hello all,

This patch is an effort to sandbox Qemu guests using Libseccomp[0]. The patches
that follows are pretty simple and straightforward. I added the correct options
and checks to the configure script and the basic calls to libseccomp in the
main loop at vl.c. Details of each one are in the emails of the patch set.

This support limits the system call footprint of the entire QEMU process to a
limited set of syscalls, those that we know QEMU uses. The idea is to limit the
allowable syscalls, therefore limiting the impact that an attacked guest could
have on the host system.

It's important to note that the libseccomp itself needs the seccomp mode 2
feature in the kernel, which is only available in kernel versions older (or
equal) than 3.5-rc1.

v2: Files separated in qemu-seccomp.c and qemu-seccomp.h for a cleaner
    implementation. The development was tested with the 3.5-rc1 kernel.

v3: As we discussed in previous emails in this mailing list, this feature is
    not supposed to replace existing security feature, but add another layer to
    the whole. The whitelist should contain all the syscalls QEMU needs. And as
    stated by Will Drewry's commit message[1]: "Filter programs will be inherited
    across fork/clone and execve.", the same white list should be passed along from
    the father process to the child, then execve() shouldn't be a problem. Note
    that there's a feature PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS in seccomp mode 2 in the kernel,
    this prevents processes from gaining privileges on execve. For example, this
    will prevent qemu (if running unprivileged) from executing setuid programs[2].

v4: Introducing "debug" mode on libseccomp support. The "debug" mode will set
    the flag SCMP_ACT_TRAP when calling seccomp_start(). It will verbosely
    print a message to the stderr in the form "seccomp: illegal system call
    execution trapped: XXX" and resume the execution. This is really just used as
    debug mode, it helps users and developers to full fill the whitelist.

v5: Libseccomp release 1.0.0[3]: The API now is context aware and it breaks the
    compatibility with older versions. I updated all the functions that differs
    from one version to another.

v6: Debug mode removed as discussed in the list/irc. Planned for future inclusion.

As always, comments are more than welcome.

Regards,

[0] - http://sourceforge.net/projects/libseccomp/
[1] - http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git;a=commit;h=e2cfabdfd075648216f99c2c03821cf3f47c1727
[2] - https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/4/12/457
[3] - http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/forum.php?thread_name=1633205.5jr3eG7nQ5%40sifl&forum_name=libseccomp-discuss


Eduardo Otubo (3):
  Adding support for libseccomp in configure and Makefile
  Adding qemu-seccomp.[ch]
  Adding seccomp calls to vl.c

 Makefile.objs  |    6 ++
 configure      |   22 +++++++++
 qemu-seccomp.c |  139 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 qemu-seccomp.h |   22 +++++++++
 vl.c           |   13 +++++
 5 files changed, 202 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 qemu-seccomp.c
 create mode 100644 qemu-seccomp.h

[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 1/3] Adding support for libseccomp in configure and Makefile

[Eduardo Otubo]

Adding basic options to the configure script to use libseccomp or not.
The default is set to 'no'. If the flag --enable-libseccomp is used, the
script will check for its existence using pkg-config.

v2:
 * As I removed all the code related to seccomp from vl.c, I created
   qemu-seccomp.[ch].
 * Also making the configure script to add the specific line to
   Makefile.obj in order to compile with appropriate support to seccomp.

v3:
 * Removing the line from Makefile.obj and adding it to Makefile.objs.
 * Marking libseccomp default option to 'yes' in the configure script.

Signed-off-by: Eduardo Otubo <otubo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 Makefile.objs |    6 ++++++
 configure     |   22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Makefile.objs b/Makefile.objs
index 5ebbcfa..13db9f3 100644
--- a/Makefile.objs
+++ b/Makefile.objs
@@ -96,6 +96,12 @@ common-obj-y += qemu-timer.o qemu-timer-common.o
 common-obj-$(CONFIG_SLIRP) += slirp/
 
 ######################################################################
+# libseccomp
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_SECCOMP),y)
+common-obj-y += qemu-seccomp.o
+endif
+
+######################################################################
 # libuser
 
 user-obj-y =
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index f0dbc03..b35d314 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -219,6 +219,7 @@ zlib="yes"
 guest_agent="yes"
 libiscsi=""
 coroutine=""
+seccomp="yes"
 
 # parse CC options first
 for opt do
@@ -848,6 +849,10 @@ for opt do
   ;;
   --disable-guest-agent) guest_agent="no"
   ;;
+  --enable-seccomp) seccomp="yes"
+  ;;
+  --disable-seccomp) seccomp="no"
+  ;;
   *) echo "ERROR: unknown option $opt"; show_help="yes"
   ;;
   esac
@@ -1135,6 +1140,8 @@ echo "  --disable-usb-redir      disable usb network redirection support"
 echo "  --enable-usb-redir       enable usb network redirection support"
 echo "  --disable-guest-agent    disable building of the QEMU Guest Agent"
 echo "  --enable-guest-agent     enable building of the QEMU Guest Agent"
+echo "  --disable-seccomp        disable seccomp support"
+echo "  --enable-seccomp         enables seccomp support"
 echo "  --with-coroutine=BACKEND coroutine backend. Supported options:"
 echo "                           gthread, ucontext, sigaltstack, windows"
 echo ""
@@ -1397,6 +1404,16 @@ EOF
 fi
 
 ##########################################
+# libseccomp check
+
+if test "$seccomp" = "yes" ; then
+    if $pkg_config libseccomp --modversion >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        LIBS=`$pkg_config --libs libseccomp`
+    else
+        feature_not_found "libseccomp"
+    fi
+fi
+##########################################
 # xen probe
 
 if test "$xen" != "no" ; then
@@ -3126,6 +3143,7 @@ echo "usb net redir     $usb_redir"
 echo "OpenGL support    $opengl"
 echo "libiscsi support  $libiscsi"
 echo "build guest agent $guest_agent"
+echo "seccomp support   $seccomp"
 echo "coroutine backend $coroutine_backend"
 
 if test "$sdl_too_old" = "yes"; then
@@ -3424,6 +3442,10 @@ if test "$libiscsi" = "yes" ; then
   echo "CONFIG_LIBISCSI=y" >> $config_host_mak
 fi
 
+if test "$seccomp" = "yes"; then
+  echo "CONFIG_SECCOMP=y" >> $config_host_mak
+fi
+
 # XXX: suppress that
 if [ "$bsd" = "yes" ] ; then
   echo "CONFIG_BSD=y" >> $config_host_mak
-- 
1.7.1

[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 2/3] Adding qemu-seccomp.[ch]

[Eduardo Otubo]

v1:
 * I added a syscall struct using priority levels as described in the
   libseccomp man page. The priority numbers are based to the frequency
   they appear in a sample strace from a regular qemu guest run under
   libvirt.

   Libseccomp generates linear BPF code to filter system calls, those rules
   are read one after another. The priority system places the most common
   rules first in order to reduce the overhead when processing them.

v2:
 * Fixed some style issues
 * Removed code from vl.c and created qemu-seccomp.[ch]
 * Now using ARRAY_SIZE macro
 * Added more syscalls without priority/frequency set yet

v3:
 * Adding copyright and license information
 * Replacing seccomp_whitelist_count just by ARRAY_SIZE
 * Adding header protection to qemu-seccomp.h
 * Moving QemuSeccompSyscall definition to qemu-seccomp.c
 * Negative return from seccomp_start is fatal now.
 * Adding open() and execve() to the whitelis

v4:
 * Tests revealed a bigger set of syscalls.
 * seccomp_start() now has an argument to set the mode according to the
   configure option trap or kill.

v5:
 * Tests on x86_64 required a new specific set of system calls.
 * libseccomp release 1.0.0: part of the API have changed in this last
   release, had to adapt to the new function signatures.

Signed-off-by: Eduardo Otubo <otubo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 qemu-seccomp.c |  139 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 qemu-seccomp.h |   22 +++++++++
 2 files changed, 161 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 qemu-seccomp.c
 create mode 100644 qemu-seccomp.h

diff --git a/qemu-seccomp.c b/qemu-seccomp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cb8016c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/qemu-seccomp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+/*
+ * QEMU seccomp mode 2 support with libseccomp
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM, Corp. 2012
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ *  Eduardo Otubo    <eotubo@br.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2.  See
+ * the COPYING file in the top-level directory.
+ *
+ * Contributions after 2012-01-13 are licensed under the terms of the
+ * GNU GPL, version 2 or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <seccomp.h>
+#include "qemu-seccomp.h"
+
+struct QemuSeccompSyscall {
+    int32_t num;
+    uint8_t priority;
+};
+
+static const struct QemuSeccompSyscall seccomp_whitelist[] = {
+    { SCMP_SYS(timer_settime), 255 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(timer_gettime), 254 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(futex), 253 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(select), 252 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(recvfrom), 251 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(sendto), 250 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(read), 249 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(brk), 248 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(clone), 247 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(mmap), 247 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(mprotect), 246 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(execve), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(open), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(ioctl), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(recvmsg), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(sendmsg), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(accept), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(connect), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(gettimeofday), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(readlink), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(access), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(prctl), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(signalfd), 245 },
+#if defined(__i386__)
+    { SCMP_SYS(fcntl64), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(fstat64), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(stat64), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(getgid32), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(getegid32), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(getuid32), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(geteuid32), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(sigreturn), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(_newselect), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(_llseek), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(mmap2), 245},
+    { SCMP_SYS(sigprocmask), 245 },
+#elif defined(__x86_64__)
+    { SCMP_SYS(sched_getparam), 245},
+    { SCMP_SYS(sched_getscheduler), 245},
+    { SCMP_SYS(fstat), 245},
+    { SCMP_SYS(clock_getres), 245},
+    { SCMP_SYS(sched_get_priority_min), 245},
+    { SCMP_SYS(sched_get_priority_max), 245},
+    { SCMP_SYS(stat), 245},
+    { SCMP_SYS(socket), 245},
+    { SCMP_SYS(setsockopt), 245},
+#endif
+    { SCMP_SYS(eventfd2), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(dup), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(gettid), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(timer_create), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(exit), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(clock_gettime), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(time), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(restart_syscall), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(pwrite64), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(chown), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(openat), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(getdents), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(timer_delete), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(exit_group), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(rt_sigreturn), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(sync), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(pread64), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(madvise), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(set_robust_list), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(lseek), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(pselect6), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(fork), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(bind), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(listen), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(eventfd), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(rt_sigprocmask), 245 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(write), 244 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(fcntl), 243 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(tgkill), 242 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(rt_sigaction), 242 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(pipe2), 242 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(munmap), 242 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(mremap), 242 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(getsockname), 242 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(getpeername), 242 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(fdatasync), 242 },
+    { SCMP_SYS(close), 242 }
+};
+
+int seccomp_start(void)
+{
+    int rc = 0;
+    unsigned int i = 0;
+    scmp_filter_ctx ctx;
+
+    ctx = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_KILL);
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        goto seccomp_return;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(seccomp_whitelist); i++) {
+        rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, seccomp_whitelist[i].num, 0);
+        if (rc < 0) {
+            goto seccomp_return;
+        }
+        rc = seccomp_syscall_priority(ctx, seccomp_whitelist[i].num,
+                                      seccomp_whitelist[i].priority);
+        if (rc < 0) {
+            goto seccomp_return;
+        }
+    }
+
+    rc = seccomp_load(ctx);
+
+  seccomp_return:
+    seccomp_release(ctx);
+    return rc;
+}
diff --git a/qemu-seccomp.h b/qemu-seccomp.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b2fc3f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/qemu-seccomp.h
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+/*
+ * QEMU seccomp mode 2 support with libseccomp
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM, Corp. 2012
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ *  Eduardo Otubo    <eotubo@br.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2.  See
+ * the COPYING file in the top-level directory.
+ *
+ * Contributions after 2012-01-13 are licensed under the terms of the
+ * GNU GPL, version 2 or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+#ifndef QEMU_SECCOMP_H
+#define QEMU_SECCOMP_H
+
+#include <seccomp.h>
+#include "osdep.h"
+
+int seccomp_start(void);
+#endif
-- 
1.7.1

[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 3/3] Adding seccomp calls to vl.c

[Eduardo Otubo]

v1:
 * Full seccomp calls and data included in vl.c

v2:
 * Full seccomp calls and data removed from vl.c and put into separate
   qemu-seccomp.[ch] file.

Signed-off-by: Eduardo Otubo <otubo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 vl.c |   13 +++++++++++++
 1 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/vl.c b/vl.c
index 91076f0..2c62efc 100644
--- a/vl.c
+++ b/vl.c
@@ -63,6 +63,11 @@
 #include <linux/ppdev.h>
 #include <linux/parport.h>
 #endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
+#include "qemu-seccomp.h"
+#endif
+
 #ifdef __sun__
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <sys/ethernet.h>
@@ -2299,6 +2304,14 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv, char **envp)
     const char *trace_events = NULL;
     const char *trace_file = NULL;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
+    if (seccomp_start() < 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr,
+                "seccomp: failed to install syscall filter in the kernel\n");
+        exit(1);
+    }
+#endif
+
     atexit(qemu_run_exit_notifiers);
     error_set_progname(argv[0]);
 
-- 
1.7.1

[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 0/3] Sandboxing Qemu guests with Libseccomp

[Eduardo Otubo]

Hello all,

This patch is an effort to sandbox Qemu guests using Libseccomp[0]. The patches
that follows are pretty simple and straightforward. I added the correct options
and checks to the configure script and the basic calls to libseccomp in the
main loop at vl.c. Details of each one are in the emails of the patch set.

This support limits the system call footprint of the entire QEMU process to a
limited set of syscalls, those that we know QEMU uses. The idea is to limit the
allowable syscalls, therefore limiting the impact that an attacked guest could
have on the host system.

It's important to note that the libseccomp itself needs the seccomp mode 2
feature in the kernel, which is only available in kernel versions older (or
equal) than 3.5-rc1.

v2: Files separated in qemu-seccomp.c and qemu-seccomp.h for a cleaner
    implementation. The development was tested with the 3.5-rc1 kernel.

v3: As we discussed in previous emails in this mailing list, this feature is
    not supposed to replace existing security feature, but add another layer to
    the whole. The whitelist should contain all the syscalls QEMU needs. And as
    stated by Will Drewry's commit message[1]: "Filter programs will be inherited
    across fork/clone and execve.", the same white list should be passed along from
    the father process to the child, then execve() shouldn't be a problem. Note
    that there's a feature PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS in seccomp mode 2 in the kernel,
    this prevents processes from gaining privileges on execve. For example, this
    will prevent qemu (if running unprivileged) from executing setuid programs[2].

v4: Introducing "debug" mode on libseccomp support. The "debug" mode will set
    the flag SCMP_ACT_TRAP when calling seccomp_start(). It will verbosely
    print a message to the stderr in the form "seccomp: illegal system call
    execution trapped: XXX" and resume the execution. This is really just used as
    debug mode, it helps users and developers to full fill the whitelist.

v5: Libseccomp release 1.0.0[3]: The API now is context aware and it breaks the
    compatibility with older versions. I updated all the functions that differs
    from one version to another.

v6: Debug mode removed as discussed in the list/irc. Planned for future inclusion.

As always, comments are more than welcome.

Regards,

[0] - http://sourceforge.net/projects/libseccomp/
[1] - http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git;a=commit;h=e2cfabdfd075648216f99c2c03821cf3f47c1727
[2] - https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/4/12/457
[3] - http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/forum.php?thread_name=1633205.5jr3eG7nQ5%40sifl&forum_name=libseccomp-discuss


Eduardo Otubo (3):
  Adding support for libseccomp in configure and Makefile
  Adding qemu-seccomp.[ch]
  Adding seccomp calls to vl.c

 Makefile.objs  |    6 ++
 configure      |   22 +++++++++
 qemu-seccomp.c |  139 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 qemu-seccomp.h |   22 +++++++++
 vl.c           |   13 +++++
 5 files changed, 202 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 qemu-seccomp.c
 create mode 100644 qemu-seccomp.h

Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 0/3] Sandboxing Qemu guests with Libseccomp

[Anthony Liguori]

Overall the code looks fine to me.

A couple general comments though:

- we need a -disable-sandbox flag in case the whitelist is bad and a
  user needs to disable it.

- for the few cases where we may exec something that requires privileges
  beyond this white list, we need to clearly document that
  -disable-sandbox may be needed.

Most scripts should be fairly limited in what they try to do so I think
that the existing sandbox should be okay.  Confirming that the existing
sandbox is enough to do ifconfig $tap 0.0.0.0 up && brctl addbr br0 $tap
would be nice too.

I'm a little concerned this hasn't gotten enough testing to enable by
default in 1.2.  So I'd suggest adding:

-sandbox on

Parse this argument via QemuOpts and make the default parameter
'enable'.  This will let us extend the white list in the future.  For
the 1.2 release, make the default for sandbox.enable=off but for 1.3,
will switch it to 'on' for the default.

By making it QemuOpts, we can actually disable/enable through the global
configuration file which is a really nice touch.

If you can make those changes and resubmit tomorrow, we can include it
for the 1.2 release.

Regards,

Anthony Liguori

Eduardo Otubo <otubo@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:

> Hello all,
>
> This patch is an effort to sandbox Qemu guests using Libseccomp[0]. The patches
> that follows are pretty simple and straightforward. I added the correct options
> and checks to the configure script and the basic calls to libseccomp in the
> main loop at vl.c. Details of each one are in the emails of the patch set.
>
> This support limits the system call footprint of the entire QEMU process to a
> limited set of syscalls, those that we know QEMU uses. The idea is to limit the
> allowable syscalls, therefore limiting the impact that an attacked guest could
> have on the host system.
>
> It's important to note that the libseccomp itself needs the seccomp mode 2
> feature in the kernel, which is only available in kernel versions older (or
> equal) than 3.5-rc1.
>
> v2: Files separated in qemu-seccomp.c and qemu-seccomp.h for a cleaner
>     implementation. The development was tested with the 3.5-rc1 kernel.
>
> v3: As we discussed in previous emails in this mailing list, this feature is
>     not supposed to replace existing security feature, but add another layer to
>     the whole. The whitelist should contain all the syscalls QEMU needs. And as
>     stated by Will Drewry's commit message[1]: "Filter programs will be inherited
>     across fork/clone and execve.", the same white list should be passed along from
>     the father process to the child, then execve() shouldn't be a problem. Note
>     that there's a feature PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS in seccomp mode 2 in the kernel,
>     this prevents processes from gaining privileges on execve. For example, this
>     will prevent qemu (if running unprivileged) from executing setuid programs[2].
>
> v4: Introducing "debug" mode on libseccomp support. The "debug" mode will set
>     the flag SCMP_ACT_TRAP when calling seccomp_start(). It will verbosely
>     print a message to the stderr in the form "seccomp: illegal system call
>     execution trapped: XXX" and resume the execution. This is really just used as
>     debug mode, it helps users and developers to full fill the whitelist.
>
> v5: Libseccomp release 1.0.0[3]: The API now is context aware and it breaks the
>     compatibility with older versions. I updated all the functions that differs
>     from one version to another.
>
> v6: Debug mode removed as discussed in the list/irc. Planned for future inclusion.
>
> As always, comments are more than welcome.
>
> Regards,
>
> [0] - http://sourceforge.net/projects/libseccomp/
> [1] - http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git;a=commit;h=e2cfabdfd075648216f99c2c03821cf3f47c1727
> [2] - https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/4/12/457
> [3] - http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/forum.php?thread_name=1633205.5jr3eG7nQ5%40sifl&forum_name=libseccomp-discuss
>
>
> Eduardo Otubo (3):
>   Adding support for libseccomp in configure and Makefile
>   Adding qemu-seccomp.[ch]
>   Adding seccomp calls to vl.c
>
>  Makefile.objs  |    6 ++
>  configure      |   22 +++++++++
>  qemu-seccomp.c |  139 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  qemu-seccomp.h |   22 +++++++++
>  vl.c           |   13 +++++
>  5 files changed, 202 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100644 qemu-seccomp.c
>  create mode 100644 qemu-seccomp.h