From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:4830:134:3::10]:37180) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1XF821-0006YU-1f for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Wed, 06 Aug 2014 16:42:09 -0400 Received: from Debian-exim by eggs.gnu.org with spam-scanned (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1XF81r-0004WA-It for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Wed, 06 Aug 2014 16:41:56 -0400 Received: from e9.ny.us.ibm.com ([32.97.182.139]:38991) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1XF81r-0004Vu-EQ for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Wed, 06 Aug 2014 16:41:47 -0400 Received: from /spool/local by e9.ny.us.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted for from ; Wed, 6 Aug 2014 16:41:47 -0400 From: Michael Roth Date: Wed, 6 Aug 2014 15:38:32 -0500 Message-Id: <1407357598-21541-23-git-send-email-mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> In-Reply-To: <1407357598-21541-1-git-send-email-mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <1407357598-21541-1-git-send-email-mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Subject: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH 022/108] usb: sanity check setup_index+setup_len in post_load List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" CVE-2013-4541 s->setup_len and s->setup_index are fed into usb_packet_copy as size/offset into s->data_buf, it's possible for invalid state to exploit this to load arbitrary data. setup_len and setup_index should be checked to make sure they are not negative. Cc: Gerd Hoffmann Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela (cherry picked from commit 9f8e9895c504149d7048e9fc5eb5cbb34b16e49a) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth --- hw/usb/bus.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/hw/usb/bus.c b/hw/usb/bus.c index fe70429..e48b19f 100644 --- a/hw/usb/bus.c +++ b/hw/usb/bus.c @@ -49,7 +49,9 @@ static int usb_device_post_load(void *opaque, int version_id) } else { dev->attached = 1; } - if (dev->setup_index >= sizeof(dev->data_buf) || + if (dev->setup_index < 0 || + dev->setup_len < 0 || + dev->setup_index >= sizeof(dev->data_buf) || dev->setup_len >= sizeof(dev->data_buf)) { return -EINVAL; } -- 1.9.1