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From: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Cc: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>,
	"Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Subject: [Qemu-devel] [PULL 25/28] 9pfs: local: mknod: don't follow symlinks
Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2017 11:30:37 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1488277840-18608-26-git-send-email-groug@kaod.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1488277840-18608-1-git-send-email-groug@kaod.org>

The local_mknod() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because it
calls:

(1) mknod() which follows symbolic links for all path elements but the
    rightmost one
(2) local_set_xattr()->setxattr() which follows symbolic links for all
    path elements
(3) local_set_mapped_file_attr() which calls in turn local_fopen() and
    mkdir(), both functions following symbolic links for all path
    elements but the rightmost one
(4) local_post_create_passthrough() which calls in turn lchown() and
    chmod(), both functions also following symbolic links

This patch converts local_mknod() to rely on opendir_nofollow() and
mknodat() to fix (1), as well as local_set_xattrat() and
local_set_mapped_file_attrat() to fix (2) and (3) respectively.

A new local_set_cred_passthrough() helper based on fchownat() and
fchmodat_nofollow() is introduced as a replacement to
local_post_create_passthrough() to fix (4).

The mapped and mapped-file security modes are supposed to be identical,
except for the place where credentials and file modes are stored. While
here, we also make that explicit by sharing the call to mknodat().

This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.

Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
---
 hw/9pfs/9p-local.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)

diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p-local.c b/hw/9pfs/9p-local.c
index fab9bee1767e..db70c2daf498 100644
--- a/hw/9pfs/9p-local.c
+++ b/hw/9pfs/9p-local.c
@@ -543,6 +543,23 @@ err:
     return -1;
 }
 
+static int local_set_cred_passthrough(FsContext *fs_ctx, int dirfd,
+                                      const char *name, FsCred *credp)
+{
+    if (fchownat(dirfd, name, credp->fc_uid, credp->fc_gid,
+                 AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW | AT_EMPTY_PATH) < 0) {
+        /*
+         * If we fail to change ownership and if we are
+         * using security model none. Ignore the error
+         */
+        if ((fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SEC_MASK) != V9FS_SM_NONE) {
+            return -1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return fchmodat_nofollow(dirfd, name, credp->fc_mode & 07777);
+}
+
 static ssize_t local_readlink(FsContext *fs_ctx, V9fsPath *fs_path,
                               char *buf, size_t bufsz)
 {
@@ -736,61 +753,46 @@ out:
 static int local_mknod(FsContext *fs_ctx, V9fsPath *dir_path,
                        const char *name, FsCred *credp)
 {
-    char *path;
     int err = -1;
-    int serrno = 0;
-    V9fsString fullname;
-    char *buffer = NULL;
+    int dirfd;
 
-    v9fs_string_init(&fullname);
-    v9fs_string_sprintf(&fullname, "%s/%s", dir_path->data, name);
-    path = fullname.data;
+    dirfd = local_opendir_nofollow(fs_ctx, dir_path->data);
+    if (dirfd == -1) {
+        return -1;
+    }
 
-    /* Determine the security model */
-    if (fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED) {
-        buffer = rpath(fs_ctx, path);
-        err = mknod(buffer, SM_LOCAL_MODE_BITS|S_IFREG, 0);
+    if (fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED ||
+        fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED_FILE) {
+        err = mknodat(dirfd, name, SM_LOCAL_MODE_BITS | S_IFREG, 0);
         if (err == -1) {
             goto out;
         }
-        err = local_set_xattr(buffer, credp);
-        if (err == -1) {
-            serrno = errno;
-            goto err_end;
-        }
-    } else if (fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED_FILE) {
 
-        buffer = rpath(fs_ctx, path);
-        err = mknod(buffer, SM_LOCAL_MODE_BITS|S_IFREG, 0);
-        if (err == -1) {
-            goto out;
+        if (fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED) {
+            err = local_set_xattrat(dirfd, name, credp);
+        } else {
+            err = local_set_mapped_file_attrat(dirfd, name, credp);
         }
-        err = local_set_mapped_file_attr(fs_ctx, path, credp);
         if (err == -1) {
-            serrno = errno;
             goto err_end;
         }
-    } else if ((fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_PASSTHROUGH) ||
-               (fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_NONE)) {
-        buffer = rpath(fs_ctx, path);
-        err = mknod(buffer, credp->fc_mode, credp->fc_rdev);
+    } else if (fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_PASSTHROUGH ||
+               fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_NONE) {
+        err = mknodat(dirfd, name, credp->fc_mode, credp->fc_rdev);
         if (err == -1) {
             goto out;
         }
-        err = local_post_create_passthrough(fs_ctx, path, credp);
+        err = local_set_cred_passthrough(fs_ctx, dirfd, name, credp);
         if (err == -1) {
-            serrno = errno;
             goto err_end;
         }
     }
     goto out;
 
 err_end:
-    remove(buffer);
-    errno = serrno;
+    unlinkat_preserve_errno(dirfd, name, 0);
 out:
-    g_free(buffer);
-    v9fs_string_free(&fullname);
+    close_preserve_errno(dirfd);
     return err;
 }
 
-- 
2.7.4

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-02-28 10:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-02-28 10:30 [Qemu-devel] [PULL 00/28] 9p CVE-2016-9602 fixes 2017-02-28 for 2.9 soft freeze Greg Kurz
2017-02-28 10:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 01/28] 9pfs: local: move xattr security ops to 9p-xattr.c Greg Kurz
2017-02-28 10:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 02/28] 9pfs: remove side-effects in local_init() Greg Kurz
2017-02-28 10:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 03/28] 9pfs: remove side-effects in local_open() and local_opendir() Greg Kurz
2017-02-28 10:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 04/28] 9pfs: introduce relative_openat_nofollow() helper Greg Kurz
2017-02-28 10:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 05/28] 9pfs: local: keep a file descriptor on the shared folder Greg Kurz
2017-02-28 10:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 06/28] 9pfs: local: open/opendir: don't follow symlinks Greg Kurz
2017-02-28 10:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 07/28] 9pfs: local: lgetxattr: " Greg Kurz
2017-02-28 10:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 08/28] 9pfs: local: llistxattr: " Greg Kurz
2017-02-28 10:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 09/28] 9pfs: local: lsetxattr: " Greg Kurz
2017-02-28 10:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 10/28] 9pfs: local: lremovexattr: " Greg Kurz
2017-02-28 10:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 11/28] 9pfs: local: unlinkat: " Greg Kurz
2017-02-28 10:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 12/28] 9pfs: local: remove: " Greg Kurz
2017-02-28 10:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 13/28] 9pfs: local: utimensat: " Greg Kurz
2017-02-28 10:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 14/28] 9pfs: local: statfs: " Greg Kurz
2017-02-28 10:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 15/28] 9pfs: local: truncate: " Greg Kurz
2017-02-28 10:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 16/28] 9pfs: local: readlink: " Greg Kurz
2017-02-28 10:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 17/28] 9pfs: local: lstat: " Greg Kurz
2017-02-28 10:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 18/28] 9pfs: local: renameat: " Greg Kurz
2017-02-28 10:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 19/28] 9pfs: local: rename: use renameat Greg Kurz
2017-02-28 10:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 20/28] 9pfs: local: improve error handling in link op Greg Kurz
2017-02-28 10:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 21/28] 9pfs: local: link: don't follow symlinks Greg Kurz
2017-02-28 10:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 22/28] 9pfs: local: chmod: " Greg Kurz
2017-02-28 10:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 23/28] 9pfs: local: chown: " Greg Kurz
2017-02-28 10:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 24/28] 9pfs: local: symlink: " Greg Kurz
2017-02-28 10:30 ` Greg Kurz [this message]
2017-02-28 10:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 26/28] 9pfs: local: mkdir: " Greg Kurz
2017-02-28 10:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 27/28] 9pfs: local: open2: " Greg Kurz
2017-02-28 10:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 28/28] 9pfs: local: drop unused code Greg Kurz
2017-02-28 14:02 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 00/28] 9p CVE-2016-9602 fixes 2017-02-28 for 2.9 soft freeze Michael Tokarev
2017-02-28 14:22   ` Greg Kurz
2017-02-28 14:55     ` Michael Tokarev
2017-02-28 15:11       ` Greg Kurz
2017-02-28 16:01       ` Daniel P. Berrange
2017-02-28 16:09       ` Pranith Kumar
2017-03-01 14:33 ` Peter Maydell

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