From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>,
Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Subject: [Qemu-devel] [PULL 15/22] sev/i386: add support to LAUNCH_MEASURE command
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 13:56:31 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1520945798-50640-16-git-send-email-pbonzini@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1520945798-50640-1-git-send-email-pbonzini@redhat.com>
From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
During machine creation we encrypted the guest bios image, the
LAUNCH_MEASURE command can be used to retrieve the measurement of
the encrypted memory region. This measurement is a signature of
the memory contents that can be sent to the guest owner as an
attestation that the memory was encrypted correctly by the firmware.
VM management tools like libvirt can query the measurement using
query-sev-launch-measure QMP command.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
target/i386/sev-stub.c | 5 ++++
target/i386/sev.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
target/i386/sev_i386.h | 2 ++
target/i386/trace-events | 1 +
4 files changed, 71 insertions(+)
diff --git a/target/i386/sev-stub.c b/target/i386/sev-stub.c
index c86d8c1..2f61c32 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev-stub.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev-stub.c
@@ -39,3 +39,8 @@ uint32_t sev_get_reduced_phys_bits(void)
{
return 0;
}
+
+char *sev_get_launch_measurement(void)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
index ff98159..b4346c1 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev.c
@@ -516,6 +516,68 @@ sev_launch_update_data(uint8_t *addr, uint64_t len)
return ret;
}
+static void
+sev_launch_get_measure(Notifier *notifier, void *unused)
+{
+ int ret, error;
+ guchar *data;
+ SEVState *s = sev_state;
+ struct kvm_sev_launch_measure *measurement;
+
+ if (!sev_check_state(SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE)) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ measurement = g_new0(struct kvm_sev_launch_measure, 1);
+
+ /* query the measurement blob length */
+ ret = sev_ioctl(sev_state->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE,
+ measurement, &error);
+ if (!measurement->len) {
+ error_report("%s: LAUNCH_MEASURE ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'",
+ __func__, ret, error, fw_error_to_str(errno));
+ goto free_measurement;
+ }
+
+ data = g_new0(guchar, measurement->len);
+ measurement->uaddr = (unsigned long)data;
+
+ /* get the measurement blob */
+ ret = sev_ioctl(sev_state->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE,
+ measurement, &error);
+ if (ret) {
+ error_report("%s: LAUNCH_MEASURE ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'",
+ __func__, ret, error, fw_error_to_str(errno));
+ goto free_data;
+ }
+
+ sev_set_guest_state(SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_SECRET);
+
+ /* encode the measurement value and emit the event */
+ s->measurement = g_base64_encode(data, measurement->len);
+ trace_kvm_sev_launch_measurement(s->measurement);
+
+free_data:
+ g_free(data);
+free_measurement:
+ g_free(measurement);
+}
+
+char *
+sev_get_launch_measurement(void)
+{
+ if (sev_state &&
+ sev_state->state >= SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_SECRET) {
+ return g_strdup(sev_state->measurement);
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static Notifier sev_machine_done_notify = {
+ .notify = sev_launch_get_measure,
+};
+
void *
sev_guest_init(const char *id)
{
@@ -593,6 +655,7 @@ sev_guest_init(const char *id)
}
ram_block_notifier_add(&sev_ram_notifier);
+ qemu_add_machine_init_done_notifier(&sev_machine_done_notify);
return s;
err:
diff --git a/target/i386/sev_i386.h b/target/i386/sev_i386.h
index 924cebc..6e37077 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev_i386.h
+++ b/target/i386/sev_i386.h
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ extern uint64_t sev_get_me_mask(void);
extern SevInfo *sev_get_info(void);
extern uint32_t sev_get_cbit_position(void);
extern uint32_t sev_get_reduced_phys_bits(void);
+extern char *sev_get_launch_measurement(void);
typedef struct QSevGuestInfo QSevGuestInfo;
typedef struct QSevGuestInfoClass QSevGuestInfoClass;
@@ -78,6 +79,7 @@ struct SEVState {
uint32_t handle;
int sev_fd;
SevState state;
+ gchar *measurement;
};
typedef struct SEVState SEVState;
diff --git a/target/i386/trace-events b/target/i386/trace-events
index c0cd8e9..f7a1a1e 100644
--- a/target/i386/trace-events
+++ b/target/i386/trace-events
@@ -13,3 +13,4 @@ kvm_memcrypt_unregister_region(void *addr, size_t len) "addr %p len 0x%lu"
kvm_sev_change_state(const char *old, const char *new) "%s -> %s"
kvm_sev_launch_start(int policy, void *session, void *pdh) "policy 0x%x session %p pdh %p"
kvm_sev_launch_update_data(void *addr, uint64_t len) "addr %p len 0x%" PRIu64
+kvm_sev_launch_measurement(const char *value) "data %s"
--
1.8.3.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-03-13 12:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-03-13 12:56 [Qemu-devel] [PULL 00/22] KVM patches for QEMU 2.12 soft freeze Paolo Bonzini
2018-03-13 12:56 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 01/22] update Linux headers to 4.16-rc5 Paolo Bonzini
2018-03-13 12:56 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 02/22] KVM: x86: Add support for save/load MSR_SMI_COUNT Paolo Bonzini
2018-03-13 12:56 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 03/22] machine: add memory-encryption option Paolo Bonzini
2018-03-13 12:56 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 04/22] docs: add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) Paolo Bonzini
2018-03-13 12:56 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 05/22] kvm: add memory encryption context Paolo Bonzini
2018-03-13 12:56 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 06/22] kvm: introduce memory encryption APIs Paolo Bonzini
2018-03-13 12:56 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 07/22] target/i386: add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) object Paolo Bonzini
2018-03-13 12:56 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 08/22] sev/i386: qmp: add query-sev command Paolo Bonzini
2018-03-13 12:56 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 09/22] include: add psp-sev.h header file Paolo Bonzini
2018-03-13 12:56 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 10/22] sev/i386: add command to initialize the memory encryption context Paolo Bonzini
2018-04-27 13:01 ` Peter Maydell
2018-03-13 12:56 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 11/22] sev/i386: register the guest memory range which may contain encrypted data Paolo Bonzini
2018-03-13 12:56 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 12/22] sev/i386: add command to create launch memory encryption context Paolo Bonzini
2018-04-27 13:04 ` Peter Maydell
2018-03-13 12:56 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 13/22] sev/i386: add command to encrypt guest memory region Paolo Bonzini
2018-03-13 12:56 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 14/22] target/i386: encrypt bios rom Paolo Bonzini
2018-03-13 12:56 ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2018-03-13 12:56 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 16/22] sev/i386: finalize the SEV guest launch flow Paolo Bonzini
2018-03-13 12:56 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 17/22] sev/i386: add migration blocker Paolo Bonzini
2018-03-13 12:56 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 18/22] cpu/i386: populate CPUID 0x8000_001F when SEV is active Paolo Bonzini
2018-03-13 12:56 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 19/22] sev/i386: hmp: add 'info sev' command Paolo Bonzini
2018-03-13 12:56 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 20/22] sev/i386: qmp: add query-sev-launch-measure command Paolo Bonzini
2018-03-13 12:56 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 21/22] sev/i386: qmp: add query-sev-capabilities command Paolo Bonzini
2018-03-13 12:56 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 22/22] sev/i386: add sev_get_capabilities() Paolo Bonzini
2018-04-27 12:53 ` Peter Maydell
2018-03-13 16:29 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 00/22] KVM patches for QEMU 2.12 soft freeze Alex Williamson
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