Re: [PATCH] virtiofsd: prevent opening of special files (CVE-2020-35517)

[alex--- via <qemu-devel@nongnu.org>]

Excerpts from Stefan Hajnoczi's message of January 21, 2021 9:44 am:
> A well-behaved FUSE client does not attempt to open special files with
> FUSE_OPEN because they are handled on the client side (e.g. device nodes
> are handled by client-side device drivers).
> 
> The check to prevent virtiofsd from opening special files is missing in
> a few cases, most notably FUSE_OPEN. A malicious client can cause
> virtiofsd to open a device node, potentially allowing the guest to
> escape. This can be exploited by a modified guest device driver. It is
> not exploitable from guest userspace since the guest kernel will handle
> special files inside the guest instead of sending FUSE requests.
> 
> This patch adds the missing checks to virtiofsd. This is a short-term
> solution because it does not prevent a compromised virtiofsd process
> from opening device nodes on the host.
> 
> Reported-by: Alex Xu <alex@alxu.ca>
> Fixes: CVE-2020-35517
> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
> ---
> This issue was diagnosed on public IRC and is therefore already known
> and not embargoed.
> 
> A stronger fix, and the long-term solution, is for users to mount the
> shared directory and any sub-mounts with nodev, as well as nosuid and
> noexec. Unfortunately virtiofsd cannot do this automatically because
> bind mounts added by the user after virtiofsd has launched would not be
> detected. I suggest the following:
> 
> 1. Modify libvirt and Kata Containers to explicitly set these mount
>    options.
> 2. Then modify virtiofsd to check that the shared directory has the
>    necessary options at startup. Refuse to start if the options are
>    missing so that the user is aware of the security requirements.
> 
> As a bonus this also increases the likelihood that other host processes
> besides virtiofsd will be protected by nosuid/noexec/nodev so that a
> malicious guest cannot drop these files in place and then arrange for a
> host process to come across them.
> 
> Additionally, user namespaces have been discussed. They seem like a
> worthwhile addition as an unprivileged or privilege-separated mode
> although there are limitations with respect to security xattrs and the
> actual uid/gid stored on the host file system not corresponding to the
> guest uid/gid.

I haven't looked too closely at the code, but the commit message seems 
reasonable to me.

Thanks,
Alex.