From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([208.118.235.92]:54260) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1UMzz4-0006MX-Un for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Tue, 02 Apr 2013 08:06:42 -0400 Received: from Debian-exim by eggs.gnu.org with spam-scanned (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1UMzyw-00011G-W7 for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Tue, 02 Apr 2013 08:06:38 -0400 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:6544) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1UMzyw-000116-OY for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Tue, 02 Apr 2013 08:06:30 -0400 Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2013 15:06:57 +0300 From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" Message-ID: <20130402120657.GD21545@redhat.com> References: <51531A51.3050709@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <51532268.40102@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <87k3os7okn.fsf@codemonkey.ws> <51532C0B.1050108@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <87ehf03dgw.fsf@codemonkey.ws> <515344AB.2030403@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <51546BAA.60504@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <20130331081728.GH23484@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] vNVRAM / blobstore design List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: Kenneth Goldman Cc: Stefan Berger , Stefan Hajnoczi , Kent E Yoder , Corey Bryant , Michael Roth , qemu-devel , Joel Schopp , Anthony Liguori On Sun, Mar 31, 2013 at 04:48:24PM -0400, Kenneth Goldman wrote: > "Michael S. Tsirkin" wrote on 03/31/2013 04:17:28 AM: > > > > You want to protect against someone who is able to > > manipulate some bits in the file (content) but not others (hash)? > > What's the attack you are trying to protect against here? > > > > I'm guessing the only result of extra checksums would be > > unbootable guests when qemu manages to corrupt the checksum > > without any help from attackers ... > > You are of course correct. I advised an integrity value just to detect > a hardware or software fault. The check value would not protect against an > attack. Fair enough, but why protect these bits specifically? E.g. disk corruption seems more likely (since it's bigger). Add integrity at that level? Why even stop at detection, let's do error correction ... -- MST