From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>
To: Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel@redhat.com>
Cc: Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.a@redhat.com>,
quintela@redhat.com,
"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
qemu-devel@nongnu.org, amit.shah@redhat.com,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] RFC: Universal encryption on QEMU I/O channels
Date: Wed, 4 Feb 2015 14:50:53 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150204145053.GW3032@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <54D2314C.7010501@redhat.com>
On Wed, Feb 04, 2015 at 04:48:44PM +0200, Marcel Apfelbaum wrote:
> On 02/04/2015 04:28 PM, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> >
> >
> >On 04/02/2015 15:02, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
> >>>I'm not sure if it makes sense for RDMA; it already has a couple of hooks
> >>>that go around the back of QEMUFile in migration, and it's transferring the
> >>>data via DMA so the page data doesn't go through the same path.
> >>
> >>Could you ever anticipate any need for authentication or encryption in
> >>the RDMA based channel ? I don't know enough about RDMA myself to know
> >>if it makes sense or not, other than the fact that any channel between
> >>two separate hosts needs security at some level in the stack.
> >
> >Authentication, possibly; but I don't think encryption makes sense. Marcel?
> I personally think that the protocol is safe enough, but as always there are holes
> and I am not a security expert:
>
> "RDMA mechanisms can create a potential security vulnerability. A node may access another nodes
> memory region that was supposed to be banned.
> In order to protect remote memory access to unauthorized memory areas, InfiniBand defines memory
> protection mechanisms, where a remote memory access requires a special key (R_Key). The R_Key is
> negotiated between the peers and is validated at the target’s system HCA card. In case of illegal key the
> packet is dropped. The R_Key requirement is built into silicon and driver code and cannot be disabled
> even when attacker compromises root/admin/superuser account on one or multiple servers."
>
> More on Layer 2 attacks and how Infiniband handle those:
> http://www.mellanox.com/related-docs/whitepapers/WP_Secuirty_In_InfiniBand_Fabrics_Final.pdf
>
Ok I guess we could probably just assume RDMA is sufficient as is for now.
We can fairly easily revisit it later if we find it it needs more work
Regards,
Daniel
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-02-04 14:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-02-04 11:32 [Qemu-devel] RFC: Universal encryption on QEMU I/O channels Daniel P. Berrange
2015-02-04 12:43 ` Paolo Bonzini
2015-02-04 13:00 ` Daniel P. Berrange
2015-02-04 13:42 ` Paolo Bonzini
2015-02-04 14:08 ` Daniel P. Berrange
2015-02-04 14:23 ` Paolo Bonzini
2015-02-04 14:34 ` Daniel P. Berrange
2015-02-04 15:04 ` Paolo Bonzini
2015-02-04 15:11 ` Daniel P. Berrange
2015-02-04 15:22 ` Paolo Bonzini
2015-02-04 15:26 ` Daniel P. Berrange
2015-02-04 16:46 ` Paolo Bonzini
2015-02-05 14:38 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2015-02-05 14:44 ` Cornelia Huck
2015-02-05 14:45 ` Peter Maydell
2015-02-04 13:49 ` Markus Armbruster
2015-02-04 13:55 ` Peter Maydell
2015-02-04 16:33 ` Markus Armbruster
2015-02-04 16:41 ` Daniel P. Berrange
2015-02-04 20:41 ` Peter Maydell
2015-02-04 21:06 ` Paolo Bonzini
2015-02-05 7:57 ` Markus Armbruster
2015-02-04 13:08 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2015-02-04 14:02 ` Daniel P. Berrange
2015-02-04 14:28 ` Paolo Bonzini
2015-02-04 14:48 ` Marcel Apfelbaum
2015-02-04 14:50 ` Daniel P. Berrange [this message]
2015-02-04 18:34 ` Eric Blake
2015-02-05 9:11 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2015-02-04 14:27 ` Paolo Bonzini
2015-02-04 14:37 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2015-03-06 17:18 ` Daniel P. Berrange
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