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From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>
To: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Cc: qemu-devel qemu-devel <qemu-devel@nongnu.org>,
	Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>,
	Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
	Programmingkid <programmingkidx@gmail.com>,
	Peter Crosthwaite <crosthwaitepeter@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] feature idea: allow user to run custom scripts
Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2015 13:33:24 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20151002123324.GB10222@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAFEAcA-sFjbSfBRVDdLbpzK5NY97x2_QKGOT-RXdfvf8CgWWFw@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, Sep 30, 2015 at 11:53:50AM +0100, Peter Maydell wrote:
> On 30 September 2015 at 09:14, Dr. David Alan Gilbert
> <dgilbert@redhat.com> wrote:
> > * Markus Armbruster (armbru@redhat.com) wrote:
> >> In my opinion, QEMU should leave them to separate GUI shells, because
> >> doing everything in QEMU distracts from our core mission and we don't
> >> have GUI expertise[*].  One more point: building in the GUI is
> >> problematic when you don't trust the guest, because then you really want
> >> to run QEMU with least privileges.
> >
> > Given that we have a built in GUI then I can see people wanting to expand
> > it.
> 
> Right, but where do you draw the line? We clearly don't have the
> active maintainer and review capacity to do anything serious with
> "ui/" (MAINTAINERS lists everything except SPICE as Odd Fixes).
> 
> This is why I tend to agree with Markus' opinion here: we should
> provide enough graphical UI to make raw QEMU minimally usable,
> and leave further user-friendliness to other projects which have
> more direct interest in that.
> 
> If we had more regular contributors who were actively interested
> in improving our UI layer my opinion might be different.

Even if we had more contributors interested in that, I still think
that we should not do it, because building a UI into QEMU is a
fundamentally bad design / architecture. QEMU is a security
sensitive component and we want to know the boundaries of what
a guest exploit can achieve - including a GUI massively expands
the attack surface making it more or less impossible to confine
any QEMU exploit, even with tools like SELinux/AppArmour, because
you have to allow use of the desktop protocol at which point you
can just talk to a separate app to perform the exploit.

Regards,
Daniel
-- 
|: http://berrange.com      -o-    http://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange/ :|
|: http://libvirt.org              -o-             http://virt-manager.org :|
|: http://autobuild.org       -o-         http://search.cpan.org/~danberr/ :|
|: http://entangle-photo.org       -o-       http://live.gnome.org/gtk-vnc :|

  parent reply	other threads:[~2015-10-02 12:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-09-27  3:39 [Qemu-devel] feature idea: allow user to run custom scripts Programmingkid
2015-09-27 10:13 ` Peter Maydell
2015-09-27 18:53   ` Peter Crosthwaite
2015-09-28  1:49     ` Programmingkid
2015-09-28  2:30       ` Michael Roth
2015-09-28  3:10         ` Programmingkid
2015-09-28  7:29           ` Markus Armbruster
2015-09-28 19:43             ` Programmingkid
2015-09-28 19:44               ` Peter Maydell
2015-09-28 19:48                 ` Programmingkid
2015-09-29 13:11                 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2015-09-29 13:17                   ` Programmingkid
2015-09-29 13:23                     ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2015-09-30  5:01                       ` Paolo Bonzini
2015-09-29 13:24                   ` Peter Maydell
2015-09-29 13:31                     ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2015-09-30  7:48                       ` Markus Armbruster
2015-09-30  8:14                         ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2015-09-30 10:53                           ` Peter Maydell
2015-09-30 14:23                             ` Programmingkid
2015-10-01 10:36                               ` Paolo Bonzini
2015-10-02 11:20                                 ` Kevin Wolf
2015-10-01  7:06                             ` Markus Armbruster
2015-10-02 12:33                             ` Daniel P. Berrange [this message]
2015-10-02 13:28                               ` Programmingkid
2015-10-01  6:55                           ` Markus Armbruster
2015-10-01  8:01                             ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2015-10-02 12:30                         ` Daniel P. Berrange
2015-10-02 13:33                           ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2015-10-02 14:28                             ` Daniel P. Berrange
2015-10-02 14:37                               ` Programmingkid
2015-10-02 16:21                                 ` Eric Blake
2015-10-02 17:57                                   ` Programmingkid

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