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From: Eduardo Otubo <eduardo.otubo@profitbricks.com>
To: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Cc: Namsun Ch'o <namnamc@Safe-mail.net>, qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] Add syscalls for -runas and -chroot to the seccomp sandbox
Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2015 16:08:20 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20151002140820.GB25464@vader> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87twq9bn5l.fsf@blackfin.pond.sub.org>

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On Fri, Oct 02, 2015 at 12=05=58PM +0200, Markus Armbruster wrote:
> "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com> writes:
> 
> > On Thu, Oct 01, 2015 at 02:06:32PM +0200, Markus Armbruster wrote:
> >> "Namsun Ch'o" <namnamc@Safe-mail.net> writes:
> >> 
> >> > The seccomp sandbox doesn't whitelist setuid, setgid, or
> >> > setgroups, which are
> >> > needed for -runas to work. It also doesn't whitelist chroot, which is needed
> >> > for the -chroot option. Unfortunately, QEMU enables seccomp before it drops
> >> > privileges or chroots, so without these whitelisted, -runas and
> >> > -chroot cause
> >> > QEMU to be killed with -sandbox on. This patch adds those syscalls.
> >> 
> >> Should it enable seccomp a bit later?
> >
> > Yeah, I think it would be better to move the seccomp enablement later.
> 
> Let's do that then.

Where exactly you guys think we could call seccomp enablement? Right
it's called (almost) right before cpu_exec_init_all(), on vl.c:4013. I
guess it is as later as it could.

> 
> > Adding setuid and chroot to the allow list is pretty strongly undesirable
> > from a security protection POV.
> 
> Indeed.

-- 
Eduardo Otubo
ProfitBricks GmbH

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  reply	other threads:[~2015-10-02 14:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-10-01  4:36 [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] Add syscalls for -runas and -chroot to the seccomp sandbox Namsun Ch'o
2015-10-01 12:06 ` Markus Armbruster
2015-10-02  8:30   ` Daniel P. Berrange
2015-10-02 10:05     ` Markus Armbruster
2015-10-02 14:08       ` Eduardo Otubo [this message]
2015-10-02 14:15         ` Daniel P. Berrange
2015-10-02 15:36           ` Eduardo Otubo
2015-10-08 13:34 ` Eduardo Otubo
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2015-10-02  0:17 namnamc
2015-10-09  2:09 namnamc
2015-10-09  6:54 ` Markus Armbruster
2015-10-09  7:24   ` Eduardo Otubo

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