From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>
To: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>,
Namsun Ch'o <namnamc@Safe-mail.net>,
qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] Add syscalls for -runas and -chroot to the seccomp sandbox
Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2015 15:15:05 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20151002141505.GF28469@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20151002140820.GB25464@vader>
On Fri, Oct 02, 2015 at 04:08:20PM +0200, Eduardo Otubo wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 02, 2015 at 12=05=58PM +0200, Markus Armbruster wrote:
> > "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com> writes:
> >
> > > On Thu, Oct 01, 2015 at 02:06:32PM +0200, Markus Armbruster wrote:
> > >> "Namsun Ch'o" <namnamc@Safe-mail.net> writes:
> > >>
> > >> > The seccomp sandbox doesn't whitelist setuid, setgid, or
> > >> > setgroups, which are
> > >> > needed for -runas to work. It also doesn't whitelist chroot, which is needed
> > >> > for the -chroot option. Unfortunately, QEMU enables seccomp before it drops
> > >> > privileges or chroots, so without these whitelisted, -runas and
> > >> > -chroot cause
> > >> > QEMU to be killed with -sandbox on. This patch adds those syscalls.
> > >>
> > >> Should it enable seccomp a bit later?
> > >
> > > Yeah, I think it would be better to move the seccomp enablement later.
> >
> > Let's do that then.
>
> Where exactly you guys think we could call seccomp enablement? Right
> it's called (almost) right before cpu_exec_init_all(), on vl.c:4013. I
> guess it is as later as it could.
It depends on what you consider seccomp to be protecting against. I think
its primary goal is to protect against exploit after a guest OS breakout,
in which case it does not need to be enabled until the guest CPUs start
executing, which IIUC, means immediately before main_loop().
If we intend seccomp to protect against flaws during QEMU setup, then having
it earlier is neccessary. eg QEMU opening a corrupt qcow2 image which might
exploit QEMU before the guest CPUs start.
If the latter is the case, then we could start with a relaxed seccomp
sandbox which included the setuid/chroot features, and then switch to a
more restricted one which blocked them before main_loop() runs.
Regards,
Daniel
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-10-02 14:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-10-01 4:36 [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] Add syscalls for -runas and -chroot to the seccomp sandbox Namsun Ch'o
2015-10-01 12:06 ` Markus Armbruster
2015-10-02 8:30 ` Daniel P. Berrange
2015-10-02 10:05 ` Markus Armbruster
2015-10-02 14:08 ` Eduardo Otubo
2015-10-02 14:15 ` Daniel P. Berrange [this message]
2015-10-02 15:36 ` Eduardo Otubo
2015-10-08 13:34 ` Eduardo Otubo
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2015-10-02 0:17 namnamc
2015-10-09 2:09 namnamc
2015-10-09 6:54 ` Markus Armbruster
2015-10-09 7:24 ` Eduardo Otubo
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