From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>
To: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
ehabkost@redhat.com, crosthwaite.peter@gmail.com,
p.fedin@samsung.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, armbru@redhat.com,
lcapitulino@redhat.com, rth@twiddle.net
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 10/22] sev: add SEV debug decrypt command
Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2016 15:15:07 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160914141507.GU28399@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160914164859-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org>
On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 04:50:51PM +0300, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 02:37:49PM +0100, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
> > On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 04:32:44PM +0300, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > > On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 02:23:14PM +0100, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
> > > > On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 03:07:58PM +0200, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > On 14/09/2016 15:05, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > > > > > I assumed that with debug on, memory is still encrypted but the
> > > > > > hypervisor can break encryption, and as the cover letter states, the
> > > > > > hypervisor is assumed benign. If true I don't see a need to
> > > > > > give users more rope.
> > > > >
> > > > > The hypervisor is assumed benign but vulnerable.
> > > > >
> > > > > So, if somebody breaks the hypervisor, you would like to make it as hard
> > > > > as possible for the attacker to do evil stuff to the guests. If the
> > > > > attacker can just ask the secure processor "decrypt some memory for me",
> > > > > then the encryption is effectively broken.
> > > >
> > > > So there's going to be a tradeoff here between use of SEV and use of
> > > > certain other features. eg, it seems that if you're using SEV, then
> > > > any concept of creating & analysing guest core dumps from the host
> > > > is out.
> > >
> > > I don't see why - as long as we don't trigger dumps, there's no leak :)
> >
> > If the facility to trigger dumps is available, then the memory
> > encryption feature of SEV is as useful as a chocolate teapot,
> > as the would be attacker can simply trigger a dump
>
> If attacker can trigger things, IOW execute code in hypervisor,
> then encrypting memory is not useful anyway.
The presentation at KVM forum claimed it *would* protect against
this, and that things like core dump of unencrypted memory would
not be permitted, so there's a disconnect between that preso and
what you're saying.
Regards,
Daniel
--
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-09-14 14:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 125+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-09-13 14:46 [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 00/22] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 14:46 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 01/22] exec: add guest RAM read/write ops Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 14:47 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 02/22] cpu-common: add debug version of physical memory read/write Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 14:47 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 03/22] monitor: use debug version of physical memory read api Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 14:47 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 04/22] memattrs: add SEV debug attrs Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 23:00 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 20:30 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 14:47 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 05/22] i386: add new option to enable SEV guest Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 22:41 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 8:41 ` Daniel P. Berrange
2016-09-14 9:11 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-13 14:47 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 06/22] sev: add initial SEV support Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 15:58 ` Eduardo Habkost
2016-09-13 19:54 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 20:10 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-13 22:00 ` Eduardo Habkost
2016-09-14 8:30 ` Daniel P. Berrange
2016-09-14 11:54 ` Eduardo Habkost
2016-09-14 11:58 ` Daniel P. Berrange
2016-09-14 16:10 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-14 16:13 ` Daniel P. Berrange
2016-09-14 16:20 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 18:46 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-14 20:23 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 8:37 ` Daniel P. Berrange
2016-09-13 14:47 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 07/22] sev: add SEV launch start command Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 14:48 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 08/22] sev: add SEV launch update command Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 14:48 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 09/22] sev: add SEV launch finish command Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 22:15 ` Eduardo Habkost
2016-09-13 14:48 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 10/22] sev: add SEV debug decrypt command Brijesh Singh
2016-09-14 2:28 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 8:57 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 13:05 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 13:07 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 13:23 ` Daniel P. Berrange
2016-09-14 13:32 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 13:37 ` Daniel P. Berrange
2016-09-14 13:50 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 14:08 ` Eduardo Habkost
2016-09-14 14:14 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 14:38 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 15:17 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 14:15 ` Daniel P. Berrange [this message]
2016-09-14 14:48 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 15:06 ` Daniel P. Berrange
2016-09-14 15:46 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 17:35 ` Eduardo Habkost
2016-09-14 22:05 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-15 14:58 ` Eduardo Habkost
2016-09-14 13:27 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2] virtio_pci: Limit DMA mask to 44 bits for legacy virtio devices Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 13:36 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 10/22] sev: add SEV debug decrypt command Brijesh Singh
2016-09-14 13:48 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 14:19 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 15:02 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 16:53 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 18:15 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 18:45 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 19:24 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 19:58 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 20:36 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 20:44 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 21:25 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-14 21:38 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-13 14:48 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 11/22] sev: add SEV debug encrypt command Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 14:48 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 12/22] sev: add SEV guest status command Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 14:48 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 13/22] hmp: update 'info kvm' to display SEV status Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 16:09 ` Eric Blake
2016-09-14 16:16 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-15 4:13 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-13 23:01 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-13 14:49 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 14/22] sev: provide SEV-enabled guest RAM read/write ops Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 14:49 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 15/22] i386: sev: register RAM read/write ops for BIOS and PC.RAM region Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 23:05 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 20:59 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-14 21:00 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 21:47 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-14 21:52 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 22:06 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-14 22:17 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 22:26 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-15 14:13 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-15 15:19 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-13 14:49 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 17/22] target-i386: add cpuid Fn8000_001f Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 23:07 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-21 16:20 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-21 16:24 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-21 18:21 ` Eduardo Habkost
2016-09-13 14:49 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 18/22] i386: clear C-bit in SEV guest page table walk Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 14:49 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 19/22] exec: set debug attribute in SEV-enabled guest Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 23:06 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-13 14:50 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 20/22] fw_cfg: sev: disable dma in real mode Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 18:39 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-13 20:46 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 20:55 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-13 22:53 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 2:33 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 8:58 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-21 18:00 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 20/22] fw_cfg: sev: disable dma in real mode Message-ID: <20160921205731-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 12:09 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 20/22] fw_cfg: sev: disable dma in real mode Eduardo Habkost
2016-09-14 13:01 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 13:14 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 13:51 ` Eduardo Habkost
2016-09-14 16:10 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 17:25 ` Eduardo Habkost
2016-09-21 18:03 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-21 18:19 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 14:50 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 21/22] hw: add pre and post system reset callback Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 22:47 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 16:19 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 14:50 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 22/22] loader: reload bios image on ROM reset in SEV-enabled guest Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 18:47 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-13 22:59 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 2:38 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 20:29 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-14 20:38 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 21:09 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-14 21:11 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 21:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 15:20 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 00/22] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Eduardo Habkost
[not found] ` <147377816978.11859.942423377333907417.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>
2016-09-13 18:37 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 16/22] i386: pc: load OS images at fixed location in SEV-enabled guest Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-09-21 15:55 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-21 15:58 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-21 16:08 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-21 16:17 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-14 2:55 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH v1 00/22] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Michael S. Tsirkin
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