From: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: qemu-devel@nongnu.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Tom Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>,
Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>,
Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>,
"Edgar E. Iglesias" <edgar.iglesias@xilinx.com>,
Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>,
Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@gmail.com>,
Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
"Daniel P . Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 10/23] sev: add command to initialize the memory encryption context
Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2018 12:13:25 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180201121324.GD2457@work-vm> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180129174132.108925-11-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
* Brijesh Singh (brijesh.singh@amd.com) wrote:
> When memory encryption is enabled, KVM_SEV_INIT command is used to
> initialize the platform. The command loads the SEV related persistent
> data from non-volatile storage and initializes the platform context.
> This command should be first issued before invoking any other guest
> commands provided by the SEV firmware.
Some minor comments rather than full review.
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> ---
> accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 15 ++++++
> accel/kvm/sev.c | 124 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> accel/kvm/trace-events | 2 +
> include/sysemu/sev.h | 10 ++++
> 4 files changed, 151 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
> index f290f487a573..a9b16846675e 100644
> --- a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
> +++ b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
> @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
> #include "qemu/event_notifier.h"
> #include "trace.h"
> #include "hw/irq.h"
> +#include "sysemu/sev.h"
>
> #include "hw/boards.h"
>
> @@ -103,6 +104,9 @@ struct KVMState
> #endif
> KVMMemoryListener memory_listener;
> QLIST_HEAD(, KVMParkedVcpu) kvm_parked_vcpus;
> +
> + /* memory encryption */
> + void *memcrypt_handle;
> };
>
> KVMState *kvm_state;
> @@ -1632,6 +1636,17 @@ static int kvm_init(MachineState *ms)
>
> kvm_state = s;
>
> + /*
> + * if memory encryption object is specified then initialize the memory
> + * encryption context.
> + * */
Style: should be */
> + if (ms->memory_encryption) {
> + kvm_state->memcrypt_handle = sev_guest_init(ms->memory_encryption);
> + if (!kvm_state->memcrypt_handle) {
> + goto err;
> + }
> + }
> +
> ret = kvm_arch_init(ms, s);
> if (ret < 0) {
> goto err;
> diff --git a/accel/kvm/sev.c b/accel/kvm/sev.c
> index e93fdfeb0c8f..be1791e510b3 100644
> --- a/accel/kvm/sev.c
> +++ b/accel/kvm/sev.c
> @@ -18,10 +18,72 @@
> #include "sysemu/kvm.h"
> #include "sysemu/sev.h"
> #include "sysemu/sysemu.h"
> +#include "trace.h"
>
> #define DEFAULT_GUEST_POLICY 0x1 /* disable debug */
> #define DEFAULT_SEV_DEVICE "/dev/sev"
>
> +static int sev_fd;
> +
> +#define SEV_FW_MAX_ERROR 0x17
> +
> +static char sev_fw_errlist[SEV_FW_MAX_ERROR][100] = {
Perhaps:
static const char *sev_few_errlist[] = {
?
> + "",
> + "Platform state is invalid",
> + "Guest state is invalid",
> + "Platform configuration is invalid",
> + "Buffer too small",
> + "Platform is already owned",
> + "Certificate is invalid",
> + "Policy is not allowed",
> + "Guest is not active",
> + "Invalid address",
> + "Bad signature",
> + "Bad measurement",
> + "Asid is already owned",
> + "Invalid ASID",
> + "WBINVD is required",
> + "DF_FLUSH is required",
> + "Guest handle is invalid",
> + "Invalid command",
> + "Guest is active",
> + "Hardware error",
> + "Hardware unsafe",
> + "Feature not supported",
> + "Invalid parameter"
> +};
> +
> +static int
> +sev_ioctl(int cmd, void *data, int *error)
> +{
> + int r;
> + struct kvm_sev_cmd input;
> +
> + memset(&input, 0x0, sizeof(input));
> +
> + input.id = cmd;
> + input.sev_fd = sev_fd;
> + input.data = (__u64)data;
> +
> + r = kvm_vm_ioctl(kvm_state, KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP, &input);
> +
> + if (error) {
> + *error = input.error;
> + }
> +
> + return r;
> +}
> +
> +static char *
> +fw_error_to_str(int code)
> +{
> + if (code > SEV_FW_MAX_ERROR) {
I'm trying to convince myself whether that should be >= and whether the
maximum error is really 0x16 ? Your list up there has 23 entries
so I think trying to access error 0x17 would be bad.
> + return NULL;
It might be better to return 'No error' or the like unless you're going
to be testing for NULL; that way you never end up with a Null getting
out.
> + }
> +
> + return sev_fw_errlist[code];
> +}
> +
> static void
> qsev_guest_finalize(Object *obj)
> {
> @@ -170,6 +232,68 @@ static const TypeInfo qsev_guest_info = {
> }
> };
>
> +static QSevGuestInfo *
> +lookup_sev_guest_info(const char *id)
> +{
> + Object *obj;
> + QSevGuestInfo *info;
> +
> + obj = object_resolve_path_component(object_get_objects_root(), id);
> + if (!obj) {
> + return NULL;
> + }
> +
> + info = (QSevGuestInfo *)
> + object_dynamic_cast(obj, TYPE_QSEV_GUEST_INFO);
> + if (!info) {
> + return NULL;
> + }
> +
> + return info;
> +}
> +
> +void *
> +sev_guest_init(const char *id)
> +{
> + SEVState *s;
> + char *devname;
> + int ret, fw_error;
> +
> + s = g_malloc0(sizeof(SEVState));
g_new0 is easier.
> + if (!s) {
> + return NULL;
> + }
and allocation aborts rather than returning NULL (unless you use the
_try_ version of g_new)
> +
> + s->sev_info = lookup_sev_guest_info(id);
> + if (!s->sev_info) {
> + error_report("%s: '%s' is not a valid '%s' object",
> + __func__, id, TYPE_QSEV_GUEST_INFO);
> + goto err;
> + }
> +
> + devname = object_property_get_str(OBJECT(s->sev_info), "sev-device", NULL);
> + sev_fd = open(devname, O_RDWR);
> + if (sev_fd < 0) {
> + error_report("%s: Failed to open %s '%s'", __func__,
> + devname, strerror(errno));
> + goto err;
> + }
> + g_free(devname);
> +
> + trace_kvm_sev_init();
> + ret = sev_ioctl(KVM_SEV_INIT, NULL, &fw_error);
> + if (ret) {
> + error_report("%s: failed to initialize ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'",
> + __func__, ret, fw_error, fw_error_to_str(fw_error));
> + goto err;
> + }
> +
> + return s;
> +err:
> + g_free(s);
> + return NULL;
> +}
> +
> static void
> sev_register_types(void)
> {
> diff --git a/accel/kvm/trace-events b/accel/kvm/trace-events
> index f89ba5578dc1..ea487e5a5913 100644
> --- a/accel/kvm/trace-events
> +++ b/accel/kvm/trace-events
> @@ -13,3 +13,5 @@ kvm_irqchip_add_msi_route(char *name, int vector, int virq) "dev %s vector %d vi
> kvm_irqchip_update_msi_route(int virq) "Updating MSI route virq=%d"
> kvm_irqchip_release_virq(int virq) "virq %d"
>
> +# sev.c
> +kvm_sev_init(void) ""
> diff --git a/include/sysemu/sev.h b/include/sysemu/sev.h
> index d2621a9d1100..6aec25bc05e5 100644
> --- a/include/sysemu/sev.h
> +++ b/include/sysemu/sev.h
> @@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
> #ifndef QEMU_SEV_H
> #define QEMU_SEV_H
>
> +#include <linux/kvm.h>
> +
> #include "qom/object.h"
> #include "qapi/error.h"
> #include "sysemu/kvm.h"
> @@ -49,5 +51,13 @@ struct QSevGuestInfoClass {
> ObjectClass parent_class;
> };
>
> +struct SEVState {
> + QSevGuestInfo *sev_info;
> +};
> +
> +typedef struct SEVState SEVState;
> +
> +void *sev_guest_init(const char *id);
> +
> #endif
>
> --
> 2.9.5
>
Dave
--
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilbert@redhat.com / Manchester, UK
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-02-01 12:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 62+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-29 17:41 [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 00/23] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2018-01-29 17:41 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 01/23] memattrs: add debug attribute Brijesh Singh
2018-01-30 21:59 ` Edgar E. Iglesias
2018-01-29 17:41 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 02/23] exec: add ram_debug_ops support Brijesh Singh
2018-01-30 21:59 ` Edgar E. Iglesias
2018-01-30 22:34 ` Brijesh Singh
2018-01-30 22:37 ` Edgar E. Iglesias
2018-01-30 23:26 ` Brijesh Singh
2018-01-29 17:41 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 03/23] exec: add debug version of physical memory read and write API Brijesh Singh
2018-01-29 17:41 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 04/23] monitor/i386: use debug APIs when accessing guest memory Brijesh Singh
2018-01-29 17:41 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 05/23] target/i386: add memory encryption feature cpuid support Brijesh Singh
2018-01-30 17:49 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2018-01-30 21:46 ` Brijesh Singh
2018-01-30 22:15 ` Brijesh Singh
2018-01-31 9:57 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2018-01-31 13:41 ` Eduardo Habkost
2018-01-31 16:05 ` Brijesh Singh
2018-01-29 17:41 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 06/23] machine: add -memory-encryption property Brijesh Singh
2018-01-29 17:41 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 07/23] kvm: update kvm.h to include memory encryption ioctls Brijesh Singh
2018-01-29 17:41 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 08/23] docs: add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) Brijesh Singh
2018-01-29 17:41 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 09/23] accel: add Secure Encrypted Virtulization (SEV) object Brijesh Singh
2018-01-29 17:41 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 10/23] sev: add command to initialize the memory encryption context Brijesh Singh
2018-02-01 12:13 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert [this message]
2018-02-01 15:33 ` Brijesh Singh
2018-02-01 15:46 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2018-01-29 17:41 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 11/23] sev: register the guest memory range which may contain encrypted data Brijesh Singh
2018-01-29 17:41 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 12/23] kvm: introduce memory encryption APIs Brijesh Singh
2018-01-29 17:41 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 13/23] hmp: display memory encryption support in 'info kvm' Brijesh Singh
2018-01-31 17:43 ` Markus Armbruster
2018-02-01 15:21 ` Brijesh Singh
2018-02-01 17:58 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2018-02-01 19:55 ` Brijesh Singh
2018-02-01 20:04 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2018-02-02 13:08 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2018-02-02 13:46 ` Brijesh Singh
2018-02-02 15:24 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2018-01-29 17:41 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 14/23] sev: add command to create launch memory encryption context Brijesh Singh
2018-01-29 17:41 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 15/23] sev: add command to encrypt guest memory region Brijesh Singh
2018-01-29 17:41 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 16/23] target/i386: encrypt bios rom Brijesh Singh
2018-01-29 17:41 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 17/23] qapi: add SEV_MEASUREMENT event Brijesh Singh
2018-01-31 17:45 ` Markus Armbruster
2018-02-01 15:25 ` Brijesh Singh
2018-02-01 15:28 ` Eric Blake
2018-01-29 17:41 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 18/23] sev: emit the " Brijesh Singh
2018-01-30 20:08 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2018-01-30 22:13 ` Brijesh Singh
2018-02-01 17:27 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2018-02-02 15:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2018-02-02 15:16 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2018-02-08 16:17 ` Brijesh Singh
2018-02-08 16:22 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2018-01-29 17:41 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 19/23] sev: Finalize the SEV guest launch flow Brijesh Singh
2018-01-29 17:41 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 20/23] hw: i386: set ram_debug_ops when memory encryption is enabled Brijesh Singh
2018-01-29 17:41 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 21/23] sev: add debug encrypt and decrypt commands Brijesh Singh
2018-01-29 17:41 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 22/23] target/i386: clear C-bit when walking SEV guest page table Brijesh Singh
2018-01-29 17:41 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 23/23] sev: add migration blocker Brijesh Singh
2018-01-29 18:13 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v6 00/23] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) no-reply
2018-01-29 18:17 ` no-reply
2018-01-29 18:19 ` no-reply
2018-01-29 18:31 ` no-reply
2018-02-06 15:51 ` Bruce Rogers
2018-02-07 1:07 ` Brijesh Singh
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