qemu-devel.nongnu.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Cc: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@xilinx.com>,
	Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>,
	Cornelia Huck <cornelia.huck@de.ibm.com>,
	"Daniel P . Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>,
	"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Edgar E. Iglesias" <edgar.iglesias@xilinx.com>,
	Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>,
	Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel@redhat.com>,
	Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Peter Crosthwaite <crosthwaite.peter@gmail.com>,
	Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>,
	Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>,
	Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@gmail.com>,
	Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>, Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>,
	Bruce Rogers <brogers@suse.com>,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Subject: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v8 05/28] target/i386: add memory encryption feature cpuid support
Date: Mon, 12 Feb 2018 09:36:52 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180212153715.87555-6-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180212153715.87555-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>

AMD EPYC processors support memory encryption feature. The feature
is reported through CPUID 8000_001F[EAX].

Fn8000_001F [EAX]:
 Bit 0   Secure Memory Encryption (SME) supported
 Bit 1   Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) supported
 Bit 2   Page flush MSR supported
 Bit 3   Ecrypted State (SEV-ES) support

when memory encryption feature is reported, CPUID 8000_001F[EBX] should
provide additional information regarding the feature (such as which page
table bit is used to mark pages as encrypted etc). The information in EBX
and ECX may vary from one family to another hence we use the host cpuid
to populate the EBX information.

The details for memory encryption CPUID is available in AMD APM
(https://support.amd.com/TechDocs/24594.pdf) Section E.4.17

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
 target/i386/cpu.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 target/i386/cpu.h |  3 +++
 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+)

diff --git a/target/i386/cpu.c b/target/i386/cpu.c
index b5e431e769da..475d98a44880 100644
--- a/target/i386/cpu.c
+++ b/target/i386/cpu.c
@@ -235,6 +235,7 @@ static void x86_cpu_vendor_words2str(char *dst, uint32_t vendor1,
 #define TCG_EXT4_FEATURES 0
 #define TCG_SVM_FEATURES 0
 #define TCG_KVM_FEATURES 0
+#define TCG_MEM_ENCRYPT_FEATURES 0
 #define TCG_7_0_EBX_FEATURES (CPUID_7_0_EBX_SMEP | CPUID_7_0_EBX_SMAP | \
           CPUID_7_0_EBX_BMI1 | CPUID_7_0_EBX_BMI2 | CPUID_7_0_EBX_ADX | \
           CPUID_7_0_EBX_PCOMMIT | CPUID_7_0_EBX_CLFLUSHOPT |            \
@@ -546,6 +547,20 @@ static FeatureWordInfo feature_word_info[FEATURE_WORDS] = {
         .cpuid_reg = R_EDX,
         .tcg_features = ~0U,
     },
+    [FEAT_MEM_ENCRYPT] = {
+        .feat_names = {
+            NULL, "sev", NULL, NULL,
+            NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+            NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+            NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+            NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+            NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+            NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+            NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+        },
+        .cpuid_eax = 0x8000001F, .cpuid_reg = R_EAX,
+        .tcg_features = TCG_MEM_ENCRYPT_FEATURES,
+    }
 };
 
 typedef struct X86RegisterInfo32 {
@@ -1966,6 +1981,9 @@ static X86CPUDefinition builtin_x86_defs[] = {
             CPUID_XSAVE_XGETBV1,
         .features[FEAT_6_EAX] =
             CPUID_6_EAX_ARAT,
+        /* Missing: SEV_ES */
+        .features[FEAT_MEM_ENCRYPT] =
+            CPUID_8000_001F_EAX_SEV,
         .xlevel = 0x8000000A,
         .model_id = "AMD EPYC Processor",
     },
@@ -3590,6 +3608,19 @@ void cpu_x86_cpuid(CPUX86State *env, uint32_t index, uint32_t count,
             *edx = 0;
         }
         break;
+    case 0x8000001F:
+        if (env->features[FEAT_MEM_ENCRYPT] & CPUID_8000_001F_EAX_SEV) {
+            *eax = env->features[FEAT_MEM_ENCRYPT];
+            host_cpuid(0x8000001F, 0, NULL, ebx, NULL, NULL);
+            *ecx = 0;
+            *edx = 0;
+        } else {
+            *eax = 0;
+            *ebx = 0;
+            *ecx = 0;
+            *edx = 0;
+        }
+        break;
     case 0xC0000000:
         *eax = env->cpuid_xlevel2;
         *ebx = 0;
@@ -4037,10 +4068,15 @@ static void x86_cpu_expand_features(X86CPU *cpu, Error **errp)
         x86_cpu_adjust_feat_level(cpu, FEAT_C000_0001_EDX);
         x86_cpu_adjust_feat_level(cpu, FEAT_SVM);
         x86_cpu_adjust_feat_level(cpu, FEAT_XSAVE);
+        x86_cpu_adjust_feat_level(cpu, FEAT_MEM_ENCRYPT);
         /* SVM requires CPUID[0x8000000A] */
         if (env->features[FEAT_8000_0001_ECX] & CPUID_EXT3_SVM) {
             x86_cpu_adjust_level(cpu, &env->cpuid_min_xlevel, 0x8000000A);
         }
+        /* SEV requires CPUID[0x8000001F] */
+        if ((env->features[FEAT_MEM_ENCRYPT] & CPUID_8000_001F_EAX_SEV)) {
+            x86_cpu_adjust_level(cpu, &env->cpuid_min_xlevel, 0x8000001F);
+        }
     }
 
     /* Set cpuid_*level* based on cpuid_min_*level, if not explicitly set */
diff --git a/target/i386/cpu.h b/target/i386/cpu.h
index f91e37d25dea..448b30f893fa 100644
--- a/target/i386/cpu.h
+++ b/target/i386/cpu.h
@@ -483,6 +483,7 @@ typedef enum FeatureWord {
     FEAT_6_EAX,         /* CPUID[6].EAX */
     FEAT_XSAVE_COMP_LO, /* CPUID[EAX=0xd,ECX=0].EAX */
     FEAT_XSAVE_COMP_HI, /* CPUID[EAX=0xd,ECX=0].EDX */
+    FEAT_MEM_ENCRYPT,   /* CPUID[8000_001F].EAX */
     FEATURE_WORDS,
 } FeatureWord;
 
@@ -679,6 +680,8 @@ typedef uint32_t FeatureWordArray[FEATURE_WORDS];
 
 #define CPUID_6_EAX_ARAT       (1U << 2)
 
+#define CPUID_8000_001F_EAX_SEV             (1U << 1) /* SEV */
+
 /* CPUID[0x80000007].EDX flags: */
 #define CPUID_APM_INVTSC       (1U << 8)
 
-- 
2.14.3

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-02-12 15:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-02-12 15:36 [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v8 00/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2018-02-12 15:36 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v8 01/28] memattrs: add debug attribute Brijesh Singh
2018-02-12 15:36 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v8 02/28] exec: add ram_debug_ops support Brijesh Singh
2018-02-12 15:36 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v8 03/28] exec: add debug version of physical memory read and write API Brijesh Singh
2018-02-12 15:36 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v8 04/28] monitor/i386: use debug APIs when accessing guest memory Brijesh Singh
2018-02-12 15:36 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2018-02-12 18:38   ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v8 05/28] target/i386: add memory encryption feature cpuid support Eduardo Habkost
2018-02-12 21:07     ` Brijesh Singh
2018-02-12 21:19       ` Borislav Petkov
2018-02-13 15:39         ` Brijesh Singh
2018-02-13 15:41           ` Borislav Petkov
2018-02-13 15:45           ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2018-02-12 15:36 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v8 06/28] machine: add -memory-encryption property Brijesh Singh
2018-02-12 15:36 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v8 07/28] kvm: update kvm.h to include memory encryption ioctls Brijesh Singh
2018-02-12 15:36 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v8 08/28] docs: add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) Brijesh Singh
2018-02-12 15:36 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v8 09/28] target/i386: add Secure Encrypted Virtulization (SEV) object Brijesh Singh
2018-02-12 15:36 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v8 10/28] sev/i386: add command to initialize the memory encryption context Brijesh Singh
2018-02-12 18:57   ` Eduardo Habkost
2018-02-12 15:36 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v8 11/28] sev/i386: register the guest memory range which may contain encrypted data Brijesh Singh
2018-02-12 15:36 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v8 12/28] kvm: introduce memory encryption APIs Brijesh Singh
2018-02-12 15:37 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v8 13/28] qmp: add query-sev command Brijesh Singh
2018-02-12 17:27   ` Eric Blake
2018-02-12 18:47     ` Brijesh Singh
2018-02-12 15:37 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v8 14/28] hmp: add 'info sev' command Brijesh Singh
2018-02-12 15:37 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v8 15/28] sev/i386: add command to create launch memory encryption context Brijesh Singh
2018-02-12 15:37 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v8 16/28] sev/i386: add command to encrypt guest memory region Brijesh Singh
2018-02-12 15:37 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v8 17/28] target/i386: encrypt bios rom Brijesh Singh
2018-02-12 15:37 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v8 18/28] sev/i386: add support to LAUNCH_MEASURE command Brijesh Singh
2018-02-12 15:37 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v8 19/28] sev/i386: finalize the SEV guest launch flow Brijesh Singh
2018-02-12 15:37 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v8 20/28] hw/i386: set ram_debug_ops when memory encryption is enabled Brijesh Singh
2018-02-12 15:37 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v8 21/28] sev/i386: add debug encrypt and decrypt commands Brijesh Singh
2018-02-12 15:37 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v8 22/28] target/i386: clear C-bit when walking SEV guest page table Brijesh Singh
2018-02-12 15:37 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v8 23/28] include: add psp-sev.h header file Brijesh Singh
2018-02-12 15:37 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v8 25/28] sev/i386: add support to KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS Brijesh Singh
2018-02-12 15:37 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v8 26/28] qmp: add query-sev-launch-measure command Brijesh Singh
2018-02-12 15:37 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v8 27/28] tests/qmp-test: blacklist " Brijesh Singh
2018-02-13 16:44   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2018-02-12 15:37 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v8 28/28] sev/i386: add migration blocker Brijesh Singh

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20180212153715.87555-6-brijesh.singh@amd.com \
    --to=brijesh.singh@amd.com \
    --cc=Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com \
    --cc=agraf@suse.de \
    --cc=alistair.francis@xilinx.com \
    --cc=armbru@redhat.com \
    --cc=berrange@redhat.com \
    --cc=borntraeger@de.ibm.com \
    --cc=bp@suse.de \
    --cc=brogers@suse.com \
    --cc=cornelia.huck@de.ibm.com \
    --cc=crosthwaite.peter@gmail.com \
    --cc=dgilbert@redhat.com \
    --cc=eblake@redhat.com \
    --cc=edgar.iglesias@xilinx.com \
    --cc=ehabkost@redhat.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=marcel@redhat.com \
    --cc=mst@redhat.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=peter.maydell@linaro.org \
    --cc=qemu-devel@nongnu.org \
    --cc=richard.henderson@linaro.org \
    --cc=rth@twiddle.net \
    --cc=stefanha@gmail.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).