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From: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: qemu-devel@nongnu.org, Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@gmail.com>,
	Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>,
	"Edgar E. Iglesias" <edgar.iglesias@xilinx.com>,
	Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>,
	Bruce Rogers <brogers@suse.com>,
	Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>,
	Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel@redhat.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>,
	Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>,
	"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
	Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@xilinx.com>,
	Cornelia Huck <cornelia.huck@de.ibm.com>,
	Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>,
	Peter Crosthwaite <crosthwaite.peter@gmail.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v10 25/28] cpu/i386: populate CPUID 0x8000_001F when SEV is active
Date: Tue, 6 Mar 2018 09:39:12 -0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180306123912.GJ5120@localhost.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180228211028.83970-26-brijesh.singh@amd.com>

On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 03:10:25PM -0600, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> When SEV is enabled, CPUID 0x8000_001F should provide additional
> information regarding the feature (such as which page table bit is used
> to mark the pages as encrypted etc).
> 
> The details for memory encryption CPUID is available in AMD APM
> (https://support.amd.com/TechDocs/24594.pdf) Section E.4.17
> 
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
> Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> ---
>  target/i386/cpu.c | 13 +++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/target/i386/cpu.c b/target/i386/cpu.c
> index b5e431e769da..7a3cec59402b 100644
> --- a/target/i386/cpu.c
> +++ b/target/i386/cpu.c
> @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
>  #include "sysemu/hvf.h"
>  #include "sysemu/cpus.h"
>  #include "kvm_i386.h"
> +#include "sev_i386.h"
>  
>  #include "qemu/error-report.h"
>  #include "qemu/option.h"
> @@ -3612,6 +3613,13 @@ void cpu_x86_cpuid(CPUX86State *env, uint32_t index, uint32_t count,
>          *ecx = 0;
>          *edx = 0;
>          break;
> +    case 0x8000001F:

What I'm worried about here is ABI stability and migration safety
guarantees.  Let's see:

> +        *eax = sev_enabled() ? 0x2 : 0;

sev_enabled() just checks if sev_state is set.
sev_state is only set by sev_guest_init().
sev_guest_init() is only called if MachineState::memory_encryption is set.

The value is a function of command-line options only.  Good.

> +        *ebx = sev_get_cbit_position();

This is 0 if sev_state is NULL (see above).  Good.

If sev_state is set, it returns sev_state->cbitpos.

s->cbitpos is set based on the "cbitpos" property of
QSevGuestInfo only (it's only validated against host CPUID).  The
property has no host-dependent default and needs to be set
explicitly.

This means sev_get_cbit_position() is a function of command-line
options only, too.  Good.

> +        *ebx |= sev_get_reduced_phys_bits() << 6;

Logic is very similar to sev_get_cbit_position(), and depends on
the "reduced-phys-bits" property of QSevGuestInfo only.  Good.


> +        *ecx = 0;
> +        *edx = 0;
> +        break;
>      default:
>          /* reserved values: zero */
>          *eax = 0;
> @@ -4041,6 +4049,11 @@ static void x86_cpu_expand_features(X86CPU *cpu, Error **errp)
>          if (env->features[FEAT_8000_0001_ECX] & CPUID_EXT3_SVM) {
>              x86_cpu_adjust_level(cpu, &env->cpuid_min_xlevel, 0x8000000A);
>          }
> +
> +        /* SEV requires CPUID[0x8000001F] */
> +        if (sev_enabled()) {
> +            x86_cpu_adjust_level(cpu, &env->cpuid_min_xlevel, 0x8000001F);
> +        }

Reviewed-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>

>      }
>  
>      /* Set cpuid_*level* based on cpuid_min_*level, if not explicitly set */
> -- 
> 2.14.3
> 
> 

-- 
Eduardo

  reply	other threads:[~2018-03-06 12:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-02-28 21:10 [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v10 00/29] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2018-02-28 21:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v10 01/28] memattrs: add debug attribute Brijesh Singh
2018-02-28 21:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v10 02/28] exec: add ram_debug_ops support Brijesh Singh
2018-02-28 21:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v10 03/28] exec: add debug version of physical memory read and write API Brijesh Singh
2018-02-28 21:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v10 04/28] monitor/i386: use debug APIs when accessing guest memory Brijesh Singh
2018-02-28 21:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v10 05/28] machine: add -memory-encryption property Brijesh Singh
2018-02-28 21:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v10 06/28] kvm: update kvm.h to include memory encryption ioctls Brijesh Singh
2018-02-28 21:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v10 07/28] docs: add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) Brijesh Singh
2018-02-28 21:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v10 08/28] target/i386: add Secure Encrypted Virtulization (SEV) object Brijesh Singh
2018-02-28 21:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v10 09/28] qmp: add query-sev command Brijesh Singh
2018-03-01 20:09   ` Eric Blake
2018-02-28 21:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v10 10/28] include: add psp-sev.h header file Brijesh Singh
2018-02-28 21:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v10 11/28] sev/i386: add command to initialize the memory encryption context Brijesh Singh
2018-03-05 13:37   ` Laszlo Ersek
2018-03-07 13:19     ` Brijesh Singh
2018-02-28 21:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v10 12/28] sev/i386: register the guest memory range which may contain encrypted data Brijesh Singh
2018-02-28 21:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v10 13/28] kvm: introduce memory encryption APIs Brijesh Singh
2018-02-28 21:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v10 14/28] hmp: add 'info sev' command Brijesh Singh
2018-03-02 11:31   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2018-02-28 21:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v10 15/28] sev/i386: add command to create launch memory encryption context Brijesh Singh
2018-02-28 21:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v10 16/28] sev/i386: add command to encrypt guest memory region Brijesh Singh
2018-02-28 21:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v10 17/28] target/i386: encrypt bios rom Brijesh Singh
2018-02-28 21:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v10 18/28] sev/i386: add support to LAUNCH_MEASURE command Brijesh Singh
2018-02-28 21:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v10 19/28] sev/i386: finalize the SEV guest launch flow Brijesh Singh
2018-02-28 21:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v10 20/28] hw/i386: set ram_debug_ops when memory encryption is enabled Brijesh Singh
2018-02-28 21:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v10 21/28] sev/i386: add debug encrypt and decrypt commands Brijesh Singh
2018-02-28 21:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v10 22/28] target/i386: clear C-bit when walking SEV guest page table Brijesh Singh
2018-02-28 21:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v10 23/28] qmp: add query-sev-launch-measure command Brijesh Singh
2018-03-01 20:11   ` Eric Blake
2018-02-28 21:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v10 24/28] sev/i386: add migration blocker Brijesh Singh
2018-02-28 21:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v10 25/28] cpu/i386: populate CPUID 0x8000_001F when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2018-03-06 12:39   ` Eduardo Habkost [this message]
2018-02-28 21:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v10 26/28] qmp: add query-sev-capabilities command Brijesh Singh
2018-03-01 20:13   ` Eric Blake
2018-03-05 17:35     ` Brijesh Singh
2018-02-28 21:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v10 27/28] sev/i386: add sev_get_capabilities() Brijesh Singh
2018-02-28 21:10 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v10 28/28] tests/qmp-test: blacklist sev specific qmp commands Brijesh Singh
2018-02-28 21:43 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v10 00/29] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh

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