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From: "Ján Tomko" <jtomko@redhat.com>
To: Eduardo Otubo <otubo@redhat.com>
Cc: Yi Min Zhao <zyimin@linux.ibm.com>,
	fiuczy@linux.ibm.com, borntraeger@de.ibm.com,
	qemu-devel@nongnu.org, jferlan@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 1/1] sandbox: disable -sandbox if CONFIG_SECCOMP undefined
Date: Fri, 18 May 2018 09:52:12 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180518075212.GE3416@dnr> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180517124109.GJ17734@vader>

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2318 bytes --]

On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 02:41:09PM +0200, Eduardo Otubo wrote:
>On 15/05/2018 - 19:33:48, Yi Min Zhao wrote:
>> If CONFIG_SECCOMP is undefined, the option 'elevateprivileges' remains
>> compiled. This would make libvirt set the corresponding capability and
>> then trigger the guest startup fails. So this patch excludes the code
>> regarding seccomp staff if CONFIG_SECCOMP is undefined.
>
>Just a sugestion for the next patch you send: If it's a single patch, you don't
>need to format it with a cover-letter. Just put all the description in the body,
>or if you need to add a text that shouldn't be included in the commit message,
>just add it after the "---" after Signed-off-by.
>
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Yi Min Zhao <zyimin@linux.ibm.com>
>> ---
>>  vl.c | 13 ++++++++-----
>>  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>>

>> @@ -4071,10 +4072,12 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv, char **envp)
>>          exit(1);
>>      }
>>
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
>>      if (qemu_opts_foreach(qemu_find_opts("sandbox"),
>>                            parse_sandbox, NULL, NULL)) {
>>          exit(1);
>>      }
>> +#endif
>>
>>      if (qemu_opts_foreach(qemu_find_opts("name"),
>>                            parse_name, NULL, NULL)) {
>> --
>> Yi Min
>>
>
>I just wanted a review from Ján, since he is the author of the original libvirt
>patch. Does this breaks libvirt logic in any way? If not, ACK on this patch.
>

Current libvirt logic assumes the -sandbox option is always present.
(IIRC it was introduced in QEMU 1.1 and when we switched from help
 scraping to capability probing via QMP for QEMU 1.2, there was no
 way to detect it)

This patch fixes the usage of QEMU new enough for seccomp blacklist
(where libvirt enables the sandbox by default),
but breaks the usage of QEMU with compiled out sandbox and
setting
  seccomp_sandbox = 0
in libvirt's qemu.conf:

error: internal error: process exited while connecting to monitor:
qemu-git: -sandbox off: There is no option group 'sandbox'


But now libvirt requires QEMU >= 1.5.0 which already supports
query-command-line-options, so if you want the option gone completely
--without-seccomp, I can add the code that probes for it and
make seccomp_sandbox = 0 a no-op if it's compiled out.

Jano

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-05-18  7:52 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-05-15 11:33 [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 0/1] Bug: Sandbox: libvirt breakdowns qemu guest Yi Min Zhao
2018-05-15 11:33 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 1/1] sandbox: disable -sandbox if CONFIG_SECCOMP undefined Yi Min Zhao
2018-05-15 15:25   ` Eric Blake
2018-05-16  1:05     ` Yi Min Zhao
2018-05-17 11:33     ` Yi Min Zhao
2018-05-17 12:41   ` Eduardo Otubo
2018-05-17 14:36     ` Yi Min Zhao
2018-05-18  7:52     ` Ján Tomko [this message]
2018-05-18  9:19       ` Eduardo Otubo
2018-05-18 13:07         ` Ján Tomko
2018-05-19  8:20           ` Yi Min Zhao
2018-05-23  7:47             ` Ján Tomko
2018-05-23  9:16               ` Yi Min Zhao
2018-05-23 10:33                 ` Eduardo Otubo
2018-05-23 12:17                   ` Yi Min Zhao
2018-05-24  7:53                     ` Eduardo Otubo
2018-05-24 13:40                       ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-05-25  4:23                         ` Yi Min Zhao
2018-05-25  9:36                           ` Eduardo Otubo
2018-05-28 12:55                             ` Yi Min Zhao
2018-05-18 12:08       ` Eric Blake

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