From: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
To: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>,
Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>,
qemu-devel@nongnu.org, "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>,
Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Subject: [Qemu-devel] [PULL 2/3] i386: Define the Virt SSBD MSR and handling of it (CVE-2018-3639)
Date: Mon, 21 May 2018 19:01:32 -0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180521220133.17445-3-ehabkost@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180521220133.17445-1-ehabkost@redhat.com>
From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
"Some AMD processors only support a non-architectural means of enabling
speculative store bypass disable (SSBD). To allow a simplified view of
this to a guest, an architectural definition has been created through a new
CPUID bit, 0x80000008_EBX[25], and a new MSR, 0xc001011f. With this, a
hypervisor can virtualize the existence of this definition and provide an
architectural method for using SSBD to a guest.
Add the new CPUID feature, the new MSR and update the existing SSBD
support to use this MSR when present." (from x86/speculation: Add virtualized
speculative store bypass disable support in Linux).
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20180521215424.13520-4-berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
---
target/i386/cpu.h | 2 ++
target/i386/kvm.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
target/i386/machine.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/target/i386/cpu.h b/target/i386/cpu.h
index f0b68905de..8ac13f6c2c 100644
--- a/target/i386/cpu.h
+++ b/target/i386/cpu.h
@@ -351,6 +351,7 @@ typedef enum X86Seg {
#define MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL 0x0000003a
#define MSR_TSC_ADJUST 0x0000003b
#define MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL 0x48
+#define MSR_VIRT_SSBD 0xc001011f
#define MSR_IA32_TSCDEADLINE 0x6e0
#define FEATURE_CONTROL_LOCKED (1<<0)
@@ -1210,6 +1211,7 @@ typedef struct CPUX86State {
uint32_t pkru;
uint64_t spec_ctrl;
+ uint64_t virt_ssbd;
/* End of state preserved by INIT (dummy marker). */
struct {} end_init_save;
diff --git a/target/i386/kvm.c b/target/i386/kvm.c
index d6666a4b19..0c656a91a4 100644
--- a/target/i386/kvm.c
+++ b/target/i386/kvm.c
@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ static bool has_msr_hv_frequencies;
static bool has_msr_hv_reenlightenment;
static bool has_msr_xss;
static bool has_msr_spec_ctrl;
+static bool has_msr_virt_ssbd;
static bool has_msr_smi_count;
static uint32_t has_architectural_pmu_version;
@@ -1233,6 +1234,9 @@ static int kvm_get_supported_msrs(KVMState *s)
case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
has_msr_spec_ctrl = true;
break;
+ case MSR_VIRT_SSBD:
+ has_msr_virt_ssbd = true;
+ break;
}
}
}
@@ -1721,6 +1725,10 @@ static int kvm_put_msrs(X86CPU *cpu, int level)
if (has_msr_spec_ctrl) {
kvm_msr_entry_add(cpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, env->spec_ctrl);
}
+ if (has_msr_virt_ssbd) {
+ kvm_msr_entry_add(cpu, MSR_VIRT_SSBD, env->virt_ssbd);
+ }
+
#ifdef TARGET_X86_64
if (lm_capable_kernel) {
kvm_msr_entry_add(cpu, MSR_CSTAR, env->cstar);
@@ -2100,8 +2108,9 @@ static int kvm_get_msrs(X86CPU *cpu)
if (has_msr_spec_ctrl) {
kvm_msr_entry_add(cpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
}
-
-
+ if (has_msr_virt_ssbd) {
+ kvm_msr_entry_add(cpu, MSR_VIRT_SSBD, 0);
+ }
if (!env->tsc_valid) {
kvm_msr_entry_add(cpu, MSR_IA32_TSC, 0);
env->tsc_valid = !runstate_is_running();
@@ -2481,6 +2490,9 @@ static int kvm_get_msrs(X86CPU *cpu)
case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
env->spec_ctrl = msrs[i].data;
break;
+ case MSR_VIRT_SSBD:
+ env->virt_ssbd = msrs[i].data;
+ break;
case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL:
env->msr_rtit_ctrl = msrs[i].data;
break;
diff --git a/target/i386/machine.c b/target/i386/machine.c
index fd99c0bbb4..4d98d367c1 100644
--- a/target/i386/machine.c
+++ b/target/i386/machine.c
@@ -916,6 +916,25 @@ static const VMStateDescription vmstate_msr_intel_pt = {
}
};
+static bool virt_ssbd_needed(void *opaque)
+{
+ X86CPU *cpu = opaque;
+ CPUX86State *env = &cpu->env;
+
+ return env->virt_ssbd != 0;
+}
+
+static const VMStateDescription vmstate_msr_virt_ssbd = {
+ .name = "cpu/virt_ssbd",
+ .version_id = 1,
+ .minimum_version_id = 1,
+ .needed = virt_ssbd_needed,
+ .fields = (VMStateField[]){
+ VMSTATE_UINT64(env.virt_ssbd, X86CPU),
+ VMSTATE_END_OF_LIST()
+ }
+};
+
VMStateDescription vmstate_x86_cpu = {
.name = "cpu",
.version_id = 12,
@@ -1039,6 +1058,7 @@ VMStateDescription vmstate_x86_cpu = {
&vmstate_spec_ctrl,
&vmstate_mcg_ext_ctl,
&vmstate_msr_intel_pt,
+ &vmstate_msr_virt_ssbd,
NULL
}
};
--
2.14.3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-21 22:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-05-21 22:01 [Qemu-devel] [PULL 0/3] Speculative store buffer bypass mitigation (CVE-2018-3639) Eduardo Habkost
2018-05-21 22:01 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 1/3] i386: define the 'ssbd' CPUID feature bit (CVE-2018-3639) Eduardo Habkost
2018-05-21 22:01 ` Eduardo Habkost [this message]
2018-05-21 22:01 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 3/3] i386: define the AMD 'virt-ssbd' " Eduardo Habkost
2018-05-22 9:59 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 0/3] Speculative store buffer bypass mitigation (CVE-2018-3639) Peter Maydell
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