* [Qemu-devel] [PULL 0/3] Speculative store buffer bypass mitigation (CVE-2018-3639)
@ 2018-05-21 22:01 Eduardo Habkost
2018-05-21 22:01 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 1/3] i386: define the 'ssbd' CPUID feature bit (CVE-2018-3639) Eduardo Habkost
` (3 more replies)
0 siblings, 4 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Eduardo Habkost @ 2018-05-21 22:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Peter Maydell
Cc: Paolo Bonzini, kvm, Eduardo Habkost, Marcel Apfelbaum, qemu-devel,
Michael S. Tsirkin, Richard Henderson, Marcelo Tosatti
This provides the QEMU part of the mitigations for the speculative
store buffer bypass vulnerabilities on the x86 platform[1], and is
the companion of the kernel patches merged in:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=3b78ce4a34b761c7fe13520de822984019ff1a8f
[1] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1528
https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/ssbd
The following changes since commit 9802316ed6c19fd45b4c498523df02ca370d0586:
Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/mjt/tags/trivial-patches-fetch' into staging (2018-05-21 10:50:32 +0100)
are available in the Git repository at:
git://github.com/ehabkost/qemu.git tags/x86-next-pull-request
for you to fetch changes up to 403503b162ffc33fb64cfefdf7b880acf41772cd:
i386: define the AMD 'virt-ssbd' CPUID feature bit (CVE-2018-3639) (2018-05-21 18:59:08 -0300)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Speculative store buffer bypass mitigation (CVE-2018-3639)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Daniel P. Berrangé (1):
i386: define the 'ssbd' CPUID feature bit (CVE-2018-3639)
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk (2):
i386: Define the Virt SSBD MSR and handling of it (CVE-2018-3639)
i386: define the AMD 'virt-ssbd' CPUID feature bit (CVE-2018-3639)
target/i386/cpu.h | 3 +++
target/i386/cpu.c | 4 ++--
target/i386/kvm.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
target/i386/machine.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--
2.14.3
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* [Qemu-devel] [PULL 1/3] i386: define the 'ssbd' CPUID feature bit (CVE-2018-3639)
2018-05-21 22:01 [Qemu-devel] [PULL 0/3] Speculative store buffer bypass mitigation (CVE-2018-3639) Eduardo Habkost
@ 2018-05-21 22:01 ` Eduardo Habkost
2018-05-21 22:01 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 2/3] i386: Define the Virt SSBD MSR and handling of it (CVE-2018-3639) Eduardo Habkost
` (2 subsequent siblings)
3 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Eduardo Habkost @ 2018-05-21 22:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Peter Maydell
Cc: Paolo Bonzini, kvm, Eduardo Habkost, Marcel Apfelbaum, qemu-devel,
Michael S. Tsirkin, Richard Henderson, Marcelo Tosatti,
Daniel P. Berrangé
From: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
New microcode introduces the "Speculative Store Bypass Disable"
CPUID feature bit. This needs to be exposed to guest OS to allow
them to protect against CVE-2018-3639.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <20180521215424.13520-2-berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
---
target/i386/cpu.h | 1 +
target/i386/cpu.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/target/i386/cpu.h b/target/i386/cpu.h
index 8bc54d70bf..f0b68905de 100644
--- a/target/i386/cpu.h
+++ b/target/i386/cpu.h
@@ -685,6 +685,7 @@ typedef uint32_t FeatureWordArray[FEATURE_WORDS];
#define CPUID_7_0_EDX_AVX512_4VNNIW (1U << 2) /* AVX512 Neural Network Instructions */
#define CPUID_7_0_EDX_AVX512_4FMAPS (1U << 3) /* AVX512 Multiply Accumulation Single Precision */
#define CPUID_7_0_EDX_SPEC_CTRL (1U << 26) /* Speculation Control */
+#define CPUID_7_0_EDX_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD (1U << 31) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
#define KVM_HINTS_DEDICATED (1U << 0)
diff --git a/target/i386/cpu.c b/target/i386/cpu.c
index e5e66a75d4..a1185b17d1 100644
--- a/target/i386/cpu.c
+++ b/target/i386/cpu.c
@@ -805,7 +805,7 @@ static FeatureWordInfo feature_word_info[FEATURE_WORDS] = {
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, "spec-ctrl", NULL,
- NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL, "ssbd",
},
.cpuid_eax = 7,
.cpuid_needs_ecx = true, .cpuid_ecx = 0,
--
2.14.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* [Qemu-devel] [PULL 2/3] i386: Define the Virt SSBD MSR and handling of it (CVE-2018-3639)
2018-05-21 22:01 [Qemu-devel] [PULL 0/3] Speculative store buffer bypass mitigation (CVE-2018-3639) Eduardo Habkost
2018-05-21 22:01 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 1/3] i386: define the 'ssbd' CPUID feature bit (CVE-2018-3639) Eduardo Habkost
@ 2018-05-21 22:01 ` Eduardo Habkost
2018-05-21 22:01 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 3/3] i386: define the AMD 'virt-ssbd' CPUID feature bit (CVE-2018-3639) Eduardo Habkost
2018-05-22 9:59 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 0/3] Speculative store buffer bypass mitigation (CVE-2018-3639) Peter Maydell
3 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Eduardo Habkost @ 2018-05-21 22:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Peter Maydell
Cc: Paolo Bonzini, kvm, Eduardo Habkost, Marcel Apfelbaum, qemu-devel,
Michael S. Tsirkin, Richard Henderson, Marcelo Tosatti,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
"Some AMD processors only support a non-architectural means of enabling
speculative store bypass disable (SSBD). To allow a simplified view of
this to a guest, an architectural definition has been created through a new
CPUID bit, 0x80000008_EBX[25], and a new MSR, 0xc001011f. With this, a
hypervisor can virtualize the existence of this definition and provide an
architectural method for using SSBD to a guest.
Add the new CPUID feature, the new MSR and update the existing SSBD
support to use this MSR when present." (from x86/speculation: Add virtualized
speculative store bypass disable support in Linux).
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20180521215424.13520-4-berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
---
target/i386/cpu.h | 2 ++
target/i386/kvm.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
target/i386/machine.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/target/i386/cpu.h b/target/i386/cpu.h
index f0b68905de..8ac13f6c2c 100644
--- a/target/i386/cpu.h
+++ b/target/i386/cpu.h
@@ -351,6 +351,7 @@ typedef enum X86Seg {
#define MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL 0x0000003a
#define MSR_TSC_ADJUST 0x0000003b
#define MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL 0x48
+#define MSR_VIRT_SSBD 0xc001011f
#define MSR_IA32_TSCDEADLINE 0x6e0
#define FEATURE_CONTROL_LOCKED (1<<0)
@@ -1210,6 +1211,7 @@ typedef struct CPUX86State {
uint32_t pkru;
uint64_t spec_ctrl;
+ uint64_t virt_ssbd;
/* End of state preserved by INIT (dummy marker). */
struct {} end_init_save;
diff --git a/target/i386/kvm.c b/target/i386/kvm.c
index d6666a4b19..0c656a91a4 100644
--- a/target/i386/kvm.c
+++ b/target/i386/kvm.c
@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ static bool has_msr_hv_frequencies;
static bool has_msr_hv_reenlightenment;
static bool has_msr_xss;
static bool has_msr_spec_ctrl;
+static bool has_msr_virt_ssbd;
static bool has_msr_smi_count;
static uint32_t has_architectural_pmu_version;
@@ -1233,6 +1234,9 @@ static int kvm_get_supported_msrs(KVMState *s)
case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
has_msr_spec_ctrl = true;
break;
+ case MSR_VIRT_SSBD:
+ has_msr_virt_ssbd = true;
+ break;
}
}
}
@@ -1721,6 +1725,10 @@ static int kvm_put_msrs(X86CPU *cpu, int level)
if (has_msr_spec_ctrl) {
kvm_msr_entry_add(cpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, env->spec_ctrl);
}
+ if (has_msr_virt_ssbd) {
+ kvm_msr_entry_add(cpu, MSR_VIRT_SSBD, env->virt_ssbd);
+ }
+
#ifdef TARGET_X86_64
if (lm_capable_kernel) {
kvm_msr_entry_add(cpu, MSR_CSTAR, env->cstar);
@@ -2100,8 +2108,9 @@ static int kvm_get_msrs(X86CPU *cpu)
if (has_msr_spec_ctrl) {
kvm_msr_entry_add(cpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
}
-
-
+ if (has_msr_virt_ssbd) {
+ kvm_msr_entry_add(cpu, MSR_VIRT_SSBD, 0);
+ }
if (!env->tsc_valid) {
kvm_msr_entry_add(cpu, MSR_IA32_TSC, 0);
env->tsc_valid = !runstate_is_running();
@@ -2481,6 +2490,9 @@ static int kvm_get_msrs(X86CPU *cpu)
case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
env->spec_ctrl = msrs[i].data;
break;
+ case MSR_VIRT_SSBD:
+ env->virt_ssbd = msrs[i].data;
+ break;
case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL:
env->msr_rtit_ctrl = msrs[i].data;
break;
diff --git a/target/i386/machine.c b/target/i386/machine.c
index fd99c0bbb4..4d98d367c1 100644
--- a/target/i386/machine.c
+++ b/target/i386/machine.c
@@ -916,6 +916,25 @@ static const VMStateDescription vmstate_msr_intel_pt = {
}
};
+static bool virt_ssbd_needed(void *opaque)
+{
+ X86CPU *cpu = opaque;
+ CPUX86State *env = &cpu->env;
+
+ return env->virt_ssbd != 0;
+}
+
+static const VMStateDescription vmstate_msr_virt_ssbd = {
+ .name = "cpu/virt_ssbd",
+ .version_id = 1,
+ .minimum_version_id = 1,
+ .needed = virt_ssbd_needed,
+ .fields = (VMStateField[]){
+ VMSTATE_UINT64(env.virt_ssbd, X86CPU),
+ VMSTATE_END_OF_LIST()
+ }
+};
+
VMStateDescription vmstate_x86_cpu = {
.name = "cpu",
.version_id = 12,
@@ -1039,6 +1058,7 @@ VMStateDescription vmstate_x86_cpu = {
&vmstate_spec_ctrl,
&vmstate_mcg_ext_ctl,
&vmstate_msr_intel_pt,
+ &vmstate_msr_virt_ssbd,
NULL
}
};
--
2.14.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* [Qemu-devel] [PULL 3/3] i386: define the AMD 'virt-ssbd' CPUID feature bit (CVE-2018-3639)
2018-05-21 22:01 [Qemu-devel] [PULL 0/3] Speculative store buffer bypass mitigation (CVE-2018-3639) Eduardo Habkost
2018-05-21 22:01 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 1/3] i386: define the 'ssbd' CPUID feature bit (CVE-2018-3639) Eduardo Habkost
2018-05-21 22:01 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 2/3] i386: Define the Virt SSBD MSR and handling of it (CVE-2018-3639) Eduardo Habkost
@ 2018-05-21 22:01 ` Eduardo Habkost
2018-05-22 9:59 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 0/3] Speculative store buffer bypass mitigation (CVE-2018-3639) Peter Maydell
3 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Eduardo Habkost @ 2018-05-21 22:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Peter Maydell
Cc: Paolo Bonzini, kvm, Eduardo Habkost, Marcel Apfelbaum, qemu-devel,
Michael S. Tsirkin, Richard Henderson, Marcelo Tosatti,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
AMD Zen expose the Intel equivalant to Speculative Store Bypass Disable
via the 0x80000008_EBX[25] CPUID feature bit.
This needs to be exposed to guest OS to allow them to protect
against CVE-2018-3639.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20180521215424.13520-3-berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
---
target/i386/cpu.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/target/i386/cpu.c b/target/i386/cpu.c
index a1185b17d1..d95310ffd4 100644
--- a/target/i386/cpu.c
+++ b/target/i386/cpu.c
@@ -836,7 +836,7 @@ static FeatureWordInfo feature_word_info[FEATURE_WORDS] = {
"ibpb", NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
- NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ NULL, "virt-ssbd", NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
},
.cpuid_eax = 0x80000008,
--
2.14.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* Re: [Qemu-devel] [PULL 0/3] Speculative store buffer bypass mitigation (CVE-2018-3639)
2018-05-21 22:01 [Qemu-devel] [PULL 0/3] Speculative store buffer bypass mitigation (CVE-2018-3639) Eduardo Habkost
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2018-05-21 22:01 ` [Qemu-devel] [PULL 3/3] i386: define the AMD 'virt-ssbd' CPUID feature bit (CVE-2018-3639) Eduardo Habkost
@ 2018-05-22 9:59 ` Peter Maydell
3 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Peter Maydell @ 2018-05-22 9:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Eduardo Habkost
Cc: Paolo Bonzini, kvm-devel, Marcel Apfelbaum, QEMU Developers,
Michael S. Tsirkin, Richard Henderson, Marcelo Tosatti
On 21 May 2018 at 23:01, Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> wrote:
> This provides the QEMU part of the mitigations for the speculative
> store buffer bypass vulnerabilities on the x86 platform[1], and is
> the companion of the kernel patches merged in:
>
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=3b78ce4a34b761c7fe13520de822984019ff1a8f
>
> [1] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1528
> https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/ssbd
>
> The following changes since commit 9802316ed6c19fd45b4c498523df02ca370d0586:
>
> Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/mjt/tags/trivial-patches-fetch' into staging (2018-05-21 10:50:32 +0100)
>
> are available in the Git repository at:
>
> git://github.com/ehabkost/qemu.git tags/x86-next-pull-request
>
> for you to fetch changes up to 403503b162ffc33fb64cfefdf7b880acf41772cd:
>
> i386: define the AMD 'virt-ssbd' CPUID feature bit (CVE-2018-3639) (2018-05-21 18:59:08 -0300)
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------
> Speculative store buffer bypass mitigation (CVE-2018-3639)
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------
Applied, thanks.
-- PMM
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
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